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2019-06-28x86/hpet: Simplify counter validationThomas Gleixner
There is no point to loop for 200k TSC cycles to check afterwards whether the HPET counter is working. Read the counter inside of the loop and break out when the counter value changed. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi.kleen@intel.com> Cc: Suravee Suthikulpanit <Suravee.Suthikulpanit@amd.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190623132435.149535103@linutronix.de
2019-06-28x86/hpet: Separate counter check out of clocksource register codeThomas Gleixner
The init code checks whether the HPET counter works late in the init function when the clocksource is registered. That should happen right with the other sanity checks. Split it into a separate validation function and move it to the other sanity checks. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi.kleen@intel.com> Cc: Suravee Suthikulpanit <Suravee.Suthikulpanit@amd.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190623132435.058540608@linutronix.de
2019-06-28x86/hpet: Shuffle code around for readability sakeThomas Gleixner
It doesn't make sense to have init functions in the middle of other code. Aside of that, further changes in that area create horrible diffs if the code stays where it is. No functional change Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi.kleen@intel.com> Cc: Suravee Suthikulpanit <Suravee.Suthikulpanit@amd.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190623132434.951733064@linutronix.de
2019-06-28x86/hpet: Move static and global variables to one placeThomas Gleixner
Having static and global variables sprinkled all over the code is just annoying to read. Move them all to the top of the file. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi.kleen@intel.com> Cc: Suravee Suthikulpanit <Suravee.Suthikulpanit@amd.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190623132434.860549134@linutronix.de
2019-06-28x86/hpet: Sanitize stub functionsThomas Gleixner
Mark them inline and remove the pointless 'return;' statement. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi.kleen@intel.com> Cc: Suravee Suthikulpanit <Suravee.Suthikulpanit@amd.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190623132434.754768274@linutronix.de
2019-06-28x86/hpet: Mark init functions __initThomas Gleixner
They are only called from init code. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi.kleen@intel.com> Cc: Suravee Suthikulpanit <Suravee.Suthikulpanit@amd.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190623132434.645357869@linutronix.de
2019-06-28x86/hpet: Remove the unused hpet_msi_read() functionThomas Gleixner
No users. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi.kleen@intel.com> Cc: Suravee Suthikulpanit <Suravee.Suthikulpanit@amd.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190623132434.553729327@linutronix.de
2019-06-28x86/hpet: Remove unused parameter from hpet_next_event()Thomas Gleixner
The clockevent device pointer is not used in this function. While at it, rename the misnamed 'timer' parameter to 'channel', which makes it clear what this parameter means. No functional change. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi.kleen@intel.com> Cc: Suravee Suthikulpanit <Suravee.Suthikulpanit@amd.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190623132434.447880978@linutronix.de
2019-06-28x86/hpet: Remove pointless x86-64 specific #includeThomas Gleixner
Nothing requires asm/pgtable.h here anymore. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi.kleen@intel.com> Cc: Suravee Suthikulpanit <Suravee.Suthikulpanit@amd.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190623132434.339011567@linutronix.de
2019-06-28x86/hpet: Restructure init codeThomas Gleixner
As a preparatory change for further consolidation, restructure the HPET init code so it becomes more readable. Fix up misleading and stale comments and rename variables so they actually make sense. No intended functional change. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi.kleen@intel.com> Cc: Suravee Suthikulpanit <Suravee.Suthikulpanit@amd.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190623132434.247842972@linutronix.de
2019-06-28x86/hpet: Replace printk(KERN...) with pr_...()Thomas Gleixner
And sanitize the format strings while at it. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi.kleen@intel.com> Cc: Suravee Suthikulpanit <Suravee.Suthikulpanit@amd.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190623132434.140411339@linutronix.de
2019-06-28x86/hpet: Simplify CPU online codeThomas Gleixner
The indirection via work scheduled on the upcoming CPU was necessary with the old hotplug code because the online callback was invoked on the control CPU not on the upcoming CPU. The rework of the CPU hotplug core guarantees that the online callbacks are invoked on the upcoming CPU. Remove the now pointless work redirection. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi.kleen@intel.com> Cc: Suravee Suthikulpanit <Suravee.Suthikulpanit@amd.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190623132434.047254075@linutronix.de
2019-06-27Merge branch 'bpf-sockopt-hooks'Alexei Starovoitov
Stanislav Fomichev says: ==================== This series implements two new per-cgroup hooks: getsockopt and setsockopt along with a new sockopt program type. The idea is pretty similar to recently introduced cgroup sysctl hooks, but implementation is simpler (no need to convert to/from strings). What this can be applied to: * move business logic of what tos/priority/etc can be set by containers (either pass or reject) * handle existing options (or introduce new ones) differently by propagating some information in cgroup/socket local storage Compared to a simple syscall/{g,s}etsockopt tracepoint, those hooks are context aware. Meaning, they can access underlying socket and use cgroup and socket local storage. v9: * allow overwriting setsocktop arguments (Alexei Starovoitov) (see individual changes for more changelog details) ==================== Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2019-06-27bpftool: support cgroup sockoptStanislav Fomichev
Support sockopt prog type and cgroup hooks in the bpftool. Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com> Cc: Martin Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2019-06-27bpf: add sockopt documentationStanislav Fomichev
Provide user documentation about sockopt prog type and cgroup hooks. v9: * add details about setsockopt context and inheritance v7: * add description for retval=0 and optlen=-1 v6: * describe cgroup chaining, add example v2: * use return code 2 for kernel bypass Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com> Cc: Martin Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2019-06-27selftests/bpf: add sockopt test that exercises BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTIStanislav Fomichev
sockopt test that verifies chaining behavior. v9: * setsockopt chaining example v7: * rework the test to verify cgroup getsockopt chaining Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com> Cc: Martin Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2019-06-27selftests/bpf: add sockopt test that exercises sk helpersStanislav Fomichev
socktop test that introduces new SOL_CUSTOM sockopt level and stores whatever users sets in sk storage. Whenever getsockopt is called, the original value is retrieved. v9: * SO_SNDBUF example to override user-supplied buffer v7: * use retval=0 and optlen-1 v6: * test 'ret=1' use-case as well (Alexei Starovoitov) v4: * don't call bpf_sk_fullsock helper v3: * drop (__u8 *)(long) casts for optval{,_end} v2: * new test Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com> Cc: Martin Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2019-06-27selftests/bpf: add sockopt testStanislav Fomichev
Add sockopt selftests: * require proper expected_attach_type * enforce context field read/write access * test bpf_sockopt_handled handler * test EPERM * test limiting optlen from getsockopt * test out-of-bounds access v9: * add tests for setsockopt argument mangling v7: * remove return 2; test retval=0 and optlen=-1 v3: * use DW for optval{,_end} loads v2: * use return code 2 for kernel bypass Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com> Cc: Martin Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2019-06-27selftests/bpf: test sockopt section nameStanislav Fomichev
Add tests that make sure libbpf section detection works. Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com> Cc: Martin Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2019-06-27libbpf: support sockopt hooksStanislav Fomichev
Make libbpf aware of new sockopt hooks so it can derive prog type and hook point from the section names. Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com> Cc: Martin Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2019-06-27bpf: sync bpf.h to tools/Stanislav Fomichev
Export new prog type and hook points to the libbpf. Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com> Cc: Martin Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2019-06-27bpf: implement getsockopt and setsockopt hooksStanislav Fomichev
Implement new BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCKOPT program type and BPF_CGROUP_{G,S}ETSOCKOPT cgroup hooks. BPF_CGROUP_SETSOCKOPT can modify user setsockopt arguments before passing them down to the kernel or bypass kernel completely. BPF_CGROUP_GETSOCKOPT can can inspect/modify getsockopt arguments that kernel returns. Both hooks reuse existing PTR_TO_PACKET{,_END} infrastructure. The buffer memory is pre-allocated (because I don't think there is a precedent for working with __user memory from bpf). This might be slow to do for each {s,g}etsockopt call, that's why I've added __cgroup_bpf_prog_array_is_empty that exits early if there is nothing attached to a cgroup. Note, however, that there is a race between __cgroup_bpf_prog_array_is_empty and BPF_PROG_RUN_ARRAY where cgroup program layout might have changed; this should not be a problem because in general there is a race between multiple calls to {s,g}etsocktop and user adding/removing bpf progs from a cgroup. The return code of the BPF program is handled as follows: * 0: EPERM * 1: success, continue with next BPF program in the cgroup chain v9: * allow overwriting setsockopt arguments (Alexei Starovoitov): * use set_fs (same as kernel_setsockopt) * buffer is always kzalloc'd (no small on-stack buffer) v8: * use s32 for optlen (Andrii Nakryiko) v7: * return only 0 or 1 (Alexei Starovoitov) * always run all progs (Alexei Starovoitov) * use optval=0 as kernel bypass in setsockopt (Alexei Starovoitov) (decided to use optval=-1 instead, optval=0 might be a valid input) * call getsockopt hook after kernel handlers (Alexei Starovoitov) v6: * rework cgroup chaining; stop as soon as bpf program returns 0 or 2; see patch with the documentation for the details * drop Andrii's and Martin's Acked-by (not sure they are comfortable with the new state of things) v5: * skip copy_to_user() and put_user() when ret == 0 (Martin Lau) v4: * don't export bpf_sk_fullsock helper (Martin Lau) * size != sizeof(__u64) for uapi pointers (Martin Lau) * offsetof instead of bpf_ctx_range when checking ctx access (Martin Lau) v3: * typos in BPF_PROG_CGROUP_SOCKOPT_RUN_ARRAY comments (Andrii Nakryiko) * reverse christmas tree in BPF_PROG_CGROUP_SOCKOPT_RUN_ARRAY (Andrii Nakryiko) * use __bpf_md_ptr instead of __u32 for optval{,_end} (Martin Lau) * use BPF_FIELD_SIZEOF() for consistency (Martin Lau) * new CG_SOCKOPT_ACCESS macro to wrap repeated parts v2: * moved bpf_sockopt_kern fields around to remove a hole (Martin Lau) * aligned bpf_sockopt_kern->buf to 8 bytes (Martin Lau) * bpf_prog_array_is_empty instead of bpf_prog_array_length (Martin Lau) * added [0,2] return code check to verifier (Martin Lau) * dropped unused buf[64] from the stack (Martin Lau) * use PTR_TO_SOCKET for bpf_sockopt->sk (Martin Lau) * dropped bpf_target_off from ctx rewrites (Martin Lau) * use return code for kernel bypass (Martin Lau & Andrii Nakryiko) Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com> Cc: Martin Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2019-06-28x86/unwind/orc: Fall back to using frame pointers for generated codeJosh Poimboeuf
The ORC unwinder can't unwind through BPF JIT generated code because there are no ORC entries associated with the code. If an ORC entry isn't available, try to fall back to frame pointers. If BPF and other generated code always do frame pointer setup (even with CONFIG_FRAME_POINTERS=n) then this will allow ORC to unwind through most generated code despite there being no corresponding ORC entries. Fixes: d15d356887e7 ("perf/x86: Make perf callchains work without CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER") Reported-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Kairui Song <kasong@redhat.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b6f69208ddff4343d56b7bfac1fc7cfcd62689e8.1561595111.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
2019-06-28perf/x86: Always store regs->ip in perf_callchain_kernel()Song Liu
The stacktrace_map_raw_tp BPF selftest is failing because the RIP saved by perf_arch_fetch_caller_regs() isn't getting saved by perf_callchain_kernel(). This was broken by the following commit: d15d356887e7 ("perf/x86: Make perf callchains work without CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER") With that change, when starting with non-HW regs, the unwinder starts with the current stack frame and unwinds until it passes up the frame which called perf_arch_fetch_caller_regs(). So regs->ip needs to be saved deliberately. Fixes: d15d356887e7 ("perf/x86: Make perf callchains work without CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER") Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Kairui Song <kasong@redhat.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/3975a298fa52b506fea32666d8ff6a13467eee6d.1561595111.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
2019-06-28selftests/x86: Add a test for process_vm_readv() on the vsyscall pageAndy Lutomirski
get_gate_page() is a piece of somewhat alarming code to make get_user_pages() work on the vsyscall page. Test it via process_vm_readv(). Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/0fe34229a9330e8f9de9765967939cc4f1cf26b1.1561610354.git.luto@kernel.org
2019-06-28x86/vsyscall: Add __ro_after_init to global variablesAndy Lutomirski
The vDSO is only configurable by command-line options, so make its global variables __ro_after_init. This seems highly unlikely to ever stop an exploit, but it's nicer anyway. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/a386925835e49d319e70c4d7404b1f6c3c2e3702.1561610354.git.luto@kernel.org
2019-06-28x86/vsyscall: Change the default vsyscall mode to xonlyAndy Lutomirski
The use case for full emulation over xonly is very esoteric, e.g. magic instrumentation tools. Change the default to the safer xonly mode. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/30539f8072d2376b9c9efcc07e6ed0d6bf20e882.1561610354.git.luto@kernel.org
2019-06-28selftests/x86/vsyscall: Verify that vsyscall=none blocks executionAndy Lutomirski
If vsyscall=none accidentally still allowed vsyscalls, the test wouldn't fail. Fix it. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b413397c804265f8865f3e70b14b09485ea7c314.1561610354.git.luto@kernel.org
2019-06-28x86/vsyscall: Document odd SIGSEGV error code for vsyscallsAndy Lutomirski
Even if vsyscall=none, user page faults on the vsyscall page are reported as though the PROT bit in the error code was set. Add a comment explaining why this is probably okay and display the value in the test case. While at it, explain why the behavior is correct with respect to PKRU. Modify also the selftest to print the odd error code so that there is a way to demonstrate the odd behaviour. If anyone really cares about more accurate emulation, the behaviour could be changed. But that needs a real good justification. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/75c91855fd850649ace162eec5495a1354221aaa.1561610354.git.luto@kernel.org
2019-06-28x86/vsyscall: Show something useful on a read faultAndy Lutomirski
Just segfaulting the application when it tries to read the vsyscall page in xonly mode is not helpful for those who need to debug it. Emit a hint. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/8016afffe0eab497be32017ad7f6f7030dc3ba66.1561610354.git.luto@kernel.org
2019-06-28x86/vsyscall: Add a new vsyscall=xonly modeAndy Lutomirski
With vsyscall emulation on, a readable vsyscall page is still exposed that contains syscall instructions that validly implement the vsyscalls. This is required because certain dynamic binary instrumentation tools attempt to read the call targets of call instructions in the instrumented code. If the instrumented code uses vsyscalls, then the vsyscall page needs to contain readable code. Unfortunately, leaving readable memory at a deterministic address can be used to help various ASLR bypasses, so some hardening value can be gained by disallowing vsyscall reads. Given how rarely the vsyscall page needs to be readable, add a mechanism to make the vsyscall page be execute only. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/d17655777c21bc09a7af1bbcf74e6f2b69a51152.1561610354.git.luto@kernel.org
2019-06-28Documentation/admin: Remove the vsyscall=native documentationAndy Lutomirski
The vsyscall=native feature is gone -- remove the docs. Fixes: 076ca272a14c ("x86/vsyscall/64: Drop "native" vsyscalls") Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/d77c7105eb4c57c1a95a95b6a5b8ba194a18e764.1561610354.git.luto@kernel.org
2019-06-27keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACLDavid Howells
Replace the uid/gid/perm permissions checking on a key with an ACL to allow the SETATTR and SEARCH permissions to be split. This will also allow a greater range of subjects to represented. ============ WHY DO THIS? ============ The problem is that SETATTR and SEARCH cover a slew of actions, not all of which should be grouped together. For SETATTR, this includes actions that are about controlling access to a key: (1) Changing a key's ownership. (2) Changing a key's security information. (3) Setting a keyring's restriction. And actions that are about managing a key's lifetime: (4) Setting an expiry time. (5) Revoking a key. and (proposed) managing a key as part of a cache: (6) Invalidating a key. Managing a key's lifetime doesn't really have anything to do with controlling access to that key. Expiry time is awkward since it's more about the lifetime of the content and so, in some ways goes better with WRITE permission. It can, however, be set unconditionally by a process with an appropriate authorisation token for instantiating a key, and can also be set by the key type driver when a key is instantiated, so lumping it with the access-controlling actions is probably okay. As for SEARCH permission, that currently covers: (1) Finding keys in a keyring tree during a search. (2) Permitting keyrings to be joined. (3) Invalidation. But these don't really belong together either, since these actions really need to be controlled separately. Finally, there are number of special cases to do with granting the administrator special rights to invalidate or clear keys that I would like to handle with the ACL rather than key flags and special checks. =============== WHAT IS CHANGED =============== The SETATTR permission is split to create two new permissions: (1) SET_SECURITY - which allows the key's owner, group and ACL to be changed and a restriction to be placed on a keyring. (2) REVOKE - which allows a key to be revoked. The SEARCH permission is split to create: (1) SEARCH - which allows a keyring to be search and a key to be found. (2) JOIN - which allows a keyring to be joined as a session keyring. (3) INVAL - which allows a key to be invalidated. The WRITE permission is also split to create: (1) WRITE - which allows a key's content to be altered and links to be added, removed and replaced in a keyring. (2) CLEAR - which allows a keyring to be cleared completely. This is split out to make it possible to give just this to an administrator. (3) REVOKE - see above. Keys acquire ACLs which consist of a series of ACEs, and all that apply are unioned together. An ACE specifies a subject, such as: (*) Possessor - permitted to anyone who 'possesses' a key (*) Owner - permitted to the key owner (*) Group - permitted to the key group (*) Everyone - permitted to everyone Note that 'Other' has been replaced with 'Everyone' on the assumption that you wouldn't grant a permit to 'Other' that you wouldn't also grant to everyone else. Further subjects may be made available by later patches. The ACE also specifies a permissions mask. The set of permissions is now: VIEW Can view the key metadata READ Can read the key content WRITE Can update/modify the key content SEARCH Can find the key by searching/requesting LINK Can make a link to the key SET_SECURITY Can change owner, ACL, expiry INVAL Can invalidate REVOKE Can revoke JOIN Can join this keyring CLEAR Can clear this keyring The KEYCTL_SETPERM function is then deprecated. The KEYCTL_SET_TIMEOUT function then is permitted if SET_SECURITY is set, or if the caller has a valid instantiation auth token. The KEYCTL_INVALIDATE function then requires INVAL. The KEYCTL_REVOKE function then requires REVOKE. The KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING function then requires JOIN to join an existing keyring. The JOIN permission is enabled by default for session keyrings and manually created keyrings only. ====================== BACKWARD COMPATIBILITY ====================== To maintain backward compatibility, KEYCTL_SETPERM will translate the permissions mask it is given into a new ACL for a key - unless KEYCTL_SET_ACL has been called on that key, in which case an error will be returned. It will convert possessor, owner, group and other permissions into separate ACEs, if each portion of the mask is non-zero. SETATTR permission turns on all of INVAL, REVOKE and SET_SECURITY. WRITE permission turns on WRITE, REVOKE and, if a keyring, CLEAR. JOIN is turned on if a keyring is being altered. The KEYCTL_DESCRIBE function translates the ACL back into a permissions mask to return depending on possessor, owner, group and everyone ACEs. It will make the following mappings: (1) INVAL, JOIN -> SEARCH (2) SET_SECURITY -> SETATTR (3) REVOKE -> WRITE if SETATTR isn't already set (4) CLEAR -> WRITE Note that the value subsequently returned by KEYCTL_DESCRIBE may not match the value set with KEYCTL_SETATTR. ======= TESTING ======= This passes the keyutils testsuite for all but a couple of tests: (1) tests/keyctl/dh_compute/badargs: The first wrong-key-type test now returns EOPNOTSUPP rather than ENOKEY as READ permission isn't removed if the type doesn't have ->read(). You still can't actually read the key. (2) tests/keyctl/permitting/valid: The view-other-permissions test doesn't work as Other has been replaced with Everyone in the ACL. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2019-06-27keys: Pass the network namespace into request_key mechanismDavid Howells
Create a request_key_net() function and use it to pass the network namespace domain tag into DNS revolver keys and rxrpc/AFS keys so that keys for different domains can coexist in the same keyring. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
2019-06-27x86/tls: Fix possible spectre-v1 in do_get_thread_area()Dianzhang Chen
The index to access the threads tls array is controlled by userspace via syscall: sys_ptrace(), hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. The index can be controlled from: ptrace -> arch_ptrace -> do_get_thread_area. Fix this by sanitizing the user supplied index before using it to access the p->thread.tls_array. Signed-off-by: Dianzhang Chen <dianzhangchen0@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: bp@alien8.de Cc: hpa@zytor.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1561524630-3642-1-git-send-email-dianzhangchen0@gmail.com
2019-06-27x86/ptrace: Fix possible spectre-v1 in ptrace_get_debugreg()Dianzhang Chen
The index to access the threads ptrace_bps is controlled by userspace via syscall: sys_ptrace(), hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. The index can be controlled from: ptrace -> arch_ptrace -> ptrace_get_debugreg. Fix this by sanitizing the user supplied index before using it access thread->ptrace_bps. Signed-off-by: Dianzhang Chen <dianzhangchen0@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: bp@alien8.de Cc: hpa@zytor.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1561476617-3759-1-git-send-email-dianzhangchen0@gmail.com
2019-06-27hrtimer: Use a bullet for the returns bullet listMauro Carvalho Chehab
That gets rid of this warning: ./kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1119: WARNING: Block quote ends without a blank line; unexpected unindent. and displays nicely both at the source code and at the produced documentation. Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Linux Doc Mailing List <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@infradead.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/74ddad7dac331b4e5ce4a90e15c8a49e3a16d2ac.1561372382.git.mchehab+samsung@kernel.org
2019-06-27workqueue: Remove GPF argument from alloc_workqueue_attrs()Thomas Gleixner
All callers use GFP_KERNEL. No point in having that argument. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
2019-06-27workqueue: Make alloc/apply/free_workqueue_attrs() staticThomas Gleixner
None of those functions have any users outside of workqueue.c. Confine them. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
2019-06-27Merge branch 'bpf-af-xdp-mlx5e'Daniel Borkmann
Tariq Toukan says: ==================== This series contains improvements to the AF_XDP kernel infrastructure and AF_XDP support in mlx5e. The infrastructure improvements are required for mlx5e, but also some of them benefit to all drivers, and some can be useful for other drivers that want to implement AF_XDP. The performance testing was performed on a machine with the following configuration: - 24 cores of Intel Xeon E5-2620 v3 @ 2.40 GHz - Mellanox ConnectX-5 Ex with 100 Gbit/s link The results with retpoline disabled, single stream: txonly: 33.3 Mpps (21.5 Mpps with queue and app pinned to the same CPU) rxdrop: 12.2 Mpps l2fwd: 9.4 Mpps The results with retpoline enabled, single stream: txonly: 21.3 Mpps (14.1 Mpps with queue and app pinned to the same CPU) rxdrop: 9.9 Mpps l2fwd: 6.8 Mpps v2 changes: Added patches for mlx5e and addressed the comments for v1. Rebased for bpf-next. v3 changes: Rebased for the newer bpf-next, resolved conflicts in libbpf. Addressed Björn's comments for coding style. Fixed a bug in error handling flow in mlx5e_open_xsk. v4 changes: UAPI is not changed, XSK RX queues are exposed to the kernel. The lower half of the available amount of RX queues are regular queues, and the upper half are XSK RX queues. The patch "xsk: Extend channels to support combined XSK/non-XSK traffic" was dropped. The final patch was reworked accordingly. Added "net/mlx5e: Attach/detach XDP program safely", as the changes introduced in the XSK patch base on the stuff from this one. Added "libbpf: Support drivers with non-combined channels", which aligns the condition in libbpf with the condition in the kernel. Rebased over the newer bpf-next. v5 changes: In v4, ethtool reports the number of channels as 'combined' and the number of XSK RX queues as 'rx' for mlx5e. It was changed, so that 'rx' is 0, and 'combined' reports the double amount of channels if there is an active UMEM - to make libbpf happy. The patch for libbpf was dropped. Although it's still useful and fixes things, it raises some disagreement, so I'm dropping it - it's no longer useful for mlx5e anymore after the change above. v6 changes: As Maxim is out of office, I rebased the series on behalf of him, solved some conflicts, and re-spinned. ==================== Acked-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn.topel@intel.com> Tested-by: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2019-06-27net/mlx5e: Add XSK zero-copy supportMaxim Mikityanskiy
This commit adds support for AF_XDP zero-copy RX and TX. We create a dedicated XSK RQ inside the channel, it means that two RQs are running simultaneously: one for non-XSK traffic and the other for XSK traffic. The regular and XSK RQs use a single ID namespace split into two halves: the lower half is regular RQs, and the upper half is XSK RQs. When any zero-copy AF_XDP socket is active, changing the number of channels is not allowed, because it would break to mapping between XSK RQ IDs and channels. XSK requires different page allocation and release routines. Such functions as mlx5e_{alloc,free}_rx_mpwqe and mlx5e_{get,put}_rx_frag are generic enough to be used for both regular and XSK RQs, and they use the mlx5e_page_{alloc,release} wrappers around the real allocation functions. Function pointers are not used to avoid losing the performance with retpolines. Wherever it's certain that the regular (non-XSK) page release function should be used, it's called directly. Only the stats that could be meaningful for XSK are exposed to the userspace. Those that don't take part in the XSK flow are not considered. Note that we don't wait for WQEs on the XSK RQ (unlike the regular RQ), because the newer xdpsock sample doesn't provide any Fill Ring entries at the setup stage. We create a dedicated XSK SQ in the channel. This separation has its advantages: 1. When the UMEM is closed, the XSK SQ can also be closed and stop receiving completions. If an existing SQ was used for XSK, it would continue receiving completions for the packets of the closed socket. If a new UMEM was opened at that point, it would start getting completions that don't belong to it. 2. Calculating statistics separately. When the userspace kicks the TX, the driver triggers a hardware interrupt by posting a NOP to a dedicated XSK ICO (internal control operations) SQ, in order to trigger NAPI on the right CPU core. This XSK ICO SQ is protected by a spinlock, as the userspace application may kick the TX from any core. Store the pointers to the UMEMs in the net device private context, independently from the kernel. This way the driver can distinguish between the zero-copy and non-zero-copy UMEMs. The kernel function xdp_get_umem_from_qid does not care about this difference, but the driver is only interested in zero-copy UMEMs, particularly, on the cleanup it determines whether to close the XSK RQ and SQ or not by looking at the presence of the UMEM. Use state_lock to protect the access to this area of UMEM pointers. LRO isn't compatible with XDP, but there may be active UMEMs while XDP is off. If this is the case, don't allow LRO to ensure XDP can be reenabled at any time. The validation of XSK parameters typically happens when XSK queues open. However, when the interface is down or the XDP program isn't set, it's still possible to have active AF_XDP sockets and even to open new, but the XSK queues will be closed. To cover these cases, perform the validation also in these flows: 1. A new UMEM is registered, but the XSK queues aren't going to be created due to missing XDP program or interface being down. 2. MTU changes while there are UMEMs registered. Having this early check prevents mlx5e_open_channels from failing at a later stage, where recovery is impossible and the application has no chance to handle the error, because it got the successful return value for an MTU change or XSK open operation. The performance testing was performed on a machine with the following configuration: - 24 cores of Intel Xeon E5-2620 v3 @ 2.40 GHz - Mellanox ConnectX-5 Ex with 100 Gbit/s link The results with retpoline disabled, single stream: txonly: 33.3 Mpps (21.5 Mpps with queue and app pinned to the same CPU) rxdrop: 12.2 Mpps l2fwd: 9.4 Mpps The results with retpoline enabled, single stream: txonly: 21.3 Mpps (14.1 Mpps with queue and app pinned to the same CPU) rxdrop: 9.9 Mpps l2fwd: 6.8 Mpps Signed-off-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maximmi@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com> Acked-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2019-06-27net/mlx5e: Move queue param structs to en/params.hMaxim Mikityanskiy
structs mlx5e_{rq,sq,cq,channel}_param are going to be used in the upcoming XSK RX and TX patches. Move them to a header file to make them accessible from other C files. Signed-off-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maximmi@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com> Acked-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2019-06-27net/mlx5e: Encapsulate open/close queues into a functionMaxim Mikityanskiy
Create new functions mlx5e_{open,close}_queues to encapsulate opening and closing RQs and SQs, and call the new functions from mlx5e_{open,close}_channel. It simplifies the existing functions a bit and prepares them for the upcoming AF_XDP changes. Signed-off-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maximmi@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com> Acked-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2019-06-27net/mlx5e: Consider XSK in XDP MTU limit calculationMaxim Mikityanskiy
Use the existing mlx5e_get_linear_rq_headroom function to calculate the headroom for mlx5e_xdp_max_mtu. This function takes the XSK headroom into consideration, which will be used in the following patches. Signed-off-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maximmi@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com> Acked-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2019-06-27net/mlx5e: XDP_TX from UMEM supportMaxim Mikityanskiy
When an XDP program returns XDP_TX, and the RQ is XSK-enabled, it requires careful handling, because convert_to_xdp_frame creates a new page and copies the data there, while our driver expects the xdp_frame to point to the same memory as the xdp_buff. Handle this case separately: map the page, and in the end unmap it and call xdp_return_frame. Signed-off-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maximmi@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com> Acked-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2019-06-27net/mlx5e: Share the XDP SQ for XDP_TX between RQsMaxim Mikityanskiy
Put the XDP SQ that is used for XDP_TX into the channel. It used to be a part of the RQ, but with introduction of AF_XDP there will be one more RQ that could share the same XDP SQ. This patch is a preparation for that change. Separate XDP_TX statistics per RQ were implemented in one of the previous patches. Signed-off-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maximmi@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com> Acked-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2019-06-27net/mlx5e: Refactor struct mlx5e_xdp_infoMaxim Mikityanskiy
Currently, struct mlx5e_xdp_info has some issues that have to be cleaned up before the upcoming AF_XDP support makes things too complicated and messy. This structure is used both when sending the packet and on completion. Moreover, the cleanup procedure on completion depends on the origin of the packet (XDP_REDIRECT, XDP_TX). Adding AF_XDP support will add new flows that use this structure even differently. To avoid overcomplicating the code, this commit refactors the usage of this structure in the following ways: 1. struct mlx5e_xdp_info is split into two different structures. One is struct mlx5e_xdp_xmit_data, a transient structure that doesn't need to be stored and is only used while sending the packet. The other is still struct mlx5e_xdp_info that is stored in a FIFO and contains the fields needed on completion. 2. The fields of struct mlx5e_xdp_info that are used in different flows are put into a union. A special enum indicates the cleanup mode and helps choose the right union member. This approach is clear and explicit. Although it could be possible to "guess" the mode by looking at the values of the fields and at the XDP SQ type, it wouldn't be that clear and extendable and would require looking through the whole chain to understand what's going on. For the reference, there are the fields of struct mlx5e_xdp_info that are used in different flows (including AF_XDP ones): Packet origin | Fields used on completion | Cleanup steps -----------------------+---------------------------+------------------ XDP_REDIRECT, | xdpf, dma_addr | DMA unmap and XDP_TX from XSK RQ | | xdp_return_frame. -----------------------+---------------------------+------------------ XDP_TX from regular RQ | di | Recycle page. -----------------------+---------------------------+------------------ AF_XDP TX | (none) | Increment the | | producer index in | | Completion Ring. On send, the same set of mlx5e_xdp_xmit_data fields is used in all flows: DMA and virtual addresses and length. Signed-off-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maximmi@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com> Acked-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2019-06-27net/mlx5e: Allow ICO SQ to be used by multiple RQsMaxim Mikityanskiy
Prepare to creation of the XSK RQ, which will require posting UMRs, too. The same ICO SQ will be used for both RQs and also to trigger interrupts by posting NOPs. UMR WQEs can't be reused any more. Optimization introduced in commit ab966d7e4ff98 ("net/mlx5e: RX, Recycle buffer of UMR WQEs") is reverted. Signed-off-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maximmi@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com> Acked-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2019-06-27net/mlx5e: Calculate linear RX frag size considering XSKMaxim Mikityanskiy
Additional conditions introduced: - XSK implies XDP. - Headroom includes the XSK headroom if it exists. - No space is reserved for struct shared_skb_info in XSK mode. - Fragment size smaller than the XSK chunk size is not allowed. A new auxiliary function mlx5e_get_linear_rq_headroom with the support for XSK is introduced. Use this function in the implementation of mlx5e_get_rq_headroom. Change headroom to u32 to match the headroom field in struct xdp_umem. Signed-off-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maximmi@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com> Acked-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2019-06-27net/mlx5e: Replace deprecated PCI_DMA_TODEVICEMaxim Mikityanskiy
The PCI API for DMA is deprecated, and PCI_DMA_TODEVICE is just defined to DMA_TO_DEVICE for backward compatibility. Just use DMA_TO_DEVICE. Signed-off-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maximmi@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com> Acked-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>