| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|---|
|
Bring in the fdtable changes for this cycle.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
|
|
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> says:
As atomic_inc_not_zero() is implemented with a try_cmpxchg() loop it has
O(N^2) behaviour under contention with N concurrent operations and it is
in a hot path in __fget_files_rcu().
The rcuref infrastructures remedies this problem by using an
unconditional increment relying on safe- and dead zones to make this
work and requiring rcu protection for the data structure in question.
This not just scales better it also introduces overflow protection.
However, in contrast to generic rcuref, files require a memory barrier
and thus cannot rely on *_relaxed() atomic operations and also require
to be built on atomic_long_t as having massive amounts of reference
isn't unheard of even if it is just an attack.
As suggested by Linus, add a file specific variant instead of making
this a generic library.
I've been testing this with will-it-scale using a multi-threaded fstat()
on the same file descriptor on a machine that Jens gave me access (thank
you very much!):
processor : 511
vendor_id : AuthenticAMD
cpu family : 25
model : 160
model name : AMD EPYC 9754 128-Core Processor
and I consistently get a 3-5% improvement on workloads with 256+ and
more threads comparing v6.12-rc1 as base with and without these patches
applied.
* patches from https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241007-brauner-file-rcuref-v2-0-387e24dc9163@kernel.org:
fs: port files to file_ref
fs: add file_ref
fs: protect backing files with rcu
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241007-brauner-file-rcuref-v2-0-387e24dc9163@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
|
|
Port files to rely on file_ref reference to improve scaling and gain
overflow protection.
- We continue to WARN during get_file() in case a file that is already
marked dead is revived as get_file() is only valid if the caller
already holds a reference to the file. This hasn't changed just the
check changes.
- The semantics for epoll and ttm's dmabuf usage have changed. Both
epoll and ttm synchronize with __fput() to prevent the underlying file
from beeing freed.
(1) epoll
Explaining epoll is straightforward using a simple diagram.
Essentially, the mutex of the epoll instance needs to be taken in both
__fput() and around epi_fget() preventing the file from being freed
while it is polled or preventing the file from being resurrected.
CPU1 CPU2
fput(file)
-> __fput(file)
-> eventpoll_release(file)
-> eventpoll_release_file(file)
mutex_lock(&ep->mtx)
epi_item_poll()
-> epi_fget()
-> file_ref_get(file)
mutex_unlock(&ep->mtx)
mutex_lock(&ep->mtx);
__ep_remove()
mutex_unlock(&ep->mtx);
-> kmem_cache_free(file)
(2) ttm dmabuf
This explanation is a bit more involved. A regular dmabuf file stashed
the dmabuf in file->private_data and the file in dmabuf->file:
file->private_data = dmabuf;
dmabuf->file = file;
The generic release method of a dmabuf file handles file specific
things:
f_op->release::dma_buf_file_release()
while the generic dentry release method of a dmabuf handles dmabuf
freeing including driver specific things:
dentry->d_release::dma_buf_release()
During ttm dmabuf initialization in ttm_object_device_init() the ttm
driver copies the provided struct dma_buf_ops into a private location:
struct ttm_object_device {
spinlock_t object_lock;
struct dma_buf_ops ops;
void (*dmabuf_release)(struct dma_buf *dma_buf);
struct idr idr;
};
ttm_object_device_init(const struct dma_buf_ops *ops)
{
// copy original dma_buf_ops in private location
tdev->ops = *ops;
// stash the release method of the original struct dma_buf_ops
tdev->dmabuf_release = tdev->ops.release;
// override the release method in the copy of the struct dma_buf_ops
// with ttm's own dmabuf release method
tdev->ops.release = ttm_prime_dmabuf_release;
}
When a new dmabuf is created the struct dma_buf_ops with the overriden
release method set to ttm_prime_dmabuf_release is passed in exp_info.ops:
DEFINE_DMA_BUF_EXPORT_INFO(exp_info);
exp_info.ops = &tdev->ops;
exp_info.size = prime->size;
exp_info.flags = flags;
exp_info.priv = prime;
The call to dma_buf_export() then sets
mutex_lock_interruptible(&prime->mutex);
dma_buf = dma_buf_export(&exp_info)
{
dmabuf->ops = exp_info->ops;
}
mutex_unlock(&prime->mutex);
which creates a new dmabuf file and then install a file descriptor to
it in the callers file descriptor table:
ret = dma_buf_fd(dma_buf, flags);
When that dmabuf file is closed we now get:
fput(file)
-> __fput(file)
-> f_op->release::dma_buf_file_release()
-> dput()
-> d_op->d_release::dma_buf_release()
-> dmabuf->ops->release::ttm_prime_dmabuf_release()
mutex_lock(&prime->mutex);
if (prime->dma_buf == dma_buf)
prime->dma_buf = NULL;
mutex_unlock(&prime->mutex);
Where we can see that prime->dma_buf is set to NULL. So when we have
the following diagram:
CPU1 CPU2
fput(file)
-> __fput(file)
-> f_op->release::dma_buf_file_release()
-> dput()
-> d_op->d_release::dma_buf_release()
-> dmabuf->ops->release::ttm_prime_dmabuf_release()
ttm_prime_handle_to_fd()
mutex_lock_interruptible(&prime->mutex)
dma_buf = prime->dma_buf
dma_buf && get_dma_buf_unless_doomed(dma_buf)
-> file_ref_get(dma_buf->file)
mutex_unlock(&prime->mutex);
mutex_lock(&prime->mutex);
if (prime->dma_buf == dma_buf)
prime->dma_buf = NULL;
mutex_unlock(&prime->mutex);
-> kmem_cache_free(file)
The logic of the mechanism is the same as for epoll: sync with
__fput() preventing the file from being freed. Here the
synchronization happens through the ttm instance's prime->mutex.
Basically, the lifetime of the dma_buf and the file are tighly
coupled.
Both (1) and (2) used to call atomic_inc_not_zero() to check whether
the file has already been marked dead and then refuse to revive it.
This is only safe because both (1) and (2) sync with __fput() and thus
prevent kmem_cache_free() on the file being called and thus prevent
the file from being immediately recycled due to SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU.
Both (1) and (2) have been ported from atomic_inc_not_zero() to
file_ref_get(). That means a file that is already in the process of
being marked as FILE_REF_DEAD:
file_ref_put()
cnt = atomic_long_dec_return()
-> __file_ref_put(cnt)
if (cnt == FIlE_REF_NOREF)
atomic_long_try_cmpxchg_release(cnt, FILE_REF_DEAD)
can be revived again:
CPU1 CPU2
file_ref_put()
cnt = atomic_long_dec_return()
-> __file_ref_put(cnt)
if (cnt == FIlE_REF_NOREF)
file_ref_get()
// Brings reference back to FILE_REF_ONEREF
atomic_long_add_negative()
atomic_long_try_cmpxchg_release(cnt, FILE_REF_DEAD)
This is fine and inherent to the file_ref_get()/file_ref_put()
semantics. For both (1) and (2) this is safe because __fput() is
prevented from making progress if file_ref_get() fails due to the
aforementioned synchronization mechanisms.
Two cases need to be considered that affect both (1) epoll and (2) ttm
dmabuf:
(i) fput()'s file_ref_put() and marks the file as FILE_REF_NOREF but
before that fput() can mark the file as FILE_REF_DEAD someone
manages to sneak in a file_ref_get() and brings the refcount back
from FILE_REF_NOREF to FILE_REF_ONEREF. In that case the original
fput() doesn't call __fput(). For epoll the poll will finish and
for ttm dmabuf the file can be used again. For ttm dambuf this is
actually an advantage because it avoids immediately allocating
a new dmabuf object.
CPU1 CPU2
file_ref_put()
cnt = atomic_long_dec_return()
-> __file_ref_put(cnt)
if (cnt == FIlE_REF_NOREF)
file_ref_get()
// Brings reference back to FILE_REF_ONEREF
atomic_long_add_negative()
atomic_long_try_cmpxchg_release(cnt, FILE_REF_DEAD)
(ii) fput()'s file_ref_put() marks the file FILE_REF_NOREF and
also suceeds in actually marking it FILE_REF_DEAD and then calls
into __fput() to free the file.
When either (1) or (2) call file_ref_get() they fail as
atomic_long_add_negative() will return true.
At the same time, both (1) and (2) all file_ref_get() under
mutexes that __fput() must also acquire preventing
kmem_cache_free() from freeing the file.
So while this might be treated as a change in semantics for (1) and
(2) it really isn't. It if should end up causing issues this can be
fixed by adding a helper that does something like:
long cnt = atomic_long_read(&ref->refcnt);
do {
if (cnt < 0)
return false;
} while (!atomic_long_try_cmpxchg(&ref->refcnt, &cnt, cnt + 1));
return true;
which would block FILE_REF_NOREF to FILE_REF_ONEREF transitions.
- Jann correctly pointed out that kmem_cache_zalloc() cannot be used
anymore once files have been ported to file_ref_t.
The kmem_cache_zalloc() call will memset() the whole struct file to
zero when it is reallocated. This will also set file->f_ref to zero
which mens that a concurrent file_ref_get() can return true:
CPU1 CPU2
__get_file_rcu()
rcu_dereference_raw()
close()
[frees file]
alloc_empty_file()
kmem_cache_zalloc()
[reallocates same file]
memset(..., 0, ...)
file_ref_get()
[increments 0->1, returns true]
init_file()
file_ref_init(..., 1)
[sets to 0]
rcu_dereference_raw()
fput()
file_ref_put()
[decrements 0->FILE_REF_NOREF, frees file]
[UAF]
causing a concurrent __get_file_rcu() call to acquire a reference to
the file that is about to be reallocated and immediately freeing it
on realizing that it has been recycled. This causes a UAF for the
task that reallocated/recycled the file.
This is prevented by switching from kmem_cache_zalloc() to
kmem_cache_alloc() and initializing the fields manually. With
file->f_ref initialized last.
Note that a memset() also isn't guaranteed to atomically update an
unsigned long so it's theoretically possible to see torn and
therefore bogus counter values.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241007-brauner-file-rcuref-v2-3-387e24dc9163@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
|
|
As atomic_inc_not_zero() is implemented with a try_cmpxchg() loop it has
O(N^2) behaviour under contention with N concurrent operations and it is
in a hot path in __fget_files_rcu().
The rcuref infrastructures remedies this problem by using an
unconditional increment relying on safe- and dead zones to make this
work and requiring rcu protection for the data structure in question.
This not just scales better it also introduces overflow protection.
However, in contrast to generic rcuref, files require a memory barrier
and thus cannot rely on *_relaxed() atomic operations and also require
to be built on atomic_long_t as having massive amounts of reference
isn't unheard of even if it is just an attack.
As suggested by Linus, add a file specific variant instead of making
this a generic library.
Files are SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU and thus don't have "regular" rcu
protection. In short, freeing of files isn't delayed until a grace
period has elapsed. Instead, they are freed immediately and thus can be
reused (multiple times) within the same grace period.
So when picking a file from the file descriptor table via its file
descriptor number it is thus possible to see an elevated reference count
on file->f_count even though the file has already been recycled possibly
multiple times by another task.
To guard against this the vfs will pick the file from the file
descriptor table twice. Once before the refcount increment and once
after to compare the pointers (grossly simplified). If they match then
the file is still valid. If not the caller needs to fput() it.
The unconditional increment makes the following race possible as
illustrated by rcuref:
> Deconstruction race
> ===================
>
> The release operation must be protected by prohibiting a grace period in
> order to prevent a possible use after free:
>
> T1 T2
> put() get()
> // ref->refcnt = ONEREF
> if (!atomic_add_negative(-1, &ref->refcnt))
> return false; <- Not taken
>
> // ref->refcnt == NOREF
> --> preemption
> // Elevates ref->refcnt to ONEREF
> if (!atomic_add_negative(1, &ref->refcnt))
> return true; <- taken
>
> if (put(&p->ref)) { <-- Succeeds
> remove_pointer(p);
> kfree_rcu(p, rcu);
> }
>
> RCU grace period ends, object is freed
>
> atomic_cmpxchg(&ref->refcnt, NOREF, DEAD); <- UAF
>
> [...] it prevents the grace period which keeps the object alive until
> all put() operations complete.
Having files by SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU shouldn't cause any problems for
this deconstruction race. Afaict, the only interesting case would be
someone freeing the file and someone immediately recycling it within the
same grace period and reinitializing file->f_count to ONEREF while a
concurrent fput() is doing atomic_cmpxchg(&ref->refcnt, NOREF, DEAD) as
in the race above.
But this is safe from SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU's perspective and it should
be safe from rcuref's perspective.
T1 T2 T3
fput() fget()
// f_count->refcnt = ONEREF
if (!atomic_add_negative(-1, &f_count->refcnt))
return false; <- Not taken
// f_count->refcnt == NOREF
--> preemption
// Elevates f_count->refcnt to ONEREF
if (!atomic_add_negative(1, &f_count->refcnt))
return true; <- taken
if (put(&f_count)) { <-- Succeeds
remove_pointer(p);
/*
* Cache is SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU
* so this is freed without a grace period.
*/
kmem_cache_free(p);
}
kmem_cache_alloc()
init_file() {
// Sets f_count->refcnt to ONEREF
rcuref_long_init(&f->f_count, 1);
}
Object has been reused within the same grace period
via kmem_cache_alloc()'s SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU.
/*
* With SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU this would be a safe UAF access and
* it would work correctly because the atomic_cmpxchg()
* will fail because the refcount has been reset to ONEREF by T3.
*/
atomic_cmpxchg(&ref->refcnt, NOREF, DEAD); <- UAF
However, there are other cases to consider:
(1) Benign race due to multiple atomic_long_read()
CPU1 CPU2
file_ref_put()
// last reference
// => count goes negative/FILE_REF_NOREF
atomic_long_add_negative_release(-1, &ref->refcnt)
-> __file_ref_put()
file_ref_get()
// goes back from negative/FILE_REF_NOREF to 0
// and file_ref_get() succeeds
atomic_long_add_negative(1, &ref->refcnt)
// This is immediately followed by file_ref_put()
// managing to set FILE_REF_DEAD
file_ref_put()
// __file_ref_put() continues and sees
// cnt > FILE_REF_RELEASED // and splats with
// "imbalanced put on file reference count"
cnt = atomic_long_read(&ref->refcnt);
The race however is benign and the problem is the
atomic_long_read(). Instead of performing a separate read this uses
atomic_long_dec_return() and pass the value to __file_ref_put().
Thanks to Linus for pointing out that braino.
(2) SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU may cause recycled files to be marked dead
When a file is recycled the following race exists:
CPU1 CPU2
// @file is already dead and thus
// cnt >= FILE_REF_RELEASED.
file_ref_get(file)
atomic_long_add_negative(1, &ref->refcnt)
// We thus call into __file_ref_get()
-> __file_ref_get()
// which sees cnt >= FILE_REF_RELEASED
cnt = atomic_long_read(&ref->refcnt);
// In the meantime @file gets freed
kmem_cache_free()
// and is immediately recycled
file = kmem_cache_zalloc()
// and the reference count is reinitialized
// and the file alive again in someone
// else's file descriptor table
file_ref_init(&ref->refcnt, 1);
// the __file_ref_get() slowpath now continues
// and as it saw earlier that cnt >= FILE_REF_RELEASED
// it wants to ensure that we're staying in the middle
// of the deadzone and unconditionally sets
// FILE_REF_DEAD.
// This marks @file dead for CPU2...
atomic_long_set(&ref->refcnt, FILE_REF_DEAD);
// Caller issues a close() system call to close @file
close(fd)
file = file_close_fd_locked()
filp_flush()
// The caller sees that cnt >= FILE_REF_RELEASED
// and warns the first time...
CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(file_count(file) == 0)
// and then splats a second time because
// __file_ref_put() sees cnt >= FILE_REF_RELEASED
file_ref_put(&ref->refcnt);
-> __file_ref_put()
My initial inclination was to replace the unconditional
atomic_long_set() with an atomic_long_try_cmpxchg() but Linus
pointed out that:
> I think we should just make file_ref_get() do a simple
>
> return !atomic_long_add_negative(1, &ref->refcnt));
>
> and nothing else. Yes, multiple CPU's can race, and you can increment
> more than once, but the gap - even on 32-bit - between DEAD and
> becoming close to REF_RELEASED is so big that we simply don't care.
> That's the point of having a gap.
I've been testing this with will-it-scale using fstat() on a machine
that Jens gave me access (thank you very much!):
processor : 511
vendor_id : AuthenticAMD
cpu family : 25
model : 160
model name : AMD EPYC 9754 128-Core Processor
and I consistently get a 3-5% improvement on 256+ threads.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-lkp/202410151043.5d224a27-oliver.sang@intel.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/202410151611.f4cd71f2-oliver.sang@intel.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241007-brauner-file-rcuref-v2-2-387e24dc9163@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
|
|
All callers treat 0 and 1 returned by expand_files() in the same way
now since the call in alloc_fd() had been made conditional. Just make
it return 0 on success and be done with it...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
->close_on_exec[] state is maintained only for opened descriptors;
as the result, anything that marks a descriptor opened has to
set its cloexec state explicitly.
As the result, all calls of __set_open_fd() are followed by
__set_close_on_exec(); might as well fold it into __set_open_fd()
so that cloexec state is defined as soon as the descriptor is
marked opened.
[braino fix folded]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
Currently backing files are not under any form of rcu protection.
Switching to file_ref requires rcu protection and so does the
speculative vma lookup. Switch backing files to the same rcu slab type
as regular files. There should be no additional magic required as the
lifetime of a backing file is always tied to a regular file.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241007-brauner-file-rcuref-v2-1-387e24dc9163@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
|
|
they are always go in pairs; seeing that they are inlined, might
as well make that a single inline function taking a boolean
argument ("do we want close_on_exec set for that descriptor")
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
First of all, tell it how many slots do we want, not which slot
is wanted. It makes one caller (dup_fd()) more straightforward
and doesn't harm another (expand_fdtable()).
Furthermore, make it return ERR_PTR() on failure rather than
returning NULL. Simplifies the callers.
Simplify the size calculation, while we are at it - note that we
always have slots_wanted greater than BITS_PER_LONG. What the
rules boil down to is
* use the smallest power of two large enough to give us
that many slots
* on 32bit skip 64 and 128 - the minimal capacity we want
there is 256 slots (i.e. 1Kb fd array).
* on 64bit don't skip anything, the minimal capacity is
128 - and we'll never be asked for 64 or less. 128 slots means
1Kb fd array, again.
* on 128bit, if that ever happens, don't skip anything -
we'll never be asked for 128 or less, so the fd array allocation
will be at least 2Kb.
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
Skip 2-levels searching via find_next_zero_bit() when there is free slot in the
word contains next_fd, as:
(1) next_fd indicates the lower bound for the first free fd.
(2) There is fast path inside of find_next_zero_bit() when size<=64 to speed up
searching.
(3) After fdt is expanded (the bitmap size doubled for each time of expansion),
it would never be shrunk. The search size increases but there are few open fds
available here.
This fast path is proposed by Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com>, and agreed by
Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>, which is more generic and scalable than previous
versions. And on top of patch 1 and 2, it improves pts/blogbench-1.1.0 read by
8% and write by 4% on Intel ICX 160 cores configuration with v6.10-rc7.
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu Ma <yu.ma@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240717145018.3972922-4-yu.ma@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
64 bits in open_fds are mapped to a common bit in full_fds_bits. It is very
likely that a bit in full_fds_bits has been cleared before in
__clear_open_fds()'s operation. Check the clear bit in full_fds_bits before
clearing to avoid unnecessary write and cache bouncing. See commit fc90888d07b8
("vfs: conditionally clear close-on-exec flag") for a similar optimization.
take stock kernel with patch 1 as baseline, it improves pts/blogbench-1.1.0
read for 13%, and write for 5% on Intel ICX 160 cores configuration with
v6.10-rc7.
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu Ma <yu.ma@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240717145018.3972922-3-yu.ma@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
alloc_fd() has a sanity check inside to make sure the struct file mapping to the
allocated fd is NULL. Remove this sanity check since it can be assured by
exisitng zero initilization and NULL set when recycling fd. Meanwhile, add
likely/unlikely and expand_file() call avoidance to reduce the work under
file_lock.
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu Ma <yu.ma@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240717145018.3972922-2-yu.ma@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
We never had callers for __close_range() except for close_range(2)
itself. Nothing of that sort has appeared in four years and if any users
do show up, we can always separate those suckers again.
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
At that point nobody else has references to the victim files_struct;
as the matter of fact, the caller will free it immediately after
close_files() returns, with no RCU delays or anything of that sort.
That's why we are not protecting against fdtable reallocation on
expansion, not cleaning the bitmaps, etc. There's no point
zeroing the pointers in ->fd[] either, let alone make that an
atomic operation.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
some of those used to be needed, some had been cargo-culted for
no reason...
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
Once upon a time, predecessors of those used to do file lookup
without bumping a refcount, provided that caller held rcu_read_lock()
across the lookup and whatever it wanted to read from the struct
file found. When struct file allocation switched to SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU,
that stopped being feasible and these primitives started to bump the
file refcount for lookup result, requiring the caller to call fput()
afterwards.
But that turned them pointless - e.g.
rcu_read_lock();
file = lookup_fdget_rcu(fd);
rcu_read_unlock();
is equivalent to
file = fget_raw(fd);
and all callers of lookup_fdget_rcu() are of that form. Similarly,
task_lookup_fdget_rcu() calls can be replaced with calling fget_task().
task_lookup_next_fdget_rcu() doesn't have direct counterparts, but
its callers would be happier if we replaced it with an analogue that
deals with RCU internally.
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild
Pull Kbuild fixes from Masahiro Yamada:
- Move non-boot built-in DTBs to the .rodata section
- Fix Kconfig bugs
- Fix maint scripts in the linux-image Debian package
- Import some list macros to scripts/include/
* tag 'kbuild-fixes-v6.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild:
kbuild: deb-pkg: Remove blank first line from maint scripts
kbuild: fix a typo dt_binding_schema -> dt_binding_schemas
scripts: import more list macros
kconfig: qconf: fix buffer overflow in debug links
kconfig: qconf: move conf_read() before drawing tree pain
kconfig: clear expr::val_is_valid when allocated
kconfig: fix infinite loop in sym_calc_choice()
kbuild: move non-boot built-in DTBs to .rodata section
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pdx86/platform-drivers-x86
Pull x86 platform driver fixes from Hans de Goede:
- Intel PMC fix for suspend/resume issues on some Sky and Kaby Lake
laptops
- Intel Diamond Rapids hw-id additions
- Documentation and MAINTAINERS fixes
- Some other small fixes
* tag 'platform-drivers-x86-v6.12-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pdx86/platform-drivers-x86:
platform/x86: x86-android-tablets: Fix use after free on platform_device_register() errors
platform/x86: wmi: Update WMI driver API documentation
platform/x86: dell-ddv: Fix typo in documentation
platform/x86: dell-sysman: add support for alienware products
platform/x86/intel: power-domains: Add Diamond Rapids support
platform/x86: ISST: Add Diamond Rapids to support list
platform/x86:intel/pmc: Disable ACPI PM Timer disabling on Sky and Kaby Lake
platform/x86: dell-laptop: Do not fail when encountering unsupported batteries
MAINTAINERS: Update Intel In Field Scan(IFS) entry
platform/x86: ISST: Fix the KASAN report slab-out-of-bounds bug
|
|
Pull kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
"ARM64:
- Fix pKVM error path on init, making sure we do not change critical
system registers as we're about to fail
- Make sure that the host's vector length is at capped by a value
common to all CPUs
- Fix kvm_has_feat*() handling of "negative" features, as the current
code is pretty broken
- Promote Joey to the status of official reviewer, while James steps
down -- hopefully only temporarly
x86:
- Fix compilation with KVM_INTEL=KVM_AMD=n
- Fix disabling KVM_X86_QUIRK_SLOT_ZAP_ALL when shadow MMU is in use
Selftests:
- Fix compilation on non-x86 architectures"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm:
x86/reboot: emergency callbacks are now registered by common KVM code
KVM: x86: leave kvm.ko out of the build if no vendor module is requested
KVM: x86/mmu: fix KVM_X86_QUIRK_SLOT_ZAP_ALL for shadow MMU
KVM: arm64: Fix kvm_has_feat*() handling of negative features
KVM: selftests: Fix build on architectures other than x86_64
KVM: arm64: Another reviewer reshuffle
KVM: arm64: Constrain the host to the maximum shared SVE VL with pKVM
KVM: arm64: Fix __pkvm_init_vcpu cptr_el2 error path
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux
Pull powerpc fix from Michael Ellerman:
- Allow r30 to be used in vDSO code generation of getrandom
Thanks to Jason A. Donenfeld
* tag 'powerpc-6.12-3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux:
powerpc/vdso: allow r30 in vDSO code generation of getrandom
|
|
The blank line causes execve() to fail:
# strace ./postinst
execve("./postinst", ...) = -1 ENOEXEC (Exec format error)
strace: exec: Exec format error
+++ exited with 1 +++
However running the scripts via shell does work (at least with bash)
because the shell attempts to execute the file as a shell script when
execve() fails.
Fixes: b611daae5efc ("kbuild: deb-pkg: split image and debug objects staging out into functions")
Signed-off-by: Aaron Thompson <dev@aaront.org>
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Nicolas Schier <nicolas@fjasle.eu>
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
|
|
If we follow "make help" to "make dt_binding_schema", we will see
below error:
$ make dt_binding_schema
make[1]: *** No rule to make target 'dt_binding_schema'. Stop.
make: *** [Makefile:224: __sub-make] Error 2
It should be a typo. So this will fix it.
Fixes: 604a57ba9781 ("dt-bindings: kbuild: Add separate target/dependency for processed-schema.json")
Signed-off-by: Xu Yang <xu.yang_2@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Nicolas Schier <n.schier@avm.de>
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
|
|
Import list_is_first, list_is_last, list_replace, and list_replace_init.
Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
|
|
platform_device_register() errors
x86_android_tablet_remove() frees the pdevs[] array, so it should not
be used after calling x86_android_tablet_remove().
When platform_device_register() fails, store the pdevs[x] PTR_ERR() value
into the local ret variable before calling x86_android_tablet_remove()
to avoid using pdevs[] after it has been freed.
Fixes: 5eba0141206e ("platform/x86: x86-android-tablets: Add support for instantiating platform-devs")
Fixes: e2200d3f26da ("platform/x86: x86-android-tablets: Add gpio_keys support to x86_android_tablet_init()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Aleksandr Burakov <a.burakov@rosalinux.ru>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/platform-driver-x86/20240917120458.7300-1-a.burakov@rosalinux.ru/
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241005130545.64136-1-hdegoede@redhat.com
|
|
The WMI driver core now passes the WMI event data to legacy notify
handlers, so WMI devices sharing notification IDs are now being
handled properly.
Fixes: e04e2b760ddb ("platform/x86: wmi: Pass event data directly to legacy notify handlers")
Signed-off-by: Armin Wolf <W_Armin@gmx.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241005213825.701887-1-W_Armin@gmx.de
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
|
|
Fix typo in word 'diagnostics' in documentation.
Signed-off-by: Anaswara T Rajan <anaswaratrajan@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Armin Wolf <W_Armin@gmx.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241005070056.16326-1-anaswaratrajan@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
|
|
Alienware supports firmware-attributes and has its own OEM string.
Signed-off-by: Crag Wang <crag_wang@dell.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241004152826.93992-1-crag_wang@dell.com
Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
|
|
Add Diamond Rapids (INTEL_PANTHERCOVE_X) to tpmi_cpu_ids to support
domaid id mappings.
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241003215554.3013807-3-srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
|
|
Add Diamond Rapids (INTEL_PANTHERCOVE_X) to SST support list by adding
to isst_cpu_ids.
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241003215554.3013807-2-srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
|
|
There have been multiple reports that the ACPI PM Timer disabling is
causing Sky and Kaby Lake systems to hang on all suspend (s2idle, s3,
hibernate) methods.
Remove the acpi_pm_tmr_ctl_offset and acpi_pm_tmr_disable_bit settings from
spt_reg_map to disable the ACPI PM Timer disabling on Sky and Kaby Lake to
fix the hang on suspend.
Fixes: e86c8186d03a ("platform/x86:intel/pmc: Enable the ACPI PM Timer to be turned off when suspended")
Reported-by: Paul Menzel <pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-pm/18784f62-91ff-4d88-9621-6c88eb0af2b5@molgen.mpg.de/
Reported-by: Todd Brandt <todd.e.brandt@intel.com>
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219346
Cc: Marek Maslanka <mmaslanka@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Todd Brandt <todd.e.brandt@intel.com>
Tested-by: Paul Menzel <pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de> # Dell XPS 13 9360/0596KF
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241003202614.17181-2-hdegoede@redhat.com
|
|
If the battery hook encounters a unsupported battery, it will
return an error. This in turn will cause the battery driver to
automatically unregister the battery hook.
On machines with multiple batteries however, this will prevent
the battery hook from handling the primary battery, since it will
always get unregistered upon encountering one of the unsupported
batteries.
Fix this by simply ignoring unsupported batteries.
Reviewed-by: Pali Rohár <pali@kernel.org>
Fixes: ab58016c68cc ("platform/x86:dell-laptop: Add knobs to change battery charge settings")
Signed-off-by: Armin Wolf <W_Armin@gmx.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241001212835.341788-4-W_Armin@gmx.de
Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
|
|
Ashok is no longer with Intel and his e-mail address will start bouncing
soon. Update his email address to the new one he provided to ensure
correct contact details in the MAINTAINERS file.
Signed-off-by: Jithu Joseph <jithu.joseph@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241001170808.203970-1-jithu.joseph@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD
KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.12, take #1
- Fix pKVM error path on init, making sure we do not change critical
system registers as we're about to fail
- Make sure that the host's vector length is at capped by a value
common to all CPUs
- Fix kvm_has_feat*() handling of "negative" features, as the current
code is pretty broken
- Promote Joey to the status of official reviewer, while James steps
down -- hopefully only temporarly
|
|
Guard them with CONFIG_KVM_X86_COMMON rather than the two vendor modules.
In practice this has no functional change, because CONFIG_KVM_X86_COMMON
is set if and only if at least one vendor-specific module is being built.
However, it is cleaner to specify CONFIG_KVM_X86_COMMON for functions that
are used in kvm.ko.
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Fixes: 590b09b1d88e ("KVM: x86: Register "emergency disable" callbacks when virt is enabled")
Fixes: 6d55a94222db ("x86/reboot: Unconditionally define cpu_emergency_virt_cb typedef")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
kvm.ko is nothing but library code shared by kvm-intel.ko and kvm-amd.ko.
It provides no functionality on its own and it is unnecessary unless one
of the vendor-specific module is compiled. In particular, /dev/kvm is
not created until one of kvm-intel.ko or kvm-amd.ko is loaded.
Use CONFIG_KVM to decide if it is built-in or a module, but use the
vendor-specific modules for the actual decision on whether to build it.
This also fixes a build failure when CONFIG_KVM_INTEL and CONFIG_KVM_AMD
are both disabled. The cpu_emergency_register_virt_callback() function
is called from kvm.ko, but it is only defined if at least one of
CONFIG_KVM_INTEL and CONFIG_KVM_AMD is provided.
Fixes: 590b09b1d88e ("KVM: x86: Register "emergency disable" callbacks when virt is enabled")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Pull bcachefs fixes from Kent Overstreet:
"A lot of little fixes, bigger ones include:
- bcachefs's __wait_on_freeing_inode() was broken in rc1 due to vfs
changes, now fixed along with another lost wakeup
- fragmentation LRU fixes; fsck now repairs successfully (this is the
data structure copygc uses); along with some nice simplification.
- Rework logged op error handling, so that if logged op replay errors
(due to another filesystem error) we delete the logged op instead
of going into an infinite loop)
- Various small filesystem connectivitity repair fixes"
* tag 'bcachefs-2024-10-05' of git://evilpiepirate.org/bcachefs:
bcachefs: Rework logged op error handling
bcachefs: Add warn param to subvol_get_snapshot, peek_inode
bcachefs: Kill snapshot arg to fsck_write_inode()
bcachefs: Check for unlinked, non-empty dirs in check_inode()
bcachefs: Check for unlinked inodes with dirents
bcachefs: Check for directories with no backpointers
bcachefs: Kill alloc_v4.fragmentation_lru
bcachefs: minor lru fsck fixes
bcachefs: Mark more errors AUTOFIX
bcachefs: Make sure we print error that causes fsck to bail out
bcachefs: bkey errors are only AUTOFIX during read
bcachefs: Create lost+found in correct snapshot
bcachefs: Fix reattach_inode()
bcachefs: Add missing wakeup to bch2_inode_hash_remove()
bcachefs: Fix trans_commit disk accounting revert
bcachefs: Fix bch2_inode_is_open() check
bcachefs: Fix return type of dirent_points_to_inode_nowarn()
bcachefs: Fix bad shift in bch2_read_flag_list()
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip
Pull xen fix from Juergen Gross:
"Fix Xen config issue introduced in the merge window"
* tag 'for-linus-6.12a-rc2-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip:
xen: Fix config option reference in XEN_PRIVCMD definition
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4
Pull ext4 fixes from Ted Ts'o:
"Fix some ext4 bugs and regressions relating to oneline resize and fast
commits"
* tag 'ext4_for_linus-5.12-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4:
ext4: fix off by one issue in alloc_flex_gd()
ext4: mark fc as ineligible using an handle in ext4_xattr_set()
ext4: use handle to mark fc as ineligible in __track_dentry_update()
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cxl/cxl
Pull cxl fix from Ira Weiny:
- Fix calculation for SBDF in error injection
* tag 'cxl-fixes-6.12-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cxl/cxl:
EINJ, CXL: Fix CXL device SBDF calculation
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/wsa/linux
Pull i2c fix from Wolfram Sang:
- Fix potential deadlock during runtime suspend and resume (stm32f7)
* tag 'i2c-for-6.12-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/wsa/linux:
i2c: stm32f7: Do not prepare/unprepare clock during runtime suspend/resume
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/broonie/spi
Pull spi fixes from Mark Brown:
"A small set of driver specific fixes that came in since the merge
window, about half of which is fixes for correctness in the use of the
runtime PM APIs done as part of a broader cleanup"
* tag 'spi-fix-v6.12-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/broonie/spi:
spi: s3c64xx: fix timeout counters in flush_fifo
spi: atmel-quadspi: Fix wrong register value written to MR
spi: spi-cadence: Fix missing spi_controller_is_target() check
spi: spi-cadence: Fix pm_runtime_set_suspended() with runtime pm enabled
spi: spi-imx: Fix pm_runtime_set_suspended() with runtime pm enabled
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull hardening fixes from Kees Cook:
- gcc plugins: Avoid Kconfig warnings with randstruct (Nathan
Chancellor)
- MAINTAINERS: Add security/Kconfig.hardening to hardening section
(Nathan Chancellor)
- MAINTAINERS: Add unsafe_memcpy() to the FORTIFY review list
* tag 'hardening-v6.12-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
MAINTAINERS: Add security/Kconfig.hardening to hardening section
hardening: Adjust dependencies in selection of MODVERSIONS
MAINTAINERS: Add unsafe_memcpy() to the FORTIFY review list
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull lsm revert from Paul Moore:
"Here is the CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO_LKM revert that we've been
discussing this week. With near unanimous agreement that the original
TOMOYO patches were not the right way to solve the distro problem
Tetsuo is trying the solve, reverting is our best option at this time"
* tag 'lsm-pr-20241004' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
tomoyo: revert CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO_LKM support
|
|
Attaching SST PCI device to VM causes "BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds".
kasan report:
[ 19.411889] ==================================================================
[ 19.413702] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _isst_if_get_pci_dev+0x3d5/0x400 [isst_if_common]
[ 19.415634] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888829e65200 by task cpuhp/16/113
[ 19.417368]
[ 19.418627] CPU: 16 PID: 113 Comm: cpuhp/16 Tainted: G E 6.9.0 #10
[ 19.420435] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS VMW201.00V.20192059.B64.2207280713 07/28/2022
[ 19.422687] Call Trace:
[ 19.424091] <TASK>
[ 19.425448] dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80
[ 19.426963] ? _isst_if_get_pci_dev+0x3d5/0x400 [isst_if_common]
[ 19.428694] print_report+0x19d/0x52e
[ 19.430206] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
[ 19.431837] ? _isst_if_get_pci_dev+0x3d5/0x400 [isst_if_common]
[ 19.433539] kasan_report+0xf0/0x170
[ 19.435019] ? _isst_if_get_pci_dev+0x3d5/0x400 [isst_if_common]
[ 19.436709] _isst_if_get_pci_dev+0x3d5/0x400 [isst_if_common]
[ 19.438379] ? __pfx_sched_clock_cpu+0x10/0x10
[ 19.439910] isst_if_cpu_online+0x406/0x58f [isst_if_common]
[ 19.441573] ? __pfx_isst_if_cpu_online+0x10/0x10 [isst_if_common]
[ 19.443263] ? ttwu_queue_wakelist+0x2c1/0x360
[ 19.444797] cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x221/0xec0
[ 19.446337] cpuhp_thread_fun+0x21b/0x610
[ 19.447814] ? __pfx_cpuhp_thread_fun+0x10/0x10
[ 19.449354] smpboot_thread_fn+0x2e7/0x6e0
[ 19.450859] ? __pfx_smpboot_thread_fn+0x10/0x10
[ 19.452405] kthread+0x29c/0x350
[ 19.453817] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 19.455253] ret_from_fork+0x31/0x70
[ 19.456685] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 19.458114] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 19.459573] </TASK>
[ 19.460853]
[ 19.462055] Allocated by task 1198:
[ 19.463410] kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50
[ 19.464788] kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
[ 19.466139] __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0
[ 19.467465] __kmalloc+0x1cd/0x470
[ 19.468748] isst_if_cdev_register+0x1da/0x350 [isst_if_common]
[ 19.470233] isst_if_mbox_init+0x108/0xff0 [isst_if_mbox_msr]
[ 19.471670] do_one_initcall+0xa4/0x380
[ 19.472903] do_init_module+0x238/0x760
[ 19.474105] load_module+0x5239/0x6f00
[ 19.475285] init_module_from_file+0xd1/0x130
[ 19.476506] idempotent_init_module+0x23b/0x650
[ 19.477725] __x64_sys_finit_module+0xbe/0x130
[ 19.476506] idempotent_init_module+0x23b/0x650
[ 19.477725] __x64_sys_finit_module+0xbe/0x130
[ 19.478920] do_syscall_64+0x82/0x160
[ 19.480036] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[ 19.481292]
[ 19.482205] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888829e65000
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
[ 19.484818] The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
allocated 512-byte region [ffff888829e65000, ffff888829e65200)
[ 19.487447]
[ 19.488328] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[ 19.489569] page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888829e60c00 pfn:0x829e60
[ 19.491140] head: order:3 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
[ 19.492466] anon flags: 0x57ffffc0000840(slab|head|node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
[ 19.493914] page_type: 0xffffffff()
[ 19.494988] raw: 0057ffffc0000840 ffff88810004cc80 0000000000000000 0000000000000001
[ 19.496451] raw: ffff888829e60c00 0000000080200018 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 19.497906] head: 0057ffffc0000840 ffff88810004cc80 0000000000000000 0000000000000001
[ 19.499379] head: ffff888829e60c00 0000000080200018 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 19.500844] head: 0057ffffc0000003 ffffea0020a79801 ffffea0020a79848 00000000ffffffff
[ 19.502316] head: 0000000800000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 19.503784] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 19.505058]
[ 19.505970] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 19.507172] ffff888829e65100: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 19.508599] ffff888829e65180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 19.510013] >ffff888829e65200: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 19.510014] ^
[ 19.510016] ffff888829e65280: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 19.510018] ffff888829e65300: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 19.515367] ==================================================================
The reason for this error is physical_package_ids assigned by VMware VMM
are not continuous and have gaps. This will cause value returned by
topology_physical_package_id() to be more than topology_max_packages().
Here the allocation uses topology_max_packages(). The call to
topology_max_packages() returns maximum logical package ID not physical
ID. Hence use topology_logical_package_id() instead of
topology_physical_package_id().
Fixes: 9a1aac8a96dc ("platform/x86: ISST: PUNIT device mapping with Sub-NUMA clustering")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Zach Wade <zachwade.k@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240923144508.1764-1-zachwade.k@gmail.com
Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/shuah/linux-kselftest
Pull kselftest fixes from Shuah Khan:
"Fixes to build warnings, install scripts, run-time error path, and git
status cleanups to tests:
- devices/probe: fix for Python3 regex string syntax warnings
- clone3: removing unused macro from clone3_cap_checkpoint_restore()
- vDSO: fix to align getrandom states to cache line
- core and exec: add missing executables to .gitignore files
- rtc: change to skip test if /dev/rtc0 can't be accessed
- timers/posix: fix warn_unused_result result in __fatal_error()
- breakpoints: fix to detect suspend successful condition correctly
- hid: fix to install required dependencies to run the test"
* tag 'linux_kselftest-fixes-6.12-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/shuah/linux-kselftest:
selftests: breakpoints: use remaining time to check if suspend succeed
kselftest/devices/probe: Fix SyntaxWarning in regex strings for Python3
selftest: hid: add missing run-hid-tools-tests.sh
selftests: vDSO: align getrandom states to cache line
selftests: exec: update gitignore for load_address
selftests: core: add unshare_test to gitignore
clone3: clone3_cap_checkpoint_restore: remove unused MAX_PID_NS_LEVEL macro
selftests:timers: posix_timers: Fix warn_unused_result in __fatal_error()
selftest: rtc: Check if could access /dev/rtc0 before testing
|
|
Initially it was thought that we just wanted to ignore errors from
logged op replay, but it turns out we do need to catch -EROFS, or we'll
go into an infinite loop.
Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>
|
|
These shouldn't always be fatal errors - logged op resume, in
particular, and we want it as a parameter there.
Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>
|
|
It was initially believed that it would be better to be explicit about
the snapshot we're updating when writing inodes in fsck; however, it
turns out that passing around the snapshot separately is more error
prone and we're usually updating the inode in the same snapshow we read
it from.
This is different from normal filesystem paths, where we do the update
in the snapshot of the subvolume we're in.
Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>
|
|
We want to check for this early so it can be reattached if necessary in
check_unreachable_inodes(); better than letting it be deleted and having
the children reattached, losing their filenames.
Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>
|
