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2016-03-15Merge branch 'x86-mm-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 mm updates from Ingo Molnar: "The main changes in this cycle were: - Enable full ASLR randomization for 32-bit programs (Hector Marco-Gisbert) - Add initial minimal INVPCI support, to flush global mappings (Andy Lutomirski) - Add KASAN enhancements (Andrey Ryabinin) - Fix mmiotrace for huge pages (Karol Herbst) - ... misc cleanups and small enhancements" * 'x86-mm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/mm/32: Enable full randomization on i386 and X86_32 x86/mm/kmmio: Fix mmiotrace for hugepages x86/mm: Avoid premature success when changing page attributes x86/mm/ptdump: Remove paravirt_enabled() x86/mm: Fix INVPCID asm constraint x86/dmi: Switch dmi_remap() from ioremap() [uncached] to ioremap_cache() x86/mm: If INVPCID is available, use it to flush global mappings x86/mm: Add a 'noinvpcid' boot option to turn off INVPCID x86/mm: Add INVPCID helpers x86/kasan: Write protect kasan zero shadow x86/kasan: Clear kasan_zero_page after TLB flush x86/mm/numa: Check for failures in numa_clear_kernel_node_hotplug() x86/mm/numa: Clean up numa_clear_kernel_node_hotplug() x86/mm: Make kmap_prot into a #define x86/mm/32: Set NX in __supported_pte_mask before enabling paging x86/mm: Streamline and restore probe_memory_block_size()
2016-03-15Merge branch 'x86-asm-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 asm updates from Ingo Molnar: "This is another big update. Main changes are: - lots of x86 system call (and other traps/exceptions) entry code enhancements. In particular the complex parts of the 64-bit entry code have been migrated to C code as well, and a number of dusty corners have been refreshed. (Andy Lutomirski) - vDSO special mapping robustification and general cleanups (Andy Lutomirski) - cpufeature refactoring, cleanups and speedups (Borislav Petkov) - lots of other changes ..." * 'x86-asm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (64 commits) x86/cpufeature: Enable new AVX-512 features x86/entry/traps: Show unhandled signal for i386 in do_trap() x86/entry: Call enter_from_user_mode() with IRQs off x86/entry/32: Change INT80 to be an interrupt gate x86/entry: Improve system call entry comments x86/entry: Remove TIF_SINGLESTEP entry work x86/entry/32: Add and check a stack canary for the SYSENTER stack x86/entry/32: Simplify and fix up the SYSENTER stack #DB/NMI fixup x86/entry: Only allocate space for tss_struct::SYSENTER_stack if needed x86/entry: Vastly simplify SYSENTER TF (single-step) handling x86/entry/traps: Clear DR6 early in do_debug() and improve the comment x86/entry/traps: Clear TIF_BLOCKSTEP on all debug exceptions x86/entry/32: Restore FLAGS on SYSEXIT x86/entry/32: Filter NT and speed up AC filtering in SYSENTER x86/entry/compat: In SYSENTER, sink AC clearing below the existing FLAGS test selftests/x86: In syscall_nt, test NT|TF as well x86/asm-offsets: Remove PARAVIRT_enabled x86/entry/32: Introduce and use X86_BUG_ESPFIX instead of paravirt_enabled uprobes: __create_xol_area() must nullify xol_mapping.fault x86/cpufeature: Create a new synthetic cpu capability for machine check recovery ...
2016-03-14Merge branch 'ras-core-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull RAS updates from Ingo Molnar: "Various RAS updates: - AMD MCE support updates for future CPUs, fixes and 'SMCA' (Scalable MCA) error decoding support (Aravind Gopalakrishnan) - x86 memcpy_mcsafe() support, to enable smart(er) hardware error recovery in NVDIMM drivers, based on an extension of the x86 exception handling code. (Tony Luck)" * 'ras-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: EDAC/sb_edac: Fix computation of channel address x86/mm, x86/mce: Add memcpy_mcsafe() x86/mce/AMD: Document some functionality x86/mce: Clarify comments regarding deferred error x86/mce/AMD: Fix logic to obtain block address x86/mce/AMD, EDAC: Enable error decoding of Scalable MCA errors x86/mce: Move MCx_CONFIG MSR definitions x86/mce: Check for faults tagged in EXTABLE_CLASS_FAULT exception table entries x86/mm: Expand the exception table logic to allow new handling options x86/mce/AMD: Set MCAX Enable bit x86/mce/AMD: Carve out threshold block preparation x86/mce/AMD: Fix LVT offset configuration for thresholding x86/mce/AMD: Reduce number of blocks scanned per bank x86/mce/AMD: Do not perform shared bank check for future processors x86/mce: Fix order of AMD MCE init function call
2016-03-14Merge branch 'mm-readonly-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull read-only kernel memory updates from Ingo Molnar: "This tree adds two (security related) enhancements to the kernel's handling of read-only kernel memory: - extend read-only kernel memory to a new class of formerly writable kernel data: 'post-init read-only memory' via the __ro_after_init attribute, and mark the ARM and x86 vDSO as such read-only memory. This kind of attribute can be used for data that requires a once per bootup initialization sequence, but is otherwise never modified after that point. This feature was based on the work by PaX Team and Brad Spengler. (by Kees Cook, the ARM vDSO bits by David Brown.) - make CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA always enabled on x86 and remove the Kconfig option. This simplifies the kernel and also signals that read-only memory is the default model and a first-class citizen. (Kees Cook)" * 'mm-readonly-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: ARM/vdso: Mark the vDSO code read-only after init x86/vdso: Mark the vDSO code read-only after init lkdtm: Verify that '__ro_after_init' works correctly arch: Introduce post-init read-only memory x86/mm: Always enable CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA and remove the Kconfig option mm/init: Add 'rodata=off' boot cmdline parameter to disable read-only kernel mappings asm-generic: Consolidate mark_rodata_ro()
2016-03-11x86/mm/32: Enable full randomization on i386 and X86_32Hector Marco-Gisbert
Currently on i386 and on X86_64 when emulating X86_32 in legacy mode, only the stack and the executable are randomized but not other mmapped files (libraries, vDSO, etc.). This patch enables randomization for the libraries, vDSO and mmap requests on i386 and in X86_32 in legacy mode. By default on i386 there are 8 bits for the randomization of the libraries, vDSO and mmaps which only uses 1MB of VA. This patch preserves the original randomness, using 1MB of VA out of 3GB or 4GB. We think that 1MB out of 3GB is not a big cost for having the ASLR. The first obvious security benefit is that all objects are randomized (not only the stack and the executable) in legacy mode which highly increases the ASLR effectiveness, otherwise the attackers may use these non-randomized areas. But also sensitive setuid/setgid applications are more secure because currently, attackers can disable the randomization of these applications by setting the ulimit stack to "unlimited". This is a very old and widely known trick to disable the ASLR in i386 which has been allowed for too long. Another trick used to disable the ASLR was to set the ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE personality flag, but fortunately this doesn't work on setuid/setgid applications because there is security checks which clear Security-relevant flags. This patch always randomizes the mmap_legacy_base address, removing the possibility to disable the ASLR by setting the stack to "unlimited". Signed-off-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es> Acked-by: Ismael Ripoll Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1457639460-5242-1-git-send-email-hecmargi@upv.es Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-03-08Merge branch 'linus' into ras/core, to pick up fixesIngo Molnar
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-03-07Merge tag 'v4.5-rc7' into x86/asm, to pick up SMAP fixIngo Molnar
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-03-05x86/mm/kmmio: Fix mmiotrace for hugepagesKarol Herbst
Because Linux might use bigger pages than the 4K pages to handle those mmio ioremaps, the kmmio code shouldn't rely on the pade id as it currently does. Using the memory address instead of the page id lets us look up how big the page is and what its base address is, so that we won't get a page fault within the same page twice anymore. Tested-by: Pierre Moreau <pierre.morrow@free.fr> Signed-off-by: Karol Herbst <nouveau@karolherbst.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-x86_64@vger.kernel.org Cc: nouveau@lists.freedesktop.org Cc: pq@iki.fi Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1456966991-6861-1-git-send-email-nouveau@karolherbst.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-03-03x86/mm/pkeys: Fix access_error() denial of writes to write-only VMADave Hansen
Andrey Wagin reported that a simple test case was broken by: 2b5f7d013fc ("mm/core, x86/mm/pkeys: Add execute-only protection keys support") This test case creates an unreadable VMA and my patch assumed that all writes must be to readable VMAs. The simplest fix for this is to remove the pkey-related bits in access_error(). For execute-only support, I believe the existing version is sufficient because the permissions we are trying to enforce are entirely expressed in vma->vm_flags. We just depend on pkeys to get *an* exception, it does not matter that PF_PK was set, or even what state PKRU is in. I will re-add the necessary bits with the full pkeys implementation that includes the new syscalls. The three cases that matter are: 1. If a write to an execute-only VMA occurs, we will see PF_WRITE set, but !VM_WRITE on the VMA, and return 1. All execute-only VMAs have VM_WRITE clear by definition. 2. If a read occurs on a present PTE, we will fall in to the "read, present" case and return 1. 3. If a read occurs to a non-present PTE, we will miss the "read, not present" case, because the execute-only VMA will have VM_EXEC set, and we will properly return 0 allowing the PTE to be populated. Test program: int main() { int *p; p = mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0); p[0] = 1; return 0; } Reported-by: Andrey Wagin <avagin@gmail.com>, Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-next@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 62b5f7d013fc ("mm/core, x86/mm/pkeys: Add execute-only protection keys support") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160301194133.65D0110C@viggo.jf.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-28Merge branch 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 fixes from Thomas Gleixner: "This update contains: - Hopefully the last ASM CLAC fixups - A fix for the Quark family related to the IMR lock which makes kexec work again - A off-by-one fix in the MPX code. Ironic, isn't it? - A fix for X86_PAE which addresses once more an unsigned long vs phys_addr_t hickup" * 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/mpx: Fix off-by-one comparison with nr_registers x86/mm: Fix slow_virt_to_phys() for X86_PAE again x86/entry/compat: Add missing CLAC to entry_INT80_32 x86/entry/32: Add an ASM_CLAC to entry_SYSENTER_32 x86/platform/intel/quark: Change the kernel's IMR lock bit to false
2016-02-27mm: ASLR: use get_random_long()Daniel Cashman
Replace calls to get_random_int() followed by a cast to (unsigned long) with calls to get_random_long(). Also address shifting bug which, in case of x86 removed entropy mask for mmap_rnd_bits values > 31 bits. Signed-off-by: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@android.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Cc: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-02-26x86/mpx: Fix off-by-one comparison with nr_registersColin Ian King
In the unlikely event that regno == nr_registers then we get an array overrun on regoff because the invalid register check is currently off-by-one. Fix this with a check that regno is >= nr_registers instead. Detected with static analysis using CoverityScan. Fixes: fcc7ffd67991 "x86, mpx: Decode MPX instruction to get bound violation information" Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1456512931-3388-1-git-send-email-colin.king@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2016-02-25x86/mm: Fix slow_virt_to_phys() for X86_PAE againDexuan Cui
"d1cd12108346: x86, pageattr: Prevent overflow in slow_virt_to_phys() for X86_PAE" was unintentionally removed by the recent "34437e67a672: x86/mm: Fix slow_virt_to_phys() to handle large PAT bit". And, the variable 'phys_addr' was defined as "unsigned long" by mistake -- it should be "phys_addr_t". As a result, Hyper-V network driver in 32-PAE Linux guest can't work again. Fixes: commit 34437e67a672: "x86/mm: Fix slow_virt_to_phys() to handle large PAT bit" Signed-off-by: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: olaf@aepfle.de Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: jasowang@redhat.com Cc: driverdev-devel@linuxdriverproject.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: apw@canonical.com Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: K. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com> Cc: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1456394292-9030-1-git-send-email-decui@microsoft.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2016-02-25x86/mm: Avoid premature success when changing page attributesJan Beulich
set_memory_nx() (and set_memory_x()) currently differ in behavior from all other set_memory_*() functions when encountering a virtual address space hole within the kernel address range: They stop processing at the hole, but nevertheless report success (making the caller believe the operation was carried out on the entire range). While observed to be a problem - triggering the CONFIG_DEBUG_WX warning - only with out of tree code, I suspect (but didn't check) that on x86-64 the CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC logic in free_init_pages() would, when called from free_initmem(), have the same effect on the set_memory_nx() called from mark_rodata_ro(). This unexpected behavior is a result of change_page_attr_set_clr() special casing changes to only the NX bit, in that it passes "false" as the "checkalias" argument to __change_page_attr_set_clr(). Since this flag becomes the "primary" argument of both __change_page_attr() and __cpa_process_fault(), the latter would so far return success without adjusting cpa->numpages. Success to the higher level callers, however, means that whatever cpa->numpages currently holds is the count of successfully processed pages. The cases when __change_page_attr() calls __cpa_process_fault(), otoh, don't generally mean the entire range got processed (as can be seen from one of the two success return paths in __cpa_process_fault() already adjusting ->numpages). Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/56BB0AD402000078000D05BF@prv-mh.provo.novell.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2016-02-24x86: Fix misspellings in commentsAdam Buchbinder
Signed-off-by: Adam Buchbinder <adam.buchbinder@gmail.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: trivial@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-22x86/mm: Always enable CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA and remove the Kconfig optionKees Cook
This removes the CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA option and makes it always enabled. This simplifies the code and also makes it clearer that read-only mapped memory is just as fundamental a security feature in kernel-space as it is in user-space. Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: David Brown <david.brown@linaro.org> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1455748879-21872-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-22x86/mm/pat: Don't implicitly allow _PAGE_RW in kernel_map_pages_in_pgd()Sai Praneeth
As part of the preparation for the EFI_MEMORY_RO flag added in the UEFI 2.5 specification, we need the ability to map pages in kernel page tables without _PAGE_RW being set. Modify kernel_map_pages_in_pgd() to require its callers to pass _PAGE_RW if the pages need to be mapped read/write. Otherwise, we'll map the pages as read-only. Signed-off-by: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1455712566-16727-12-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-22x86/mm/pat: Use _PAGE_GLOBAL bit for EFI page table mappingsSai Praneeth
Since EFI page tables can be treated as kernel page tables they should be global. All the other page mapping functions in pageattr.c set the _PAGE_GLOBAL bit and we want to avoid inconsistencies when we map a page in the EFI code paths, for example when that page is split in __split_large_page(), etc. It also makes it easier to validate that the EFI region mappings have the correct attributes because there are fewer differences compared with regular kernel mappings. Signed-off-by: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1455712566-16727-4-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-22Merge tag 'v4.5-rc5' into efi/core, before queueing up new changesIngo Molnar
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-20Merge branch 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar: "This is unusually large, partly due to the EFI fixes that prevent accidental deletion of EFI variables through efivarfs that may brick machines. These fixes are somewhat involved to maintain compatibility with existing install methods and other usage modes, while trying to turn off the 'rm -rf' bricking vector. Other fixes are for large page ioremap()s and for non-temporal user-memcpy()s" * 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/mm: Fix vmalloc_fault() to handle large pages properly hpet: Drop stale URLs x86/uaccess/64: Handle the caching of 4-byte nocache copies properly in __copy_user_nocache() x86/uaccess/64: Make the __copy_user_nocache() assembly code more readable lib/ucs2_string: Correct ucs2 -> utf8 conversion efi: Add pstore variables to the deletion whitelist efi: Make efivarfs entries immutable by default efi: Make our variable validation list include the guid efi: Do variable name validation tests in utf8 efi: Use ucs2_as_utf8 in efivarfs instead of open coding a bad version lib/ucs2_string: Add ucs2 -> utf8 helper functions
2016-02-20x86/mm/ptdump: Remove paravirt_enabled()Borislav Petkov
is_hypervisor_range() can simply check if the PGD index is within ffff800000000000 - ffff87ffffffffff which is the range reserved for a hypervisor. That range is practically an ABI, see Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt. Tested-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> # Under Xen, as PV guest Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1455825641-19585-1-git-send-email-bp@alien8.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-18mm, x86: fix pte_page() crash in gup_pte_range()Hugh Dickins
Commit 3565fce3a659 ("mm, x86: get_user_pages() for dax mappings") has moved up the pte_page(pte) in x86's fast gup_pte_range(), for no discernible reason: put it back where it belongs, after the pte_flags check and the pfn_valid cross-check. That may be the cause of the NULL pointer dereference in gup_pte_range(), seen when vfio called vaddr_get_pfn() when starting a qemu-kvm based VM. Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Reported-by: Michael Long <Harn-Solo@gmx.de> Tested-by: Michael Long <Harn-Solo@gmx.de> Acked-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-02-18mm/core, x86/mm/pkeys: Add execute-only protection keys supportDave Hansen
Protection keys provide new page-based protection in hardware. But, they have an interesting attribute: they only affect data accesses and never affect instruction fetches. That means that if we set up some memory which is set as "access-disabled" via protection keys, we can still execute from it. This patch uses protection keys to set up mappings to do just that. If a user calls: mmap(..., PROT_EXEC); or mprotect(ptr, sz, PROT_EXEC); (note PROT_EXEC-only without PROT_READ/WRITE), the kernel will notice this, and set a special protection key on the memory. It also sets the appropriate bits in the Protection Keys User Rights (PKRU) register so that the memory becomes unreadable and unwritable. I haven't found any userspace that does this today. With this facility in place, we expect userspace to move to use it eventually. Userspace _could_ start doing this today. Any PROT_EXEC calls get converted to PROT_READ inside the kernel, and would transparently be upgraded to "true" PROT_EXEC with this code. IOW, userspace never has to do any PROT_EXEC runtime detection. This feature provides enhanced protection against leaking executable memory contents. This helps thwart attacks which are attempting to find ROP gadgets on the fly. But, the security provided by this approach is not comprehensive. The PKRU register which controls access permissions is a normal user register writable from unprivileged userspace. An attacker who can execute the 'wrpkru' instruction can easily disable the protection provided by this feature. The protection key that is used for execute-only support is permanently dedicated at compile time. This is fine for now because there is currently no API to set a protection key other than this one. Despite there being a constant PKRU value across the entire system, we do not set it unless this feature is in use in a process. That is to preserve the PKRU XSAVE 'init state', which can lead to faster context switches. PKRU *is* a user register and the kernel is modifying it. That means that code doing: pkru = rdpkru() pkru |= 0x100; mmap(..., PROT_EXEC); wrpkru(pkru); could lose the bits in PKRU that enforce execute-only permissions. To avoid this, we suggest avoiding ever calling mmap() or mprotect() when the PKRU value is expected to be unstable. Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Chen Gang <gang.chen.5i5j@gmail.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net> Cc: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Piotr Kwapulinski <kwapulinski.piotr@gmail.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Vladimir Murzin <vladimir.murzin@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160212210240.CB4BB5CA@viggo.jf.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-18mm/core, x86/mm/pkeys: Differentiate instruction fetchesDave Hansen
As discussed earlier, we attempt to enforce protection keys in software. However, the code checks all faults to ensure that they are not violating protection key permissions. It was assumed that all faults are either write faults where we check PKRU[key].WD (write disable) or read faults where we check the AD (access disable) bit. But, there is a third category of faults for protection keys: instruction faults. Instruction faults never run afoul of protection keys because they do not affect instruction fetches. So, plumb the PF_INSTR bit down in to the arch_vma_access_permitted() function where we do the protection key checks. We also add a new FAULT_FLAG_INSTRUCTION. This is because handle_mm_fault() is not passed the architecture-specific error_code where we keep PF_INSTR, so we need to encode the instruction fetch information in to the arch-generic fault flags. Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160212210224.96928009@viggo.jf.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-18x86/mm/pkeys: Optimize fault handling in access_error()Dave Hansen
We might not strictly have to make modifictions to access_error() to check the VMA here. If we do not, we will do this: 1. app sets VMA pkey to K 2. app touches a !present page 3. do_page_fault(), allocates and maps page, sets pte.pkey=K 4. return to userspace 5. touch instruction reexecutes, but triggers PF_PK 6. do PKEY signal What happens with this patch applied: 1. app sets VMA pkey to K 2. app touches a !present page 3. do_page_fault() notices that K is inaccessible 4. do PKEY signal We basically skip the fault that does an allocation. So what this lets us do is protect areas from even being *populated* unless it is accessible according to protection keys. That seems handy to me and makes protection keys work more like an mprotect()'d mapping. Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160212210222.EBB63D8C@viggo.jf.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-18mm/gup, x86/mm/pkeys: Check VMAs and PTEs for protection keysDave Hansen
Today, for normal faults and page table walks, we check the VMA and/or PTE to ensure that it is compatible with the action. For instance, if we get a write fault on a non-writeable VMA, we SIGSEGV. We try to do the same thing for protection keys. Basically, we try to make sure that if a user does this: mprotect(ptr, size, PROT_NONE); *ptr = foo; they see the same effects with protection keys when they do this: mprotect(ptr, size, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE); set_pkey(ptr, size, 4); wrpkru(0xffffff3f); // access disable pkey 4 *ptr = foo; The state to do that checking is in the VMA, but we also sometimes have to do it on the page tables only, like when doing a get_user_pages_fast() where we have no VMA. We add two functions and expose them to generic code: arch_pte_access_permitted(pte_flags, write) arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, write) These are, of course, backed up in x86 arch code with checks against the PTE or VMA's protection key. But, there are also cases where we do not want to respect protection keys. When we ptrace(), for instance, we do not want to apply the tracer's PKRU permissions to the PTEs from the process being traced. Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Boaz Harrosh <boaz@plexistor.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net> Cc: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> Cc: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Dominik Dingel <dingel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Dominik Vogt <vogt@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@mprc.pku.edu.cn> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com> Cc: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@linux.intel.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Shachar Raindel <raindel@mellanox.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160212210219.14D5D715@viggo.jf.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-18x86/mm/gup: Simplify get_user_pages() PTE bit handlingDave Hansen
The current get_user_pages() code is a wee bit more complicated than it needs to be for pte bit checking. Currently, it establishes a mask of required pte _PAGE_* bits and ensures that the pte it goes after has all those bits. This consolidates the three identical copies of this code. Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160212210218.3A2D4045@viggo.jf.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-18x86/mm/pkeys: Fill in pkey field in siginfoDave Hansen
This fills in the new siginfo field: si_pkey to indicate to userspace which protection key was set on the PTE that we faulted on. Note though that *ALL* protection key faults have to be generated by a valid, present PTE at some point. But this code does no PTE lookups which seeds odd. The reason is that we take advantage of the way we generate PTEs from VMAs. All PTEs under a VMA share some attributes. For instance, they are _all_ either PROT_READ *OR* PROT_NONE. They also always share a protection key, so we never have to walk the page tables; we just use the VMA. Note that _pkey is a 64-bit value. The current hardware only supports 4-bit protection keys. We do this because there is _plenty_ of space in _sigfault and it is possible that future processors would support more than 4 bits of protection keys. Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160212210213.ABC488FA@viggo.jf.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-18x86/mm/pkeys: Pass VMA down in to fault signal generation codeDave Hansen
During a page fault, we look up the VMA to ensure that the fault is in a region with a valid mapping. But, in the top-level page fault code we don't need the VMA for much else. Once we have decided that an access is bad, we are going to send a signal no matter what and do not need the VMA any more. So we do not pass it down in to the signal generation code. But, for protection keys, we need the VMA. It tells us *which* protection key we violated if we get a PF_PK. So, we need to pass the VMA down and fill in siginfo->si_pkey. Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160212210211.AD3B36A3@viggo.jf.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-18x86/mm/pkeys: Add new 'PF_PK' page fault error code bitDave Hansen
Note: "PK" is how the Intel SDM refers to this bit, so we also use that nomenclature. This only defines the bit, it does not plumb it anywhere to be handled. Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160212210207.DA7B43E6@viggo.jf.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-18Merge branch 'x86/urgent' into x86/asm, to pick up fixesIngo Molnar
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-18x86/mm: Expand the exception table logic to allow new handling optionsTony Luck
Huge amounts of help from Andy Lutomirski and Borislav Petkov to produce this. Andy provided the inspiration to add classes to the exception table with a clever bit-squeezing trick, Boris pointed out how much cleaner it would all be if we just had a new field. Linus Torvalds blessed the expansion with: ' I'd rather not be clever in order to save just a tiny amount of space in the exception table, which isn't really criticial for anybody. ' The third field is another relative function pointer, this one to a handler that executes the actions. We start out with three handlers: 1: Legacy - just jumps the to fixup IP 2: Fault - provide the trap number in %ax to the fixup code 3: Cleaned up legacy for the uaccess error hack Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f6af78fcbd348cf4939875cfda9c19689b5e50b8.1455732970.git.tony.luck@intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-18x86/mm: Fix vmalloc_fault() to handle large pages properlyToshi Kani
A kernel page fault oops with the callstack below was observed when a read syscall was made to a pmem device after a huge amount (>512GB) of vmalloc ranges was allocated by ioremap() on a x86_64 system: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff880840000ff8 IP: vmalloc_fault+0x1be/0x300 PGD c7f03a067 PUD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SM Call Trace: __do_page_fault+0x285/0x3e0 do_page_fault+0x2f/0x80 ? put_prev_entity+0x35/0x7a0 page_fault+0x28/0x30 ? memcpy_erms+0x6/0x10 ? schedule+0x35/0x80 ? pmem_rw_bytes+0x6a/0x190 [nd_pmem] ? schedule_timeout+0x183/0x240 btt_log_read+0x63/0x140 [nd_btt] : ? __symbol_put+0x60/0x60 ? kernel_read+0x50/0x80 SyS_finit_module+0xb9/0xf0 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa4 Since v4.1, ioremap() supports large page (pud/pmd) mappings in x86_64 and PAE. vmalloc_fault() however assumes that the vmalloc range is limited to pte mappings. vmalloc faults do not normally happen in ioremap'd ranges since ioremap() sets up the kernel page tables, which are shared by user processes. pgd_ctor() sets the kernel's PGD entries to user's during fork(). When allocation of the vmalloc ranges crosses a 512GB boundary, ioremap() allocates a new pud table and updates the kernel PGD entry to point it. If user process's PGD entry does not have this update yet, a read/write syscall to the range will cause a vmalloc fault, which hits the Oops above as it does not handle a large page properly. Following changes are made to vmalloc_fault(). 64-bit: - No change for the PGD sync operation as it handles large pages already. - Add pud_huge() and pmd_huge() to the validation code to handle large pages. - Change pud_page_vaddr() to pud_pfn() since an ioremap range is not directly mapped (while the if-statement still works with a bogus addr). - Change pmd_page() to pmd_pfn() since an ioremap range is not backed by struct page (while the if-statement still works with a bogus addr). 32-bit: - No change for the sync operation since the index3 PGD entry covers the entire vmalloc range, which is always valid. (A separate change to sync PGD entry is necessary if this memory layout is changed regardless of the page size.) - Add pmd_huge() to the validation code to handle large pages. This is for completeness since vmalloc_fault() won't happen in ioremap'd ranges as its PGD entry is always valid. Reported-by: Henning Schild <henning.schild@siemens.com> Signed-off-by: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.1+ Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1455758214-24623-1-git-send-email-toshi.kani@hpe.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-16mm/gup: Switch all callers of get_user_pages() to not pass tsk/mmDave Hansen
We will soon modify the vanilla get_user_pages() so it can no longer be used on mm/tasks other than 'current/current->mm', which is by far the most common way it is called. For now, we allow the old-style calls, but warn when they are used. (implemented in previous patch) This patch switches all callers of: get_user_pages() get_user_pages_unlocked() get_user_pages_locked() to stop passing tsk/mm so they will no longer see the warnings. Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: jack@suse.cz Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160212210156.113E9407@viggo.jf.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-16Merge branches 'x86/fpu', 'x86/mm' and 'x86/asm' into x86/pkeysIngo Molnar
Provide a stable basis for the pkeys patches, which touches various x86 details. Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-14Merge branch 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 fixes from Thomas Gleixner: "Two small fixlets for x86: - Prevent a KASAN false positive in thread_saved_pc() - Fix a 32-bit truncation problem in the x86 numa code" * 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/mm/numa: Fix 32-bit memblock range truncation bug on 32-bit NUMA kernels x86: Fix KASAN false positives in thread_saved_pc()
2016-02-09x86/mm: Honour passed pgprot in track_pfn_insert() and track_pfn_remap()Matthew Wilcox
track_pfn_insert() overwrites the pgprot that is passed in with a value based on the VMA's page_prot. This is a problem for people trying to do clever things with the new vm_insert_pfn_prot() as it will simply overwrite the passed protection flags. If we use the current value of the pgprot as the base, then it will behave as people are expecting. Also fix track_pfn_remap() in the same way. Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1453742717-10326-2-git-send-email-matthew.r.wilcox@intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-09x86/kasan: Write protect kasan zero shadowAndrey Ryabinin
After kasan_init() executed, no one is allowed to write to kasan_zero_page, so write protect it. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1452516679-32040-3-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-09x86/kasan: Clear kasan_zero_page after TLB flushAndrey Ryabinin
Currently we clear kasan_zero_page before __flush_tlb_all(). This works with current implementation of native_flush_tlb[_global]() because it doesn't cause do any writes to kasan shadow memory. But any subtle change made in native_flush_tlb*() could break this. Also current code seems doesn't work for paravirt guests (lguest). Only after the TLB flush we can be sure that kasan_zero_page is not used as early shadow anymore (instrumented code will not write to it). So it should cleared it only after the TLB flush. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1452516679-32040-2-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-08x86/mm/numa: Check for failures in numa_clear_kernel_node_hotplug()Ingo Molnar
numa_clear_kernel_node_hotplug() uses memblock_set_node() without checking for failures. memblock_set_node() is a complex function that might extend the memblock array - which extension might fail - so check for this possibility. It's not supposed to happen (because realistically if we have so little memory that this fails then we likely won't be able to boot anyway), but do the check nevertheless. Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Cc: Chen Tang <imtangchen@gmail.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu> Cc: Taku Izumi <izumi.taku@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Tang Chen <tangchen@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Wen Congyang <wency@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Yasuaki Ishimatsu <isimatu.yasuaki@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: y14sg1 <y14sg1@comcast.net> Cc: Zhang Yanfei <zhangyanfei@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-08x86/mm/numa: Clean up numa_clear_kernel_node_hotplug()Ingo Molnar
So we fixed an overflow bug in numa_clear_kernel_node_hotplug(): 2b54ab3c66d4 ("x86/mm/numa: Fix memory corruption on 32-bit NUMA kernels") ... and the bug was indirectly caused by poor coding style, such as using start/end local variables unnecessarily, which lost the physaddr_t type. So make the code more readable and try to fully comment all the thinking behind the logic. No change in functionality. Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Cc: Chen Tang <imtangchen@gmail.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu> Cc: Taku Izumi <izumi.taku@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Tang Chen <tangchen@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Wen Congyang <wency@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Yasuaki Ishimatsu <isimatu.yasuaki@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: y14sg1 <y14sg1@comcast.net> Cc: Zhang Yanfei <zhangyanfei@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-08Merge branch 'x86/urgent' into x86/mm, to pick up dependent fixIngo Molnar
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-08x86/mm/numa: Fix 32-bit memblock range truncation bug on 32-bit NUMA kernelsIngo Molnar
The following commit: a0acda917284 ("acpi, numa, mem_hotplug: mark all nodes the kernel resides un-hotpluggable") Introduced numa_clear_kernel_node_hotplug(), which function is executed during early bootup, and which marks all currently reserved memblock regions as hot-memory-unswappable as well. y14sg1 <y14sg1@comcast.net> reported that when running 32-bit NUMA kernels, the grsecurity/PAX kernel patch flagged a size overflow in this function: PAX: size overflow detected in function x86_numa_init arch/x86/mm/numa.c:691 [...] ... the reason for the overflow is that memblock_clear_hotplug() takes physical addresses as arguments, while the start/end variables used by numa_clear_kernel_node_hotplug() are 'unsigned long', which is 32-bit on PAE kernels, but which has 64-bit physical addresses. So on 32-bit PAE kernels that have physical memory above the 4GB boundary, we truncate a 64-bit physical address range to 32 bits and pass it to memblock_clear_hotplug(), which at minimum prevents the original memory-hotplug bugfix from working, but might have other side effects as well. The fix is to use the proper type to handle physical addresses, phys_addr_t. Reported-by: y14sg1 <y14sg1@comcast.net> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Cc: Chen Tang <imtangchen@gmail.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu> Cc: Taku Izumi <izumi.taku@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Tang Chen <tangchen@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Wen Congyang <wency@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Yasuaki Ishimatsu <isimatu.yasuaki@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Zhang Yanfei <zhangyanfei@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-05mm, hugetlb: don't require CMA for runtime gigantic pagesVlastimil Babka
Commit 944d9fec8d7a ("hugetlb: add support for gigantic page allocation at runtime") has added the runtime gigantic page allocation via alloc_contig_range(), making this support available only when CONFIG_CMA is enabled. Because it doesn't depend on MIGRATE_CMA pageblocks and the associated infrastructure, it is possible with few simple adjustments to require only CONFIG_MEMORY_ISOLATION instead of full CONFIG_CMA. After this patch, alloc_contig_range() and related functions are available and used for gigantic pages with just CONFIG_MEMORY_ISOLATION enabled. Note CONFIG_CMA selects CONFIG_MEMORY_ISOLATION. This allows supporting runtime gigantic pages without the CMA-specific checks in page allocator fastpaths. Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Luiz Capitulino <lcapitulino@redhat.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Zhang Yanfei <zhangyanfei@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Yasuaki Ishimatsu <isimatu.yasuaki@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net> Cc: Hillf Danton <hillf.zj@alibaba-inc.com> Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-02-03Merge branch 'linus' into efi/core, to refresh the branch and to pick up ↵Ingo Molnar
recent fixes Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-01-31Merge branch 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 fixes from Thomas Gleixner: "A bit on the largish side due to a series of fixes for a regression in the x86 vector management which was introduced in 4.3. This work was started in December already, but it took some time to fix all corner cases and a couple of older bugs in that area which were detected while at it Aside of that a few platform updates for intel-mid, quark and UV and two fixes for in the mm code: - Use proper types for pgprot values to avoid truncation - Prevent a size truncation in the pageattr code when setting page attributes for large mappings" * 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (21 commits) x86/mm/pat: Avoid truncation when converting cpa->numpages to address x86/mm: Fix types used in pgprot cacheability flags translations x86/platform/quark: Print boundaries correctly x86/platform/UV: Remove EFI memmap quirk for UV2+ x86/platform/intel-mid: Join string and fix SoC name x86/platform/intel-mid: Enable 64-bit build x86/irq: Plug vector cleanup race x86/irq: Call irq_force_move_complete with irq descriptor x86/irq: Remove outgoing CPU from vector cleanup mask x86/irq: Remove the cpumask allocation from send_cleanup_vector() x86/irq: Clear move_in_progress before sending cleanup IPI x86/irq: Remove offline cpus from vector cleanup x86/irq: Get rid of code duplication x86/irq: Copy vectormask instead of an AND operation x86/irq: Check vector allocation early x86/irq: Reorganize the search in assign_irq_vector x86/irq: Reorganize the return path in assign_irq_vector x86/irq: Do not use apic_chip_data.old_domain as temporary buffer x86/irq: Validate that irq descriptor is still active x86/irq: Fix a race in x86_vector_free_irqs() ...
2016-01-30x86/cpufeature: Carve out X86_FEATURE_*Borislav Petkov
Move them to a separate header and have the following dependency: x86/cpufeatures.h <- x86/processor.h <- x86/cpufeature.h This makes it easier to use the header in asm code and not include the whole cpufeature.h and add guards for asm. Suggested-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1453842730-28463-5-git-send-email-bp@alien8.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-01-29x86/mm/pat: Avoid truncation when converting cpa->numpages to addressMatt Fleming
There are a couple of nasty truncation bugs lurking in the pageattr code that can be triggered when mapping EFI regions, e.g. when we pass a cpa->pgd pointer. Because cpa->numpages is a 32-bit value, shifting left by PAGE_SHIFT will truncate the resultant address to 32-bits. Viorel-Cătălin managed to trigger this bug on his Dell machine that provides a ~5GB EFI region which requires 1236992 pages to be mapped. When calling populate_pud() the end of the region gets calculated incorrectly in the following buggy expression, end = start + (cpa->numpages << PAGE_SHIFT); And only 188416 pages are mapped. Next, populate_pud() gets invoked for a second time because of the loop in __change_page_attr_set_clr(), only this time no pages get mapped because shifting the remaining number of pages (1048576) by PAGE_SHIFT is zero. At which point the loop in __change_page_attr_set_clr() spins forever because we fail to map progress. Hitting this bug depends very much on the virtual address we pick to map the large region at and how many pages we map on the initial run through the loop. This explains why this issue was only recently hit with the introduction of commit a5caa209ba9c ("x86/efi: Fix boot crash by mapping EFI memmap entries bottom-up at runtime, instead of top-down") It's interesting to note that safe uses of cpa->numpages do exist in the pageattr code. If instead of shifting ->numpages we multiply by PAGE_SIZE, no truncation occurs because PAGE_SIZE is a UL value, and so the result is unsigned long. To avoid surprises when users try to convert very large cpa->numpages values to addresses, change the data type from 'int' to 'unsigned long', thereby making it suitable for shifting by PAGE_SHIFT without any type casting. The alternative would be to make liberal use of casting, but that is far more likely to cause problems in the future when someone adds more code and fails to cast properly; this bug was difficult enough to track down in the first place. Reported-and-tested-by: Viorel-Cătălin Răpițeanu <rapiteanu.catalin@gmail.com> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=110131 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1454067370-10374-1-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2016-01-20x86/mm: Make kmap_prot into a #defineAndy Lutomirski
The value (once we initialize it) is a foregone conclusion. Make it a #define to save a tiny amount of text and data size and to make it more comprehensible. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/0850eb0213de9da88544ff7fae72dc6d06d2b441.1453239349.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-01-20x86/mm/32: Set NX in __supported_pte_mask before enabling pagingAndy Lutomirski
There's a short window in which very early mappings can end up with NX clear because they are created before we've noticed that we have NX. It turns out that we detect NX very early, so there's no need to defer __supported_pte_mask setup. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/2b544627345f7110160545a3f47031eb45c3ad4f.1453239349.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>