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Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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btrfs_calc_trans_metadata_size() does an unsigned 32-bit multiplication,
which can overflow if num_items >= 4 GB / (nodesize * BTRFS_MAX_LEVEL * 2).
For a nodesize of 16kB, this overflow happens at 16k items. Usually,
num_items is a small constant passed to btrfs_start_transaction(), but
we also use btrfs_calc_trans_metadata_size() for metadata reservations
for extent items in btrfs_delalloc_{reserve,release}_metadata().
In drop_outstanding_extents(), num_items is calculated as
inode->reserved_extents - inode->outstanding_extents. The difference
between these two counters is usually small, but if many delalloc
extents are reserved and then the outstanding extents are merged in
btrfs_merge_extent_hook(), the difference can become large enough to
overflow in btrfs_calc_trans_metadata_size().
The overflow manifests itself as a leak of a multiple of 4 GB in
delalloc_block_rsv and the metadata bytes_may_use counter. This in turn
can cause early ENOSPC errors. Additionally, these WARN_ONs in
extent-tree.c will be hit when unmounting:
WARN_ON(fs_info->delalloc_block_rsv.size > 0);
WARN_ON(fs_info->delalloc_block_rsv.reserved > 0);
WARN_ON(space_info->bytes_pinned > 0 ||
space_info->bytes_reserved > 0 ||
space_info->bytes_may_use > 0);
Fix it by casting nodesize to a u64 so that
btrfs_calc_trans_metadata_size() does a full 64-bit multiplication.
While we're here, do the same in btrfs_calc_trunc_metadata_size(); this
can't overflow with any existing uses, but it's better to be safe here
than have another hard-to-debug problem later on.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
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Before this, we use 'filled' mode here, ie. if all range has been
filled with EXTENT_DEFRAG bits, get to clear it, but if the defrag
range joins the adjacent delalloc range, then we'll have EXTENT_DEFRAG
bits in extent_state until releasing this inode's pages, and that
prevents extent_data from being freed.
This clears the bit if any was found within the ordered extent.
Signed-off-by: Liu Bo <bo.li.liu@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
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In verify_dir_item, it wants to printk name_len of dir_item but
printk data_len acutally.
Fix it by calling btrfs_dir_name_len instead of btrfs_dir_data_len.
Signed-off-by: Su Yue <suy.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip
Pull xen fix from Juergen Gross:
"A fix for Xen on ARM when dealing with 64kB page size of a guest"
* tag 'for-linus-4.12b-rc5-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip:
xen/privcmd: Support correctly 64KB page granularity when mapping memory
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The 5th generation Thinkpad X1 Carbons use Synaptics touchpads accessible
over SMBus/RMI, combined with ALPS or Elantech trackpoint devices instead
of classic IBM/Lenovo trackpoints. Unfortunately there is no way for ALPS
driver to detect whether it is dealing with touchpad + trackpoint
combination or just a trackpoint, so we end up with a "phantom" dualpoint
ALPS device in addition to real touchpad and trackpoint.
Given that we do not have any special advanced handling for ALPS or
Elantech trackpoints (unlike IBM trackpoints that have separate driver and
a host of options) we are better off keeping the trackpoints in PS/2
emulation mode. We achieve that by setting serio type to SERIO_PS_PSTHRU,
which will limit number of protocols psmouse driver will try. In addition
to getting rid of the "phantom" touchpads, this will also speed up probing
of F03 pass-through port.
Reported-by: Damjan Georgievski <gdamjan@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux
Pull powerpc fixes from Michael Ellerman:
"Mostly fairly minor, of note are:
- Fix percpu allocations to be NUMA aware
- Limit 4k page size config to 64TB virtual address space
- Avoid needlessly restoring FP and vector registers
Thanks to Aneesh Kumar K.V, Breno Leitao, Christophe Leroy, Frederic
Barrat, Madhavan Srinivasan, Michael Bringmann, Nicholas Piggin,
Vaibhav Jain"
* tag 'powerpc-4.12-5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux:
powerpc/book3s64: Move PPC_DT_CPU_FTRs and enable it by default
powerpc/mm/4k: Limit 4k page size config to 64TB virtual address space
cxl: Fix error path on bad ioctl
powerpc/perf: Fix Power9 test_adder fields
powerpc/numa: Fix percpu allocations to be NUMA aware
cxl: Avoid double free_irq() for psl,slice interrupts
powerpc/kernel: Initialize load_tm on task creation
powerpc/kernel: Fix FP and vector register restoration
powerpc/64: Reclaim CPU_FTR_SUBCORE
powerpc/hotplug-mem: Fix missing endian conversion of aa_index
powerpc/sysdev/simple_gpio: Fix oops in gpio save_regs function
powerpc/spufs: Fix coredump of SPU contexts
powerpc/64s: Add dt_cpu_ftrs boot time setup option
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm/arm-soc
Pull ARM SoC fixes from Olof Johansson:
"Been sitting on these for a couple of weeks waiting on some larger
batches to come in but it's been pretty quiet.
Just your garden variety fixes here:
- A few maintainers updates (ep93xx, Exynos, TI, Marvell)
- Some PM fixes for Atmel/at91 and Marvell
- A few DT fixes for Marvell, Versatile, TI Keystone, bcm283x
- A reset driver patch to set module license for symbol access"
* tag 'armsoc-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm/arm-soc:
MAINTAINERS: EP93XX: Update maintainership
MAINTAINERS: remove kernel@stlinux.com obsolete mailing list
ARM: dts: versatile: use #include "..." to include local DT
MAINTAINERS: add device-tree files to TI DaVinci entry
ARM: at91: select CONFIG_ARM_CPU_SUSPEND
ARM: dts: keystone-k2l: fix broken Ethernet due to disabled OSR
arm64: defconfig: enable some core options for 64bit Rockchip socs
arm64: marvell: dts: fix interrupts in 7k/8k crypto nodes
reset: hi6220: Set module license so that it can be loaded
MAINTAINERS: add irqchip related drivers to Marvell EBU maintainers
MAINTAINERS: sort F entries for Marvell EBU maintainers
ARM: davinci: PM: Do not free useful resources in normal path in 'davinci_pm_init'
ARM: davinci: PM: Free resources in error handling path in 'davinci_pm_init'
ARM: dts: bcm283x: Reserve first page for firmware
memory: atmel-ebi: mark PM ops as __maybe_unused
MAINTAINERS: Remove Javier Martinez Canillas as reviewer for Exynos
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The inode destruction path for the 'dax' device filesystem incorrectly
assumes that the inode was initialized through 'alloc_dax()'. However,
if someone attempts to directly mount the dax filesystem with 'mount -t
dax dax mnt' that will bypass 'alloc_dax()' and the following failure
signatures may occur as a result:
kill_dax() must be called before final iput()
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1188 at drivers/dax/super.c:243 dax_destroy_inode+0x48/0x50
RIP: 0010:dax_destroy_inode+0x48/0x50
Call Trace:
destroy_inode+0x3b/0x60
evict+0x139/0x1c0
iput+0x1f9/0x2d0
dentry_unlink_inode+0xc3/0x160
__dentry_kill+0xcf/0x180
? dput+0x37/0x3b0
dput+0x3a3/0x3b0
do_one_tree+0x36/0x40
shrink_dcache_for_umount+0x2d/0x90
generic_shutdown_super+0x1f/0x120
kill_anon_super+0x12/0x20
deactivate_locked_super+0x43/0x70
deactivate_super+0x4e/0x60
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
RIP: 0010:kfree+0x6d/0x290
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dax_i_callback+0x22/0x60
? dax_destroy_inode+0x50/0x50
rcu_process_callbacks+0x298/0x740
ida_remove called for id=0 which is not allocated.
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at lib/idr.c:383 ida_remove+0x110/0x120
[..]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
ida_simple_remove+0x2b/0x50
? dax_destroy_inode+0x50/0x50
dax_i_callback+0x3c/0x60
rcu_process_callbacks+0x298/0x740
Add missing initialization of the 'struct dax_device' and inode so that
the destruction path does not kfree() or ida_simple_remove()
uninitialized data.
Fixes: 7b6be8444e0f ("dax: refactor dax-fs into a generic provider of 'struct dax_device' instances")
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
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Replace bi_error with a new bi_status to allow for a clear conversion.
Note that device mapper overloaded bi_error with a private value, which
we'll have to keep arround at least for now and thus propagate to a
proper blk_status_t value.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
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Use the same values for use for request completion errors as the return
value from ->queue_rq. BLK_STS_RESOURCE is special cased to cause
a requeue, and all the others are completed as-is.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
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Currently we use nornal Linux errno values in the block layer, and while
we accept any error a few have overloaded magic meanings. This patch
instead introduces a new blk_status_t value that holds block layer specific
status codes and explicitly explains their meaning. Helpers to convert from
and to the previous special meanings are provided for now, but I suspect
we want to get rid of them in the long run - those drivers that have a
errno input (e.g. networking) usually get errnos that don't know about
the special block layer overloads, and similarly returning them to userspace
will usually return somethings that strictly speaking isn't correct
for file system operations, but that's left as an exercise for later.
For now the set of errors is a very limited set that closely corresponds
to the previous overloaded errno values, but there is some low hanging
fruite to improve it.
blk_status_t (ab)uses the sparse __bitwise annotations to allow for sparse
typechecking, so that we can easily catch places passing the wrong values.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
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Turn the error paramter into a pointer so that target drivers can change
the value, and make sure only DM_ENDIO_* values are returned from the
methods.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
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Instead use the special DM_MAPIO_KILL return value to return -EIO just
like we do for the request based path. Note that dm-log-writes returned
-ENOMEM in a few places, which now becomes -EIO instead. No consumer
treats -ENOMEM special so this shouldn't be an issue (and it should
use a mempool to start with to make guaranteed progress).
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
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This simplifies the code and especially the error passing a bit and
will help with the next patch.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
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Once we move the block layer to its own status code we'll still want to
propagate the bio_iov_iter_get_pages, so restructure __blkdev_direct_IO
to take ret into account when returning the errno.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
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Only read bio->bi_error once in the common path.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <Bart.VanAssche@sandisk.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
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Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <Bart.VanAssche@sandisk.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
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A few (but not all) dm targets use a special EWOULDBLOCK error code for
failing REQ_RAHEAD requests that fail due to a lack of available resources.
But no one else knows about this magic code, and lower level drivers also
don't generate it when failing read-ahead requests for similar reasons.
So remove this special casing and ignore all additional error handling for
REQ_RAHEAD - if this was a real underlying error we'd get a normal read
once the real read comes in.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <Bart.VanAssche@sandisk.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
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Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <Bart.VanAssche@sandisk.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
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We will only have sense data if the command executed and got a SCSI
result, so this is pointless.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
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Instead of reinventing it poorly.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <Bart.VanAssche@sandisk.com>
Reviewed-by: Javier González <javier@cnexlabs.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
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Fix the compile after the switch to the UUID API in commit f4c19ac9
("thermal: int340x_thermal: Switch to use new generic UUID API").
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
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If the nbd server stops receiving packets altogether we will get stuck
waiting for them to receive indefinitely as the tcp buffer will never
empty, which looks like a deadlock. Fix this by setting the sk send
timeout to our configured timeout, that way if the server really
misbehaves we'll disconnect cleanly instead of waiting forever.
Reported-by: Dan Melnic <dmm@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
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gcc points out an unusual indentation:
drivers/block/loop.c: In function 'loop_set_status':
drivers/block/loop.c:1149:3: error: this 'if' clause does not guard... [-Werror=misleading-indentation]
if (figure_loop_size(lo, info->lo_offset, info->lo_sizelimit,
^~
drivers/block/loop.c:1152:4: note: ...this statement, but the latter is misleadingly indented as if it were guarded by the 'if'
goto exit;
This was introduced by a new feature that accidentally moved the opening
braces from one condition to another. Adding a second pair of braces
makes it work correctly again and also more readable.
Fixes: f2c6df7dbf9a ("loop: support 4k physical blocksize")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
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There are new types and helpers that are supposed to be used in
new code.
As a preparation to get rid of legacy types and API functions do
the conversion here.
The conversion fixes a potential bug in int340x_thermal as well
since we have to use memcmp() on binary data.
Acked-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
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Maniaxx reported a kernel boot crash in the EFI code, which I emulated
by using same invalid phys addr in code:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffffffff280001
IP: efi_bgrt_init+0xfb/0x153
...
Call Trace:
? bgrt_init+0xbc/0xbc
acpi_parse_bgrt+0xe/0x12
acpi_table_parse+0x89/0xb8
acpi_boot_init+0x445/0x4e2
? acpi_parse_x2apic+0x79/0x79
? dmi_ignore_irq0_timer_override+0x33/0x33
setup_arch+0xb63/0xc82
? early_idt_handler_array+0x120/0x120
start_kernel+0xb7/0x443
? early_idt_handler_array+0x120/0x120
x86_64_start_reservations+0x29/0x2b
x86_64_start_kernel+0x154/0x177
secondary_startup_64+0x9f/0x9f
There is also a similar bug filed in bugzilla.kernel.org:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=195633
The crash is caused by this commit:
7b0a911478c7 efi/x86: Move the EFI BGRT init code to early init code
The root cause is the firmware on those machines provides invalid BGRT
image addresses.
In a kernel before above commit BGRT initializes late and uses ioremap()
to map the image address. Ioremap validates the address, if it is not a
valid physical address ioremap() just fails and returns. However in current
kernel EFI BGRT initializes early and uses early_memremap() which does not
validate the image address, and kernel panic happens.
According to ACPI spec the BGRT image address should fall into
EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA, see the section 5.2.22.4 of below document:
http://www.uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/ACPI_6_1.pdf
Fix this issue by validating the image address in efi_bgrt_init(). If the
image address does not fall into any EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA areas we just
bail out with a warning message.
Reported-by: Maniaxx <tripleshiftone@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 7b0a911478c7 ("efi/x86: Move the EFI BGRT init code to early init code")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170609084558.26766-2-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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During an eeh call to cxl_remove can result in double free_irq of
psl,slice interrupts. This can happen if perst_reloads_same_image == 1
and call to cxl_configure_adapter() fails during slot_reset
callback. In such a case we see a kernel oops with following back-trace:
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
Call Trace:
free_irq+0x88/0xd0 (unreliable)
cxl_unmap_irq+0x20/0x40 [cxl]
cxl_native_release_psl_irq+0x78/0xd8 [cxl]
pci_deconfigure_afu+0xac/0x110 [cxl]
cxl_remove+0x104/0x210 [cxl]
pci_device_remove+0x6c/0x110
device_release_driver_internal+0x204/0x2e0
pci_stop_bus_device+0xa0/0xd0
pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device+0x28/0x40
pci_hp_remove_devices+0xb0/0x150
pci_hp_remove_devices+0x68/0x150
eeh_handle_normal_event+0x140/0x580
eeh_handle_event+0x174/0x360
eeh_event_handler+0x1e8/0x1f0
This patch fixes the issue of double free_irq by checking that
variables that hold the virqs (err_hwirq, serr_hwirq, psl_virq) are
not '0' before un-mapping and resetting these variables to '0' when
they are un-mapped.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vaibhav Jain <vaibhav@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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If more than one gpio bank has the "pwm" property, only one will be
registered successfully, all the others will fail with:
mvebu-gpio: probe of f1018140.gpio failed with error -17
That's because in alloc_pwms(), the chip->base (aka "int pwm"), was not
set (thus, ==0) ; and 0 is a meaningful start value in alloc_pwm().
What was intended is mvpwm->chip->base = -1.
Like that, the numbering will be done auto-magically
Moreover, as the region might be already occupied by another pwm, we
shouldn't force:
mvpwm->chip->base = 0
nor
mvpwm->chip->base = id * MVEBU_MAX_GPIO_PER_BANK;
Tested on clearfog-pro (Marvell 88F6828)
Fixes: 757642f9a584 ("gpio: mvebu: Add limited PWM support")
Signed-off-by: Richard Genoud <richard.genoud@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Gregory CLEMENT <gregory.clement@free-electrons.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
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The blink counter A was always selected because 0 was forced in the
blink select counter register.
The variable 'set' was obviously there to be used as the register value,
selecting the B counter when id==1 and A counter when id==0.
Tested on clearfog-pro (Marvell 88F6828)
Fixes: 757642f9a584 ("gpio: mvebu: Add limited PWM support")
Reviewed-by: Gregory CLEMENT <gregory.clement@free-electrons.com>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Sennhauser <ralph.sennhauser@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Genoud <richard.genoud@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/paulmck/linux-rcu into rcu/urgent
Pull RCU fix from Paul E. McKenney:
" This series enables srcu_read_lock() and srcu_read_unlock() to be used from
interrupt handlers, which fixes a bug in KVM's use of SRCU in delivery
of interrupts to guest OSes. "
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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If a key's refcount is dropped to zero between key_lookup() peeking at
the refcount and subsequently attempting to increment it, refcount_inc()
will see a zero refcount. Here, refcount_inc() will WARN_ONCE(), and
will *not* increment the refcount, which will remain zero.
Once key_lookup() drops key_serial_lock, it is possible for the key to
be freed behind our back.
This patch uses refcount_inc_not_zero() to perform the peek and increment
atomically.
Fixes: fff292914d3a2f1e ("security, keys: convert key.usage from atomic_t to refcount_t")
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Cc: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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The initial Diffie-Hellman computation made direct use of the MPI
library because the crypto module did not support DH at the time. Now
that KPP is implemented, KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE should use it to get rid of
duplicate code and leverage possible hardware acceleration.
This fixes an issue whereby the input to the KDF computation would
include additional uninitialized memory when the result of the
Diffie-Hellman computation was shorter than the input prime number.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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Signed-off-by: Loganaden Velvindron <logan@hackers.mu>
Signed-off-by: Yasir Auleear <yasirmx@hackers.mu>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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Accessing a 'u8[4]' through a '__be32 *' violates alignment rules. Just
make the counter a __be32 instead.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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If userspace called KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE with kdf_params containing NULL
otherinfo but nonzero otherinfolen, the kernel would allocate a buffer
for the otherinfo, then feed it into the KDF without initializing it.
Fix this by always doing the copy from userspace (which will fail with
EFAULT in this scenario).
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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Requesting "digest_null" in the keyctl_kdf_params caused an infinite
loop in kdf_ctr() because the "null" hash has a digest size of 0. Fix
it by rejecting hash algorithms with a digest size of 0.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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While a 'struct key' itself normally does not contain sensitive
information, Documentation/security/keys.txt actually encourages this:
"Having a payload is not required; and the payload can, in fact,
just be a value stored in the struct key itself."
In case someone has taken this advice, or will take this advice in the
future, zero the key structure before freeing it. We might as well, and
as a bonus this could make it a bit more difficult for an adversary to
determine which keys have recently been in use.
This is safe because the key_jar cache does not use a constructor.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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As the previous patch did for encrypted-keys, zero sensitive any
potentially sensitive data related to the "trusted" key type before it
is freed. Notably, we were not zeroing the tpm_buf structures in which
the actual key is stored for TPM seal and unseal, nor were we zeroing
the trusted_key_payload in certain error paths.
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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For keys of type "encrypted", consistently zero sensitive key material
before freeing it. This was already being done for the decrypted
payloads of encrypted keys, but not for the master key and the keys
derived from the master key.
Out of an abundance of caution and because it is trivial to do so, also
zero buffers containing the key payload in encrypted form, although
depending on how the encrypted-keys feature is used such information
does not necessarily need to be kept secret.
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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Zero the payloads of user and logon keys before freeing them. This
prevents sensitive key material from being kept around in the slab
caches after a key is released.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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Before returning from add_key() or one of the keyctl() commands that
takes in a key payload, zero the temporary buffer that was allocated to
hold the key payload copied from userspace. This may contain sensitive
key material that should not be kept around in the slab caches.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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key_update() freed the key_preparsed_payload even if it was not
initialized first. This would cause a crash if userspace called
keyctl_update() on a key with type like "asymmetric" that has a
->preparse() method but not an ->update() method. Possibly it could
even be triggered for other key types by racing with keyctl_setperm() to
make the KEY_NEED_WRITE check fail (the permission was already checked,
so normally it wouldn't fail there).
Reproducer with key type "asymmetric", given a valid cert.der:
keyctl new_session
keyid=$(keyctl padd asymmetric desc @s < cert.der)
keyctl setperm $keyid 0x3f000000
keyctl update $keyid data
[ 150.686666] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001
[ 150.687601] IP: asymmetric_key_free_kids+0x12/0x30
[ 150.688139] PGD 38a3d067
[ 150.688141] PUD 3b3de067
[ 150.688447] PMD 0
[ 150.688745]
[ 150.689160] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 150.689455] Modules linked in:
[ 150.689769] CPU: 1 PID: 2478 Comm: keyctl Not tainted 4.11.0-rc4-xfstests-00187-ga9f6b6b8cd2f #742
[ 150.690916] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-20170228_101828-anatol 04/01/2014
[ 150.692199] task: ffff88003b30c480 task.stack: ffffc90000350000
[ 150.692952] RIP: 0010:asymmetric_key_free_kids+0x12/0x30
[ 150.693556] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000353e58 EFLAGS: 00010202
[ 150.694142] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000004
[ 150.694845] RDX: ffffffff81ee3920 RSI: ffff88003d4b0700 RDI: 0000000000000001
[ 150.697569] RBP: ffffc90000353e60 R08: ffff88003d5d2140 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 150.702483] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001
[ 150.707393] R13: 0000000000000004 R14: ffff880038a4d2d8 R15: 000000000040411f
[ 150.709720] FS: 00007fcbcee35700(0000) GS:ffff88003fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 150.711504] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 150.712733] CR2: 0000000000000001 CR3: 0000000039eab000 CR4: 00000000003406e0
[ 150.714487] Call Trace:
[ 150.714975] asymmetric_key_free_preparse+0x2f/0x40
[ 150.715907] key_update+0xf7/0x140
[ 150.716560] ? key_default_cmp+0x20/0x20
[ 150.717319] keyctl_update_key+0xb0/0xe0
[ 150.718066] SyS_keyctl+0x109/0x130
[ 150.718663] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2
[ 150.719440] RIP: 0033:0x7fcbce75ff19
[ 150.719926] RSP: 002b:00007ffd5d167088 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000fa
[ 150.720918] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000404d80 RCX: 00007fcbce75ff19
[ 150.721874] RDX: 00007ffd5d16785e RSI: 000000002866cd36 RDI: 0000000000000002
[ 150.722827] RBP: 0000000000000006 R08: 000000002866cd36 R09: 00007ffd5d16785e
[ 150.723781] R10: 0000000000000004 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000404d80
[ 150.724650] R13: 00007ffd5d16784d R14: 00007ffd5d167238 R15: 000000000040411f
[ 150.725447] Code: 83 c4 08 31 c0 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 85 ff 74 23 55 48 89 e5 53 48 89 fb <48> 8b 3f e8 06 21 c5 ff 48 8b 7b 08 e8 fd 20 c5 ff 48 89 df e8
[ 150.727489] RIP: asymmetric_key_free_kids+0x12/0x30 RSP: ffffc90000353e58
[ 150.728117] CR2: 0000000000000001
[ 150.728430] ---[ end trace f7f8fe1da2d5ae8d ]---
Fixes: 4d8c0250b841 ("KEYS: Call ->free_preparse() even after ->preparse() returns an error")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.17+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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sys_add_key() and the KEYCTL_UPDATE operation of sys_keyctl() allowed a
NULL payload with nonzero length to be passed to the key type's
->preparse(), ->instantiate(), and/or ->update() methods. Various key
types including asymmetric, cifs.idmap, cifs.spnego, and pkcs7_test did
not handle this case, allowing an unprivileged user to trivially cause a
NULL pointer dereference (kernel oops) if one of these key types was
present. Fix it by doing the copy_from_user() when 'plen' is nonzero
rather than when '_payload' is non-NULL, causing the syscall to fail
with EFAULT as expected when an invalid buffer is specified.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.10+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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MACs should, in general, be compared using crypto_memneq() to prevent
timing attacks.
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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The encrypted-keys module was using a single global HMAC transform,
which could be rekeyed by multiple threads concurrently operating on
different keys, causing incorrect HMAC values to be calculated. Fix
this by allocating a new HMAC transform whenever we need to calculate a
HMAC. Also simplify things a bit by allocating the shash_desc's using
SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK() for both the HMAC and unkeyed hashes.
The following script reproduces the bug:
keyctl new_session
keyctl add user master "abcdefghijklmnop" @s
for i in $(seq 2); do
(
set -e
for j in $(seq 1000); do
keyid=$(keyctl add encrypted desc$i "new user:master 25" @s)
datablob="$(keyctl pipe $keyid)"
keyctl unlink $keyid > /dev/null
keyid=$(keyctl add encrypted desc$i "load $datablob" @s)
keyctl unlink $keyid > /dev/null
done
) &
done
Output with bug:
[ 439.691094] encrypted_key: bad hmac (-22)
add_key: Invalid argument
add_key: Invalid argument
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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