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This command is used to query the SNP platform status. See the SEV-SNP
spec for more details.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240126041126.1927228-24-michael.roth@amd.com
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With all the required host changes in place, it should now be possible
to initialize SNP-related MSR bits, set up RMP table enforcement, and
initialize SNP support in firmware while maintaining legacy support for
SEV/SEV-ES guests. Go ahead and enable the SNP feature now.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240126041126.1927228-23-michael.roth@amd.com
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Implement a workaround for an SNP erratum where the CPU will incorrectly
signal an RMP violation #PF if a hugepage (2MB or 1GB) collides with the
RMP entry of a VMCB, VMSA or AVIC backing page.
When SEV-SNP is globally enabled, the CPU marks the VMCB, VMSA, and AVIC
backing pages as "in-use" via a reserved bit in the corresponding RMP
entry after a successful VMRUN. This is done for _all_ VMs, not just
SNP-Active VMs.
If the hypervisor accesses an in-use page through a writable
translation, the CPU will throw an RMP violation #PF. On early SNP
hardware, if an in-use page is 2MB-aligned and software accesses any
part of the associated 2MB region with a hugepage, the CPU will
incorrectly treat the entire 2MB region as in-use and signal a an RMP
violation #PF.
To avoid this, the recommendation is to not use a 2MB-aligned page for
the VMCB, VMSA or AVIC pages. Add a generic allocator that will ensure
that the page returned is not 2MB-aligned and is safe to be used when
SEV-SNP is enabled. Also implement similar handling for the VMCB/VMSA
pages of nested guests.
[ mdr: Squash in nested guest handling from Ashish, commit msg fixups. ]
Reported-by: Alper Gun <alpergun@google.com> # for nested VMSA case
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240126041126.1927228-22-michael.roth@amd.com
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Add a kdump safe version of sev_firmware_shutdown() and register it as a
crash_kexec_post_notifier so it will be invoked during panic/crash to do
SEV/SNP shutdown. This is required for transitioning all IOMMU pages to
reclaim/hypervisor state, otherwise re-init of IOMMU pages during
crashdump kernel boot fails and panics the crashdump kernel.
This panic notifier runs in atomic context, hence it ensures not to
acquire any locks/mutexes and polls for PSP command completion instead
of depending on PSP command completion interrupt.
[ mdr: Remove use of "we" in comments. ]
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240126041126.1927228-21-michael.roth@amd.com
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Add a new IOMMU API interface amd_iommu_snp_disable() to transition
IOMMU pages to Hypervisor state from Reclaim state after SNP_SHUTDOWN_EX
command. Invoke this API from the CCP driver after SNP_SHUTDOWN_EX
command.
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240126041126.1927228-20-michael.roth@amd.com
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The behavior of legacy SEV commands is altered when the firmware is
initialized for SNP support. In that case, all command buffer memory
that may get written to by legacy SEV commands must be marked as
firmware-owned in the RMP table prior to issuing the command.
Additionally, when a command buffer contains a system physical address
that points to additional buffers that firmware may write to, special
handling is needed depending on whether:
1) the system physical address points to guest memory
2) the system physical address points to host memory
To handle case #1, the pages of these buffers are changed to
firmware-owned in the RMP table before issuing the command, and restored
to hypervisor-owned after the command completes.
For case #2, a bounce buffer is used instead of the original address.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240126041126.1927228-19-michael.roth@amd.com
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For SEV/SEV-ES, a buffer can be used to access non-volatile data so it
can be initialized from a file specified by the init_ex_path CCP module
parameter instead of relying on the SPI bus for NV storage, and
afterward the buffer can be read from to sync new data back to the file.
When SNP is enabled, the pages comprising this buffer need to be set to
firmware-owned in the RMP table before they can be accessed by firmware
for subsequent updates to the initial contents.
Implement that handling here.
[ bp: Carve out allocation into a helper. ]
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240126041126.1927228-18-michael.roth@amd.com
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The behavior and requirement for the SEV-legacy command is altered when
the SNP firmware is in the INIT state. See SEV-SNP firmware ABI
specification for more details.
Allocate the Trusted Memory Region (TMR) as a 2MB-sized/aligned region
when SNP is enabled to satisfy new requirements for SNP. Continue
allocating a 1MB-sized region for !SNP configuration.
[ bp: Carve out TMR allocation into a helper. ]
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240126041126.1927228-17-michael.roth@amd.com
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Pages are unsafe to be released back to the page-allocator if they
have been transitioned to firmware/guest state and can't be reclaimed
or transitioned back to hypervisor/shared state. In this case, add them
to an internal leaked pages list to ensure that they are not freed or
touched/accessed to cause fatal page faults.
[ mdr: Relocate to arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c ]
Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240126041126.1927228-16-michael.roth@amd.com
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Export sev_do_cmd() as a generic API for the hypervisor to issue
commands to manage an SEV or an SNP guest. The commands for SEV and SNP
are defined in the SEV and SEV-SNP firmware specifications.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240126041126.1927228-15-michael.roth@amd.com
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Before SNP VMs can be launched, the platform must be appropriately
configured and initialized via the SNP_INIT command.
During the execution of SNP_INIT command, the firmware configures
and enables SNP security policy enforcement in many system components.
Some system components write to regions of memory reserved by early
x86 firmware (e.g. UEFI). Other system components write to regions
provided by the operation system, hypervisor, or x86 firmware.
Such system components can only write to HV-fixed pages or Default
pages. They will error when attempting to write to pages in other page
states after SNP_INIT enables their SNP enforcement.
Starting in SNP firmware v1.52, the SNP_INIT_EX command takes a list of
system physical address ranges to convert into the HV-fixed page states
during the RMP initialization. If INIT_RMP is 1, hypervisors should
provide all system physical address ranges that the hypervisor will
never assign to a guest until the next RMP re-initialization.
For instance, the memory that UEFI reserves should be included in the
range list. This allows system components that occasionally write to
memory (e.g. logging to UEFI reserved regions) to not fail due to
RMP initialization and SNP enablement.
Note that SNP_INIT(_EX) must not be executed while non-SEV guests are
executing, otherwise it is possible that the system could reset or hang.
The psp_init_on_probe module parameter was added for SEV/SEV-ES support
and the init_ex_path module parameter to allow for time for the
necessary file system to be mounted/available.
SNP_INIT(_EX) does not use the file associated with init_ex_path. So, to
avoid running into issues where SNP_INIT(_EX) is called while there are
other running guests, issue it during module probe regardless of the
psp_init_on_probe setting, but maintain the previous deferrable handling
for SEV/SEV-ES initialization.
[ mdr: Squash in psp_init_on_probe changes from Tom, reduce
proliferation of 'probe' function parameter where possible.
bp: Fix 32-bit allmodconfig build. ]
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@profian.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@profian.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240126041126.1927228-14-michael.roth@amd.com
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AMD introduced the next generation of SEV called SEV-SNP (Secure Nested
Paging). SEV-SNP builds upon existing SEV and SEV-ES functionality while
adding new hardware security protection.
Define the commands and structures used to communicate with the AMD-SP
when creating and managing the SEV-SNP guests. The SEV-SNP firmware spec
is available at developer.amd.com/sev.
[ mdr: update SNP command list and SNP status struct based on current
spec, use C99 flexible arrays, fix kernel-doc issues. ]
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240126041126.1927228-13-michael.roth@amd.com
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If the kernel uses a 2MB or larger directmap mapping to write to an
address, and that mapping contains any 4KB pages that are set to private
in the RMP table, an RMP #PF will trigger and cause a host crash.
SNP-aware code that owns the private PFNs will never attempt such
a write, but other kernel tasks writing to other PFNs in the range may
trigger these checks inadvertently due to writing to those other PFNs
via a large directmap mapping that happens to also map a private PFN.
Prevent this by splitting any 2MB+ mappings that might end up containing
a mix of private/shared PFNs as a result of a subsequent RMPUPDATE for
the PFN/rmp_level passed in.
Another way to handle this would be to limit the directmap to 4K
mappings in the case of hosts that support SNP, but there is potential
risk for performance regressions of certain host workloads.
Handling it as-needed results in the directmap being slowly split over
time, which lessens the risk of a performance regression since the more
the directmap gets split as a result of running SNP guests, the more
likely the host is being used primarily to run SNP guests, where
a mostly-split directmap is actually beneficial since there is less
chance of TLB flushing and cpa_lock contention being needed to perform
these splits.
Cases where a host knows in advance it wants to primarily run SNP guests
and wishes to pre-split the directmap can be handled by adding
a tuneable in the future, but preliminary testing has shown this to not
provide a signficant benefit in the common case of guests that are
backed primarily by 2MB THPs, so it does not seem to be warranted
currently and can be added later if a need arises in the future.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240126041126.1927228-12-michael.roth@amd.com
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The RMPUPDATE instruction updates the access restrictions for a page via
its corresponding entry in the RMP Table. The hypervisor will use the
instruction to enforce various access restrictions on pages used for
confidential guests and other specialized functionality. See APM3 for
details on the instruction operations.
The PSMASH instruction expands a 2MB RMP entry in the RMP table into a
corresponding set of contiguous 4KB RMP entries while retaining the
state of the validated bit from the original 2MB RMP entry. The
hypervisor will use this instruction in cases where it needs to re-map a
page as 4K rather than 2MB in a guest's nested page table.
Add helpers to make use of these instructions.
[ mdr: add RMPUPDATE retry logic for transient FAIL_OVERLAP errors. ]
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Liam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240126041126.1927228-11-michael.roth@amd.com
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response_msg is a pointer to an unsigned int (u32). So passing just
response_msg to sizeof would not print the size of the variable. To get
the size of response_msg we need to pass it as a pointer variable.
Fixes: ec5b0f1193ad ("firmware: microchip: add PolarFire SoC Auto Update support")
Signed-off-by: Samasth Norway Ananda <samasth.norway.ananda@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Conor Dooley <conor.dooley@microchip.com>
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Make sure the rpc timeout was assigned with the correct value for
initial timeout and max number of retries.
Fixes: 57331a59ac0d ("NFSv4.1: Use the nfs_client's rpc timeouts for backchannel")
Signed-off-by: Samasth Norway Ananda <samasth.norway.ananda@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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All error handling paths, except this one, go to 'out' where
release_swfw_sync() is called.
This call balances the acquire_swfw_sync() call done at the beginning of
the function.
Branch to the error handling path in order to correctly release some
resources in case of error.
Fixes: ae14a1d8e104 ("ixgbe: Fix IOSF SB access issues")
Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Pucha Himasekhar Reddy <himasekharx.reddy.pucha@intel.com> (A Contingent worker at Intel)
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
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The e1000e driver supports hardware with a variety of different clock
speeds, and thus a variety of different increment values used for
programming its PTP hardware clock.
The values currently programmed in e1000e_ptp_init are incorrect. In
particular, only two maximum adjustments are used: 24000000 - 1, and
600000000 - 1. These were originally intended to be used with the 96 MHz
clock and the 25 MHz clock.
Both of these values are actually slightly too high. For the 96 MHz clock,
the actual maximum value that can safely be programmed is 23,999,938. For
the 25 MHz clock, the maximum value is 599,999,904.
Worse, several devices use a 24 MHz clock or a 38.4 MHz clock. These parts
are incorrectly assigned one of either the 24million or 600million values.
For the 24 MHz clock, this is not a significant issue: its current
increment value can support an adjustment up to 7billion in the positive
direction. However, the 38.4 KHz clock uses an increment value which can
only support up to 230,769,157 before it starts overflowing.
To understand where these values come from, consider that frequency
adjustments have the form of:
new_incval = base_incval + (base_incval * adjustment) / (unit of adjustment)
The maximum adjustment is reported in terms of parts per billion:
new_incval = base_incval + (base_incval * adjustment) / 1 billion
The largest possible adjustment is thus given by the following:
max_incval = base_incval + (base_incval * max_adj) / 1 billion
Re-arranging to solve for max_adj:
max_adj = (max_incval - base_incval) * 1 billion / base_incval
We also need to ensure that negative adjustments cannot underflow. This can
be achieved simply by ensuring max_adj is always less than 1 billion.
Introduce new macros in e1000.h codifying the maximum adjustment in PPB for
each frequency given its associated increment values. Also clarify where
these values come from by commenting about the above equations.
Replace the switch statement in e1000e_ptp_init with one which mirrors the
increment value switch statement from e1000e_get_base_timinica. For each
device, assign the appropriate maximum adjustment based on its frequency.
Some parts can have one of two frequency modes as determined by
E1000_TSYNCRXCTL_SYSCFI.
Since the new flow directly matches the assignments in
e1000e_get_base_timinca, and uses well defined macro names, it is much
easier to verify that the resulting maximum adjustments are correct. It
also avoids difficult to parse construction such as the "hw->mac.type <
e1000_phc_lpt", and the use of fallthrough which was especially confusing
when combined with a conditional block.
Note that I believe the current increment value configuration used for
24MHz clocks is sub-par, as it leaves at least 3 extra bits available in
the INCVALUE register. However, fixing that requires more careful review of
the clock rate and associated values.
Reported-by: Trey Harrison <harrisondigitalmedia@gmail.com>
Fixes: 68fe1d5da548 ("e1000e: Add Support for 38.4MHZ frequency")
Fixes: d89777bf0e42 ("e1000e: add support for IEEE-1588 PTP")
Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Tested-by: Naama Meir <naamax.meir@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
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The SPDIF hardware block found in the H616 SoC has the same layout as
the one found in the H6 SoC, except that it is missing the receiver
side.
Add a new compatible string for it.
Signed-off-by: Chen-Yu Tsai <wens@csie.org>
Acked-by: Conor Dooley <conor.dooley@microchip.com>
Reviewed-by: Jernej Skrabec <jernej.skrabec@gmail.com>
Link: https://msgid.link/r/20240127163247.384439-3-wens@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
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When the H6 was added to the bindings, only the TX DMA channel was
added. As the hardware supports both transmit and receive functions,
the binding is missing the RX DMA channel and is thus incorrect.
Also, the reset control was not made mandatory.
Add the RX DMA channel for SPDIF on H6 by removing the compatible from
the list of compatibles that should only have a TX DMA channel. And add
the H6 compatible to the list of compatibles that require the reset
control to be present.
Fixes: b20453031472 ("dt-bindings: sound: sun4i-spdif: Add Allwinner H6 compatible")
Signed-off-by: Chen-Yu Tsai <wens@csie.org>
Acked-by: Conor Dooley <conor.dooley@microchip.com>
Reviewed-by: Jernej Skrabec <jernej.skrabec@gmail.com>
Link: https://msgid.link/r/20240127163247.384439-2-wens@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
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The SPDIF hardware block found in the H616 SoC has the same layout as
the one found in the H6 SoC, except that it is missing the receiver
side.
Since the driver currently only supports the transmit function, support
for the H616 is identical to what is currently done for the H6.
Signed-off-by: Chen-Yu Tsai <wens@csie.org>
Reviewed-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jernej Skrabec <jernej.skrabec@gmail.com>
Link: https://msgid.link/r/20240127163247.384439-4-wens@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
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TEST_* functions append their own newline. Remove newlines from
TEST_* callsites to avoid extra newlines in output.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Jones <ajones@ventanamicro.com>
Acked-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231206170241.82801-11-ajones@ventanamicro.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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TEST_* functions append their own newline. Remove newlines from
TEST_* callsites to avoid extra newlines in output.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Jones <ajones@ventanamicro.com>
Acked-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231206170241.82801-10-ajones@ventanamicro.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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TEST_* functions append their own newline. Remove newlines from
TEST_* callsites to avoid extra newlines in output.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Jones <ajones@ventanamicro.com>
Acked-by: Zenghui Yu <yuzenghui@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231206170241.82801-9-ajones@ventanamicro.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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TEST_* functions append their own newline. Remove newlines from
TEST_* callsites to avoid extra newlines in output.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Jones <ajones@ventanamicro.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231206170241.82801-8-ajones@ventanamicro.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Rework the NX hugepage test's skip message regarding the magic token to
provide all of the necessary magic, and to very explicitly recommended
using the wrapper shell script.
Opportunistically remove an overzealous newline; splitting the
recommendation message across two lines of ~45 characters makes it much
harder to read than running out a single line to 98 characters.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231129224042.530798-1-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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There has been some discussion about what is expected from
a maintainer and so a cleanup seems to be in order. A dedicated
mailing list has been created to discuss brcm80211 specific
development issues. Keeping the status as Supported although
help in maintaining this driver is welcomed.
Cc: brcm80211@lists.linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@kernel.org>
Link: https://msgid.link/20240126105724.384063-1-arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com
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RMP faults on kernel addresses are fatal and should never happen in
practice. They indicate a bug in the host kernel somewhere. Userspace
RMP faults shouldn't occur either, since even for VMs the memory used
for private pages is handled by guest_memfd and by design is not
mappable by userspace.
Dump RMP table information about the PFN corresponding to the faulting
HVA to help diagnose any issues of this sort when show_fault_oops() is
triggered by an RMP fault.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240126041126.1927228-10-michael.roth@amd.com
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Bit 31 in the page fault-error bit will be set when processor encounters
an RMP violation.
While at it, use the BIT() macro.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240126041126.1927228-9-michael.roth@amd.com
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This information will be useful for debugging things like page faults
due to RMP access violations and RMPUPDATE failures.
[ mdr: move helper to standalone patch, rework dump logic as suggested
by Boris. ]
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240126041126.1927228-8-michael.roth@amd.com
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Add a helper that can be used to access information contained in the RMP
entry corresponding to a particular PFN. This will be needed to make
decisions on how to handle setting up mappings in the NPT in response to
guest page-faults and handling things like cleaning up pages and setting
them back to the default hypervisor-owned state when they are no longer
being used for private data.
[ mdr: separate 'assigned' indicator from return code, and simplify
function signatures for various helpers. ]
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240126041126.1927228-7-michael.roth@amd.com
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SNP enabled platforms require the MtrrFixDramModeEn bit to be set across
all CPUs when SNP is enabled. Therefore, don't print error messages when
MtrrFixDramModeEn is set when bringing CPUs online.
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/68b2d6bf-bce7-47f9-bebb-2652cc923ff9@linux.microsoft.com/
Reported-by: Jeremi Piotrowski <jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240126041126.1927228-6-michael.roth@amd.com
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The laptop requires a quirk ID to enable its internal microphone. Add
it to the DMI quirk table.
Reported-by: Techno Mooney <techno.mooney@gmail.com>
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218402
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Techno Mooney <techno.mooney@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com>
Link: https://msgid.link/r/20240129081148.1044891-1-bagasdotme@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
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The memory integrity guarantees of SEV-SNP are enforced through a new
structure called the Reverse Map Table (RMP). The RMP is a single data
structure shared across the system that contains one entry for every 4K
page of DRAM that may be used by SEV-SNP VMs. The APM Volume 2 section
on Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) details a number of steps needed to
detect/enable SEV-SNP and RMP table support on the host:
- Detect SEV-SNP support based on CPUID bit
- Initialize the RMP table memory reported by the RMP base/end MSR
registers and configure IOMMU to be compatible with RMP access
restrictions
- Set the MtrrFixDramModEn bit in SYSCFG MSR
- Set the SecureNestedPagingEn and VMPLEn bits in the SYSCFG MSR
- Configure IOMMU
RMP table entry format is non-architectural and it can vary by
processor. It is defined by the PPR document for each respective CPU
family. Restrict SNP support to CPU models/families which are compatible
with the current RMP table entry format to guard against any undefined
behavior when running on other system types. Future models/support will
handle this through an architectural mechanism to allow for broader
compatibility.
SNP host code depends on CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV config flag which may be
enabled even when CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT isn't set, so update the
SNP-specific IOMMU helpers used here to rely on CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
instead of CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Co-developed-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240126041126.1927228-5-michael.roth@amd.com
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Currently, the expectation is that the kernel will call
amd_iommu_snp_enable() to perform various checks and set the
amd_iommu_snp_en flag that the IOMMU uses to adjust its setup routines
to account for additional requirements on hosts where SNP is enabled.
This is somewhat fragile as it relies on this call being done prior to
IOMMU setup. It is more robust to just do this automatically as part of
IOMMU initialization, so rework the code accordingly.
There is still a need to export information about whether or not the
IOMMU is configured in a manner compatible with SNP, so relocate the
existing amd_iommu_snp_en flag so it can be used to convey that
information in place of the return code that was previously provided by
calls to amd_iommu_snp_enable().
While here, also adjust the kernel messages related to IOMMU SNP
enablement for consistency/grammar/clarity.
Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Acked-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240126041126.1927228-4-michael.roth@amd.com
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Without SEV-SNP, Automatic IBRS protects only the kernel. But when
SEV-SNP is enabled, the Automatic IBRS protection umbrella widens to all
host-side code, including userspace. This protection comes at a cost:
reduced userspace indirect branch performance.
To avoid this performance loss, don't use Automatic IBRS on SEV-SNP
hosts and all back to retpolines instead.
[ mdr: squash in changes from review discussion. ]
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240126041126.1927228-3-michael.roth@amd.com
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Add CPU feature detection for Secure Encrypted Virtualization with
Secure Nested Paging. This feature adds a strong memory integrity
protection to help prevent malicious hypervisor-based attacks like
data replay, memory re-mapping, and more.
Since enabling the SNP CPU feature imposes a number of additional
requirements on host initialization and handling legacy firmware APIs
for SEV/SEV-ES guests, only introduce the CPU feature bit so that the
relevant handling can be added, but leave it disabled via a
disabled-features mask.
Once all the necessary changes needed to maintain legacy SEV/SEV-ES
support are introduced in subsequent patches, the SNP feature bit will
be unmasked/enabled.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@profian.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240126041126.1927228-2-michael.roth@amd.com
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Commit
cbebd68f59f0 ("x86/mm: Fix use of uninitialized buffer in sme_enable()")
'fixed' an issue in sme_enable() detected by static analysis, and broke
the common case in the process.
cmdline_find_option() will return < 0 on an error, or when the command
line argument does not appear at all. In this particular case, the
latter is not an error condition, and so the early exit is wrong.
Instead, without mem_encrypt= on the command line, the compile time
default should be honoured, which could be to enable memory encryption,
and this is currently broken.
Fix it by setting sme_me_mask to a preliminary value based on the
compile time default, and only omitting the command line argument test
when cmdline_find_option() returns an error.
[ bp: Drop active_by_default while at it. ]
Fixes: cbebd68f59f0 ("x86/mm: Fix use of uninitialized buffer in sme_enable()")
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240126163918.2908990-2-ardb+git@google.com
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When memory encryption is enabled, the kernel prints the encryption
flavor that the system supports.
The check assumes that everything is AMD SME/SEV if it doesn't have
the TDX CPU feature set.
Hyper-V vTOM sets cc_vendor to CC_VENDOR_INTEL when it runs as L2 guest
on top of TDX, but not X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST. Hyper-V only needs memory
encryption enabled for I/O without the rest of CoCo enabling.
To avoid confusion, check the cc_vendor directly.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeremi Piotrowski <jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Acked-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240124140217.533748-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
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Compare the opcode bytes at rIP for each #VC exit reason to verify the
instruction which raised the #VC exception is actually the right one.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240105101407.11694-1-bp@alien8.de
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lsm_{[gs]et_self_attr,list_modules} syscall numbers
To pick the changes in these csets:
d8b0f5465012538c ("wire up syscalls for statmount/listmount")
5f42375904b08890 ("LSM: wireup Linux Security Module syscalls")
Used in some architectures to create syscall tables.
This addresses this perf build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header differences:
diff -u tools/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ZbfMuAlUMRO9Hqa6@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
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Many devices with a single alternate setting do not have a Valid
Alternate Setting Control and validation performed by
validate_sample_rate_table_v2v3() doesn't work on them and is not
really needed. So check the presense of control before sending
altsetting validation requests.
MOTU Microbook IIc is suffering the most without this check. It
takes up to 40 seconds to bootup due to how slow it switches
sampling rates:
[ 2659.164824] usb 3-2: New USB device found, idVendor=07fd, idProduct=0004, bcdDevice= 0.60
[ 2659.164827] usb 3-2: New USB device strings: Mfr=1, Product=2, SerialNumber=0
[ 2659.164829] usb 3-2: Product: MicroBook IIc
[ 2659.164830] usb 3-2: Manufacturer: MOTU
[ 2659.166204] usb 3-2: Found last interface = 3
[ 2679.322298] usb 3-2: No valid sample rate available for 1:1, assuming a firmware bug
[ 2679.322306] usb 3-2: 1:1: add audio endpoint 0x3
[ 2679.322321] usb 3-2: Creating new data endpoint #3
[ 2679.322552] usb 3-2: 1:1 Set sample rate 96000, clock 1
[ 2684.362250] usb 3-2: 2:1: cannot get freq (v2/v3): err -110
[ 2694.444700] usb 3-2: No valid sample rate available for 2:1, assuming a firmware bug
[ 2694.444707] usb 3-2: 2:1: add audio endpoint 0x84
[ 2694.444721] usb 3-2: Creating new data endpoint #84
[ 2699.482103] usb 3-2: 2:1 Set sample rate 96000, clock 1
Signed-off-by: Alexander Tsoy <alexander@tsoy.me>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240129121254.3454481-1-alexander@tsoy.me
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
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The ctrl->state value is updated in another thread using WRITE_ONCE, so
ensure all the readers use the appropriate accessor.
Reviewed-by: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grmberg.me>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni <kch@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
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This reverts commit cca974daeb6c43ea971f8ceff5a7080d7d49ee30.
The added sanity check is incorrect. BUDMIN is not the wrong value and
is too small.
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
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This reverts commit 5f38ac54e60562323ea4abb1bfb37d043ee23357.
This causes issues with rebooting and the 7800XT.
Cc: Kenneth Feng <kenneth.feng@amd.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5f38ac54e605 ("drm/amd/pm: fix the high voltage and temperature issue")
Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/amd/-/issues/3062
Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
Acked-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
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Fix netfs_unbuffered_write_iter() to return immediately if
generic_write_checks() returns 0, indicating there's nothing to write.
Note that netfs_file_write_iter() already does this.
Also, whilst we're at it, put in checks for the size being zero before we
even take the locks. Note that generic_write_checks() can still reduce the
size to zero, so we still need that check.
Without this, a warning similar to the following is logged to dmesg:
netfs: Zero-sized write [R=1b6da]
and the syscall fails with EIO, e.g.:
/sbin/ldconfig.real: Writing of cache extension data failed: Input/output error
This can be reproduced on 9p by:
xfs_io -f -c 'pwrite 0 0' /xfstest.test/foo
Fixes: 153a9961b551 ("netfs: Implement unbuffered/DIO write support")
Reported-by: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ZbQUU6QKmIftKsmo@FV7GG9FTHL/
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240129094924.1221977-3-dhowells@redhat.com
Tested-by: Dominique Martinet <asmadeus@codewreck.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
cc: Dominique Martinet <asmadeus@codewreck.org>
cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
cc: <v9fs@lists.linux.dev>
cc: <linux_oss@crudebyte.com>
cc: <netfs@lists.linux.dev>
cc: <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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If netfs_begin_read gets a NETFS_DIO_READ request that begins
past i_size, it won't perform any i/o and just return 0. This
will leak an increment to i_dio_count that is done at the top
of the function.
This can cause subsequent buffered read requests to block
indefinitely, waiting for a non existing dio operation to complete.
Add a inode_dio_end() for the NETFS_DIO_READ case, before returning.
Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240129094924.1221977-2-dhowells@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
cc: <linux-afs@lists.infradead.org>
cc: <netfs@lists.linux.dev>
cc: <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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TCP rx zerocopy intent is to map pages initially allocated
from NIC drivers, not pages owned by a fs.
This patch adds to can_map_frag() these additional checks:
- Page must not be a compound one.
- page->mapping must be NULL.
This fixes the panic reported by ZhangPeng.
syzbot was able to loopback packets built with sendfile(),
mapping pages owned by an ext4 file to TCP rx zerocopy.
r3 = socket$inet_tcp(0x2, 0x1, 0x0)
mmap(&(0x7f0000ff9000/0x4000)=nil, 0x4000, 0x0, 0x12, r3, 0x0)
r4 = socket$inet_tcp(0x2, 0x1, 0x0)
bind$inet(r4, &(0x7f0000000000)={0x2, 0x4e24, @multicast1}, 0x10)
connect$inet(r4, &(0x7f00000006c0)={0x2, 0x4e24, @empty}, 0x10)
r5 = openat$dir(0xffffffffffffff9c, &(0x7f00000000c0)='./file0\x00',
0x181e42, 0x0)
fallocate(r5, 0x0, 0x0, 0x85b8)
sendfile(r4, r5, 0x0, 0x8ba0)
getsockopt$inet_tcp_TCP_ZEROCOPY_RECEIVE(r4, 0x6, 0x23,
&(0x7f00000001c0)={&(0x7f0000ffb000/0x3000)=nil, 0x3000, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0,
0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0}, &(0x7f0000000440)=0x40)
r6 = openat$dir(0xffffffffffffff9c, &(0x7f00000000c0)='./file0\x00',
0x181e42, 0x0)
Fixes: 93ab6cc69162 ("tcp: implement mmap() for zero copy receive")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/5106a58e-04da-372a-b836-9d3d0bd2507b@huawei.com/T/
Reported-and-bisected-by: ZhangPeng <zhangpeng362@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Arjun Roy <arjunroy@google.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: linux-mm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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rx_data_reassembly skb is stored during NCI data exchange for processing
fragmented packets. It is dropped only when the last fragment is processed
or when an NTF packet with NCI_OP_RF_DEACTIVATE_NTF opcode is received.
However, the NCI device may be deallocated before that which leads to skb
leak.
As by design the rx_data_reassembly skb is bound to the NCI device and
nothing prevents the device to be freed before the skb is processed in
some way and cleaned, free it on the NCI device cleanup.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.
Fixes: 6a2968aaf50c ("NFC: basic NCI protocol implementation")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: syzbot+6b7c68d9c21e4ee4251b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/000000000000f43987060043da7b@google.com/
Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@ispras.ru>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Syzkaller reported [1] hitting a warning after failing to allocate
resources for skb in hsr_init_skb(). Since a WARN_ONCE() call will
not help much in this case, it might be prudent to switch to
netdev_warn_once(). At the very least it will suppress syzkaller
reports such as [1].
Just in case, use netdev_warn_once() in send_prp_supervision_frame()
for similar reasons.
[1]
HSR: Could not send supervision frame
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 85 at net/hsr/hsr_device.c:294 send_hsr_supervision_frame+0x60a/0x810 net/hsr/hsr_device.c:294
RIP: 0010:send_hsr_supervision_frame+0x60a/0x810 net/hsr/hsr_device.c:294
...
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
hsr_announce+0x114/0x370 net/hsr/hsr_device.c:382
call_timer_fn+0x193/0x590 kernel/time/timer.c:1700
expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1751 [inline]
__run_timers+0x764/0xb20 kernel/time/timer.c:2022
run_timer_softirq+0x58/0xd0 kernel/time/timer.c:2035
__do_softirq+0x21a/0x8de kernel/softirq.c:553
invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:427 [inline]
__irq_exit_rcu kernel/softirq.c:632 [inline]
irq_exit_rcu+0xb7/0x120 kernel/softirq.c:644
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x95/0xb0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1076
</IRQ>
<TASK>
asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:649
...
This issue is also found in older kernels (at least up to 5.10).
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: syzbot+3ae0a3f42c84074b7c8e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 121c33b07b31 ("net: hsr: introduce common code for skb initialization")
Signed-off-by: Nikita Zhandarovich <n.zhandarovich@fintech.ru>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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