| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|---|
|
'struct kobj_type' is not modified. It is only used in
kobject_init_and_add()/kobject_init() which takes
a 'const struct kobj_type *ktype' parameter.
Constifying this structure moves some data to a read-only section,
so increase over all security.
On a x86_64, compiled with ppc64 defconfig:
Before:
======
text data bss dec hex filename
7145 606 0 7751 1e47 arch/powerpc/kernel/cacheinfo.o
3663 384 16 4063 fdf arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.o
After:
======
text data bss dec hex filename
7193 558 0 7751 1e47 arch/powerpc/kernel/cacheinfo.o
3663 384 16 4063 fdf arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.o
Signed-off-by: Huang Xiaojia <huangxiaojia2@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20240826150957.3500237-1-huangxiaojia2@huawei.com
|
|
If attempting to read the size or data attributes of a non-existent
variable (which will be possible after a later patch to expose the PLPKS
via the secvar interface), don't spam the kernel log with error messages.
Only print errors for return codes that aren't ENOENT.
Reported-by: Sudhakar Kuppusamy <sudhakar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230210080401.345462-14-ajd@linux.ibm.com
|
|
Due to sysfs constraints, when writing to a variable, we can only handle
writes of up to PAGE_SIZE.
It's possible that the maximum object size is larger than PAGE_SIZE, in
which case, print a warning on boot so that the user is aware.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell Currey <ruscur@russell.cc>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230210080401.345462-13-ajd@linux.ibm.com
|
|
Currently, the list of variables is populated by calling
secvar_ops->get_next() repeatedly, which is explicitly modelled on the
OPAL API (including the keylen parameter).
For the upcoming PLPKS backend, we have a static list of variable names.
It is messy to fit that into get_next(), so instead, let the backend put
a NULL-terminated array of variable names into secvar_ops->var_names,
which will be used if get_next() is undefined.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell Currey <ruscur@russell.cc>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230210080401.345462-12-ajd@linux.ibm.com
|
|
The forthcoming pseries consumer of the secvar API wants to expose a
number of config variables. Allowing secvar implementations to provide
their own sysfs attributes makes it easy for consumers to expose what
they need to.
This is not being used by the OPAL secvar implementation at present, and
the config directory will not be created if no attributes are set.
Signed-off-by: Russell Currey <ruscur@russell.cc>
Co-developed-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230210080401.345462-11-ajd@linux.ibm.com
|
|
Remove unnecessary prefixes from error messages in secvar_sysfs_init()
(the file defines pr_fmt, so putting "secvar:" in every message is
unnecessary). Make capitalisation and punctuation more consistent.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell Currey <ruscur@russell.cc>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230210080401.345462-10-ajd@linux.ibm.com
|
|
Currently the max object size is handled in the core secvar code with an
entirely OPAL-specific implementation, so create a new max_size() op and
move the existing implementation into the powernv platform. Should be
no functional change.
Signed-off-by: Russell Currey <ruscur@russell.cc>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230210080401.345462-9-ajd@linux.ibm.com
|
|
The code that handles the format string in secvar-sysfs.c is entirely
OPAL specific, so create a new "format" op in secvar_operations to make
the secvar code more generic. No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Russell Currey <ruscur@russell.cc>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230210080401.345462-8-ajd@linux.ibm.com
|
|
The secvar format string and object size sysfs files are both ASCII
text, and should use sysfs_emit(). No functional change.
Suggested-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Russell Currey <ruscur@russell.cc>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230210080401.345462-7-ajd@linux.ibm.com
|
|
There's no reason for secvar_operations to use uint64_t vs the more
common kernel type u64.
The types are compatible, but they require different printk format
strings which can lead to confusion.
Change all the secvar related routines to use u64.
Reviewed-by: Russell Currey <ruscur@russell.cc>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230210080401.345462-5-ajd@linux.ibm.com
|
|
secvar_ops->get_next() returns -ENOENT when there are no more variables
to return, which is expected behaviour.
Fix this by returning 0 if get_next() returns -ENOENT.
This fixes an issue introduced in commit bd5d9c743d38 ("powerpc: expose
secure variables to userspace via sysfs"), but the return code of
secvar_sysfs_load() was never checked so this issue never mattered.
Signed-off-by: Russell Currey <ruscur@russell.cc>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230210080401.345462-4-ajd@linux.ibm.com
|
|
Refcount leak will happen when format_show returns failure in multiple
cases. Unified management of of_node_put can fix this problem.
Signed-off-by: Hangyu Hua <hbh25y@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220302021959.10959-1-hbh25y@gmail.com
|
|
PowerNV secure variables, which store the keys used for OS kernel
verification, are managed by the firmware. These secure variables need to
be accessed by the userspace for addition/deletion of the certificates.
This patch adds the sysfs interface to expose secure variables for PowerNV
secureboot. The users shall use this interface for manipulating
the keys stored in the secure variables.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1573441836-3632-3-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com
|
