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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fix from Borislav Petkov:
"A single fix for early boot crashes of kernels built with gcc10 and
stack protector enabled"
* tag 'x86_urgent_for_v5.7-rc7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86: Fix early boot crash on gcc-10, third try
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Pull up arch-specific prototype efi_systab_show_arch() in order to
fix a -Wmissing-prototypes warning:
arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c:957:7: warning: no previous prototype for
‘efi_systab_show_arch’ [-Wmissing-prototypes]
char *efi_systab_show_arch(char *str)
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Thiel <b.thiel@posteo.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200516132647.14568-1-b.thiel@posteo.de
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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Pull kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
"A new testcase for guest debugging (gdbstub) that exposed a bunch of
bugs, mostly for AMD processors. And a few other x86 fixes"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm:
KVM: x86: Fix off-by-one error in kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_setup_mce
KVM: x86: Fix pkru save/restore when guest CR4.PKE=0, move it to x86.c
KVM: SVM: Disable AVIC before setting V_IRQ
KVM: Introduce kvm_make_all_cpus_request_except()
KVM: VMX: pass correct DR6 for GD userspace exit
KVM: x86, SVM: isolate vcpu->arch.dr6 from vmcb->save.dr6
KVM: SVM: keep DR6 synchronized with vcpu->arch.dr6
KVM: nSVM: trap #DB and #BP to userspace if guest debugging is on
KVM: selftests: Add KVM_SET_GUEST_DEBUG test
KVM: X86: Fix single-step with KVM_SET_GUEST_DEBUG
KVM: X86: Set RTM for DB_VECTOR too for KVM_EXIT_DEBUG
KVM: x86: fix DR6 delivery for various cases of #DB injection
KVM: X86: Declare KVM_CAP_SET_GUEST_DEBUG properly
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Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni <chaitanya.kulkarni@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tegra/linux into arm/soc
ARM: tegra: Core changes for v5.8-rc1
This contains core changes needed for the CPU frequency scaling and CPU
idle drivers on Tegra20 and Tegra30.
* tag 'tegra-for-5.8-arm-core' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tegra/linux:
ARM: tegra: Create tegra20-cpufreq platform device on Tegra30
ARM: tegra: Don't enable PLLX while resuming from LP1 on Tegra30
ARM: tegra: Switch CPU to PLLP on resume from LP1 on Tegra30/114/124
ARM: tegra: Correct PL310 Auxiliary Control Register initialization
ARM: tegra: Do not fully reinitialize L2 on resume
ARM: tegra: Initialize r0 register for firmware wake-up
firmware: tf: Different way of L2 cache enabling after LP2 suspend
firmware: tegra: Make BPMP a regular driver
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200515145311.1580134-10-thierry.reding@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/robh/linux into arm/soc
VExpress modularization
This series enables building various Versatile Express platform drivers
as modules. The primary target is the Fast Model FVP which is supported
in Android. As Android is moving towards their GKI, or generic kernel,
the hardware support has to be in modules. Currently ARCH_VEXPRESS
enables several built-in only drivers. Some of these are needed, but
some are only needed for older 32-bit VExpress platforms and can just
be disabled.
* tag 'vexpress-modules-for-soc-v2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/robh/linux:
ARM: vexpress: Don't select VEXPRESS_CONFIG
bus: vexpress-config: Support building as module
vexpress: Move setting master site to vexpress-config bus
bus: vexpress-config: simplify config bus probing
bus: vexpress-config: Merge vexpress-syscfg into vexpress-config
mfd: vexpress-sysreg: Support building as a module
mfd: vexpress-sysreg: Use devres API variants
mfd: vexpress-sysreg: Drop unused syscon child devices
mfd: vexpress-sysreg: Drop selecting CONFIG_CLKSRC_MMIO
clk: vexpress-osc: Support building as a module
clk: vexpress-osc: Use the devres clock API variants
clk: versatile: Only enable SP810 on 32-bit by default
clk: versatile: Rework kconfig structure
amba: Retry adding deferred devices at late_initcall
arm64: vexpress: Don't select CONFIG_POWER_RESET_VEXPRESS
ARM: vexpress: Move vexpress_flags_set() into arch code
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
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Now that the non-DT IM-PD1 support code has been removed, drop the clock
related code from clk-impd1.c.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200428204945.21067-1-robh@kernel.org
Cc: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Cc: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-clk@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
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<linux/parser.h> is missing include guards. Add them.
This is needed to allow declaring a function in <linux/fscrypt.h> that
takes a substring_t parameter.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200512233251.118314-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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Move the bpf verifier trace check into the new switch statement in
HEAD.
Resolve the overlapping changes in hinic, where bug fixes overlap
the addition of VF support.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Pull networking fixes from David Miller:
1) Fix sk_psock reference count leak on receive, from Xiyu Yang.
2) CONFIG_HNS should be invisible, from Geert Uytterhoeven.
3) Don't allow locking route MTUs in ipv6, RFCs actually forbid this,
from Maciej Żenczykowski.
4) ipv4 route redirect backoff wasn't actually enforced, from Paolo
Abeni.
5) Fix netprio cgroup v2 leak, from Zefan Li.
6) Fix infinite loop on rmmod in conntrack, from Florian Westphal.
7) Fix tcp SO_RCVLOWAT hangs, from Eric Dumazet.
8) Various bpf probe handling fixes, from Daniel Borkmann.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net: (68 commits)
selftests: mptcp: pm: rm the right tmp file
dpaa2-eth: properly handle buffer size restrictions
bpf: Restrict bpf_trace_printk()'s %s usage and add %pks, %pus specifier
bpf: Add bpf_probe_read_{user, kernel}_str() to do_refine_retval_range
bpf: Restrict bpf_probe_read{, str}() only to archs where they work
MAINTAINERS: Mark networking drivers as Maintained.
ipmr: Add lockdep expression to ipmr_for_each_table macro
ipmr: Fix RCU list debugging warning
drivers: net: hamradio: Fix suspicious RCU usage warning in bpqether.c
net: phy: broadcom: fix BCM54XX_SHD_SCR3_TRDDAPD value for BCM54810
tcp: fix error recovery in tcp_zerocopy_receive()
MAINTAINERS: Add Jakub to networking drivers.
MAINTAINERS: another add of Karsten Graul for S390 networking
drivers: ipa: fix typos for ipa_smp2p structure doc
pppoe: only process PADT targeted at local interfaces
selftests/bpf: Enforce returning 0 for fentry/fexit programs
bpf: Enforce returning 0 for fentry/fexit progs
net: stmmac: fix num_por initialization
security: Fix the default value of secid_to_secctx hook
libbpf: Fix register naming in PT_REGS s390 macros
...
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MP_JOIN subflows must not land into the accept queue.
Currently tcp_check_req() calls an mptcp specific helper
to detect such scenario.
Such helper leverages the subflow context to check for
MP_JOIN subflows. We need to deal also with MP JOIN
failures, even when the subflow context is not available
due allocation failure.
A possible solution would be changing the syn_recv_sock()
signature to allow returning a more descriptive action/
error code and deal with that in tcp_check_req().
Since the above need is MPTCP specific, this patch instead
uses a TCP request socket hole to add a MPTCP specific flag.
Such flag is used by the MPTCP syn_recv_sock() to tell
tcp_check_req() how to deal with the request socket.
This change is a no-op for !MPTCP build, and makes the
MPTCP code simpler. It allows also the next patch to deal
correctly with MP JOIN failure.
v1 -> v2:
- be more conservative on drop_req initialization (Mat)
RFC -> v1:
- move the drop_req bit inside tcp_request_sock (Eric)
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Alexei Starovoitov says:
====================
pull-request: bpf 2020-05-15
The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net* tree.
We've added 9 non-merge commits during the last 2 day(s) which contain
a total of 14 files changed, 137 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-).
The main changes are:
1) Fix secid_to_secctx LSM hook default value, from Anders.
2) Fix bug in mmap of bpf array, from Andrii.
3) Restrict bpf_probe_read to archs where they work, from Daniel.
4) Enforce returning 0 for fentry/fexit progs, from Yonghong.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The BCM54811 PHY shares many similarities with the already supported BCM54810
PHY but additionally requires some semi-unique configuration.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Lo <kevlo@kevlo.org>
Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Pull drm fixes from Dave Airlie:
"As mentioned last week an i915 PR came in late, but I left it, so the
i915 bits of this cover 2 weeks, which is why it's likely a bit larger
than usual.
Otherwise it's mostly amdgpu fixes, one tegra fix, one meson fix.
i915:
- Handle idling during i915_gem_evict_something busy loops (Chris)
- Mark current submissions with a weak-dependency (Chris)
- Propagate error from completed fences (Chris)
- Fixes on execlist to avoid GPU hang situation (Chris)
- Fixes couple deadlocks (Chris)
- Timeslice preemption fixes (Chris)
- Fix Display Port interrupt handling on Tiger Lake (Imre)
- Reduce debug noise around Frame Buffer Compression (Peter)
- Fix logic around IPC W/a for Coffee Lake and Kaby Lake (Sultan)
- Avoid dereferencing a dead context (Chris)
tegra:
- tegra120/4 smmu fixes
amdgpu:
- Clockgating fixes
- Fix fbdev with scatter/gather display
- S4 fix for navi
- Soft recovery for gfx10
- Freesync fixes
- Atomic check cursor fix
- Add a gfxoff quirk
- MST fix
amdkfd:
- Fix GEM reference counting
meson:
- error code propogation fix"
* tag 'drm-fixes-2020-05-15' of git://anongit.freedesktop.org/drm/drm: (29 commits)
drm/i915: Handle idling during i915_gem_evict_something busy loops
drm/meson: pm resume add return errno branch
drm/amd/amdgpu: Update update_config() logic
drm/amd/amdgpu: add raven1 part to the gfxoff quirk list
drm/i915: Mark concurrent submissions with a weak-dependency
drm/i915: Propagate error from completed fences
drm/i915/gvt: Fix kernel oops for 3-level ppgtt guest
drm/i915/gvt: Init DPLL/DDI vreg for virtual display instead of inheritance.
drm/amd/display: add basic atomic check for cursor plane
drm/amd/display: Fix vblank and pageflip event handling for FreeSync
drm/amdgpu: implement soft_recovery for gfx10
drm/amdgpu: enable hibernate support on Navi1X
drm/amdgpu: Use GEM obj reference for KFD BOs
drm/amdgpu: force fbdev into vram
drm/amd/powerplay: perform PG ungate prior to CG ungate
drm/amdgpu: drop unnecessary cancel_delayed_work_sync on PG ungate
drm/amdgpu: disable MGCG/MGLS also on gfx CG ungate
drm/i915/execlists: Track inflight CCID
drm/i915/execlists: Avoid reusing the same logical CCID
drm/i915/gem: Remove object_is_locked assertion from unpin_from_display_plane
...
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This change adds accounting for the memory allocated for shadow stacks.
Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
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This change adds generic support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack,
which uses a shadow stack to protect return addresses from being
overwritten by an attacker. Details are available here:
https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ShadowCallStack.html
Note that security guarantees in the kernel differ from the ones
documented for user space. The kernel must store addresses of
shadow stacks in memory, which means an attacker capable reading
and writing arbitrary memory may be able to locate them and hijack
control flow by modifying the stacks.
Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com>
[will: Numerous cosmetic changes]
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
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Implement permissions as stated in uapi/linux/capability.h
In order to do that the verifier allow_ptr_leaks flag is split
into four flags and they are set as:
env->allow_ptr_leaks = bpf_allow_ptr_leaks();
env->bypass_spec_v1 = bpf_bypass_spec_v1();
env->bypass_spec_v4 = bpf_bypass_spec_v4();
env->bpf_capable = bpf_capable();
The first three currently equivalent to perfmon_capable(), since leaking kernel
pointers and reading kernel memory via side channel attacks is roughly
equivalent to reading kernel memory with cap_perfmon.
'bpf_capable' enables bounded loops, precision tracking, bpf to bpf calls and
other verifier features. 'allow_ptr_leaks' enable ptr leaks, ptr conversions,
subtraction of pointers. 'bypass_spec_v1' disables speculative analysis in the
verifier, run time mitigations in bpf array, and enables indirect variable
access in bpf programs. 'bypass_spec_v4' disables emission of sanitation code
by the verifier.
That means that the networking BPF program loaded with CAP_BPF + CAP_NET_ADMIN
will have speculative checks done by the verifier and other spectre mitigation
applied. Such networking BPF program will not be able to leak kernel pointers
and will not be able to access arbitrary kernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200513230355.7858-3-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
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Split BPF operations that are allowed under CAP_SYS_ADMIN into
combination of CAP_BPF, CAP_PERFMON, CAP_NET_ADMIN.
For backward compatibility include them in CAP_SYS_ADMIN as well.
The end result provides simple safety model for applications that use BPF:
- to load tracing program types
BPF_PROG_TYPE_{KPROBE, TRACEPOINT, PERF_EVENT, RAW_TRACEPOINT, etc}
use CAP_BPF and CAP_PERFMON
- to load networking program types
BPF_PROG_TYPE_{SCHED_CLS, XDP, SK_SKB, etc}
use CAP_BPF and CAP_NET_ADMIN
There are few exceptions from this rule:
- bpf_trace_printk() is allowed in networking programs, but it's using
tracing mechanism, hence this helper needs additional CAP_PERFMON
if networking program is using this helper.
- BPF_F_ZERO_SEED flag for hash/lru map is allowed under CAP_SYS_ADMIN only
to discourage production use.
- BPF HW offload is allowed under CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
- bpf_probe_write_user() is allowed under CAP_SYS_ADMIN only.
CAPs are not checked at attach/detach time with two exceptions:
- loading BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB is allowed for unprivileged users,
hence CAP_NET_ADMIN is required at attach time.
- flow_dissector detach doesn't check prog FD at detach,
hence CAP_NET_ADMIN is required at detach time.
CAP_SYS_ADMIN is required to iterate BPF objects (progs, maps, links) via get_next_id
command and convert them to file descriptor via GET_FD_BY_ID command.
This restriction guarantees that mutliple tasks with CAP_BPF are not able to
affect each other. That leads to clean isolation of tasks. For example:
task A with CAP_BPF and CAP_NET_ADMIN loads and attaches a firewall via bpf_link.
task B with the same capabilities cannot detach that firewall unless
task A explicitly passed link FD to task B via scm_rights or bpffs.
CAP_SYS_ADMIN can still detach/unload everything.
Two networking user apps with CAP_SYS_ADMIN and CAP_NET_ADMIN can
accidentely mess with each other programs and maps.
Two networking user apps with CAP_NET_ADMIN and CAP_BPF cannot affect each other.
CAP_NET_ADMIN + CAP_BPF allows networking programs access only packet data.
Such networking progs cannot access arbitrary kernel memory or leak pointers.
bpftool, bpftrace, bcc tools binaries should NOT be installed with
CAP_BPF and CAP_PERFMON, since unpriv users will be able to read kernel secrets.
But users with these two permissions will be able to use these tracing tools.
CAP_PERFMON is least secure, since it allows kprobes and kernel memory access.
CAP_NET_ADMIN can stop network traffic via iproute2.
CAP_BPF is the safest from security point of view and harmless on its own.
Having CAP_BPF and/or CAP_NET_ADMIN is not enough to write into arbitrary map
and if that map is used by firewall-like bpf prog.
CAP_BPF allows many bpf prog_load commands in parallel. The verifier
may consume large amount of memory and significantly slow down the system.
Existing unprivileged BPF operations are not affected.
In particular unprivileged users are allowed to load socket_filter and cg_skb
program types and to create array, hash, prog_array, map-in-map map types.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200513230355.7858-2-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
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The amount of time spent parsing fwnodes of devices can become really
high if the devices are added in an non-ideal order. Worst case can be
O(N^2) when N devices are added. But this can be optimized to O(N) by
adding all the devices and then parsing all their fwnodes in one batch.
This commit adds fw_devlink_pause() and fw_devlink_resume() to allow
doing this.
Signed-off-by: Saravana Kannan <saravanak@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200515053500.215929-4-saravanak@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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The HST path selector needs this information to perform path
prediction. For request-based mpath, struct request's io_start_time_ns
is used, while for bio-based, use the start_time stored in dm_io.
Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
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Add functions dm_bufio_issue_discard and dm_bufio_discard_buffers.
dm_bufio_issue_discard sends discard request to the underlying device.
dm_bufio_discard_buffers frees buffers in the range and then calls
dm_bufio_issue_discard.
Also, factor out block_to_sector for reuse in dm_bufio_issue_discard.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jic23/iio into staging-next
Jonathan writes:
Second set of new device support, cleanups and features for IIO in the 5.8 cycle
Usual mixed back but with a few subsystem wide or device type
wide cleanups.
New device support
* adis16475
- New driver supporting adis16470, adis16475, adis16477, adis16465,
adis16467, adis16500, adis16505 and adis16507.
Includes some rework of the adis library to simplify using it
for this new driver.
* ak8974
- Add support for Alps hscdt008a. ID only. Related patches add support
for scale.
* atlas-sensor
- Add support for RTD-SM OEM temperature sensor.
* cm32181
- Add support for CM3218 including support for SMBUS alert via
ACPI resources.
* ltc2632
- Add support for ltc2634-12/10/8 DACS including handling per
device type numbers of channels.
Major Features
* cm32181
- ACPI bindings including parsing CPM0 and CPM1 custom ACPI tables.
Includes minor tidy ups and fixes.
* vcnl4000
- Add event support
- Add buffered data capture support
- Add control of sampling frequency
Cleanups and minor fixes.
* core
- Trivial rework of iio_device_alloc to use an early return and
improve readability.
- Precursors to addition of multiple buffer support. So far
minor refactoring.
* subsystem wide
- Use get_unaligned_be24 slightly improve readability over open
coding it.
* adis drivers
- Use iio_get_debugfs_dentry access function.
* bh1780, cm32181, cm3232, gp2ap02a00f, opt3001, st_uvis25, vl6180,
dmard06, kxsd9
- Drop use of of_match_ptr to allow ACPI based probing via PRP0001.
Part of clear out of this to avoid cut and paste into new drivers.
* ad5592r, ad5593r
- Fix typos
* ad5933
- Use managed interfaces to automate error handling and remove.
* ak8974
- Fix wrong number of 'real bits' for buffered data.
- Refactor to pull measurement code out as separate function.
bmp280
- Fix lack of clamp on range during data capture.
* at91-sama5d2_adc
- Handle unfinished conversions correctly.
- Allow use of triggers other than it's own.
- Reorganize buffer setup and tear down as part of long running
subsystem wide rework.
* ccs811
- Add DT binding docs and match table.
- Support external reset and wakeup pins.
* hid-sensors
- Reorganize buffer setup and tear down as part of long running
subsystem wide rework.
* ltr501
- Constify some structs.
* vcnl4000
- Fix an endian issue by using explicit byte swapped i2c accessors.
* tag 'iio-for-5.8b' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jic23/iio: (74 commits)
iio: light: ltr501: Constify structs
staging: iio: ad5933: attach life-cycle of kfifo buffer to parent device and use managed calls throughout
iio: bmp280: fix compensation of humidity
iio: light: cm32181: Fix integartion time typo
iio: light: cm32181: Add support for parsing CPM0 and CPM1 ACPI tables
iio: light: cm32181: Make lux_per_bit and lux_per_bit_base_it runtime settings
iio: light: cm32181: Use units of 1/100000th for calibscale and lux_per_bit
iio: light: cm32181: Change reg_init to use a bitmap of which registers to init
iio: light: cm32181: Handle CM3218 ACPI devices with 2 I2C resources
iio: light: cm32181: Clean up the probe function a bit
iio: light: cm32181: Add support for the CM3218
iio: light: cm32181: Add some extra register defines
iio: light: cm32181: Add support for ACPI enumeration
iio: light: cm32181: Switch to new style i2c-driver probe function
iio: hid-sensors: move triggered buffer setup into hid_sensor_setup_trigger
iio: vcnl4000: Add buffer support for VCNL4010/20.
iio: vcnl4000: Add sampling frequency support for VCNL4010/20.
iio: vcnl4000: Add event support for VCNL4010/20.
iio: vcnl4000: Factorize data reading and writing.
iio: vcnl4000: Fix i2c swapped word reading.
...
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usb_hcd_pci_probe expects users to call this with driver_data set as
hc_driver, that limits the possibility of using the driver_data for
driver data.
Add hc_driver as argument to usb_hcd_pci_probe and modify the callers
ehci/ohci/xhci/uhci to pass hc_driver as argument and freeup the
driver_data used
Tested xhci driver on Dragon-board RB3, compile tested ehci, ohci and
uhci.
[For all but the xHCI parts]
[For the xhci part]
Suggested-by: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Acked-by: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200514122039.300417-2-vkoul@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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All the users threat them as immutable - annotate them as such.
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Emil Velikov <emil.l.velikov@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200513214351.2138580-3-emil.l.velikov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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The user is not supposed to thinker with the underlying sysrq_key_op.
Make that explicit by adding a handful of const notations.
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Emil Velikov <emil.l.velikov@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200513214351.2138580-2-emil.l.velikov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
Export a pointer to the sysrq_get_key_op(). This way we can cleanly
unregister it, instead of the current solutions of modifuing it inplace.
Since __sysrq_get_key_op() is no longer used externally, let's make it
a static function.
This patch will allow us to limit access to each and every sysrq op and
constify the sysrq handling.
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Emil Velikov <emil.l.velikov@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200513214351.2138580-1-emil.l.velikov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
We're about to amend uart_get_rs485_mode() to support a GPIO pin for
rs485 bus termination. Retrieving the GPIO descriptor may fail, so
allow uart_get_rs485_mode() to return an errno and change all callers
to check for failure.
The GPIO descriptor is going to be stored in struct uart_port. Pass
that struct to uart_get_rs485_mode() in lieu of a struct device and
struct serial_rs485, both of which are directly accessible from struct
uart_port.
A few drivers call uart_get_rs485_mode() before setting the struct
device pointer in struct uart_port. Shuffle those calls around where
necessary.
[Heiko Stuebner did the ar933x_uart.c portion, hence his Signed-off-by.]
Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner <heiko@sntech.de>
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/271e814af4b0db3bffbbb74abf2b46b75add4516.1589285873.git.lukas@wunner.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
After moving iommu_group setup to iommu core code [1][2] and removing
private domain support in vt-d [3], there are no users for functions such
as iommu_request_dm_for_dev(), iommu_request_dma_domain_for_dev() and
request_default_domain_for_dev(). So, remove these functions.
[1] commit dce8d6964ebd ("iommu/amd: Convert to probe/release_device()
call-backs")
[2] commit e5d1841f18b2 ("iommu/vt-d: Convert to probe/release_device()
call-backs")
[3] commit 327d5b2fee91 ("iommu/vt-d: Allow 32bit devices to uses DMA
domain")
Signed-off-by: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200513224721.20504-1-sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
|
|
... or the odyssey of trying to disable the stack protector for the
function which generates the stack canary value.
The whole story started with Sergei reporting a boot crash with a kernel
built with gcc-10:
Kernel panic — not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: start_secondary
CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc5—00235—gfffb08b37df9 #139
Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. To be filled by O.E.M./H77M—D3H, BIOS F12 11/14/2013
Call Trace:
dump_stack
panic
? start_secondary
__stack_chk_fail
start_secondary
secondary_startup_64
-—-[ end Kernel panic — not syncing: stack—protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: start_secondary
This happens because gcc-10 tail-call optimizes the last function call
in start_secondary() - cpu_startup_entry() - and thus emits a stack
canary check which fails because the canary value changes after the
boot_init_stack_canary() call.
To fix that, the initial attempt was to mark the one function which
generates the stack canary with:
__attribute__((optimize("-fno-stack-protector"))) ... start_secondary(void *unused)
however, using the optimize attribute doesn't work cumulatively
as the attribute does not add to but rather replaces previously
supplied optimization options - roughly all -fxxx options.
The key one among them being -fno-omit-frame-pointer and thus leading to
not present frame pointer - frame pointer which the kernel needs.
The next attempt to prevent compilers from tail-call optimizing
the last function call cpu_startup_entry(), shy of carving out
start_secondary() into a separate compilation unit and building it with
-fno-stack-protector, was to add an empty asm("").
This current solution was short and sweet, and reportedly, is supported
by both compilers but we didn't get very far this time: future (LTO?)
optimization passes could potentially eliminate this, which leads us
to the third attempt: having an actual memory barrier there which the
compiler cannot ignore or move around etc.
That should hold for a long time, but hey we said that about the other
two solutions too so...
Reported-by: Sergei Trofimovich <slyfox@gentoo.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200314164451.346497-1-slyfox@gentoo.org
|
|
The current codebase makes use of the zero-length array language
extension to the C90 standard, but the preferred mechanism to declare
variable-length types such as these ones is a flexible array member[1][2],
introduced in C99:
struct foo {
int stuff;
struct boo array[];
};
By making use of the mechanism above, we will get a compiler warning
in case the flexible array does not occur last in the structure, which
will help us prevent some kind of undefined behavior bugs from being
inadvertently introduced[3] to the codebase from now on.
Also, notice that, dynamic memory allocations won't be affected by
this change:
"Flexible array members have incomplete type, and so the sizeof operator
may not be applied. As a quirk of the original implementation of
zero-length arrays, sizeof evaluates to zero."[1]
sizeof(flexible-array-member) triggers a warning because flexible array
members have incomplete type[1]. There are some instances of code in
which the sizeof operator is being incorrectly/erroneously applied to
zero-length arrays and the result is zero. Such instances may be hiding
some bugs. So, this work (flexible-array member conversions) will also
help to get completely rid of those sorts of issues.
This issue was found with the help of Coccinelle.
[1] https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Zero-Length.html
[2] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/21
[3] commit 76497732932f ("cxgb3/l2t: Fix undefined behaviour")
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Rosin <peda@axentia.se>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@kernel.org>
|
|
This is an immutable branch shared with the OPP tree. It contains also
the patches to convert the interconnect framework from tristate to bool
after Greg agreed with that. This will make the integration between
the OPP layer and interconnect much easier.
* icc-get-by-index:
interconnect: Add of_icc_get_by_index() helper function
interconnect: Disallow interconnect core to be built as a module
interconnect: Remove unused module exit code from core
Signed-off-by: Georgi Djakov <georgi.djakov@linaro.org>
|
|
Alexei Starovoitov says:
====================
pull-request: bpf-next 2020-05-14
The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net-next* tree.
The main changes are:
1) Merged tag 'perf-for-bpf-2020-05-06' from tip tree that includes CAP_PERFMON.
2) support for narrow loads in bpf_sock_addr progs and additional
helpers in cg-skb progs, from Andrey.
3) bpf benchmark runner, from Andrii.
4) arm and riscv JIT optimizations, from Luke.
5) bpf iterator infrastructure, from Yonghong.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Set the correct bit when checking for PHY_BRCM_DIS_TXCRXC_NOENRGY on the
BCM54810 PHY.
Fixes: 0ececcfc9267 ("net: phy: broadcom: Allow BCM54810 to use bcm54xx_adjust_rxrefclk()")
Signed-off-by: Kevin Lo <kevlo@kevlo.org>
Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Previously we used pcie_find_root_port() to find a Root Port from a PCIe
device and pci_find_pcie_root_port() to find a Root Port from a
Conventional PCI device.
Unify the two functions and use pcie_find_root_port() to find a Root Port
from either a Conventional PCI device or a PCIe device. Then there is no
need to distinguish the type of the device.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1589019568-5216-1-git-send-email-yangyicong@hisilicon.com
Signed-off-by: Yicong Yang <yangyicong@hisilicon.com>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Acked-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org> # wireless
Acked-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> # thunderbolt
|
|
On some adjacent code, fix bad code formatting
Signed-off-by: Ariel Elior <ariel.elior@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Kalderon <michal.kalderon@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Igor Russkikh <irusskikh@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
On different hardware events we have to respond differently,
on some of hardware indications hw attention (error condition)
should be cleared by the driver to continue normal functioning.
Here we introduce attention clear flags, and put them on some
important events (in aeu_descs).
Signed-off-by: Ariel Elior <ariel.elior@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Kalderon <michal.kalderon@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Igor Russkikh <irusskikh@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Here we introduce qed device error tracking flags and error types.
qed_hw_err_notify is an entrace point to report errors.
It'll notify higher level drivers (qede/qedr/etc) to handle and recover
the error.
List of posible errors comes from hardware interfaces, but could be
extended in future.
Signed-off-by: Ariel Elior <ariel.elior@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Kalderon <michal.kalderon@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Igor Russkikh <irusskikh@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
security_secid_to_secctx is called by the bpf_lsm hook and a successful
return value (i.e 0) implies that the parameter will be consumed by the
LSM framework. The current behaviour return success when the pointer
isn't initialized when CONFIG_BPF_LSM is enabled, with the default
return from kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c.
This is the internal error:
[ 1229.341488][ T2659] usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from null address (offset 0, size 280)!
[ 1229.374977][ T2659] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 1229.376813][ T2659] kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:99!
[ 1229.378398][ T2659] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[ 1229.380348][ T2659] Modules linked in:
[ 1229.381654][ T2659] CPU: 0 PID: 2659 Comm: systemd-journal Tainted: G B W 5.7.0-rc5-next-20200511-00019-g864e0c6319b8-dirty #13
[ 1229.385429][ T2659] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
[ 1229.387143][ T2659] pstate: 80400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO BTYPE=--)
[ 1229.389165][ T2659] pc : usercopy_abort+0xc8/0xcc
[ 1229.390705][ T2659] lr : usercopy_abort+0xc8/0xcc
[ 1229.392225][ T2659] sp : ffff000064247450
[ 1229.393533][ T2659] x29: ffff000064247460 x28: 0000000000000000
[ 1229.395449][ T2659] x27: 0000000000000118 x26: 0000000000000000
[ 1229.397384][ T2659] x25: ffffa000127049e0 x24: ffffa000127049e0
[ 1229.399306][ T2659] x23: ffffa000127048e0 x22: ffffa000127048a0
[ 1229.401241][ T2659] x21: ffffa00012704b80 x20: ffffa000127049e0
[ 1229.403163][ T2659] x19: ffffa00012704820 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 1229.405094][ T2659] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 1229.407008][ T2659] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 003d090000000000
[ 1229.408942][ T2659] x13: ffff80000d5b25b2 x12: 1fffe0000d5b25b1
[ 1229.410859][ T2659] x11: 1fffe0000d5b25b1 x10: ffff80000d5b25b1
[ 1229.412791][ T2659] x9 : ffffa0001034bee0 x8 : ffff00006ad92d8f
[ 1229.414707][ T2659] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffffa00015eacb20
[ 1229.416642][ T2659] x5 : ffff0000693c8040 x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 1229.418558][ T2659] x3 : ffffa0001034befc x2 : d57a7483a01c6300
[ 1229.420610][ T2659] x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000059
[ 1229.422526][ T2659] Call trace:
[ 1229.423631][ T2659] usercopy_abort+0xc8/0xcc
[ 1229.425091][ T2659] __check_object_size+0xdc/0x7d4
[ 1229.426729][ T2659] put_cmsg+0xa30/0xa90
[ 1229.428132][ T2659] unix_dgram_recvmsg+0x80c/0x930
[ 1229.429731][ T2659] sock_recvmsg+0x9c/0xc0
[ 1229.431123][ T2659] ____sys_recvmsg+0x1cc/0x5f8
[ 1229.432663][ T2659] ___sys_recvmsg+0x100/0x160
[ 1229.434151][ T2659] __sys_recvmsg+0x110/0x1a8
[ 1229.435623][ T2659] __arm64_sys_recvmsg+0x58/0x70
[ 1229.437218][ T2659] el0_svc_common.constprop.1+0x29c/0x340
[ 1229.438994][ T2659] do_el0_svc+0xe8/0x108
[ 1229.440587][ T2659] el0_svc+0x74/0x88
[ 1229.441917][ T2659] el0_sync_handler+0xe4/0x8b4
[ 1229.443464][ T2659] el0_sync+0x17c/0x180
[ 1229.444920][ T2659] Code: aa1703e2 aa1603e1 910a8260 97ecc860 (d4210000)
[ 1229.447070][ T2659] ---[ end trace 400497d91baeaf51 ]---
[ 1229.448791][ T2659] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[ 1229.450692][ T2659] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 1229.452061][ T2659] CPU features: 0x240002,20002004
[ 1229.453647][ T2659] Memory Limit: none
[ 1229.455015][ T2659] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]---
Rework the so the default return value is -EOPNOTSUPP.
There are likely other callbacks such as security_inode_getsecctx() that
may have the same problem, and that someone that understand the code
better needs to audit them.
Thank you Arnd for helping me figure out what went wrong.
Fixes: 98e828a0650f ("security: Refactor declaration of LSM hooks")
Signed-off-by: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200512174607.9630-1-anders.roxell@linaro.org
|
|
Merge misc fixes from Andrew Morton:
"7 fixes"
* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>:
kasan: add missing functions declarations to kasan.h
kasan: consistently disable debugging features
ipc/util.c: sysvipc_find_ipc() incorrectly updates position index
userfaultfd: fix remap event with MREMAP_DONTUNMAP
mm/gup: fix fixup_user_fault() on multiple retries
epoll: call final ep_events_available() check under the lock
mm, memcg: fix inconsistent oom event behavior
|
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull more tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"Various tracing fixes:
- Fix a crash when having function tracing and function stack tracing
on the command line.
The ftrace trampolines are created as executable and read only. But
the stack tracer tries to modify them with text_poke() which
expects all kernel text to still be writable at boot. Keep the
trampolines writable at boot, and convert them to read-only with
the rest of the kernel.
- A selftest was triggering in the ring buffer iterator code, that is
no longer valid with the update of keeping the ring buffer writable
while a iterator is reading.
Just bail after three failed attempts to get an event and remove
the warning and disabling of the ring buffer.
- While modifying the ring buffer code, decided to remove all the
unnecessary BUG() calls"
* tag 'trace-v5.7-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
ring-buffer: Remove all BUG() calls
ring-buffer: Don't deactivate the ring buffer on failed iterator reads
x86/ftrace: Have ftrace trampolines turn read-only at the end of system boot up
|
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A recent commit 9852ae3fe529 ("mm, memcg: consider subtrees in
memory.events") changed the behavior of memcg events, which will now
consider subtrees in memory.events.
But oom_kill event is a special one as it is used in both cgroup1 and
cgroup2. In cgroup1, it is displayed in memory.oom_control. The file
memory.oom_control is in both root memcg and non root memcg, that is
different with memory.event as it only in non-root memcg. That commit
is okay for cgroup2, but it is not okay for cgroup1 as it will cause
inconsistent behavior between root memcg and non-root memcg.
Here's an example on why this behavior is inconsistent in cgroup1.
root memcg
/
memcg foo
/
memcg bar
Suppose there's an oom_kill in memcg bar, then the oon_kill will be
root memcg : memory.oom_control(oom_kill) 0
/
memcg foo : memory.oom_control(oom_kill) 1
/
memcg bar : memory.oom_control(oom_kill) 1
For the non-root memcg, its memory.oom_control(oom_kill) includes its
descendants' oom_kill, but for root memcg, it doesn't include its
descendants' oom_kill. That means, memory.oom_control(oom_kill) has
different meanings in different memcgs. That is inconsistent. Then the
user has to know whether the memcg is root or not.
If we can't fully support it in cgroup1, for example by adding
memory.events.local into cgroup1 as well, then let's don't touch its
original behavior.
Fixes: 9852ae3fe529 ("mm, memcg: consider subtrees in memory.events")
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Acked-by: Chris Down <chris@chrisdown.name>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200502141055.7378-1-laoar.shao@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Blk-crypto delegates crypto operations to inline encryption hardware
when available. The separately configurable blk-crypto-fallback contains
a software fallback to the kernel crypto API - when enabled, blk-crypto
will use this fallback for en/decryption when inline encryption hardware
is not available.
This lets upper layers not have to worry about whether or not the
underlying device has support for inline encryption before deciding to
specify an encryption context for a bio. It also allows for testing
without actual inline encryption hardware - in particular, it makes it
possible to test the inline encryption code in ext4 and f2fs simply by
running xfstests with the inlinecrypt mount option, which in turn allows
for things like the regular upstream regression testing of ext4 to cover
the inline encryption code paths.
For more details, refer to Documentation/block/inline-encryption.rst.
Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
Whenever a device supports blk-integrity, make the kernel pretend that
the device doesn't support inline encryption (essentially by setting the
keyslot manager in the request queue to NULL).
There's no hardware currently that supports both integrity and inline
encryption. However, it seems possible that there will be such hardware
in the near future (like the NVMe key per I/O support that might support
both inline encryption and PI).
But properly integrating both features is not trivial, and without
real hardware that implements both, it is difficult to tell if it will
be done correctly by the majority of hardware that support both.
So it seems best not to support both features together right now, and
to decide what to do at probe time.
Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
We must have some way of letting a storage device driver know what
encryption context it should use for en/decrypting a request. However,
it's the upper layers (like the filesystem/fscrypt) that know about and
manages encryption contexts. As such, when the upper layer submits a bio
to the block layer, and this bio eventually reaches a device driver with
support for inline encryption, the device driver will need to have been
told the encryption context for that bio.
We want to communicate the encryption context from the upper layer to the
storage device along with the bio, when the bio is submitted to the block
layer. To do this, we add a struct bio_crypt_ctx to struct bio, which can
represent an encryption context (note that we can't use the bi_private
field in struct bio to do this because that field does not function to pass
information across layers in the storage stack). We also introduce various
functions to manipulate the bio_crypt_ctx and make the bio/request merging
logic aware of the bio_crypt_ctx.
We also make changes to blk-mq to make it handle bios with encryption
contexts. blk-mq can merge many bios into the same request. These bios need
to have contiguous data unit numbers (the necessary changes to blk-merge
are also made to ensure this) - as such, it suffices to keep the data unit
number of just the first bio, since that's all a storage driver needs to
infer the data unit number to use for each data block in each bio in a
request. blk-mq keeps track of the encryption context to be used for all
the bios in a request with the request's rq_crypt_ctx. When the first bio
is added to an empty request, blk-mq will program the encryption context
of that bio into the request_queue's keyslot manager, and store the
returned keyslot in the request's rq_crypt_ctx. All the functions to
operate on encryption contexts are in blk-crypto.c.
Upper layers only need to call bio_crypt_set_ctx with the encryption key,
algorithm and data_unit_num; they don't have to worry about getting a
keyslot for each encryption context, as blk-mq/blk-crypto handles that.
Blk-crypto also makes it possible for request-based layered devices like
dm-rq to make use of inline encryption hardware by cloning the
rq_crypt_ctx and programming a keyslot in the new request_queue when
necessary.
Note that any user of the block layer can submit bios with an
encryption context, such as filesystems, device-mapper targets, etc.
Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
Inline Encryption hardware allows software to specify an encryption context
(an encryption key, crypto algorithm, data unit num, data unit size) along
with a data transfer request to a storage device, and the inline encryption
hardware will use that context to en/decrypt the data. The inline
encryption hardware is part of the storage device, and it conceptually sits
on the data path between system memory and the storage device.
Inline Encryption hardware implementations often function around the
concept of "keyslots". These implementations often have a limited number
of "keyslots", each of which can hold a key (we say that a key can be
"programmed" into a keyslot). Requests made to the storage device may have
a keyslot and a data unit number associated with them, and the inline
encryption hardware will en/decrypt the data in the requests using the key
programmed into that associated keyslot and the data unit number specified
with the request.
As keyslots are limited, and programming keys may be expensive in many
implementations, and multiple requests may use exactly the same encryption
contexts, we introduce a Keyslot Manager to efficiently manage keyslots.
We also introduce a blk_crypto_key, which will represent the key that's
programmed into keyslots managed by keyslot managers. The keyslot manager
also functions as the interface that upper layers will use to program keys
into inline encryption hardware. For more information on the Keyslot
Manager, refer to documentation found in block/keyslot-manager.c and
linux/keyslot-manager.h.
Co-developed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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POSIX defines faccessat() as having a fourth "flags" argument, while the
linux syscall doesn't have it. Glibc tries to emulate AT_EACCESS and
AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, but AT_EACCESS emulation is broken.
Add a new faccessat(2) syscall with the added flags argument and implement
both flags.
The value of AT_EACCESS is defined in glibc headers to be the same as
AT_REMOVEDIR. Use this value for the kernel interface as well, together
with the explanatory comment.
Also add AT_EMPTY_PATH support, which is not documented by POSIX, but can
be useful and is trivial to implement.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
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Systemd is hacking around to get it and it's trivial to add to statx, so...
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
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If mounts are deleted after a read(2) call on /proc/self/mounts (or its
kin), the subsequent read(2) could miss a mount that comes after the
deleted one in the list. This is because the file position is interpreted
as the number mount entries from the start of the list.
E.g. first read gets entries #0 to #9; the seq file index will be 10. Then
entry #5 is deleted, resulting in #10 becoming #9 and #11 becoming #10,
etc... The next read will continue from entry #10, and #9 is missed.
Solve this by adding a cursor entry for each open instance. Taking the
global namespace_sem for write seems excessive, since we are only dealing
with a per-namespace list. Instead add a per-namespace spinlock and use
that together with namespace_sem taken for read to protect against
concurrent modification of the mount list. This may reduce parallelism of
is_local_mountpoint(), but it's hardly a big contention point. We could
also use RCU freeing of cursors to make traversal not need additional
locks, if that turns out to be neceesary.
Only move the cursor once for each read (cursor is not added on open) to
minimize cacheline invalidation. When EOF is reached, the cursor is taken
off the list, in order to prevent an excessive number of cursors due to
inactive open file descriptors.
Reported-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
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Whiteouts, unlike real device node should not require privileges to create.
The general concern with device nodes is that opening them can have side
effects. The kernel already avoids zero major (see
Documentation/admin-guide/devices.txt). To be on the safe side the patch
explicitly forbids registering a char device with 0/0 number (see
cdev_add()).
This guarantees that a non-O_PATH open on a whiteout will fail with ENODEV;
i.e. it won't have any side effect.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
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blk_io_schedule() isn't called from performance sensitive code path, and
it is easier to maintain by exporting it as symbol.
Also blk_io_schedule() is only called by CONFIG_BLOCK code, so it is safe
to do this way. Meantime fixes build failure when CONFIG_BLOCK is off.
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Fixes: e6249cdd46e4 ("block: add blk_io_schedule() for avoiding task hung in sync dio")
Reported-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Tested-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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