Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 CPU updates from Ingo Molnar:
"The changes in this development cycle were:
- AMD CPU topology enhancements that are cleanups on current CPUs but
which enable future Fam17 hardware. (Yazen Ghannam)
- unify bugs.c and bugs_64.c (Borislav Petkov)
- remove the show_msr= boot option (Borislav Petkov)
- simplify a boot message (Borislav Petkov)"
* 'x86-cpu-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/cpu/AMD: Clean up cpu_llc_id assignment per topology feature
x86/cpu: Get rid of the show_msr= boot option
x86/cpu: Merge bugs.c and bugs_64.c
x86/cpu: Remove the printk format specifier in "CPU0: "
|
|
Update driver drv260x to use generic device properties so that it can be
used on non-DT systems. We also remove platform data as generic device
properties work on static board code as well.
Signed-off-by: Jingkui Wang <jkwang@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
|
|
Let's introduce a temporary for "client->dev" is probe() as we use
it quite a few times and "dev" is shorter.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
|
|
We were assigning I2C bus controller instead of client as parent device.
Besides being logically wrong, it messed up with devm handling of input
device. As a result we were leaving input device and event node behind
after rmmod-ing the driver, which lead to a kernel oops if one were to
access the event node later.
Let's remove the assignment and rely on devm_input_allocate_device() to
set it up properly for us.
Signed-off-by: Jingkui Wang <jkwang@google.com>
Fixes: 7132fe4f5687 ("Input: drv260x - add TI drv260x haptics driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
|
|
Some resources are incorrectly organized and at odds with
HW capabilities. Specifically, ILQ, IEQ, QPs, MSS, QOS
and statistics belong in a VSI.
Signed-off-by: Faisal Latif <faisal.latif@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mustafa Ismail <mustafa.ismail@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Henry Orosco <henry.orosco@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
|
|
In i40iw_ieq_handle_partial() the check for !status is incorrect.
Signed-off-by: Mustafa Ismail <mustafa.ismail@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Henry Orosco <henry.orosco@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
|
|
Currently we are changing the MSS regardless of whether
there is a change or not in MTU. Fix to make the
assignment of MSS dependent on an MTU change.
Signed-off-by: Mustafa Ismail <mustafa.ismail@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Henry Orosco <henry.orosco@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Shiraz Saleem <shiraz.saleem@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
|
|
Add a QP reference when terminate timer is started to ensure
the destroy QP doesn't race ahead to free the QP while it is being
referenced in the terminate timer's handler.
Signed-off-by: Shiraz Saleem <shiraz.saleem@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
|
|
On a device close, the control QP (CQP) is destroyed by calling
cqp_destroy which destroys the CQP and frees its SD buffer memory.
However, if the reset flag is true, cqp_destroy is never called and
leads to a memory leak on SD buffer memory. Fix this by always calling
cqp_destroy, on device close, regardless of reset. The exception to this
when CQP create fails. In this case, the SD buffer memory is already
freed on an error check and there is no need to call cqp_destroy.
Signed-off-by: Mustafa Ismail <mustafa.ismail@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Shiraz Saleem <shiraz.saleem@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
|
|
When flush QP and there are no pending work requests, signal completion
to unblock i40iw_drain_sq and i40iw_drain_rq which are waiting on
completion for iwqp->sq_drained and iwqp->sq_drained respectively.
Also, signal completion if flush QP fails to prevent the drain SQ or RQ
from being blocked indefintely.
Signed-off-by: Shiraz Saleem <shiraz.saleem@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
|
|
A QP can be double freed if i40iw_cm_disconn() is
called while it is currently being freed by
i40iw_rem_ref(). The fix in i40iw_cm_disconn() will
first check if the QP is already freed before
making another request for the QP to be freed.
Signed-off-by: Mustafa Ismail <mustafa.ismail@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Shiraz Saleem <shiraz.saleem@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Henry Orosco <henry.orosco@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 cleanups from Ingo Molnar:
"Two cleanups in the LDT handling code, by Dan Carpenter and Thomas
Gleixner"
* 'x86-cleanups-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/ldt: Make all size computations unsigned
x86/ldt: Make a size argument unsigned
|
|
hw_stats is a pointer to i40_iw_dev_stats struct in i40iw_get_hw_stats().
Use hw_stats and not &hw_stats in the memcpy to copy the i40iw device stats
data into rdma_hw_stats counters.
Fixes: b40f4757daa1 ("IB/core: Make device counter infrastructure dynamic")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.7+
Signed-off-by: Shiraz Saleem <shiraz.saleem@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Faisal Latif <faisal.latif@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 build updates from Ingo Molnar:
"The main changes in this cycle were:
- Makefile improvements (Paul Bolle)
- KConfig cleanups to better separate 32-bit only, 64-bit only and
generic feature enablement sections (Ingo Molnar)"
* 'x86-build-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/build: Remove three unneeded genhdr-y entries
x86/build: Don't use $(LINUXINCLUDE) twice
x86/kconfig: Sort the 'config X86' selects alphabetically
x86/kconfig: Clean up 32-bit compat options
x86/kconfig: Clean up IA32_EMULATION select
x86/kconfig, x86/pkeys: Move pkeys selects to X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
x86/kconfig: Move 64-bit only arch Kconfig selects to 'config X86_64'
x86/kconfig: Move 32-bit only arch Kconfig selects to 'config X86_32'
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 boot updates from Ingo Molnar:
"Misc cleanups/simplifications by Borislav Petkov, Paul Bolle and Wei
Yang"
* 'x86-boot-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/boot/64: Optimize fixmap page fixup
x86/boot: Simplify the GDTR calculation assembly code a bit
x86/boot/build: Remove always empty $(USERINCLUDE)
|
|
The macros I40IW_STAG_KEY_FROM_STAG and I40IW_STAG_INDEX_FROM_STAG are
apparently bad - they are using the logical "&&" operation which
does not make sense here. It should have been a bitwise "&" instead.
Since the macros seem to be completely unused, let's simply remove
them so that nobody accidentially uses them in the future. And while
we're at it, also remove the unused macro I40IW_CREATE_STAG.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Faisal Latif <faisal.latif@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
|
|
->get_authorizer(), ->verify_authorizer_reply(), ->sign_message() and
->check_message_signature() shouldn't be doing anything with or on the
connection (like closing it or sending messages).
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
|
|
The length of the reply is protocol-dependent - for cephx it's
ceph_x_authorize_reply. Nothing sensible can be passed from the
messenger layer anyway.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
|
|
After sending an authorizer (ceph_x_authorize_a + ceph_x_authorize_b),
the client gets back a ceph_x_authorize_reply, which it is supposed to
verify to ensure the authenticity and protect against replay attacks.
The code for doing this is there (ceph_x_verify_authorizer_reply(),
ceph_auth_verify_authorizer_reply() + plumbing), but it is never
invoked by the the messenger.
AFAICT this goes back to 2009, when ceph authentication protocols
support was added to the kernel client in 4e7a5dcd1bba ("ceph:
negotiate authentication protocol; implement AUTH_NONE protocol").
The second param of ceph_connection_operations::verify_authorizer_reply
is unused all the way down. Pass 0 to facilitate backporting, and kill
it in the next commit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
|
|
It's called during inital setup, when everything should be allocated
with GFP_KERNEL.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
|
|
This is useless and more importantly not allowed on the writeback path,
because crypto_alloc_skcipher() allocates memory with GFP_KERNEL, which
can recurse back into the filesystem:
kworker/9:3 D ffff92303f318180 0 20732 2 0x00000080
Workqueue: ceph-msgr ceph_con_workfn [libceph]
ffff923035dd4480 ffff923038f8a0c0 0000000000000001 000000009eb27318
ffff92269eb28000 ffff92269eb27338 ffff923036b145ac ffff923035dd4480
00000000ffffffff ffff923036b145b0 ffffffff951eb4e1 ffff923036b145a8
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff951eb4e1>] ? schedule+0x31/0x80
[<ffffffff951eb77a>] ? schedule_preempt_disabled+0xa/0x10
[<ffffffff951ed1f4>] ? __mutex_lock_slowpath+0xb4/0x130
[<ffffffff951ed28b>] ? mutex_lock+0x1b/0x30
[<ffffffffc0a974b3>] ? xfs_reclaim_inodes_ag+0x233/0x2d0 [xfs]
[<ffffffff94d92ba5>] ? move_active_pages_to_lru+0x125/0x270
[<ffffffff94f2b985>] ? radix_tree_gang_lookup_tag+0xc5/0x1c0
[<ffffffff94dad0f3>] ? __list_lru_walk_one.isra.3+0x33/0x120
[<ffffffffc0a98331>] ? xfs_reclaim_inodes_nr+0x31/0x40 [xfs]
[<ffffffff94e05bfe>] ? super_cache_scan+0x17e/0x190
[<ffffffff94d919f3>] ? shrink_slab.part.38+0x1e3/0x3d0
[<ffffffff94d9616a>] ? shrink_node+0x10a/0x320
[<ffffffff94d96474>] ? do_try_to_free_pages+0xf4/0x350
[<ffffffff94d967ba>] ? try_to_free_pages+0xea/0x1b0
[<ffffffff94d863bd>] ? __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x61d/0xe60
[<ffffffff94ddf42d>] ? cache_grow_begin+0x9d/0x560
[<ffffffff94ddfb88>] ? fallback_alloc+0x148/0x1c0
[<ffffffff94ed84e7>] ? __crypto_alloc_tfm+0x37/0x130
[<ffffffff94de09db>] ? __kmalloc+0x1eb/0x580
[<ffffffffc09fe2db>] ? crush_choose_firstn+0x3eb/0x470 [libceph]
[<ffffffff94ed84e7>] ? __crypto_alloc_tfm+0x37/0x130
[<ffffffff94ed9c19>] ? crypto_spawn_tfm+0x39/0x60
[<ffffffffc08b30a3>] ? crypto_cbc_init_tfm+0x23/0x40 [cbc]
[<ffffffff94ed857c>] ? __crypto_alloc_tfm+0xcc/0x130
[<ffffffff94edcc23>] ? crypto_skcipher_init_tfm+0x113/0x180
[<ffffffff94ed7cc3>] ? crypto_create_tfm+0x43/0xb0
[<ffffffff94ed83b0>] ? crypto_larval_lookup+0x150/0x150
[<ffffffff94ed7da2>] ? crypto_alloc_tfm+0x72/0x120
[<ffffffffc0a01dd7>] ? ceph_aes_encrypt2+0x67/0x400 [libceph]
[<ffffffffc09fd264>] ? ceph_pg_to_up_acting_osds+0x84/0x5b0 [libceph]
[<ffffffff950d40a0>] ? release_sock+0x40/0x90
[<ffffffff95139f94>] ? tcp_recvmsg+0x4b4/0xae0
[<ffffffffc0a02714>] ? ceph_encrypt2+0x54/0xc0 [libceph]
[<ffffffffc0a02b4d>] ? ceph_x_encrypt+0x5d/0x90 [libceph]
[<ffffffffc0a02bdf>] ? calcu_signature+0x5f/0x90 [libceph]
[<ffffffffc0a02ef5>] ? ceph_x_sign_message+0x35/0x50 [libceph]
[<ffffffffc09e948c>] ? prepare_write_message_footer+0x5c/0xa0 [libceph]
[<ffffffffc09ecd18>] ? ceph_con_workfn+0x2258/0x2dd0 [libceph]
[<ffffffffc09e9903>] ? queue_con_delay+0x33/0xd0 [libceph]
[<ffffffffc09f68ed>] ? __submit_request+0x20d/0x2f0 [libceph]
[<ffffffffc09f6ef8>] ? ceph_osdc_start_request+0x28/0x30 [libceph]
[<ffffffffc0b52603>] ? rbd_queue_workfn+0x2f3/0x350 [rbd]
[<ffffffff94c94ec0>] ? process_one_work+0x160/0x410
[<ffffffff94c951bd>] ? worker_thread+0x4d/0x480
[<ffffffff94c95170>] ? process_one_work+0x410/0x410
[<ffffffff94c9af8d>] ? kthread+0xcd/0xf0
[<ffffffff951efb2f>] ? ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
[<ffffffff94c9aec0>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x190/0x190
Allocating the cipher along with the key fixes the issue - as long the
key doesn't change, a single cipher context can be used concurrently in
multiple requests.
We still can't take that GFP_KERNEL allocation though. Both
ceph_crypto_key_clone() and ceph_crypto_key_decode() are called from
GFP_NOFS context, so resort to memalloc_noio_{save,restore}() here.
Reported-by: Lucas Stach <l.stach@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
|
|
- replace an ad-hoc array with a struct
- rename to calc_signature() for consistency
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
|
|
It's going to be used as a temporary buffer for in-place en/decryption
with ceph_crypt() instead of on-stack buffers, so rename to enc_buf.
Ensure alignment to avoid GFP_ATOMIC allocations in the crypto stack.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
|
|
Starting with 4.9, kernel stacks may be vmalloced and therefore not
guaranteed to be physically contiguous; the new CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
option is enabled by default on x86. This makes it invalid to use
on-stack buffers with the crypto scatterlist API, as sg_set_buf()
expects a logical address and won't work with vmalloced addresses.
There isn't a different (e.g. kvec-based) crypto API we could switch
net/ceph/crypto.c to and the current scatterlist.h API isn't getting
updated to accommodate this use case. Allocating a new header and
padding for each operation is a non-starter, so do the en/decryption
in-place on a single pre-assembled (header + data + padding) heap
buffer. This is explicitly supported by the crypto API:
"... the caller may provide the same scatter/gather list for the
plaintext and cipher text. After the completion of the cipher
operation, the plaintext data is replaced with the ciphertext data
in case of an encryption and vice versa for a decryption."
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
|
|
Since commit 0a990e709356 ("ceph: clean up service ticket decoding"),
th->session_key isn't assigned until everything is decoded.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
|
|
Pass what's going to be encrypted - that's msg_b, not ticket_blob.
ceph_x_encrypt_buflen() returns the upper bound, so this doesn't change
the maxlen calculation, but makes it a bit clearer.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
|
|
Starting with version 5 the following properties change:
- UBIFS_FLG_DOUBLE_HASH is mandatory
- UBIFS_FLG_ENCRYPTION is optional but depdens on UBIFS_FLG_DOUBLE_HASH
- Filesystems with unknown super block flags will be rejected, this
allows us in future to add new features without raising the UBIFS
write version.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
|
|
This feature flag indicates that the filesystem contains encrypted
files.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
|
|
This feature flag indicates that all directory entry nodes have a 32bit
cookie set and therefore UBIFS is allowed to perform lookups by hash.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
|
|
UBIFS stores a 32bit hash of every file, for traditional lookups by name
this scheme is fine since UBIFS can first try to find the file by the
hash of the filename and upon collisions it can walk through all entries
with the same hash and do a string compare.
When filesnames are encrypted fscrypto will ask the filesystem for a
unique cookie, based on this cookie the filesystem has to be able to
locate the target file again. With 32bit hashes this is impossible
because the chance for collisions is very high. Do deal with that we
store a 32bit cookie directly in the UBIFS directory entry node such
that we get a 64bit cookie (32bit from filename hash and the dent
cookie). For a lookup by hash UBIFS finds the entry by the first 32bit
and then compares the dent cookie. If it does not match, it has to do a
linear search of the whole directory and compares all dent cookies until
the correct entry is found.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
|
|
tnc_read_hashed_node() is a better name since we read a node
by a given hash, not a name.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
|
|
As of now all filenames known by UBIFS are strings with a NUL
terminator. With encrypted filenames a filename can be any binary
string and the r5 function cannot search for the NUL terminator.
UBIFS always knows how long a filename is, therefore we can change
the hash function to iterate over the filename length to work
correctly with binary strings.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
|
|
With encrypted filenames we store raw binary data, doing
string tests is no longer possible.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
|
|
...and provide a non const variant for fscrypto
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
|
|
When data of a data node is compressed and encrypted
we need to store the size of the compressed data because
before encryption we may have to add padding bytes.
For the new field we consume the last two padding bytes
in struct ubifs_data_node. Two bytes are fine because
the data length is at most 4096.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
|
|
We need this extra check in mmap because a process could
gain an already opened fd.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
|
|
When we're creating a new inode in UBIFS the inode is not
yet exposed and fscrypto calls ubifs_xattr_set() without
holding the inode mutex. This is okay but ubifs_xattr_set()
has to know about this.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
|
|
...and mark the dentry as encrypted.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
|
|
When a file is moved or linked into another directory
its current crypto policy has to be compatible with the
target policy.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
|
|
We need ->open() for files to load the crypto key.
If the no key is present and the file is encrypted,
refuse to open.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
|
|
We need the ->open() hook to load the crypto context
which is needed for all crypto operations within that
directory.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
|