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2021-04-21nfp: devlink: initialize the devlink port attribute "lanes"Yinjun Zhang
The number of lanes of devlink port should be correctly initialized when registering the port, so that the input check when running "devlink port split <port> count <N>" can pass. Fixes: a21cf0a8330b ("devlink: Add a new devlink port lanes attribute and pass to netlink") Signed-off-by: Yinjun Zhang <yinjun.zhang@corigine.com> Signed-off-by: Louis Peens <louis.peens@corigine.com> Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2021-04-21Merge branch 'mv88e6xxx-small-improvements'David S. Miller
Tobias Waldekranz says: ==================== net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: Tiny fixes/improvements Just some small things I have noticed that do not fit in any other series. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2021-04-21net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: Export cross-chip PVT as devlink regionTobias Waldekranz
Export the raw PVT data in a devlink region so that it can be inspected from userspace and compared to the current bridge configuration. Signed-off-by: Tobias Waldekranz <tobias@waldekranz.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2021-04-21net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: Fix off-by-one in VTU devlink region sizeTobias Waldekranz
In the unlikely event of the VTU being loaded to the brim with 4k entries, the last one was placed in the buffer, but the size reported to devlink was off-by-one. Make sure that the final entry is available to the caller. Fixes: ca4d632aef03 ("net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: Export VTU as devlink region") Signed-off-by: Tobias Waldekranz <tobias@waldekranz.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2021-04-21net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: Correct spelling of define "ADRR" -> "ADDR"Tobias Waldekranz
Because ADRR is not a thing. Signed-off-by: Tobias Waldekranz <tobias@waldekranz.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2021-04-21Merge branch 'octeontx2-af-cn10k'David S. Miller
Srujana Challa says: ==================== Add support for CN10K CPT block OcteonTX3 (CN10K) silicon is a Marvell next-gen silicon. CN10K CPT introduces new features like reassembly support and some feature enhancements. This patchset adds new mailbox messages and some minor changes to existing mailbox messages to support CN10K CPT. v1-v2 Fixed sparse warnings. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2021-04-21octeontx2-af: Add mailbox for CPT statsSrujana Challa
Adds a new mailbox to get CPT stats, includes performance counters, CPT engines status and RXC status. Signed-off-by: Narayana Prasad Raju Atherya <pathreya@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: Srujana Challa <schalla@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2021-04-21octeontx2-af: cn10k: Add mailbox to configure reassembly timeoutSrujana Challa
CN10K CPT coprocessor includes a component named RXC which is responsible for reassembly of inner IP packets. RXC has the feature to evict oldest entries based on age/threshold. This patch adds a new mailbox to configure reassembly age or threshold. Signed-off-by: Jerin Jacob Kollanukkaran <jerinj@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: Srujana Challa <schalla@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2021-04-21octeontx2-af: cn10k: Mailbox changes for CN10K CPTSrujana Challa
Adds changes to existing CPT mailbox messages to support CN10K CPT block. This patch also adds new register defines for CN10K CPT. Signed-off-by: Vidya Sagar Velumuri <vvelumuri@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: Srujana Challa <schalla@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2021-04-21Merge tag 'mmc-v5.12-rc5' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ulfh/mmc Pull MMC fix from Ulf Hansson: "Replace WARN_ONCE with dev_warn_once for non-optimal sg-alignment in the meson-gx host driver" * tag 'mmc-v5.12-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ulfh/mmc: mmc: meson-gx: replace WARN_ONCE with dev_warn_once about scatterlist size alignment in block mode
2021-04-21Merge tag 'wireless-drivers-2021-04-21' of ↵David S. Miller
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvalo/wireless-drivers Kalle Valo says: ==================== wireless-drivers fixes for v5.12 As there was -rc8 release, one more important fix for v5.12. iwlwifi * fix spinlock warning in gen2 devices ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2021-04-21nvme: cleanup nvme_configure_apstChristoph Hellwig
Remove a level of indentation from the main code implementating the table search by using a goto for the APST not supported case. Also move the main comment above the function. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Niklas Cassel <niklas.cassel@wdc.com>
2021-04-21nvme: do not try to reconfigure APST when the controller is not liveChristoph Hellwig
Do not call nvme_configure_apst when the controller is not live, given that nvme_configure_apst will fail due the lack of an admin queue when the controller is being torn down and nvme_set_latency_tolerance is called from dev_pm_qos_hide_latency_tolerance. Fixes: 510a405d945b("nvme: fix memory leak for power latency tolerance") Reported-by: Peng Liu <liupeng17@lenovo.com> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
2021-04-21nvme: add 'kato' sysfs attributeHannes Reinecke
Add a 'kato' controller sysfs attribute to display the current keep-alive timeout value (if any). This allows userspace to identify persistent discovery controllers, as these will have a non-zero KATO value. Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
2021-04-21nvme: sanitize KATO settingHannes Reinecke
According to the NVMe base spec the KATO commands should be sent at half of the KATO interval, to properly account for round-trip times. As we now will only ever send one KATO command per connection we can easily use the recommended values. This also fixes a potential issue where the request timeout for the KATO command does not match the value in the connect command, which might be causing spurious connection drops from the target. Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
2021-04-21nvmet: avoid queuing keep-alive timer if it is disabledHou Pu
Issue following command: nvme set-feature -f 0xf -v 0 /dev/nvme1n1 # disable keep-alive timer nvme admin-passthru -o 0x18 /dev/nvme1n1 # send keep-alive command will make keep-alive timer fired and thus delete the controller like below: [247459.907635] nvmet: ctrl 1 keep-alive timer (0 seconds) expired! [247459.930294] nvmet: ctrl 1 fatal error occurred! Avoid this by not queuing delayed keep-alive if it is disabled when keep-alive command is received from the admin queue. Signed-off-by: Hou Pu <houpu.main@gmail.com> Tested-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni <chaitanya.kulkarni@wdc.com> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
2021-04-21PM: hibernate: x86: Use crc32 instead of md5 for hibernation e820 integrity ↵Chris von Recklinghausen
check Hibernation fails on a system in fips mode because md5 is used for the e820 integrity check and is not available. Use crc32 instead. The check is intended to detect whether the E820 memory map provided by the firmware after cold boot unexpectedly differs from the one that was in use when the hibernation image was created. In this case, the hibernation image cannot be restored, as it may cover memory regions that are no longer available to the OS. A non-cryptographic checksum such as CRC-32 is sufficient to detect such inadvertent deviations. Fixes: 62a03defeabd ("PM / hibernate: Verify the consistent of e820 memory map by md5 digest") Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Tested-by: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Chris von Recklinghausen <crecklin@redhat.com> [ rjw: Subject edit ] Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
2021-04-21cpufreq: Kconfig: fix documentation linksAlexander Monakov
User documentation for cpufreq governors and drivers has been moved to admin-guide; adjust references from Kconfig entries accordingly. Remove references from undocumented cpufreq drivers, as well as the 'userspace' cpufreq governor, for which no additional details are provided in the admin-guide text. Fixes: 2a0e49279850 ("cpufreq: User/admin documentation update and consolidation") Signed-off-by: Alexander Monakov <amonakov@ispras.ru> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
2021-04-21brd: expose number of allocated pages in debugfsCalvin Owens
While the maximum size of each ramdisk is defined either as a module parameter, or compile time default, it's impossible to know how many pages have currently been allocated by each ram%d device, since they're allocated when used and never freed. This patch creates a new directory at this location: /sys/kernel/debug/ramdisk_pages/ which will contain a file named "ram%d" for each instantiated ramdisk on the system. The file is read-only, and read() will output the number of pages currently held by that ramdisk. We lose track how much memory a ramdisk is using as pages once used are simply recycled but never freed. In instances where we exhaust the size of the ramdisk with a file that exceeds it, encounter ENOSPC and delete the file for mitigation; df would show decrease in used and increase in available blocks but the since we have touched all pages, the memory footprint of the ramdisk does not reflect the blocks used/available count ... [root@localhost ~]# mkfs.ext2 /dev/ram15 mke2fs 1.45.6 (20-Mar-2020) Creating filesystem with 4096 1k blocks and 1024 inodes [root@localhost ~]# mount /dev/ram15 /mnt/ram15/ [root@localhost ~]# cat /sys/kernel/debug/ramdisk_pages/ram15 58 [root@kerneltest008.06.prn3 ~]# df /dev/ram15 Filesystem 1K-blocks Used Available Use% Mounted on /dev/ram15 3963 31 3728 1% /mnt/ram15 [root@kerneltest008.06.prn3 ~]# dd if=/dev/urandom of=/mnt/ram15/test2 bs=1M count=5 dd: error writing '/mnt/ram15/test2': No space left on device 4+0 records in 3+0 records out 4005888 bytes (4.0 MB, 3.8 MiB) copied, 0.0446614 s, 89.7 MB/s [root@kerneltest008.06.prn3 ~]# df /mnt/ram15/ Filesystem 1K-blocks Used Available Use% Mounted on /dev/ram15 3963 3960 0 100% /mnt/ram15 [root@kerneltest008.06.prn3 ~]# cat /sys/kernel/debug/ramdisk_pages/ram15 1024 [root@kerneltest008.06.prn3 ~]# rm /mnt/ram15/test2 rm: remove regular file '/mnt/ram15/test2'? y [root@kerneltest008.06.prn3 /var]# df /dev/ram15 Filesystem 1K-blocks Used Available Use% Mounted on /dev/ram15 3963 31 3728 1% /mnt/ram15 # Acutal memory footprint [root@kerneltest008.06.prn3 /var]# cat /sys/kernel/debug/ramdisk_pages/ram15 1024 ... This debugfs counter will always reveal the accurate number of permanently allocated pages to the ramdisk. Signed-off-by: Calvin Owens <calvinowens@fb.com> [cleaned up the !CONFIG_DEBUG_FS case and API changes for HEAD] Signed-off-by: Kyle McMartin <jkkm@fb.com> [rebased] Signed-off-by: Saravanan D <saravanand@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2021-04-21ACPI: video: use native backlight for GA401/GA502/GA503Luke D Jones
Force backlight control in these models to use the native interface at /sys/class/backlight/amdgpu_bl0. Signed-off-by: Luke D. Jones <luke@ljones.dev> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
2021-04-21ACPI: APEI: remove redundant assignment to variable rcColin Ian King
The variable rc is being assigned a value that is never read, the assignment is redundant and can be removed. Addresses-Coverity: ("Unused value") Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
2021-04-21block: return -EBUSY when there are open partitions in blkdev_reread_partChristoph Hellwig
The switch to go through blkdev_get_by_dev means we now ignore the return value from bdev_disk_changed in __blkdev_get. Add a manual check to restore the old semantics. Fixes: 4601b4b130de ("block: reopen the device in blkdev_reread_part") Reported-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210421160502.447418-1-hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2021-04-21KVM: SVM: Allocate SEV command structures on local stackSean Christopherson
Use the local stack to "allocate" the structures used to communicate with the PSP. The largest struct used by KVM, sev_data_launch_secret, clocks in at 52 bytes, well within the realm of reasonable stack usage. The smallest structs are a mere 4 bytes, i.e. the pointer for the allocation is larger than the allocation itself. Now that the PSP driver plays nice with vmalloc pointers, putting the data on a virtually mapped stack (CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y) will not cause explosions. Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20210406224952.4177376-9-seanjc@google.com> Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> [Apply same treatment to PSP migration commands. - Paolo] Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-04-21crypto: ccp: Use the stack and common buffer for INIT commandSean Christopherson
Drop the dedicated init_cmd_buf and instead use a local variable. Now that the low level helper uses an internal buffer for all commands, using the stack for the upper layers is safe even when running with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20210406224952.4177376-8-seanjc@google.com> Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-04-21crypto: ccp: Use the stack and common buffer for status commandsSean Christopherson
Drop the dedicated status_cmd_buf and instead use a local variable for PLATFORM_STATUS. Now that the low level helper uses an internal buffer for all commands, using the stack for the upper layers is safe even when running with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20210406224952.4177376-7-seanjc@google.com> Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-04-21crypto: ccp: Use the stack for small SEV command buffersSean Christopherson
For commands with small input/output buffers, use the local stack to "allocate" the structures used to communicate with the PSP. Now that __sev_do_cmd_locked() gracefully handles vmalloc'd buffers, there's no reason to avoid using the stack, e.g. CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y will just work. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20210406224952.4177376-6-seanjc@google.com> Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-04-21crypto: ccp: Play nice with vmalloc'd memory for SEV command structsSean Christopherson
Copy the incoming @data comman to an internal buffer so that callers can put SEV command buffers on the stack without running afoul of CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y, i.e. without bombing on vmalloc'd pointers. As of today, the largest supported command takes a 68 byte buffer, i.e. pretty much every command can be put on the stack. Because sev_cmd_mutex is held for the entirety of a transaction, only a single bounce buffer is required. Use the internal buffer unconditionally, as the majority of in-kernel users will soon switch to using the stack. At that point, checking virt_addr_valid() becomes (negligible) overhead in most cases, and supporting both paths slightly increases complexity. Since the commands are all quite small, the cost of the copies is insignificant compared to the latency of communicating with the PSP. Allocate a full page for the buffer as opportunistic preparation for SEV-SNP, which requires the command buffer to be in firmware state for commands that trigger memory writes from the PSP firmware. Using a full page now will allow SEV-SNP support to simply transition the page as needed. Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20210406224952.4177376-5-seanjc@google.com> Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-04-21crypto: ccp: Reject SEV commands with mismatching command bufferSean Christopherson
WARN on and reject SEV commands that provide a valid data pointer, but do not have a known, non-zero length. And conversely, reject commands that take a command buffer but none is provided (data is null). Aside from sanity checking input, disallowing a non-null pointer without a non-zero size will allow a future patch to cleanly handle vmalloc'd data by copying the data to an internal __pa() friendly buffer. Note, this also effectively prevents callers from using commands that have a non-zero length and are not known to the kernel. This is not an explicit goal, but arguably the side effect is a good thing from the kernel's perspective. Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20210406224952.4177376-4-seanjc@google.com> Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-04-21crypto: ccp: Detect and reject "invalid" addresses destined for PSPSean Christopherson
Explicitly reject using pointers that are not virt_to_phys() friendly as the source for SEV commands that are sent to the PSP. The PSP works with physical addresses, and __pa()/virt_to_phys() will not return the correct address in these cases, e.g. for a vmalloc'd pointer. At best, the bogus address will cause the command to fail, and at worst lead to system instability. While it's unlikely that callers will deliberately use a bad pointer for SEV buffers, a caller can easily use a vmalloc'd pointer unknowingly when running with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y as it's not obvious that putting the command buffers on the stack would be bad. The command buffers are relative small and easily fit on the stack, and the APIs to do not document that the incoming pointer must be a physically contiguous, __pa() friendly pointer. Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Fixes: 200664d5237f ("crypto: ccp: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) command support") Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20210406224952.4177376-3-seanjc@google.com> Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-04-21crypto: ccp: Free SEV device if SEV init failsSean Christopherson
Free the SEV device if later initialization fails. The memory isn't technically leaked as it's tracked in the top-level device's devres list, but unless the top-level device is removed, the memory won't be freed and is effectively leaked. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20210406224952.4177376-2-seanjc@google.com> Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-04-21KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH commandBrijesh Singh
The command finalize the guest receiving process and make the SEV guest ready for the execution. Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> Message-Id: <d08914dc259644de94e29b51c3b68a13286fc5a3.1618498113.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-04-21KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA commandBrijesh Singh
The command is used for copying the incoming buffer into the SEV guest memory space. Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> Message-Id: <c5d0e3e719db7bb37ea85d79ed4db52e9da06257.1618498113.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-04-21KVM: SVM: Add support for KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START commandBrijesh Singh
The command is used to create the encryption context for an incoming SEV guest. The encryption context can be later used by the hypervisor to import the incoming data into the SEV guest memory space. Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> Message-Id: <c7400111ed7458eee01007c4d8d57cdf2cbb0fc2.1618498113.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-04-21KVM: SVM: Add support for KVM_SEV_SEND_CANCEL commandSteve Rutherford
After completion of SEND_START, but before SEND_FINISH, the source VMM can issue the SEND_CANCEL command to stop a migration. This is necessary so that a cancelled migration can restart with a new target later. Reviewed-by: Nathan Tempelman <natet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com> Message-Id: <20210412194408.2458827-1-srutherford@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-04-21KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH commandBrijesh Singh
The command is used to finailize the encryption context created with KVM_SEV_SEND_START command. Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> Message-Id: <5082bd6a8539d24bc55a1dd63a1b341245bb168f.1618498113.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-04-21KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEND_UPDATE_DATA commandBrijesh Singh
The command is used for encrypting the guest memory region using the encryption context created with KVM_SEV_SEND_START. Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by : Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> Message-Id: <d6a6ea740b0c668b30905ae31eac5ad7da048bb3.1618498113.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-04-21KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV SEND_START commandBrijesh Singh
The command is used to create an outgoing SEV guest encryption context. Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com> Reviewed-by: Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> Message-Id: <2f1686d0164e0f1b3d6a41d620408393e0a48376.1618498113.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-04-21KVM: Boost vCPU candidate in user mode which is delivering interruptWanpeng Li
Both lock holder vCPU and IPI receiver that has halted are condidate for boost. However, the PLE handler was originally designed to deal with the lock holder preemption problem. The Intel PLE occurs when the spinlock waiter is in kernel mode. This assumption doesn't hold for IPI receiver, they can be in either kernel or user mode. the vCPU candidate in user mode will not be boosted even if they should respond to IPIs. Some benchmarks like pbzip2, swaptions etc do the TLB shootdown in kernel mode and most of the time they are running in user mode. It can lead to a large number of continuous PLE events because the IPI sender causes PLE events repeatedly until the receiver is scheduled while the receiver is not candidate for a boost. This patch boosts the vCPU candidiate in user mode which is delivery interrupt. We can observe the speed of pbzip2 improves 10% in 96 vCPUs VM in over-subscribe scenario (The host machine is 2 socket, 48 cores, 96 HTs Intel CLX box). There is no performance regression for other benchmarks like Unixbench spawn (most of the time contend read/write lock in kernel mode), ebizzy (most of the time contend read/write sem and TLB shoodtdown in kernel mode). Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com> Message-Id: <1618542490-14756-1-git-send-email-wanpengli@tencent.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-04-21KVM: x86: document behavior of measurement ioctls with len==0Paolo Bonzini
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-04-21KVM: selftests: Always run vCPU thread with blocked SIG_IPIPaolo Bonzini
The main thread could start to send SIG_IPI at any time, even before signal blocked on vcpu thread. Therefore, start the vcpu thread with the signal blocked. Without this patch, on very busy cores the dirty_log_test could fail directly on receiving a SIGUSR1 without a handler (when vcpu runs far slower than main). Reported-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-04-21KVM: selftests: Sync data verify of dirty logging with guest syncPeter Xu
This fixes a bug that can trigger with e.g. "taskset -c 0 ./dirty_log_test" or when the testing host is very busy. A similar previous attempt is done [1] but that is not enough, the reason is stated in the reply [2]. As a summary (partly quotting from [2]): The problem is I think one guest memory write operation (of this specific test) contains a few micro-steps when page is during kvm dirty tracking (here I'm only considering write-protect rather than pml but pml should be similar at least when the log buffer is full): (1) Guest read 'iteration' number into register, prepare to write, page fault (2) Set dirty bit in either dirty bitmap or dirty ring (3) Return to guest, data written When we verify the data, we assumed that all these steps are "atomic", say, when (1) happened for this page, we assume (2) & (3) must have happened. We had some trick to workaround "un-atomicity" of above three steps, as previous version of this patch wanted to fix atomicity of step (2)+(3) by explicitly letting the main thread wait for at least one vmenter of vcpu thread, which should work. However what I overlooked is probably that we still have race when (1) and (2) can be interrupted. One example calltrace when it could happen that we read an old interation, got interrupted before even setting the dirty bit and flushing data: __schedule+1742 __cond_resched+52 __get_user_pages+530 get_user_pages_unlocked+197 hva_to_pfn+206 try_async_pf+132 direct_page_fault+320 kvm_mmu_page_fault+103 vmx_handle_exit+288 vcpu_enter_guest+2460 kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+325 kvm_vcpu_ioctl+526 __x64_sys_ioctl+131 do_syscall_64+51 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+68 It means iteration number cached in vcpu register can be very old when dirty bit set and data flushed. So far I don't see an easy way to guarantee all steps 1-3 atomicity but to sync at the GUEST_SYNC() point of guest code when we do verification of the dirty bits as what this patch does. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210413213641.23742-1-peterx@redhat.com/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210417140956.GV4440@xz-x1/ Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Cc: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20210417143602.215059-2-peterx@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-04-21KVM: x86: Support KVM VMs sharing SEV contextNathan Tempelman
Add a capability for userspace to mirror SEV encryption context from one vm to another. On our side, this is intended to support a Migration Helper vCPU, but it can also be used generically to support other in-guest workloads scheduled by the host. The intention is for the primary guest and the mirror to have nearly identical memslots. The primary benefits of this are that: 1) The VMs do not share KVM contexts (think APIC/MSRs/etc), so they can't accidentally clobber each other. 2) The VMs can have different memory-views, which is necessary for post-copy migration (the migration vCPUs on the target need to read and write to pages, when the primary guest would VMEXIT). This does not change the threat model for AMD SEV. Any memory involved is still owned by the primary guest and its initial state is still attested to through the normal SEV_LAUNCH_* flows. If userspace wanted to circumvent SEV, they could achieve the same effect by simply attaching a vCPU to the primary VM. This patch deliberately leaves userspace in charge of the memslots for the mirror, as it already has the power to mess with them in the primary guest. This patch does not support SEV-ES (much less SNP), as it does not handle handing off attested VMSAs to the mirror. For additional context, we need a Migration Helper because SEV PSP migration is far too slow for our live migration on its own. Using an in-guest migrator lets us speed this up significantly. Signed-off-by: Nathan Tempelman <natet@google.com> Message-Id: <20210408223214.2582277-1-natet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-04-21nSVM: Check addresses of MSR and IO permission mapsKrish Sadhukhan
According to section "Canonicalization and Consistency Checks" in APM vol 2, the following guest state is illegal: "The MSR or IOIO intercept tables extend to a physical address that is greater than or equal to the maximum supported physical address." Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com> Message-Id: <20210412215611.110095-5-krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-04-21of: linux/of.h: fix kernel-doc warningsRandy Dunlap
Correct kernel-doc notation warnings: ../include/linux/of.h:1211: warning: Function parameter or member 'output' not described in 'of_property_read_string_index' ../include/linux/of.h:1211: warning: Excess function parameter 'out_string' description in 'of_property_read_string_index' ../include/linux/of.h:1477: warning: This comment starts with '/**', but isn't a kernel-doc comment. Refer Documentation/doc-guide/kernel-doc.rst * Overlay support Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210417061244.2262-1-rdunlap@infradead.org
2021-04-21drm/amdgpu: fix GCR_GENERAL_CNTL offset for dimgrey_cavefishJiansong Chen
dimgrey_cavefish has similar gc_10_3 ip with sienna_cichlid, so follow its registers offset setting. Signed-off-by: Jiansong Chen <Jiansong.Chen@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Tao Zhou <tao.zhou1@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
2021-04-21amd/display: allow non-linear multi-planar formatsSimon Ser
Accept non-linear buffers which use a multi-planar format, as long as they don't use DCC. Tested on GFX9 with NV12. Signed-off-by: Simon Ser <contact@emersion.fr> Cc: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Cc: Harry Wentland <hwentlan@amd.com> Cc: Nicholas Kazlauskas <nicholas.kazlauskas@amd.com> Cc: Bas Nieuwenhuizen <bas@basnieuwenhuizen.nl> Reviewed-by: Bas Nieuwenhuizen <bas@basnieuwenhuizen.nl> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
2021-04-21ataflop: fix off by one in ataflop_probe()Dan Carpenter
Smatch complains that the "type > NUM_DISK_MINORS" should be >= instead of >. We also need to subtract one from "type" at the start. Fixes: bf9c0538e485 ("ataflop: use a separate gendisk for each media format") Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2021-04-21ataflop: potential out of bounds in do_format()Dan Carpenter
The function uses "type" as an array index: q = unit[drive].disk[type]->queue; Unfortunately the bounds check on "type" isn't done until later in the function. Fix this by moving the bounds check to the start. Fixes: bf9c0538e485 ("ataflop: use a separate gendisk for each media format") Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2021-04-21drm/amd/display: Update modifier list for gfx10_3Qingqing Zhuo
[Why] Current list supports modifiers that have DCC_MAX_COMPRESSED_BLOCK set to AMD_FMT_MOD_DCC_BLOCK_128B, while AMD_FMT_MOD_DCC_BLOCK_64B is used instead by userspace. [How] Replace AMD_FMT_MOD_DCC_BLOCK_128B with AMD_FMT_MOD_DCC_BLOCK_64B for modifiers with DCC supported. Fixes: faa37f54ce0462 ("drm/amd/display: Expose modifiers") Signed-off-by: Qingqing Zhuo <qingqing.zhuo@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Bas Nieuwenhuizen <bas@basnieuwenhuizen.nl> Tested-by: Bas Nieuwenhuizen <bas@basnieuwenhuizen.nl> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
2021-04-21drm/amdgpu: reserve fence slot to update page tablePhilip Yang
Forgot to reserve a fence slot to use sdma to update page table, cause below kernel BUG backtrace to handle vm retry fault while application is exiting. [ 133.048143] kernel BUG at /home/yangp/git/compute_staging/kernel/drivers/dma-buf/dma-resv.c:281! [ 133.048487] Workqueue: events amdgpu_irq_handle_ih1 [amdgpu] [ 133.048506] RIP: 0010:dma_resv_add_shared_fence+0x204/0x280 [ 133.048672] amdgpu_vm_sdma_commit+0x134/0x220 [amdgpu] [ 133.048788] amdgpu_vm_bo_update_range+0x220/0x250 [amdgpu] [ 133.048905] amdgpu_vm_handle_fault+0x202/0x370 [amdgpu] [ 133.049031] gmc_v9_0_process_interrupt+0x1ab/0x310 [amdgpu] [ 133.049165] ? kgd2kfd_interrupt+0x9a/0x180 [amdgpu] [ 133.049289] ? amdgpu_irq_dispatch+0xb6/0x240 [amdgpu] [ 133.049408] amdgpu_irq_dispatch+0xb6/0x240 [amdgpu] [ 133.049534] amdgpu_ih_process+0x9b/0x1c0 [amdgpu] [ 133.049657] amdgpu_irq_handle_ih1+0x21/0x60 [amdgpu] [ 133.049669] process_one_work+0x29f/0x640 [ 133.049678] worker_thread+0x39/0x3f0 [ 133.049685] ? process_one_work+0x640/0x640 Signed-off-by: Philip Yang <Philip.Yang@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Felix Kuehling <Felix.Kuehling@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.11.x