Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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I observed that the upper layer will not send messages above this value.
As conclusion the application receive buffer should not below that
value, otherwise we are not capable to deliver the dlm message to the
upper layer. This patch forbids to set the receive buffer below the
maximum possible dlm message size.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Aring <aahringo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Teigland <teigland@redhat.com>
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This patch adds a callback to CLUSTER_ATTR macro to allow individual
callbacks for attributes which might have a more complex attribute range
checking just than non zero.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Aring <aahringo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Teigland <teigland@redhat.com>
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This patch fixes to set per nodeid mark configuration for accepted
sockets as well. Before this patch only the listen socket mark value was
used for all accepted connections. This patch will ensure that the
cluster mark attribute value will be always used for all sockets, if a
per nodeid mark value is specified dlm will use this value for the
specific node.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Aring <aahringo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Teigland <teigland@redhat.com>
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During my experiments to make dlm robust against tcpkill application I
was able to run sometimes in a circular lock dependency warning between
clusters_root.subsys.su_mutex and con->sock_mutex. We don't need to
held the sock_mutex when getting the mark value which held the
clusters_root.subsys.su_mutex. This patch moves the specific handling
just before the sock_mutex will be held.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Aring <aahringo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Teigland <teigland@redhat.com>
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This fixes the below mem leak.
[ 130.157600] =============================================================================
[ 130.159662] BUG f2fs_page_array_entry-252:16 (Tainted: G W O ): Objects remaining in f2fs_page_array_entry-252:16 on __kmem_cache_shutdown()
[ 130.162742] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
[ 130.162742]
[ 130.164979] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
[ 130.166188] INFO: Slab 0x000000009f5a52d2 objects=22 used=4 fp=0x00000000ba72c3e9 flags=0xfffffc0010200
[ 130.168269] CPU: 7 PID: 3560 Comm: umount Tainted: G B W O 5.9.0-rc4+ #35
[ 130.170019] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1 04/01/2014
[ 130.171941] Call Trace:
[ 130.172528] dump_stack+0x74/0x9a
[ 130.173298] slab_err+0xb7/0xdc
[ 130.174044] ? kernel_poison_pages+0xc0/0xc0
[ 130.175065] ? on_each_cpu_cond_mask+0x48/0x90
[ 130.176096] __kmem_cache_shutdown.cold+0x34/0x141
[ 130.177190] kmem_cache_destroy+0x59/0x100
[ 130.178223] f2fs_destroy_page_array_cache+0x15/0x20 [f2fs]
[ 130.179527] f2fs_put_super+0x1bc/0x380 [f2fs]
[ 130.180538] generic_shutdown_super+0x72/0x110
[ 130.181547] kill_block_super+0x27/0x50
[ 130.182438] kill_f2fs_super+0x76/0xe0 [f2fs]
[ 130.183448] deactivate_locked_super+0x3b/0x80
[ 130.184456] deactivate_super+0x3e/0x50
[ 130.185363] cleanup_mnt+0x109/0x160
[ 130.186179] __cleanup_mnt+0x12/0x20
[ 130.187003] task_work_run+0x70/0xb0
[ 130.187841] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x18f/0x1b0
[ 130.188917] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x31/0x170
[ 130.189989] do_syscall_64+0x45/0x90
[ 130.190828] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 130.191986] RIP: 0033:0x7faf868ea2eb
[ 130.192815] Code: 7b 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 90 f3 0f 1e fa 31 f6 e9 05 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa b8 a6 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 75 7b 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01
[ 130.196872] RSP: 002b:00007fffb7edb478 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a6
[ 130.198494] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00007faf86a18204 RCX: 00007faf868ea2eb
[ 130.201021] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 000055971df71c50
[ 130.203415] RBP: 000055971df71a40 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007fffb7eda1f0
[ 130.205772] R10: 00007faf86a04339 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055971df71c50
[ 130.208150] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000055971df71b38 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 130.210515] INFO: Object 0x00000000a980843a @offset=744
[ 130.212476] INFO: Allocated in page_array_alloc+0x3d/0xe0 [f2fs] age=1572 cpu=0 pid=3297
[ 130.215030] __slab_alloc+0x20/0x40
[ 130.216566] kmem_cache_alloc+0x2a0/0x2e0
[ 130.218217] page_array_alloc+0x3d/0xe0 [f2fs]
[ 130.219940] f2fs_init_compress_ctx+0x1f/0x40 [f2fs]
[ 130.221736] f2fs_write_cache_pages+0x3db/0x860 [f2fs]
[ 130.223591] f2fs_write_data_pages+0x2c9/0x300 [f2fs]
[ 130.225414] do_writepages+0x43/0xd0
[ 130.226907] __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0xd5/0x110
[ 130.228632] filemap_write_and_wait_range+0x48/0xb0
[ 130.230336] __generic_file_write_iter+0x18a/0x1d0
[ 130.232035] f2fs_file_write_iter+0x226/0x550 [f2fs]
[ 130.233737] new_sync_write+0x113/0x1a0
[ 130.235204] vfs_write+0x1a6/0x200
[ 130.236579] ksys_write+0x67/0xe0
[ 130.237898] __x64_sys_write+0x1a/0x20
[ 130.239309] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
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Compressed inode and normal inode has different layout, so we should
disallow enabling compress on non-empty file to avoid race condition
during inode .i_addr array parsing and updating.
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
[Jaegeuk Kim: Fix missing condition]
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
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Add two slab caches: "f2fs_cic_entry" and "f2fs_dic_entry" for memory
allocation of compress_io_ctx and decompress_io_ctx structure.
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
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Add a per-sbi slab cache "f2fs_page_array_entry-%u:%u" for memory
allocation of page pointer array in compress context.
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
[Jaegeuk Kim: Fix wrong memory allocation]
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
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Although UDF standard allows it, we don't support sparing table larger
than a single block. Check it during mount so that we don't try to
access memory beyond end of buffer.
Reported-by: syzbot+9991561e714f597095da@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
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We use only a single member out of the i_ext union in udf_inode_info.
Just remove the pointless union.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
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When we fail to read inode, some data accessed in udf_evict_inode() may
be uninitialized. Move the accesses to !is_bad_inode() branch.
Reported-by: syzbot+91f02b28f9bb5f5f1341@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
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The async buffered reads feature is not working when readahead is
turned off. There are two things to concern:
- when doing retry in io_read, not only the IOCB_WAITQ flag but also
the IOCB_NOWAIT flag is still set, which makes it goes to would_block
phase in generic_file_buffered_read() and then return -EAGAIN. After
that, the io-wq thread work is queued, and later doing the async
reads in the old way.
- even if we remove IOCB_NOWAIT when doing retry, the feature is still
not running properly, since in generic_file_buffered_read() it goes to
lock_page_killable() after calling mapping->a_ops->readpage() to do
IO, and thus causing process to sleep.
Fixes: 1a0a7853b901 ("mm: support async buffered reads in generic_file_buffered_read()")
Fixes: 3b2a4439e0ae ("io_uring: get rid of kiocb_wait_page_queue_init()")
Signed-off-by: Hao Xu <haoxu@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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As syzbot reported:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in init_min_max_mtime fs/f2fs/segment.c:4710 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in f2fs_build_segment_manager+0x9302/0xa6d0 fs/f2fs/segment.c:4792
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880a1b934a8 by task syz-executor682/6878
CPU: 1 PID: 6878 Comm: syz-executor682 Not tainted 5.9.0-rc6-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x198/0x1fd lib/dump_stack.c:118
print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xae/0x497 mm/kasan/report.c:383
__kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:513 [inline]
kasan_report.cold+0x1f/0x37 mm/kasan/report.c:530
init_min_max_mtime fs/f2fs/segment.c:4710 [inline]
f2fs_build_segment_manager+0x9302/0xa6d0 fs/f2fs/segment.c:4792
f2fs_fill_super+0x381a/0x6e80 fs/f2fs/super.c:3633
mount_bdev+0x32e/0x3f0 fs/super.c:1417
legacy_get_tree+0x105/0x220 fs/fs_context.c:592
vfs_get_tree+0x89/0x2f0 fs/super.c:1547
do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2875 [inline]
path_mount+0x1387/0x20a0 fs/namespace.c:3192
do_mount fs/namespace.c:3205 [inline]
__do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3413 [inline]
__se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3390 [inline]
__x64_sys_mount+0x27f/0x300 fs/namespace.c:3390
do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
The root cause is: if segs_per_sec is larger than one, and segment count
in last section is less than segs_per_sec, we will suffer out-of-boundary
memory access on sit_i->sentries[] in init_min_max_mtime().
Fix this by adding sanity check among segment count, section count and
segs_per_sec value in sanity_check_raw_super().
Reported-by: syzbot+481a3ffab50fed41dcc0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
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As syzbot reported:
kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/segment.h:657!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 1 PID: 16220 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.9.0-rc5-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:f2fs_ra_meta_pages+0xa51/0xdc0 fs/f2fs/segment.h:657
Call Trace:
build_sit_entries fs/f2fs/segment.c:4195 [inline]
f2fs_build_segment_manager+0x4b8a/0xa3c0 fs/f2fs/segment.c:4779
f2fs_fill_super+0x377d/0x6b80 fs/f2fs/super.c:3633
mount_bdev+0x32e/0x3f0 fs/super.c:1417
legacy_get_tree+0x105/0x220 fs/fs_context.c:592
vfs_get_tree+0x89/0x2f0 fs/super.c:1547
do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2875 [inline]
path_mount+0x1387/0x2070 fs/namespace.c:3192
do_mount fs/namespace.c:3205 [inline]
__do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3413 [inline]
__se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3390 [inline]
__x64_sys_mount+0x27f/0x300 fs/namespace.c:3390
do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
@blkno in f2fs_ra_meta_pages could exceed max segment count, causing panic
in following sanity check in current_sit_addr(), add check condition to
avoid this issue.
Reported-by: syzbot+3698081bcf0bb2d12174@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
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As syzbot reported:
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x21c/0x280 lib/dump_stack.c:118
kmsan_report+0xf7/0x1e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_report.c:122
__msan_warning+0x58/0xa0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:219
f2fs_lookup+0xe05/0x1a80 fs/f2fs/namei.c:503
lookup_open fs/namei.c:3082 [inline]
open_last_lookups fs/namei.c:3177 [inline]
path_openat+0x2729/0x6a90 fs/namei.c:3365
do_filp_open+0x2b8/0x710 fs/namei.c:3395
do_sys_openat2+0xa88/0x1140 fs/open.c:1168
do_sys_open fs/open.c:1184 [inline]
__do_compat_sys_openat fs/open.c:1242 [inline]
__se_compat_sys_openat+0x2a4/0x310 fs/open.c:1240
__ia32_compat_sys_openat+0x56/0x70 fs/open.c:1240
do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 [inline]
__do_fast_syscall_32+0x129/0x180 arch/x86/entry/common.c:139
do_fast_syscall_32+0x6a/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:162
do_SYSENTER_32+0x73/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:205
entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe+0x4d/0x5c
In f2fs_lookup(), @res_page could be used before being initialized,
because in __f2fs_find_entry(), once F2FS_I(dir)->i_current_depth was
been fuzzed to zero, then @res_page will never be initialized, causing
this kmsan warning, relocating @res_page initialization place to fix
this bug.
Reported-by: syzbot+0eac6f0bbd558fd866d7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
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We can relocate @res_page assignment in find_in_block() to
its caller, so unneeded parameter could be removed for cleanup.
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
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Meta area is not included in section_count computation.
So the minimum number of total_sections is 1 meanwhile it cannot be
greater than segment_count_main.
The minimum number of meta segments is 8 (SB + 2 (CP + SIT + NAT) + SSA).
Signed-off-by: Wang Xiaojun <wangxiaojun11@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
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Use seg_end_blkaddr instead of "segment0_blkaddr + (segment_count <<
log_blocks_per_seg)".
Signed-off-by: Wang Xiaojun <wangxiaojun11@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
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A NULL will not be return by __bitmap_ptr here.
Remove the unused check.
Signed-off-by: Wang Xiaojun <wangxiaojun11@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
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Relocate blkzoned feature check into parse_options() like
other feature check.
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
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sbi->devs would be initialized only if image enables multiple device
feature or blkzoned feature, if blkzoned feature flag was set by fuzz
in non-blkzoned device, we will suffer below panic:
get_zone_idx fs/f2fs/segment.c:4892 [inline]
f2fs_usable_zone_blks_in_seg fs/f2fs/segment.c:4943 [inline]
f2fs_usable_blks_in_seg+0x39b/0xa00 fs/f2fs/segment.c:4999
Call Trace:
check_block_count+0x69/0x4e0 fs/f2fs/segment.h:704
build_sit_entries fs/f2fs/segment.c:4403 [inline]
f2fs_build_segment_manager+0x51da/0xa370 fs/f2fs/segment.c:5100
f2fs_fill_super+0x3880/0x6ff0 fs/f2fs/super.c:3684
mount_bdev+0x32e/0x3f0 fs/super.c:1417
legacy_get_tree+0x105/0x220 fs/fs_context.c:592
vfs_get_tree+0x89/0x2f0 fs/super.c:1547
do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2896 [inline]
path_mount+0x12ae/0x1e70 fs/namespace.c:3216
do_mount fs/namespace.c:3229 [inline]
__do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3437 [inline]
__se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3414 [inline]
__x64_sys_mount+0x27f/0x300 fs/namespace.c:3414
do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
Add sanity check to inconsistency on factors: blkzoned flag, device
path and device character to avoid above panic.
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
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Missing the trace exit in f2fs_sync_dirty_inodes
Signed-off-by: Zhang Qilong <zhangqilong3@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
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The type of SM_I(sbi)->reserved_segments is unsigned int,
so change the return value to unsigned int.
The type cast can be removed in reserved_sections as a result.
Signed-off-by: Xiaojun Wang <wangxiaojun11@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
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When removing the last reference of an inode the size of an auth node
is already part of write_len. So we must not call ubifs_add_auth_dirt().
Call it only when needed.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>
Cc: Kristof Havasi <havasiefr@gmail.com>
Fixes: 6a98bc4614de ("ubifs: Add authentication nodes to journal")
Reported-and-tested-by: Kristof Havasi <havasiefr@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
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Dentries that represent no-key names must have a dentry_operations that
includes fscrypt_d_revalidate(). Currently, this is handled by
fscrypt_prepare_lookup() installing fscrypt_d_ops.
However, ceph support for encryption
(https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200914191707.380444-1-jlayton@kernel.org)
can't use fscrypt_d_ops, since ceph already has its own
dentry_operations.
Similarly, ext4 and f2fs support for directories that are both encrypted
and casefolded
(https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200923010151.69506-1-drosen@google.com)
can't use fscrypt_d_ops either, since casefolding requires some dentry
operations too.
To satisfy both users, we need to move the responsibility of installing
the dentry_operations to filesystems.
In preparation for this, export fscrypt_d_revalidate() and give it a
!CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION stub.
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200924054721.187797-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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Pull NFS client bugfixes from Trond Myklebust:
"Highlights include:
- NFSv4.2: copy_file_range needs to invalidate caches on success
- NFSv4.2: Fix security label length not being reset
- pNFS/flexfiles: Ensure we initialise the mirror bsizes correctly
on read
- pNFS/flexfiles: Fix signed/unsigned type issues with mirror
indices"
* tag 'nfs-for-5.9-3' of git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/trondmy/linux-nfs:
pNFS/flexfiles: Be consistent about mirror index types
pNFS/flexfiles: Ensure we initialise the mirror bsizes correctly on read
NFSv4.2: fix client's attribute cache management for copy_file_range
nfs: Fix security label length not being reset
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iomap complete routine can deadlock with btrfs_fallocate because of the
call to generic_write_sync().
P0 P1
inode_lock() fallocate(FALLOC_FL_ZERO_RANGE)
__iomap_dio_rw() inode_lock()
<block>
<submits IO>
<completes IO>
inode_unlock()
<gets inode_lock()>
inode_dio_wait()
iomap_dio_complete()
generic_write_sync()
btrfs_file_fsync()
inode_lock()
<deadlock>
inode_dio_end() is used to notify the end of DIO data in order
to synchronize with truncate. Call inode_dio_end() before calling
generic_write_sync(), so filesystems can lock i_rwsem during a sync.
This matches the way it is done in fs/direct-io.c:dio_complete().
Signed-off-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
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This is to avoid the deadlock caused in btrfs because of O_DIRECT |
O_DSYNC.
Filesystems such as btrfs require i_rwsem while performing sync on a
file. iomap_dio_rw() is called under i_rw_sem. This leads to a
deadlock because of:
iomap_dio_complete()
generic_write_sync()
btrfs_sync_file()
Separate out iomap_dio_complete() from iomap_dio_rw(), so filesystems
can call iomap_dio_complete() after unlocking i_rwsem.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
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For filesystems with block size < page size, we need to set all the
per-block uptodate bits if the page was already uptodate at the time
we create the per-block metadata. This can happen if the page is
invalidated (eg by a write to drop_caches) but ultimately not removed
from the page cache.
This is a data corruption issue as page writeback skips blocks which
are marked !uptodate.
Fixes: 9dc55f1389f9 ("iomap: add support for sub-pagesize buffered I/O without buffer heads")
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Reported-by: Qian Cai <cai@redhat.com>
Cc: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Gao Xiang <hsiangkao@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
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syzbot reports a potential lock deadlock between the normal IO path and
->show_fdinfo():
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
5.9.0-rc6-syzkaller #0 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syz-executor.2/19710 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff888098ddc450 (sb_writers#4){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: io_write+0x6b5/0xb30 fs/io_uring.c:3296
but task is already holding lock:
ffff8880a11b8428 (&ctx->uring_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __do_sys_io_uring_enter+0xe9a/0x1bd0 fs/io_uring.c:8348
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #2 (&ctx->uring_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:956 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x134/0x10e0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1103
__io_uring_show_fdinfo fs/io_uring.c:8417 [inline]
io_uring_show_fdinfo+0x194/0xc70 fs/io_uring.c:8460
seq_show+0x4a8/0x700 fs/proc/fd.c:65
seq_read+0x432/0x1070 fs/seq_file.c:208
do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:734 [inline]
do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:721 [inline]
do_iter_read+0x48e/0x6e0 fs/read_write.c:955
vfs_readv+0xe5/0x150 fs/read_write.c:1073
kernel_readv fs/splice.c:355 [inline]
default_file_splice_read.constprop.0+0x4e6/0x9e0 fs/splice.c:412
do_splice_to+0x137/0x170 fs/splice.c:871
splice_direct_to_actor+0x307/0x980 fs/splice.c:950
do_splice_direct+0x1b3/0x280 fs/splice.c:1059
do_sendfile+0x55f/0xd40 fs/read_write.c:1540
__do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1601 [inline]
__se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1587 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendfile64+0x1cc/0x210 fs/read_write.c:1587
do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
-> #1 (&p->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:956 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x134/0x10e0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1103
seq_read+0x61/0x1070 fs/seq_file.c:155
pde_read fs/proc/inode.c:306 [inline]
proc_reg_read+0x221/0x300 fs/proc/inode.c:318
do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:734 [inline]
do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:721 [inline]
do_iter_read+0x48e/0x6e0 fs/read_write.c:955
vfs_readv+0xe5/0x150 fs/read_write.c:1073
kernel_readv fs/splice.c:355 [inline]
default_file_splice_read.constprop.0+0x4e6/0x9e0 fs/splice.c:412
do_splice_to+0x137/0x170 fs/splice.c:871
splice_direct_to_actor+0x307/0x980 fs/splice.c:950
do_splice_direct+0x1b3/0x280 fs/splice.c:1059
do_sendfile+0x55f/0xd40 fs/read_write.c:1540
__do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1601 [inline]
__se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1587 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendfile64+0x1cc/0x210 fs/read_write.c:1587
do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
-> #0 (sb_writers#4){.+.+}-{0:0}:
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2496 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2601 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3218 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x2a96/0x5780 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4441
lock_acquire+0x1f3/0xaf0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5029
percpu_down_read include/linux/percpu-rwsem.h:51 [inline]
__sb_start_write+0x228/0x450 fs/super.c:1672
io_write+0x6b5/0xb30 fs/io_uring.c:3296
io_issue_sqe+0x18f/0x5c50 fs/io_uring.c:5719
__io_queue_sqe+0x280/0x1160 fs/io_uring.c:6175
io_queue_sqe+0x692/0xfa0 fs/io_uring.c:6254
io_submit_sqe fs/io_uring.c:6324 [inline]
io_submit_sqes+0x1761/0x2400 fs/io_uring.c:6521
__do_sys_io_uring_enter+0xeac/0x1bd0 fs/io_uring.c:8349
do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of:
sb_writers#4 --> &p->lock --> &ctx->uring_lock
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&ctx->uring_lock);
lock(&p->lock);
lock(&ctx->uring_lock);
lock(sb_writers#4);
*** DEADLOCK ***
1 lock held by syz-executor.2/19710:
#0: ffff8880a11b8428 (&ctx->uring_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __do_sys_io_uring_enter+0xe9a/0x1bd0 fs/io_uring.c:8348
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 19710 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 5.9.0-rc6-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x198/0x1fd lib/dump_stack.c:118
check_noncircular+0x324/0x3e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1827
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2496 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2601 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3218 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x2a96/0x5780 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4441
lock_acquire+0x1f3/0xaf0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5029
percpu_down_read include/linux/percpu-rwsem.h:51 [inline]
__sb_start_write+0x228/0x450 fs/super.c:1672
io_write+0x6b5/0xb30 fs/io_uring.c:3296
io_issue_sqe+0x18f/0x5c50 fs/io_uring.c:5719
__io_queue_sqe+0x280/0x1160 fs/io_uring.c:6175
io_queue_sqe+0x692/0xfa0 fs/io_uring.c:6254
io_submit_sqe fs/io_uring.c:6324 [inline]
io_submit_sqes+0x1761/0x2400 fs/io_uring.c:6521
__do_sys_io_uring_enter+0xeac/0x1bd0 fs/io_uring.c:8349
do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x45e179
Code: 3d b2 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 0b b2 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007f1194e74c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000001aa
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000000082c0 RCX: 000000000045e179
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 000000000118cf98 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000118cf4c
R13: 00007ffd1aa5756f R14: 00007f1194e759c0 R15: 000000000118cf4c
Fix this by just not diving into details if we fail to trylock the
io_uring mutex. We know the ctx isn't going away during this operation,
but we cannot safely iterate buffers/files/personalities if we don't
hold the io_uring mutex.
Reported-by: syzbot+2f8fa4e860edc3066aba@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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syzbot reports a crash with tty polling, which is using the double poll
handling:
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000009: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000048-0x000000000000004f]
CPU: 0 PID: 6874 Comm: syz-executor749 Not tainted 5.9.0-rc6-next-20200924-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:io_poll_get_single fs/io_uring.c:4778 [inline]
RIP: 0010:io_poll_double_wake+0x51/0x510 fs/io_uring.c:4845
Code: fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 9e 03 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 49 8b 5d 08 48 8d 7b 48 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 06 0f 8e 63 03 00 00 0f b6 6b 48 bf 06 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc90001c1fb70 EFLAGS: 00010006
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000004
RDX: 0000000000000009 RSI: ffffffff81d9b3ad RDI: 0000000000000048
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffff8880a3cac798 R09: ffffc90001c1fc60
R10: fffff52000383f73 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000004
R13: ffff8880a3cac798 R14: ffff8880a3cac7a0 R15: 0000000000000004
FS: 0000000001f98880(0000) GS:ffff8880ae400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f18886916c0 CR3: 0000000094c5a000 CR4: 00000000001506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
__wake_up_common+0x147/0x650 kernel/sched/wait.c:93
__wake_up_common_lock+0xd0/0x130 kernel/sched/wait.c:123
tty_ldisc_hangup+0x1cf/0x680 drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:735
__tty_hangup.part.0+0x403/0x870 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:625
__tty_hangup drivers/tty/tty_io.c:575 [inline]
tty_vhangup+0x1d/0x30 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:698
pty_close+0x3f5/0x550 drivers/tty/pty.c:79
tty_release+0x455/0xf60 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1679
__fput+0x285/0x920 fs/file_table.c:281
task_work_run+0xdd/0x190 kernel/task_work.c:141
tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:188 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:165 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1e2/0x1f0 kernel/entry/common.c:192
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x7a/0x2c0 kernel/entry/common.c:267
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x401210
which is due to a failure in removing the double poll wait entry if we
hit a wakeup match. This can cause multiple invocations of the wakeup,
which isn't safe.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.8
Reported-by: syzbot+81b3883093f772addf6d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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KSTAT_QUERY_FLAGS expands to AT_STATX_SYNC_TYPE, which itself already
is a mask. Remove the double name, especially given that the prefix
is a little confusing vs the normal AT_* flags.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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The function really obsfucates checking for valid flags and setting the
lookup flags. The fact that it returns -EINVAL through and unsigned
return value, which is then used as boolean really doesn't help either.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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This allows to keep vfs_statx static in fs/stat.c to prepare for the following
changes.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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vfs_statx_fd is only used to implement vfs_fstat. Remove vfs_statx_fd
and just implement vfs_fstat directly.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Pull io_uring fixes from Jens Axboe:
"Two fixes for regressions in this cycle, and one that goes to 5.8
stable:
- fix leak of getname() retrieved filename
- remove plug->nowait assignment, fixing a regression with btrfs
- fix for async buffered retry"
* tag 'io_uring-5.9-2020-09-25' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block:
io_uring: ensure async buffered read-retry is setup properly
io_uring: don't unconditionally set plug->nowait = true
io_uring: ensure open/openat2 name is cleaned on cancelation
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Since only the v4 code cares about it, maybe it's better to leave
rq_lease_breaker out of the common dispatch code?
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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There are actually rare races where this is possible (e.g. if a new open
intervenes between the read of i_writecount and the fi_fds).
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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The nfsd open code has always kept separate read-only, read-write, and
write-only opens as necessary to ensure that when a client closes or
downgrades, we don't retain more access than necessary.
Also, I didn't realize the cache behaved this way when I wrote
94415b06eb8a "nfsd4: a client's own opens needn't prevent delegations".
There I assumed fi_fds[O_WRONLY] and fi_fds[O_RDWR] would always be
distinct. The violation of that assumption is triggering a
WARN_ON_ONCE() and could also cause the server to give out a delegation
when it shouldn't.
Fixes: 94415b06eb8a ("nfsd4: a client's own opens needn't prevent delegations")
Tested-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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silence nfscache allocation warnings with kvzalloc
Currently nfsd_reply_cache_init attempts hash table allocation through
kmalloc, and manually falls back to vzalloc if that fails. This makes
the code a little larger than needed, and creates a significant amount
of serial console spam if you have enough systems.
Switching to kvzalloc gets rid of the allocation warnings, and makes
the code a little cleaner too as a side effect.
Freeing of nn->drc_hashtbl is already done using kvfree currently.
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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Fixes coccicheck warning:
fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c:3234:5-29: WARNING: Comparison to bool
Signed-off-by: Zheng Bin <zhengbin13@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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Squelch some sparse warnings:
/home/cel/src/linux/linux/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c:1860:16: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types)
/home/cel/src/linux/linux/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c:1860:16: expected int status
/home/cel/src/linux/linux/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c:1860:16: got restricted __be32
/home/cel/src/linux/linux/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c:1862:24: warning: incorrect type in return expression (different base types)
/home/cel/src/linux/linux/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c:1862:24: expected restricted __be32
/home/cel/src/linux/linux/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c:1862:24: got int status
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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Squelch some sparse warnings:
/home/cel/src/linux/linux/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c:4692:24: warning: incorrect type in return expression (different base types)
/home/cel/src/linux/linux/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c:4692:24: expected int
/home/cel/src/linux/linux/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c:4692:24: got restricted __be32 [usertype]
/home/cel/src/linux/linux/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c:4702:32: warning: incorrect type in return expression (different base types)
/home/cel/src/linux/linux/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c:4702:32: expected int
/home/cel/src/linux/linux/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c:4702:32: got restricted __be32 [usertype]
/home/cel/src/linux/linux/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c:4739:13: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types)
/home/cel/src/linux/linux/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c:4739:13: expected restricted __be32 [usertype] err
/home/cel/src/linux/linux/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c:4739:13: got int
/home/cel/src/linux/linux/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c:4891:15: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types)
/home/cel/src/linux/linux/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c:4891:15: expected unsigned int [assigned] [usertype] count
/home/cel/src/linux/linux/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c:4891:15: got restricted __be32 [usertype]
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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Squelch some sparse warnings:
/home/cel/src/linux/linux/fs/nfsd/vfs.c:2264:13: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types)
/home/cel/src/linux/linux/fs/nfsd/vfs.c:2264:13: expected int err
/home/cel/src/linux/linux/fs/nfsd/vfs.c:2264:13: got restricted __be32
/home/cel/src/linux/linux/fs/nfsd/vfs.c:2266:24: warning: incorrect type in return expression (different base types)
/home/cel/src/linux/linux/fs/nfsd/vfs.c:2266:24: expected restricted __be32
/home/cel/src/linux/linux/fs/nfsd/vfs.c:2266:24: got int err
/home/cel/src/linux/linux/fs/nfsd/vfs.c:2288:13: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types)
/home/cel/src/linux/linux/fs/nfsd/vfs.c:2288:13: expected int err
/home/cel/src/linux/linux/fs/nfsd/vfs.c:2288:13: got restricted __be32
/home/cel/src/linux/linux/fs/nfsd/vfs.c:2290:24: warning: incorrect type in return expression (different base types)
/home/cel/src/linux/linux/fs/nfsd/vfs.c:2290:24: expected restricted __be32
/home/cel/src/linux/linux/fs/nfsd/vfs.c:2290:24: got int err
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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Reserving space for a large READ payload requires special handling when
reserving space in the xdr buffer pages. One problem we can have is use
of the scratch buffer, which is used to get a pointer to a contiguous
region of data up to PAGE_SIZE. When using the scratch buffer, calls to
xdr_commit_encode() shift the data to it's proper alignment in the xdr
buffer. If we've reserved several pages in a vector, then this could
potentially invalidate earlier pointers and result in incorrect READ
data being sent to the client.
I get around this by looking at the amount of space left in the current
page, and never reserve more than that for each entry in the read
vector. This lets us place data directly where it needs to go in the
buffer pages.
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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Now when a read delegation is given, two delegation related traces
will be printed:
nfsd_deleg_open: client 5f45b854:e6058001 stateid 00000030:00000001
nfsd_deleg_none: client 5f45b854:e6058001 stateid 0000002f:00000001
Although the intention is to let developers know two stateid are
returned, the traces are confusing about whether or not a read delegation
is handled out. So renaming trace_nfsd_deleg_none() to trace_nfsd_open()
and trace_nfsd_deleg_open() to trace_nfsd_deleg_read() to make
the intension clearer.
The patched traces will be:
nfsd_deleg_read: client 5f48a967:b55b21cd stateid 00000003:00000001
nfsd_open: client 5f48a967:b55b21cd stateid 00000002:00000001
Suggested-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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In nfsd4_encode_listxattrs(), the variable p is assigned to at one point
but this value is never used before p is reassigned. Fix this.
Addresses-Coverity: ("Unused value")
Signed-off-by: Alex Dewar <alex.dewar90@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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Missing "is".
Signed-off-by: Alex Dewar <alex.dewar90@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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The delegation is no longer returnable, so I don't think there's much
point retrying the recall.
(I think it's worth asking why we even need separate CLOSED_DELEG and
REVOKED_DELEG states. But treating them the same would currently cause
nfsd4_free_stateid to call list_del_init(&dp->dl_recall_lru) on a
delegation that the laundromat had unhashed but not revoked, incorrectly
removing it from the laundromat's reaplist or a client's dl_recall_lru.)
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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It was an interesting idea but nobody seems to be using it, it's buggy
at this point, and nfs4state.c is already complicated enough without it.
The new nfsd/clients/ code provides some of the same functionality, and
could probably do more if desired.
This feature has been deprecated since 9d60d93198c6 ("Deprecate nfsd
fault injection").
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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