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Fix to return a negative error code from the error handling
case instead of 0, as done elsewhere in this function.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhang Changzhong <zhangchangzhong@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1605581105-35295-1-git-send-email-zhangchangzhong@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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LTE module MR400 embedded in TL-MR6400 v4 requires DTR to be set.
Signed-off-by: Filip Moc <dev@moc6.cz>
Acked-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201117173631.GA550981@moc6.cz
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Return the error value if the inject sysfs file creation fails, rather
than returning 0, to signal to the upper layer that the ->probe function
failed.
[ bp: Massage. ]
Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Michal Simek <michal.simek@xilinx.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201116135810.3130845-1-zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com
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At the start of driver initialization, we do not know what bias
setting the bootloader has configured the system for and we only know
for certain the very first time we do a transition.
However, since the initial value of the comparison index is -EINVAL,
this negative value results in an array out of bound access on the
very first transition.
Since we don't know what the setting is, we just set the bias
configuration as there is nothing to compare against. This prevents
the array out of bound access.
NOTE: Even though we could use a more relaxed check of "< 0" the only
valid values(ignoring cosmic ray induced bitflips) are -EINVAL, 0+.
Fixes: 40b1936efebd ("regulator: Introduce TI Adaptive Body Bias(ABB) on-chip LDO driver")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/CA+G9fYuk4imvhyCN7D7T6PMDH6oNp6HDCRiTUKMQ6QXXjBa4ag@mail.gmail.com/
Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Nishanth Menon <nm@ti.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201118145009.10492-1-nm@ti.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
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In kabylake_set_bias_level(), enabling mclk may fail if the clock has
already been enabled by the firmware. Attempts to disable that clock
later will fail with a warning backtrace.
mclk already disabled
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 108 at drivers/clk/clk.c:952 clk_core_disable+0x1b6/0x1cf
...
Call Trace:
clk_disable+0x2d/0x3a
kabylake_set_bias_level+0x72/0xfd [snd_soc_kbl_rt5663_rt5514_max98927]
snd_soc_card_set_bias_level+0x2b/0x6f
snd_soc_dapm_set_bias_level+0xe1/0x209
dapm_pre_sequence_async+0x63/0x96
async_run_entry_fn+0x3d/0xd1
process_one_work+0x2a9/0x526
...
Only disable the clock if it has been enabled.
Fixes: 15747a802075 ("ASoC: eve: implement set_bias_level function for rt5514")
Cc: Brent Lu <brent.lu@intel.com>
Cc: Curtis Malainey <cujomalainey@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201111205434.207610-1-linux@roeck-us.net
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
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Use a statically generated key for signing the enclave, because
generating keys on the fly can eat the kernel entropy pool. Another
good reason for doing this is predictable builds. The RSA has been
arbitrarily selected. It's contents do not matter.
This also makes the selftest execute a lot quicker instead of the delay
that it had before (because of slow key generation).
[ bp: Disambiguate "static key" which means something else in the
kernel, fix typos. ]
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201118170640.39629-1-jarkko@kernel.org
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In xfs_initialize_perag(), if kmem_zalloc(), xfs_buf_hash_init(), or
radix_tree_preload() failed, the returned value 'error' is not set
accordingly.
Reported-as-fixing: 8b26c5825e02 ("xfs: handle ENOMEM correctly during initialisation of perag structures")
Fixes: 9b2471797942 ("xfs: cache unlinked pointers in an rhashtable")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
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The aim of the inode btree record iterator function is to call a
callback on every record in the btree. To avoid having to tear down and
recreate the inode btree cursor around every callback, it caches a
certain number of records in a memory buffer. After each batch of
callback invocations, we have to perform a btree lookup to find the
next record after where we left off.
However, if the keys of the inode btree are corrupt, the lookup might
put us in the wrong part of the inode btree, causing the walk function
to loop forever. Therefore, we add extra cursor tracking to make sure
that we never go backwards neither when performing the lookup nor when
jumping to the next inobt record. This also fixes an off by one error
where upon resume the lookup should have been for the inode /after/ the
point at which we stopped.
Found by fuzzing xfs/460 with keys[2].startino = ones causing bulkstat
and quotacheck to hang.
Fixes: a211432c27ff ("xfs: create simplified inode walk function")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanrlinux@gmail.com>
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Currently, commit e9e2eae89ddb dropped a (int) decoration from
XFS_LITINO(mp), and since sizeof() expression is also involved,
the result of XFS_LITINO(mp) is simply as the size_t type
(commonly unsigned long).
Considering the expression in xfs_attr_shortform_bytesfit():
offset = (XFS_LITINO(mp) - bytes) >> 3;
let "bytes" be (int)340, and
"XFS_LITINO(mp)" be (unsigned long)336.
on 64-bit platform, the expression is
offset = ((unsigned long)336 - (int)340) >> 3 =
(int)(0xfffffffffffffffcUL >> 3) = -1
but on 32-bit platform, the expression is
offset = ((unsigned long)336 - (int)340) >> 3 =
(int)(0xfffffffcUL >> 3) = 0x1fffffff
instead.
so offset becomes a large positive number on 32-bit platform, and
cause xfs_attr_shortform_bytesfit() returns maxforkoff rather than 0.
Therefore, one result is
"ASSERT(new_size <= XFS_IFORK_SIZE(ip, whichfork));"
assertion failure in xfs_idata_realloc(), which was also the root
cause of the original bugreport from Dennis, see:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1894177
And it can also be manually triggered with the following commands:
$ touch a;
$ setfattr -n user.0 -v "`seq 0 80`" a;
$ setfattr -n user.1 -v "`seq 0 80`" a
on 32-bit platform.
Fix the case in xfs_attr_shortform_bytesfit() by bailing out
"XFS_LITINO(mp) < bytes" in advance suggested by Eric and a misleading
comment together with this bugfix suggested by Darrick. It seems the
other users of XFS_LITINO(mp) are not impacted.
Fixes: e9e2eae89ddb ("xfs: only check the superblock version for dinode size calculation")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.7+
Reported-and-tested-by: Dennis Gilmore <dgilmore@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Gao Xiang <hsiangkao@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
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Teach the directory scrubber to check all the bestfree entries,
including the null ones. We want to be able to detect the case where
the entry is null but there actually /is/ a directory data block.
Found by fuzzing lbests[0] = ones in xfs/391.
Fixes: df481968f33b ("xfs: scrub directory freespace")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanrlinux@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
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We always know the correct state of the rmap record flags (attr, bmbt,
unwritten) so check them by direct comparison.
Fixes: d852657ccfc0 ("xfs: cross-reference reverse-mapping btree")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanrlinux@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
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The comment and logic in xchk_btree_check_minrecs for dealing with
inode-rooted btrees isn't quite correct. While the direct children of
the inode root are allowed to have fewer records than what would
normally be allowed for a regular ondisk btree block, this is only true
if there is only one child block and the number of records don't fit in
the inode root.
Fixes: 08a3a692ef58 ("xfs: btree scrub should check minrecs")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanrlinux@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
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Short Version:
The SGX section->laundry_list structure is effectively thread-local, but
declared next to some shared structures. Its semantics are clear as mud.
Fix that. No functional changes. Compile tested only.
Long Version:
The SGX hardware keeps per-page metadata. This can provide things like
permissions, integrity and replay protection. It also prevents things
like having an enclave page mapped multiple times or shared between
enclaves.
But, that presents a problem for kexec()'d kernels (or any other kernel
that does not run immediately after a hardware reset). This is because
the last kernel may have been rude and forgotten to reset pages, which
would trigger the "shared page" sanity check.
To fix this, the SGX code "launders" the pages by running the EREMOVE
instruction on all pages at boot. This is slow and can take a long
time, so it is performed off in the SGX-specific ksgxd instead of being
synchronous at boot. The init code hands the list of pages to launder in
a per-SGX-section list: ->laundry_list. The only code to touch this list
is the init code and ksgxd. This means that no locking is necessary for
->laundry_list.
However, a lock is required for section->page_list, which is accessed
while creating enclaves and by ksgxd. This lock (section->lock) is
acquired by ksgxd while also processing ->laundry_list. It is easy to
confuse the purpose of the locking as being for ->laundry_list and
->page_list.
Rename ->laundry_list to ->init_laundry_list to make it clear that this
is not normally used at runtime. Also add some comments clarifying the
locking, and reorganize 'sgx_epc_section' to put 'lock' near the things
it protects.
Note: init_laundry_list is 128 bytes of wasted space at runtime. It
could theoretically be dynamically allocated and then freed after
the laundering process. But it would take nearly 128 bytes of extra
instructions to do that.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201116222531.4834-1-dave.hansen@intel.com
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Add the maintainer information for the SGX subsystem.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-25-jarkko@kernel.org
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Document the Intel SGX kernel architecture. The fine-grained architecture
details can be looked up from Intel SDM Volume 3D.
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-24-jarkko@kernel.org
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Enclave memory is normally inaccessible from outside the enclave. This
makes enclaves hard to debug. However, enclaves can be put in a debug
mode when they are being built. In that mode, enclave data *can* be read
and/or written by using the ENCLS[EDBGRD] and ENCLS[EDBGWR] functions.
This is obviously only for debugging and destroys all the protections
present with normal enclaves. But, enclaves know their own debug status
and can adjust their behavior appropriately.
Add a vm_ops->access() implementation which can be used to read and write
memory inside debug enclaves. This is typically used via ptrace() APIs.
[ bp: Massage. ]
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-23-jarkko@kernel.org
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Just like normal RAM, there is a limited amount of enclave memory available
and overcommitting it is a very valuable tool to reduce resource use.
Introduce a simple reclaim mechanism for enclave pages.
In contrast to normal page reclaim, the kernel cannot directly access
enclave memory. To get around this, the SGX architecture provides a set of
functions to help. Among other things, these functions copy enclave memory
to and from normal memory, encrypting it and protecting its integrity in
the process.
Implement a page reclaimer by using these functions. Picks victim pages in
LRU fashion from all the enclaves running in the system. A new kernel
thread (ksgxswapd) reclaims pages in the background based on watermarks,
similar to normal kswapd.
All enclave pages can be reclaimed, architecturally. But, there are some
limits to this, such as the special SECS metadata page which must be
reclaimed last. The page version array (used to mitigate replaying old
reclaimed pages) is also architecturally reclaimable, but not yet
implemented. The end result is that the vast majority of enclave pages are
currently reclaimable.
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-22-jarkko@kernel.org
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvms390/linux into kvm-master
KVM: s390: Fix for destroy page ultravisor call
- handle response code from older firmware
- add uv.c to KVM: s390/s390 maintainer list
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Add a selftest for SGX. It is a trivial test where a simple enclave
copies one 64-bit word of memory between two memory locations,
but ensures that all SGX hardware and software infrastructure is
functioning.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Cc: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-21-jarkko@kernel.org
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Enclaves encounter exceptions for lots of reasons: everything from enclave
page faults to NULL pointer dereferences, to system calls that must be
“proxied” to the kernel from outside the enclave.
In addition to the code contained inside an enclave, there is also
supporting code outside the enclave called an “SGX runtime”, which is
virtually always implemented inside a shared library. The runtime helps
build the enclave and handles things like *re*building the enclave if it
got destroyed by something like a suspend/resume cycle.
The rebuilding has traditionally been handled in SIGSEGV handlers,
registered by the library. But, being process-wide, shared state, signal
handling and shared libraries do not mix well.
Introduce a vDSO function call that wraps the enclave entry functions
(EENTER/ERESUME functions of the ENCLU instruciton) and returns information
about any exceptions to the caller in the SGX runtime.
Instead of generating a signal, the kernel places exception information in
RDI, RSI and RDX. The kernel-provided userspace portion of the vDSO handler
will place this information in a user-provided buffer or trigger a
user-provided callback at the time of the exception.
The vDSO function calling convention uses the standard RDI RSI, RDX, RCX,
R8 and R9 registers. This makes it possible to declare the vDSO as a C
prototype, but other than that there is no specific support for SystemV
ABI. Things like storing XSAVE are the responsibility of the enclave and
the runtime.
[ bp: Change vsgx.o build dependency to CONFIG_X86_SGX. ]
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-20-jarkko@kernel.org
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vDSO functions can now leverage an exception fixup mechanism similar to
kernel exception fixup. For vDSO exception fixup, the initial user is
Intel's Software Guard Extensions (SGX), which will wrap the low-level
transitions to/from the enclave, i.e. EENTER and ERESUME instructions,
in a vDSO function and leverage fixup to intercept exceptions that would
otherwise generate a signal. This allows the vDSO wrapper to return the
fault information directly to its caller, obviating the need for SGX
applications and libraries to juggle signal handlers.
Attempt to fixup vDSO exceptions immediately prior to populating and
sending signal information. Except for the delivery mechanism, an
exception in a vDSO function should be treated like any other exception
in userspace, e.g. any fault that is successfully handled by the kernel
should not be directly visible to userspace.
Although it's debatable whether or not all exceptions are of interest to
enclaves, defer to the vDSO fixup to decide whether to do fixup or
generate a signal. Future users of vDSO fixup, if there ever are any,
will undoubtedly have different requirements than SGX enclaves, e.g. the
fixup vs. signal logic can be made function specific if/when necessary.
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-19-jarkko@kernel.org
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vDSO exception fixup is a replacement for signals in limited situations.
Signals and vDSO exception fixup need to provide similar information to
userspace, including the hardware error code.
That hardware error code needs to be sanitized. For instance, if userspace
accesses a kernel address, the error code could indicate to userspace
whether the address had a Present=1 PTE. That can leak information about
the kernel layout to userspace, which is bad.
The existing signal code does this sanitization, but fairly late in the
signal process. The vDSO exception code runs before the sanitization
happens.
Move error code sanitization out of the signal code and into a helper.
Call the helper in the signal code.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-18-jarkko@kernel.org
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Signals are a horrid little mechanism. They are especially nasty in
multi-threaded environments because signal state like handlers is global
across the entire process. But, signals are basically the only way that
userspace can “gracefully” handle and recover from exceptions.
The kernel generally does not like exceptions to occur during execution.
But, exceptions are a fact of life and must be handled in some
circumstances. The kernel handles them by keeping a list of individual
instructions which may cause exceptions. Instead of truly handling the
exception and returning to the instruction that caused it, the kernel
instead restarts execution at a *different* instruction. This makes it
obvious to that thread of execution that the exception occurred and lets
*that* code handle the exception instead of the handler.
This is not dissimilar to the try/catch exceptions mechanisms that some
programming languages have, but applied *very* surgically to single
instructions. It effectively changes the visible architecture of the
instruction.
Problem
=======
SGX generates a lot of signals, and the code to enter and exit enclaves and
muck with signal handling is truly horrid. At the same time, an approach
like kernel exception fixup can not be easily applied to userspace
instructions because it changes the visible instruction architecture.
Solution
========
The vDSO is a special page of kernel-provided instructions that run in
userspace. Any userspace calling into the vDSO knows that it is special.
This allows the kernel a place to legitimately rewrite the user/kernel
contract and change instruction behavior.
Add support for fixing up exceptions that occur while executing in the
vDSO. This replaces what could traditionally only be done with signal
handling.
This new mechanism will be used to replace previously direct use of SGX
instructions by userspace.
Just introduce the vDSO infrastructure. Later patches will actually
replace signal generation with vDSO exception fixup.
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-17-jarkko@kernel.org
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The whole point of SGX is to create a hardware protected place to do
“stuff”. But, before someone is willing to hand over the keys to
the castle , an enclave must often prove that it is running on an
SGX-protected processor. Provisioning enclaves play a key role in
providing proof.
There are actually three different enclaves in play in order to make this
happen:
1. The application enclave. The familiar one we know and love that runs
the actual code that’s doing real work. There can be many of these on
a single system, or even in a single application.
2. The quoting enclave (QE). The QE is mentioned in lots of silly
whitepapers, but, for the purposes of kernel enabling, just pretend they
do not exist.
3. The provisioning enclave. There is typically only one of these
enclaves per system. Provisioning enclaves have access to a special
hardware key.
They can use this key to help to generate certificates which serve as
proof that enclaves are running on trusted SGX hardware. These
certificates can be passed around without revealing the special key.
Any user who can create a provisioning enclave can access the
processor-unique Provisioning Certificate Key which has privacy and
fingerprinting implications. Even if a user is permitted to create
normal application enclaves (via /dev/sgx_enclave), they should not be
able to create provisioning enclaves. That means a separate permissions
scheme is needed to control provisioning enclave privileges.
Implement a separate device file (/dev/sgx_provision) which allows
creating provisioning enclaves. This device will typically have more
strict permissions than the plain enclave device.
The actual device “driver” is an empty stub. Open file descriptors for
this device will represent a token which allows provisioning enclave duty.
This file descriptor can be passed around and ultimately given as an
argument to the /dev/sgx_enclave driver ioctl().
[ bp: Touchups. ]
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-16-jarkko@kernel.org
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Enclaves have two basic states. They are either being built and are
malleable and can be modified by doing things like adding pages. Or,
they are locked down and not accepting changes. They can only be run
after they have been locked down. The ENCLS[EINIT] function induces the
transition from being malleable to locked-down.
Add an ioctl() that performs ENCLS[EINIT]. After this, new pages can
no longer be added with ENCLS[EADD]. This is also the time where the
enclave can be measured to verify its integrity.
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-15-jarkko@kernel.org
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SGX enclave pages are inaccessible to normal software. They must be
populated with data by copying from normal memory with the help of the
EADD and EEXTEND functions of the ENCLS instruction.
Add an ioctl() which performs EADD that adds new data to an enclave, and
optionally EEXTEND functions that hash the page contents and use the
hash as part of enclave “measurement” to ensure enclave integrity.
The enclave author gets to decide which pages will be included in the
enclave measurement with EEXTEND. Measurement is very slow and has
sometimes has very little value. For instance, an enclave _could_
measure every page of data and code, but would be slow to initialize.
Or, it might just measure its code and then trust that code to
initialize the bulk of its data after it starts running.
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-14-jarkko@kernel.org
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Add an ioctl() that performs the ECREATE function of the ENCLS
instruction, which creates an SGX Enclave Control Structure (SECS).
Although the SECS is an in-memory data structure, it is present in
enclave memory and is not directly accessible by software.
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-13-jarkko@kernel.org
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Intel(R) SGX is a new hardware functionality that can be used by
applications to set aside private regions of code and data called
enclaves. New hardware protects enclave code and data from outside
access and modification.
Add a driver that presents a device file and ioctl API to build and
manage enclaves.
[ bp: Small touchups, remove unused encl variable in sgx_encl_find() as
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> ]
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-12-jarkko@kernel.org
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Avoid processing bogus interrupt statuses when the HW is runtime suspended and
the M_CAN_IR register read may get all bits 1's. Handler can be called if the
interrupt request is shared with other peripherals or at the end of free_irq().
Therefore check the runtime suspended status before processing.
Fixes: cdf8259d6573 ("can: m_can: Add PM Support")
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Nikula <jarkko.nikula@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200915134715.696303-1-jarkko.nikula@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
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Patch 541656d3a513 ("gfs2: freeze should work on read-only mounts") changed
the check for glock state in function freeze_go_sync() from "gl->gl_state
== LM_ST_SHARED" to "gl->gl_req == LM_ST_EXCLUSIVE". That's wrong and it
regressed gfs2's freeze/thaw mechanism because it caused only the freezing
node (which requests the glock in EX) to queue freeze work.
All nodes go through this go_sync code path during the freeze to drop their
SHared hold on the freeze glock, allowing the freezing node to acquire it
in EXclusive mode. But all the nodes must freeze access to the file system
locally, so they ALL must queue freeze work. The freeze_work calls
freeze_func, which makes a request to reacquire the freeze glock in SH,
effectively blocking until the thaw from the EX holder. Once thawed, the
freezing node drops its EX hold on the freeze glock, then the (blocked)
freeze_func reacquires the freeze glock in SH again (on all nodes, including
the freezer) so all nodes go back to a thawed state.
This patch changes the check back to gl_state == LM_ST_SHARED like it was
prior to 541656d3a513.
Fixes: 541656d3a513 ("gfs2: freeze should work on read-only mounts")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.8+
Signed-off-by: Bob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
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flexcan_transceiver_enable() during bus-off recovery
If the CAN controller goes into bus off, the do_set_mode() callback with
CAN_MODE_START can be used to recover the controller, which then calls
flexcan_chip_start(). If configured, this is done automatically by the
framework or manually by the user.
In flexcan_chip_start() there is an explicit call to
flexcan_transceiver_enable(), which does a regulator_enable() on the
transceiver regulator. This results in a net usage counter increase, as there
is no corresponding flexcan_transceiver_disable() in the bus off code path.
This further leads to the transceiver stuck enabled, even if the CAN interface
is shut down.
To fix this problem the
flexcan_transceiver_enable()/flexcan_transceiver_disable() are moved out of
flexcan_chip_start()/flexcan_chip_stop() into flexcan_open()/flexcan_close().
Fixes: e955cead0311 ("CAN: Add Flexcan CAN controller driver")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201118150148.2664024-1-mkl@pengutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
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Don't recycle a refnode until we're done with all requests of nodes
ejected before.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.7+
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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An active ref_node always can be found in ctx->files_data, it's much
safer to get it this way instead of poking into files_data->ref_list.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.7+
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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I totally fumbled the ?: usage when generating the DDI encoder
names. Reverse the things that need reversing, and to make it
a bit less messy add a few macros to hide the arithmetic on the
port enums.
Cc: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@linux.intel.com>
Fixes: 2d709a5a624c ("drm/i915: Give DDI encoders even better names")
Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20201117154028.8516-1-ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com
Reviewed-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@intel.com>
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"intel_iommu=off" command line is used to disable iommu but iommu is force
enabled in a tboot system for security reason.
However for better performance on high speed network device, a new option
"intel_iommu=tboot_noforce" is introduced to disable the force on.
By default kernel should panic if iommu init fail in tboot for security
reason, but it's unnecessory if we use "intel_iommu=tboot_noforce,off".
Fix the code setting force_on and move intel_iommu_tboot_noforce
from tboot code to intel iommu code.
Fixes: 7304e8f28bb2 ("iommu/vt-d: Correctly disable Intel IOMMU force on")
Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Lukasz Hawrylko <lukasz.hawrylko@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201110071908.3133-1-zhenzhong.duan@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
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The error codes were not set on some of these error paths.
Also the error handling was more confusing than it needed to be so I
cleaned it up and shuffled it around a bit.
Fixes: d2fb0a043838 ("dmaengine: break out channel registration")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Ujfalusi <peter.ujfalusi@ti.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201113101631.GE168908@mwanda
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
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Most changes in uv.c are related to KVM. Involve also the KVM team
regarding changes to uv.c.
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
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Older firmware can return rc=0x107 rrc=0xd for destroy page if the
page is already non-secure. This should be handled like a success
as already done by newer firmware.
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Fixes: 1a80b54d1ce1 ("s390/uv: add destroy page call")
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
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sysrq-t ends up invoking show_opcodes() for each task which tries to access
the user space code of other processes, which is obviously bogus.
It either manages to dump where the foreign task's regs->ip points to in a
valid mapping of the current task or triggers a pagefault and prints "Code:
Bad RIP value.". Both is just wrong.
Add a safeguard in copy_code() and check whether the @regs pointer matches
currents pt_regs. If not, do not even try to access it.
While at it, add commentary why using copy_from_user_nmi() is safe in
copy_code() even if the function name suggests otherwise.
Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201117202753.667274723@linutronix.de
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I didnt' format the thing correctly :-(
Fixes: 39aead8373b3 ("fbcon: Disable accelerated scrolling")
Reviewed-by: Simon Ser <contact@emersion.fr>
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20201118073637.597206-1-daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch
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In the macro for_each_oldnew_crtc_in_state() 'crtc_state' is provided
as a container for state->crtcs[i].new_state, but is not utilised in
some use-cases, so we fake-use it instead.
Fixes the following W=1 kernel build warning(s):
drivers/gpu/drm/imx/ipuv3-plane.c: In function ‘ipu_planes_assign_pre’:
drivers/gpu/drm/imx/ipuv3-plane.c:746:42: warning: variable ‘crtc_state’ set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
Cc: Philipp Zabel <p.zabel@pengutronix.de>
Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch>
Cc: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>
Cc: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>
Cc: Pengutronix Kernel Team <kernel@pengutronix.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <festevam@gmail.com>
Cc: NXP Linux Team <linux-imx@nxp.com>
Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20201116174112.1833368-43-lee.jones@linaro.org
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Fixes the following W=1 kernel build warning(s):
drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_debugfs.c:25: warning: Function parameter or member 'minor' not described in 'vc4_debugfs_init'
drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_debugfs.c:62: warning: Function parameter or member 'dev' not described in 'vc4_debugfs_add_file'
drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_debugfs.c:62: warning: Function parameter or member 'name' not described in 'vc4_debugfs_add_file'
drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_debugfs.c:62: warning: Function parameter or member 'show' not described in 'vc4_debugfs_add_file'
drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_debugfs.c:62: warning: Function parameter or member 'data' not described in 'vc4_debugfs_add_file'
Cc: Eric Anholt <eric@anholt.net>
Cc: Maxime Ripard <mripard@kernel.org>
Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch>
Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20201116174112.1833368-41-lee.jones@linaro.org
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Fixes the following W=1 kernel build warning(s):
drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_v3d.c:131: warning: Function parameter or member 'vc4' not described in 'vc4_v3d_pm_get'
drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_v3d.c:231: warning: Function parameter or member 'vc4' not described in 'bin_bo_alloc'
Cc: Eric Anholt <eric@anholt.net>
Cc: Maxime Ripard <mripard@kernel.org>
Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch>
Cc: Rob Clark <robdclark@gmail.com>
Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20201116174112.1833368-40-lee.jones@linaro.org
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Fixes the following W=1 kernel build warning(s):
drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_hdmi.c: In function ‘vc4_hdmi_set_audio_infoframe’:
drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_hdmi.c:334:6: warning: variable ‘ret’ set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
Cc: Eric Anholt <eric@anholt.net>
Cc: Maxime Ripard <mripard@kernel.org>
Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch>
Cc: Philipp Zabel <p.zabel@pengutronix.de>
Cc: Rob Clark <robdclark@gmail.com>
Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20201116174112.1833368-39-lee.jones@linaro.org
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The alternative is to move them into the source file that uses then,
but they are large and intrusive, so that strategy is being avoided.
Fixes the following W=1 kernel build warning(s):
drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_hdmi_regs.h:282:39: warning: ‘vc5_hdmi_hdmi1_fields’ defined but not used [-Wunused-const-variable=]
drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_hdmi_regs.h:206:39: warning: ‘vc5_hdmi_hdmi0_fields’ defined but not used [-Wunused-const-variable=]
drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_hdmi_regs.h:145:39: warning: ‘vc4_hdmi_fields’ defined but not used [-Wunused-const-variable=]
Cc: Eric Anholt <eric@anholt.net>
Cc: Maxime Ripard <mripard@kernel.org>
Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch>
Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20201116174112.1833368-38-lee.jones@linaro.org
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Fixes the following W=1 kernel build warning(s):
drivers/gpu/drm/v3d/v3d_sched.c:75: warning: Function parameter or member 'sched_job' not described in 'v3d_job_dependency'
drivers/gpu/drm/v3d/v3d_sched.c:75: warning: Function parameter or member 's_entity' not described in 'v3d_job_dependency'
Cc: Eric Anholt <eric@anholt.net>
Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch>
Cc: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>
Cc: "Christian König" <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: linux-media@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linaro-mm-sig@lists.linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20201116174112.1833368-37-lee.jones@linaro.org
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Use correct bittiming limits for the KCAN CAN controller.
Fixes: aec5fb2268b7 ("can: kvaser_usb: Add support for Kvaser USB hydra family")
Signed-off-by: Jimmy Assarsson <extja@kvaser.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201115163027.16851-2-jimmyassarsson@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
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Use correct bittiming limits for the KCAN CAN controller.
Fixes: 26ad340e582d ("can: kvaser_pciefd: Add driver for Kvaser PCIEcan devices")
Signed-off-by: Jimmy Assarsson <extja@kvaser.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201115163027.16851-1-jimmyassarsson@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
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Commit e0d072782c73 ("dma-mapping: introduce DMA range map, supplanting
dma_pfn_offset") introduced a regression in our code since the second
backed to probe will now get -EINVAL back from dma_direct_set_offset and
will prevent the entire DRM device from probing.
Ignore -EINVAL as a temporary measure to get it back working, before
removing that call entirely.
Fixes: e0d072782c73 ("dma-mapping: introduce DMA range map, supplanting dma_pfn_offset")
Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <maxime@cerno.tech>
Reviewed-by: Chen-Yu Tsai <wens@csie.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
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This is a non-functional change, if anything a better fall-back
handling.
Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
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