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2025-07-11x86/pti: Add attack vector controls for PTIDavid Kaplan
Disable PTI mitigation if user->kernel attack vector mitigations are disabled. Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-20-david.kaplan@amd.com
2025-07-11x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for ITSDavid Kaplan
Use attack vector controls to determine if ITS mitigation is required. Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-19-david.kaplan@amd.com
2025-07-11x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for SRSODavid Kaplan
Use attack vector controls to determine if SRSO mitigation is required. Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-18-david.kaplan@amd.com
2025-07-11x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for L1TFDavid Kaplan
Use attack vector controls to determine if L1TF mitigation is required. Disable SMT if cross-thread protection is desired. Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-17-david.kaplan@amd.com
2025-07-11x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2David Kaplan
Use attack vector controls to determine if spectre_v2 mitigation is required. Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-16-david.kaplan@amd.com
2025-07-11x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for BHIDavid Kaplan
Use attack vector controls to determine if BHI mitigation is required. Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-15-david.kaplan@amd.com
2025-07-11x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2_userDavid Kaplan
Use attack vector controls to determine if spectre_v2_user mitigation is required. Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-14-david.kaplan@amd.com
2025-07-11x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for retbleedDavid Kaplan
Use attack vector controls to determine if retbleed mitigation is required. Disable SMT if cross-thread protection is desired and STIBP is not available. Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-13-david.kaplan@amd.com
2025-07-11x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v1David Kaplan
Use attack vector controls to determine if spectre_v1 mitigation is required. Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-12-david.kaplan@amd.com
2025-07-11x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for GDSDavid Kaplan
Use attack vector controls to determine if GDS mitigation is required. Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-11-david.kaplan@amd.com
2025-07-11x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for SRBDSDavid Kaplan
Use attack vector controls to determine if SRBDS mitigation is required. Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-10-david.kaplan@amd.com
2025-07-11x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for RFDSDavid Kaplan
Use attack vector controls to determine if RFDS mitigation is required. Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-9-david.kaplan@amd.com
2025-07-11x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for MMIODavid Kaplan
Use attack vectors controls to determine if MMIO mitigation is required. Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-8-david.kaplan@amd.com
2025-07-11x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for TAADavid Kaplan
Use attack vector controls to determine if TAA mitigation is required. Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-7-david.kaplan@amd.com
2025-07-11x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for MDSDavid Kaplan
Use attack vector controls to determine if MDS mitigation is required. The global mitigations=off command now simply disables all attack vectors so explicit checking of mitigations=off is no longer needed. If cross-thread attack mitigations are required, disable SMT. Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-6-david.kaplan@amd.com
2025-07-11x86/bugs: Define attack vectors relevant for each bugDavid Kaplan
Add a function which defines which vulnerabilities should be mitigated based on the selected attack vector controls. The selections here are based on the individual characteristics of each vulnerability. Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-5-david.kaplan@amd.com
2025-07-11x86/Kconfig: Add arch attack vector supportDavid Kaplan
ARCH_HAS_CPU_ATTACK_VECTORS should be set for architectures which implement the new attack-vector based controls for CPU mitigations. If an arch does not support attack-vector based controls then an attempt to use them results in a warning. Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-4-david.kaplan@amd.com
2025-07-11cpu: Define attack vectorsDavid Kaplan
Define 4 new attack vectors that are used for controlling CPU speculation mitigations. These may be individually disabled as part of the mitigations= command line. Attack vector controls are combined with global options like 'auto' or 'auto,nosmt' like 'mitigations=auto,no_user_kernel'. The global options come first in the mitigations= string. Cross-thread mitigations can either remain enabled fully, including potentially disabling SMT ('auto,nosmt'), remain enabled except for disabling SMT ('auto'), or entirely disabled through the new 'no_cross_thread' attack vector option. The default settings for these attack vectors are consistent with existing kernel defaults, other than the automatic disabling of VM-based attack vectors if KVM support is not present. Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-3-david.kaplan@amd.com
2025-07-11Documentation/x86: Document new attack vector controlsDavid Kaplan
Document the 5 new attack vector command line options, how they interact with existing vulnerability controls, and recommendations on when they can be disabled. Note that while mitigating against untrusted userspace requires both user-to-kernel and user-to-user protection, these are kept separate. The kernel can control what code executes inside of it and that may affect the risk associated with vulnerabilities especially if new kernel mitigations are implemented. The same isn't typically true of userspace. In other words, the risk associated with user-to-user or guest-to-guest attacks is unlikely to change over time. While the risk associated with user-to-kernel or guest-to-host attacks may change. Therefore, these controls are separated. Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250709155731.3279419-1-david.kaplan@amd.com
2025-07-09Merge tag 'tsa_x86_bugs_for_6.16' into tip-x86-bugsBorislav Petkov (AMD)
Pick up TSA changes from mainline so that attack vectors work can continue ontop. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
2025-06-26x86/bugs: Clean up SRSO microcode handlingDavid Kaplan
SRSO microcode only exists for Zen3/Zen4 CPUs. For those CPUs, the microcode is required for any mitigation other than Safe-RET to be effective. Safe-RET can still protect user->kernel and guest->host attacks without microcode. Clarify this in the code and ensure that SRSO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED is selected for any mitigation besides Safe-RET if the required microcode isn't present. Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250625155805.600376-4-david.kaplan@amd.com
2025-06-26x86/bugs: Use IBPB for retbleed if used by SRSODavid Kaplan
If spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb then this mitigates retbleed as well. This is relevant for AMD Zen1 and Zen2 CPUs which are vulnerable to both bugs. Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Cc: H . Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Cc: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250625155805.600376-3-david.kaplan@amd.com
2025-06-26x86/bugs: Add SRSO_MITIGATION_NOSMTDavid Kaplan
AMD Zen1 and Zen2 CPUs with SMT disabled are not vulnerable to SRSO. Instead of overloading the X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO bit to indicate this, define a separate mitigation to make the code cleaner. Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Cc: H . Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Cc: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250625155805.600376-2-david.kaplan@amd.com
2025-06-24x86/bugs: Allow ITS stuffing in eIBRS+retpoline mode alsoPawan Gupta
After a recent restructuring of the ITS mitigation, RSB stuffing can no longer be enabled in eIBRS+Retpoline mode. Before ITS, retbleed mitigation only allowed stuffing when eIBRS was not enabled. This was perfectly fine since eIBRS mitigates retbleed. However, RSB stuffing mitigation for ITS is still needed with eIBRS. The restructuring solely relies on retbleed to deploy stuffing, and does not allow it when eIBRS is enabled. This behavior is different from what was before the restructuring. Fix it by allowing stuffing in eIBRS+retpoline mode also. Fixes: 61ab72c2c6bf ("x86/bugs: Restructure ITS mitigation") Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20250519235101.2vm6sc5txyoykb2r@desk/ Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250611-eibrs-fix-v4-7-5ff86cac6c61@linux.intel.com
2025-06-23x86/bugs: Remove its=stuff dependency on retbleedPawan Gupta
Allow ITS to enable stuffing independent of retbleed. The dependency is only on retpoline. It is a valid case for retbleed to be mitigated by eIBRS while ITS deploys stuffing at the same time. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250611-eibrs-fix-v4-6-5ff86cac6c61@linux.intel.com
2025-06-23x86/bugs: Introduce cdt_possible()Pawan Gupta
In preparation to allow ITS to also enable stuffing aka Call Depth Tracking (CDT) independently of retbleed, introduce a helper cdt_possible(). Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250611-eibrs-fix-v4-5-5ff86cac6c61@linux.intel.com
2025-06-23x86/bugs: Use switch/case in its_apply_mitigation()Pawan Gupta
Prepare to apply stuffing mitigation in its_apply_mitigation(). This is currently only done via retbleed mitigation. Also using switch/case makes it evident that mitigation mode like VMEXIT_ONLY doesn't need any special handling. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250611-eibrs-fix-v4-4-5ff86cac6c61@linux.intel.com
2025-06-23x86/bugs: Avoid warning when overriding return thunkPawan Gupta
The purpose of the warning is to prevent an unexpected change to the return thunk mitigation. However, there are legitimate cases where the return thunk is intentionally set more than once. For example, ITS and SRSO both can set the return thunk after retbleed has set it. In both the cases retbleed is still mitigated. Replace the warning with an info about the active return thunk. Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250611-eibrs-fix-v4-3-5ff86cac6c61@linux.intel.com
2025-06-23x86/bugs: Simplify the retbleed=stuff checksPawan Gupta
Simplify the nested checks, remove redundant print and comment. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250611-eibrs-fix-v4-2-5ff86cac6c61@linux.intel.com
2025-06-23x86/bugs: Avoid AUTO after the select step in the retbleed mitigationPawan Gupta
The retbleed select function leaves the mitigation to AUTO in some cases. Moreover, the update function can also set the mitigation to AUTO. This is inconsistent with other mitigations and requires explicit handling of AUTO at the end of update step. Make sure a mitigation gets selected in the select step, and do not change it to AUTO in the update step. When no mitigation can be selected leave it to NONE, which is what AUTO was getting changed to in the end. Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250611-eibrs-fix-v4-1-5ff86cac6c61@linux.intel.com
2025-06-17x86/process: Move the buffer clearing before MONITORBorislav Petkov (AMD)
Move the VERW clearing before the MONITOR so that VERW doesn't disarm it and the machine never enters C1. Original idea by Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>. Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
2025-06-17x86/microcode/AMD: Add TSA microcode SHAsBorislav Petkov (AMD)
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
2025-06-17KVM: SVM: Advertise TSA CPUID bits to guestsBorislav Petkov (AMD)
Synthesize the TSA CPUID feature bits for guests. Set TSA_{SQ,L1}_NO on unaffected machines. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
2025-06-17x86/bugs: Add a Transient Scheduler Attacks mitigationBorislav Petkov (AMD)
Add the required features detection glue to bugs.c et all in order to support the TSA mitigation. Co-developed-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
2025-06-16x86/bugs: Rename MDS machinery to something more genericBorislav Petkov (AMD)
It will be used by other x86 mitigations. No functional changes. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
2025-06-15Linux 6.16-rc2v6.16-rc2Linus Torvalds
2025-06-15Merge tag 'kbuild-fixes-v6.16' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild Pull Kbuild fixes from Masahiro Yamada: - Move warnings about linux/export.h from W=1 to W=2 - Fix structure type overrides in gendwarfksyms * tag 'kbuild-fixes-v6.16' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild: gendwarfksyms: Fix structure type overrides kbuild: move warnings about linux/export.h from W=1 to W=2
2025-06-16gendwarfksyms: Fix structure type overridesSami Tolvanen
As we always iterate through the entire die_map when expanding type strings, recursively processing referenced types in type_expand_child() is not actually necessary. Furthermore, the type_string kABI rule added in commit c9083467f7b9 ("gendwarfksyms: Add a kABI rule to override type strings") can fail to override type strings for structures due to a missing kabi_get_type_string() check in this function. Fix the issue by dropping the unnecessary recursion and moving the override check to type_expand(). Note that symbol versions are otherwise unchanged with this patch. Fixes: c9083467f7b9 ("gendwarfksyms: Add a kABI rule to override type strings") Reported-by: Giuliano Procida <gprocida@google.com> Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Reviewed-by: Petr Pavlu <petr.pavlu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
2025-06-16kbuild: move warnings about linux/export.h from W=1 to W=2Masahiro Yamada
This hides excessive warnings, as nobody builds with W=2. Fixes: a934a57a42f6 ("scripts/misc-check: check missing #include <linux/export.h> when W=1") Fixes: 7d95680d64ac ("scripts/misc-check: check unnecessary #include <linux/export.h> when W=1") Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
2025-06-14Merge tag 'v6.16-rc1-smb3-client-fixes' of git://git.samba.org/sfrench/cifs-2.6Linus Torvalds
Pull smb client fixes from Steve French: - SMB3.1.1 POSIX extensions fix for char remapping - Fix for repeated directory listings when directory leases enabled - deferred close handle reuse fix * tag 'v6.16-rc1-smb3-client-fixes' of git://git.samba.org/sfrench/cifs-2.6: smb: improve directory cache reuse for readdir operations smb: client: fix perf regression with deferred closes smb: client: disable path remapping with POSIX extensions
2025-06-14Merge tag 'iommu-fixes-v6.16-rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/iommu/linux Pull iommu fix from Joerg Roedel: - Fix PTE size calculation for NVidia Tegra * tag 'iommu-fixes-v6.16-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/iommu/linux: iommu/tegra: Fix incorrect size calculation
2025-06-14Merge tag 'block-6.16-20250614' of git://git.kernel.dk/linuxLinus Torvalds
Pull block fixes from Jens Axboe: - Fix for a deadlock on queue freeze with zoned writes - Fix for zoned append emulation - Two bio folio fixes, for sparsemem and for very large folios - Fix for a performance regression introduced in 6.13 when plug insertion was changed - Fix for NVMe passthrough handling for polled IO - Document the ublk auto registration feature - loop lockdep warning fix * tag 'block-6.16-20250614' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux: nvme: always punt polled uring_cmd end_io work to task_work Documentation: ublk: Separate UBLK_F_AUTO_BUF_REG fallback behavior sublists block: Fix bvec_set_folio() for very large folios bio: Fix bio_first_folio() for SPARSEMEM without VMEMMAP block: use plug request list tail for one-shot backmerge attempt block: don't use submit_bio_noacct_nocheck in blk_zone_wplug_bio_work block: Clear BIO_EMULATES_ZONE_APPEND flag on BIO completion ublk: document auto buffer registration(UBLK_F_AUTO_BUF_REG) loop: move lo_set_size() out of queue freeze
2025-06-14Merge tag 'io_uring-6.16-20250614' of git://git.kernel.dk/linuxLinus Torvalds
Pull io_uring fixes from Jens Axboe: - Fix for a race between SQPOLL exit and fdinfo reading. It's slim and I was only able to reproduce this with an artificial delay in the kernel. Followup sparse fix as well to unify the access to ->thread. - Fix for multiple buffer peeking, avoiding truncation if possible. - Run local task_work for IOPOLL reaping when the ring is exiting. This currently isn't done due to an assumption that polled IO will never need task_work, but a fix on the block side is going to change that. * tag 'io_uring-6.16-20250614' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux: io_uring: run local task_work from ring exit IOPOLL reaping io_uring/kbuf: don't truncate end buffer for multiple buffer peeks io_uring: consistently use rcu semantics with sqpoll thread io_uring: fix use-after-free of sq->thread in __io_uring_show_fdinfo()
2025-06-14Merge tag 'rust-fixes-6.16' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ojeda/linux Pull Rust fix from Miguel Ojeda: - 'hrtimer': fix future compile error when the 'impl_has_hr_timer!' macro starts to get called * tag 'rust-fixes-6.16' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ojeda/linux: rust: time: Fix compile error in impl_has_hr_timer macro
2025-06-14Merge tag 'mm-hotfixes-stable-2025-06-13-21-56' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Pull misc fixes from Andrew Morton: "9 hotfixes. 3 are cc:stable and the remainder address post-6.15 issues or aren't considered necessary for -stable kernels. Only 4 are for MM" * tag 'mm-hotfixes-stable-2025-06-13-21-56' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: mm: add mmap_prepare() compatibility layer for nested file systems init: fix build warnings about export.h MAINTAINERS: add Barry as a THP reviewer drivers/rapidio/rio_cm.c: prevent possible heap overwrite mm: close theoretical race where stale TLB entries could linger mm/vma: reset VMA iterator on commit_merge() OOM failure docs: proc: update VmFlags documentation in smaps scatterlist: fix extraneous '@'-sign kernel-doc notation selftests/mm: skip failed memfd setups in gup_longterm
2025-06-13Merge tag 'scsi-fixes' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/scsi Pull SCSI fixes from James Bottomley: "All fixes for drivers. The core change in the error handler is simply to translate an ALUA specific sense code into a retry the ALUA components can handle and won't impact any other devices" * tag 'scsi-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/scsi: scsi: error: alua: I/O errors for ALUA state transitions scsi: storvsc: Increase the timeouts to storvsc_timeout scsi: s390: zfcp: Ensure synchronous unit_add scsi: iscsi: Fix incorrect error path labels for flashnode operations scsi: mvsas: Fix typos in per-phy comments and SAS cmd port registers scsi: core: ufs: Fix a hang in the error handler
2025-06-13Merge tag 'drm-fixes-2025-06-14' of https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/kernelLinus Torvalds
Pull drm fixes from Dave Airlie: "Quiet week, only two pull requests came my way, xe has a couple of fixes and then a bunch of fixes across the board, vc4 probably fixes the biggest problem: vc4: - Fix infinite EPROBE_DEFER loop in vc4 probing amdxdna: - Fix amdxdna firmware size meson: - modesetting fixes sitronix: - Kconfig fix for st7171-i2c dma-buf: - Fix -EBUSY WARN_ON_ONCE in dma-buf udmabuf: - Use dma_sync_sgtable_for_cpu in udmabuf xe: - Fix regression disallowing 64K SVM migration - Use a bounce buffer for WA BB" * tag 'drm-fixes-2025-06-14' of https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/kernel: drm/xe/lrc: Use a temporary buffer for WA BB udmabuf: use sgtable-based scatterlist wrappers dma-buf: fix compare in WARN_ON_ONCE drm/sitronix: st7571-i2c: Select VIDEOMODE_HELPERS drm/meson: fix more rounding issues with 59.94Hz modes drm/meson: use vclk_freq instead of pixel_freq in debug print drm/meson: fix debug log statement when setting the HDMI clocks drm/vc4: fix infinite EPROBE_DEFER loop drm/xe/svm: Fix regression disallowing 64K SVM migration accel/amdxdna: Fix incorrect PSP firmware size
2025-06-13io_uring: run local task_work from ring exit IOPOLL reapingJens Axboe
In preparation for needing to shift NVMe passthrough to always use task_work for polled IO completions, ensure that those are suitably run at exit time. See commit: 9ce6c9875f3e ("nvme: always punt polled uring_cmd end_io work to task_work") for details on why that is necessary. Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2025-06-13nvme: always punt polled uring_cmd end_io work to task_workJens Axboe
Currently NVMe uring_cmd completions will complete locally, if they are polled. This is done because those completions are always invoked from task context. And while that is true, there's no guarantee that it's invoked under the right ring context, or even task. If someone does NVMe passthrough via multiple threads and with a limited number of poll queues, then ringA may find completions from ringB. For that case, completing the request may not be sound. Always just punt the passthrough completions via task_work, which will redirect the completion, if needed. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 585079b6e425 ("nvme: wire up async polling for io passthrough commands") Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2025-06-13Merge tag 'acpi-6.16-rc2' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rafael/linux-pm Pull ACPI fixes from Rafael Wysocki: "These fix an ACPI APEI error injection driver failure that started to occur after switching it over to using a faux device, address an EC driver issue related to invalid ECDT tables, clean up the usage of mwait_idle_with_hints() in the ACPI PAD driver, add a new IRQ override quirk, and fix a NULL pointer dereference related to nosmp: - Update the faux device handling code in the driver core and address an ACPI APEI error injection driver failure that started to occur after switching it over to using a faux device on top of that (Dan Williams) - Update data types of variables passed as arguments to mwait_idle_with_hints() in the ACPI PAD (processor aggregator device) driver to match the function definition after recent changes (Uros Bizjak) - Fix a NULL pointer dereference in the ACPI CPPC library that occurs when nosmp is passed to the kernel in the command line (Yunhui Cui) - Ignore ECDT tables with an invalid ID string to prevent using an incorrect GPE for signaling events on some systems (Armin Wolf) - Add a new IRQ override quirk for MACHENIKE 16P (Wentao Guan)" * tag 'acpi-6.16-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rafael/linux-pm: ACPI: resource: Use IRQ override on MACHENIKE 16P ACPI: EC: Ignore ECDT tables with an invalid ID string ACPI: CPPC: Fix NULL pointer dereference when nosmp is used ACPI: PAD: Update arguments of mwait_idle_with_hints() ACPI: APEI: EINJ: Do not fail einj_init() on faux_device_create() failure driver core: faux: Quiet probe failures driver core: faux: Suppress bind attributes
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