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There's no point in having a static readahead callback in inode.c that
does nothing besides calling extent_readahead() from extent_io.c.
So just remove the callback at inode.c and rename extent_readahead()
to btrfs_readahead().
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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The __btrfs_tree_lock() and __btrfs_tree_read_lock() are using a naming
with a double underscore prefix, which is specially not proper for
exported functions. Remove the double underscore prefix from their name
and add the "_nested" suffix.
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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The functions btrfs_tree_lock() and btrfs_tree_read_lock() are very
trivial so that can be made inline and avoid call overhead, as they
are very often called inside critical sections (when searching a btree
for example, attempting to lock a child node/leaf while holding a lock
on the parent).
So make them static inline, which even reduces the size of the btrfs
module a little bit.
Before this change:
$ size fs/btrfs/btrfs.ko
text data bss dec hex filename
1718786 156276 16920 1891982 1cde8e fs/btrfs/btrfs.ko
After this change:
$ size fs/btrfs/btrfs.ko
text data bss dec hex filename
1718650 156260 16920 1891830 1cddf6 fs/btrfs/btrfs.ko
Running fs_mark also showed a tiny improvement with this script:
$ cat test.sh
#!/bin/bash
DEV=/dev/nullb0
MNT=/mnt/nullb0
FILES=100000
THREADS=$(nproc --all)
echo "performance" | \
tee /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu*/cpufreq/scaling_governor
umount $DEV &> /dev/null
mkfs.btrfs -f $DEV
mount $DEV $MNT
OPTS="-S 0 -L 5 -n $FILES -s 0 -t $THREADS -k"
for ((i = 1; i <= $THREADS; i++)); do
OPTS="$OPTS -d $MNT/d$i"
done
fs_mark $OPTS
umount $MNT
Before this change:
FSUse% Count Size Files/sec App Overhead
10 1200000 0 180894.0 10705410
16 2400000 0 228211.4 10765738
23 3600000 0 215969.6 11011072
30 4800000 0 199077.1 11145587
46 6000000 0 176624.1 11658470
After this change:
FSUse% Count Size Files/sec App Overhead
10 1200000 0 185312.3 10708377
16 2400000 0 229320.4 10858013
23 3600000 0 217958.7 11006167
30 4800000 0 205122.9 11112899
46 6000000 0 178039.1 11438852
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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When creating a snapshot we first check with btrfs_lookup_dir_item() if
there is a name collision in the parent directory and then return an error
if there's a collision. Then later on when trying to insert a dir item for
the snapshot we BUG_ON() if the return value is -EEXIST or -EOVERFLOW:
static noinline int create_pending_snapshot(...)
{
(...)
/* check if there is a file/dir which has the same name. */
dir_item = btrfs_lookup_dir_item(...);
(...)
ret = btrfs_insert_dir_item(...);
/* We have check then name at the beginning, so it is impossible. */
BUG_ON(ret == -EEXIST || ret == -EOVERFLOW);
if (ret) {
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, ret);
goto fail;
}
(...)
}
It's impossible to get the -EEXIST because we previously checked for a
potential collision with btrfs_lookup_dir_item() and we know that after
that no one could have added a colliding name because at this point the
transaction is in its critical section, state TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_DOING,
so no one can join this transaction to add a colliding name and neither
can anyone start a new transaction to do that.
As for the -EOVERFLOW, that can't happen as long as we have the extended
references feature enabled, which is a mkfs default for many years now.
In either case, the BUG_ON() is excessive as we can properly deal with
any error and can abort the transaction and jump to the 'fail' label,
in which case we'll also get the useful stack trace (just like a BUG_ON())
from the abort if the error is either -EEXIST or -EOVERFLOW.
So remove the BUG_ON().
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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Utilize set_bit() and test_bit() on worker->flags within io_uring/io-wq
to address potential data races.
The structure io_worker->flags may be accessed through various data
paths, leading to concurrency issues. When KCSAN is enabled, it reveals
data races occurring in io_worker_handle_work and
io_wq_activate_free_worker functions.
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in io_worker_handle_work / io_wq_activate_free_worker
write to 0xffff8885c4246404 of 4 bytes by task 49071 on cpu 28:
io_worker_handle_work (io_uring/io-wq.c:434 io_uring/io-wq.c:569)
io_wq_worker (io_uring/io-wq.c:?)
<snip>
read to 0xffff8885c4246404 of 4 bytes by task 49024 on cpu 5:
io_wq_activate_free_worker (io_uring/io-wq.c:? io_uring/io-wq.c:285)
io_wq_enqueue (io_uring/io-wq.c:947)
io_queue_iowq (io_uring/io_uring.c:524)
io_req_task_submit (io_uring/io_uring.c:1511)
io_handle_tw_list (io_uring/io_uring.c:1198)
<snip>
Line numbers against commit 18daea77cca6 ("Merge tag 'for-linus' of
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm").
These races involve writes and reads to the same memory location by
different tasks running on different CPUs. To mitigate this, refactor
the code to use atomic operations such as set_bit(), test_bit(), and
clear_bit() instead of basic "and" and "or" operations. This ensures
thread-safe manipulation of worker flags.
Also, move `create_index` to avoid holes in the structure.
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240507170002.2269003-1-leitao@debian.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Based on the discussion at [1], it would be helpful to mark certain
variables as explicitly "data racy", which would result in KCSAN not
reporting data races involving any accesses on such variables. To do
that, introduce the __data_racy type qualifier:
struct foo {
...
int __data_racy bar;
...
};
In KCSAN-kernels, __data_racy turns into volatile, which KCSAN already
treats specially by considering them "marked". In non-KCSAN kernels the
type qualifier turns into no-op.
The generated code between KCSAN-instrumented kernels and non-KCSAN
kernels is already huge (inserted calls into runtime for every memory
access), so the extra generated code (if any) due to volatile for few
such __data_racy variables are unlikely to have measurable impact on
performance.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAHk-=wi3iondeh_9V2g3Qz5oHTRjLsOpoy83hb58MVh=nRZe0A@mail.gmail.com/ [1]
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
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The GHCB protocol version may be different from one guest to the next.
Add a field to track it for each KVM instance and extend KVM_SEV_INIT2
to allow it to be configured by userspace.
Now that all SEV-ES support for GHCB protocol version 2 is in place, go
ahead and default to it when creating SEV-ES guests through the new
KVM_SEV_INIT2 interface. Keep the older KVM_SEV_ES_INIT interface
restricted to GHCB protocol version 1.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240501071048.2208265-5-michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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GHCB version 2 adds support for a GHCB-based termination request that
a guest can issue when it reaches an error state and wishes to inform
the hypervisor that it should be terminated. Implement support for that
similarly to GHCB MSR-based termination requests that are already
available to SEV-ES guests via earlier versions of the GHCB protocol.
See 'Termination Request' in the 'Invoking VMGEXIT' section of the GHCB
specification for more details.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240501071048.2208265-4-michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Version 2 of the GHCB specification introduced advertisement of features
that are supported by the Hypervisor.
Now that KVM supports version 2 of the GHCB specification, bump the
maximum supported protocol version.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240501071048.2208265-3-michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Add support for AP Reset Hold being invoked using the GHCB MSR protocol,
available in version 2 of the GHCB specification.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240501071048.2208265-2-michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Zero out all of kvm_caps when loading a new vendor module to ensure that
KVM can't inadvertently rely on global initialization of a field, and add
a comment above the definition of kvm_caps to call out that all fields
needs to be explicitly computed during vendor module load.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240423165328.2853870-4-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Effectively reset supported_mce_cap on vendor module load to ensure that
capabilities aren't unintentionally preserved across module reload, e.g.
if kvm-intel.ko added a module param to control LMCE support, or if
someone somehow managed to load a vendor module that doesn't support LMCE
after loading and unloading kvm-intel.ko.
Practically speaking, this bug is a non-issue as kvm-intel.ko doesn't have
a module param for LMCE, and there is no system in the world that supports
both kvm-intel.ko and kvm-amd.ko.
Fixes: c45dcc71b794 ("KVM: VMX: enable guest access to LMCE related MSRs")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240423165328.2853870-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Recompute the entire set of supported VM types when a vendor module is
loaded, as preserving supported_vm_types across vendor module unload and
reload can result in VM types being incorrectly treated as supported.
E.g. if a vendor module is loaded with TDP enabled, unloaded, and then
reloaded with TDP disabled, KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM will be incorrectly
retained. Ditto for SEV_VM and SEV_ES_VM and their respective module
params in kvm-amd.ko.
Fixes: 2a955c4db1dd ("KVM: x86: Add supported_vm_types to kvm_caps")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240423165328.2853870-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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KVM/riscv changes for 6.10
- Support guest breakpoints using ebreak
- Introduce per-VCPU mp_state_lock and reset_cntx_lock
- Virtualize SBI PMU snapshot and counter overflow interrupts
- New selftests for SBI PMU and Guest ebreak
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvms390/linux into HEAD
KVM: s390: Fix for 6.9
Fix wild read on capability check.
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The debug print clearly lacks a \n at the end. Add it.
Fixes: 8f86c82aba8b ("drm/connector: demote connector force-probes for non-master clients")
Reviewed-by: Abhinav Kumar <quic_abhinavk@quicinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Ser <contact@emersion.fr>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20240502153234.1.I2052f01c8d209d9ae9c300b87c6e4f60bd3cc99e@changeid
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Commit 1f2bcb8c8ccd ("gpio: protect the descriptor label with SRCU")
caused a massive drop in performance of requesting GPIO lines due to the
call to synchronize_srcu() on each label change. Rework the code to not
wait until all read-only users are done with reading the label but
instead atomically replace the label pointer and schedule its release
after all read-only critical sections are done.
To that end wrap the descriptor label in a struct that also contains the
rcu_head struct required for deferring tasks using call_srcu() and stop
using kstrdup_const() as we're required to allocate memory anyway. Just
allocate enough for the label string and rcu_head in one go.
Reported-by: Neil Armstrong <neil.armstrong@linaro.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-gpio/CAMRc=Mfig2oooDQYTqo23W3PXSdzhVO4p=G4+P8y1ppBOrkrJQ@mail.gmail.com/
Fixes: 1f2bcb8c8ccd ("gpio: protect the descriptor label with SRCU")
Suggested-by: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Neil Armstrong <neil.armstrong@linaro.org> # on SM8650-QRD
Acked-by: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240507121346.16969-1-brgl@bgdev.pl
Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@linaro.org>
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WARN if __kvm_faultin_pfn() generates a "no slot" pfn, and gracefully
handle the unexpected behavior instead of continuing on with dangerous
state, e.g. tdp_mmu_map_handle_target_level() _only_ checks fault->slot,
and so could install a bogus PFN into the guest.
The existing code is functionally ok, because kvm_faultin_pfn() pre-checks
all of the cases that result in KVM_PFN_NOSLOT, but it is unnecessarily
unsafe as it relies on __gfn_to_pfn_memslot() getting the _exact_ same
memslot, i.e. not a re-retrieved pointer with KVM_MEMSLOT_INVALID set.
And checking only fault->slot would fall apart if KVM ever added a flag or
condition that forced emulation, similar to how KVM handles writes to
read-only memslots.
Cc: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240228024147.41573-17-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Explicitly set "pfn" and "hva" to error values in kvm_mmu_do_page_fault()
to harden KVM against using "uninitialized" values. In quotes because the
fields are actually zero-initialized, and zero is a legal value for both
page frame numbers and virtual addresses. E.g. failure to set "pfn" prior
to creating an SPTE could result in KVM pointing at physical address '0',
which is far less desirable than KVM generating a SPTE with reserved PA
bits set and thus effectively killing the VM.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240228024147.41573-16-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Explicitly set fault->hva to KVM_HVA_ERR_BAD when handling a "no slot"
fault to ensure that KVM doesn't use a bogus virtual address, e.g. if
there *was* a slot but it's unusable (APIC access page), or if there
really was no slot, in which case fault->hva will be '0' (which is a
legal address for x86).
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240228024147.41573-15-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Handle the "no memslot" case at the beginning of kvm_faultin_pfn(), just
after the private versus shared check, so that there's no need to
repeatedly query whether or not a slot exists. This also makes it more
obvious that, except for private vs. shared attributes, the process of
faulting in a pfn simply doesn't apply to gfns without a slot.
Opportunistically stuff @fault's metadata in kvm_handle_noslot_fault() so
that it doesn't need to be duplicated in all paths that invoke
kvm_handle_noslot_fault(), and to minimize the probability of not stuffing
the right fields.
Leave the existing handle behind, but convert it to a WARN, to guard
against __kvm_faultin_pfn() unexpectedly nullifying fault->slot.
Cc: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240228024147.41573-14-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Move the checks related to the validity of an access to a memslot from the
inner __kvm_faultin_pfn() to its sole caller, kvm_faultin_pfn(). This
allows emulating accesses to the APIC access page, which don't need to
resolve a pfn, even if there is a relevant in-progress mmu_notifier
invalidation. Ditto for accesses to KVM internal memslots from L2, which
KVM also treats as emulated MMIO.
More importantly, this will allow for future cleanup by having the
"no memslot" case bail from kvm_faultin_pfn() very early on.
Go to rather extreme and gross lengths to make the change a glorified
nop, e.g. call into __kvm_faultin_pfn() even when there is no slot, as the
related code is very subtle. E.g. fault->slot can be nullified if it
points at the APIC access page, some flows in KVM x86 expect fault->pfn
to be KVM_PFN_NOSLOT, while others check only fault->slot, etc.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240228024147.41573-13-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Explicitly detect and disallow private accesses to emulated MMIO in
kvm_handle_noslot_fault() instead of relying on kvm_faultin_pfn_private()
to perform the check. This will allow the page fault path to go straight
to kvm_handle_noslot_fault() without bouncing through __kvm_faultin_pfn().
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20240228024147.41573-12-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Allow mapping KVM's internal memslots used for EPT without unrestricted
guest into L2, i.e. allow mapping the hidden TSS and the identity mapped
page tables into L2. Unlike the APIC access page, there is no correctness
issue with letting L2 access the "hidden" memory. Allowing these memslots
to be mapped into L2 fixes a largely theoretical bug where KVM could
incorrectly emulate subsequent _L1_ accesses as MMIO, and also ensures
consistent KVM behavior for L2.
If KVM is using TDP, but L1 is using shadow paging for L2, then routing
through kvm_handle_noslot_fault() will incorrectly cache the gfn as MMIO,
and create an MMIO SPTE. Creating an MMIO SPTE is ok, but only because
kvm_mmu_page_role.guest_mode ensure KVM uses different roots for L1 vs.
L2. But vcpu->arch.mmio_gfn will remain valid, and could cause KVM to
incorrectly treat an L1 access to the hidden TSS or identity mapped page
tables as MMIO.
Furthermore, forcing L2 accesses to be treated as "no slot" faults doesn't
actually prevent exposing KVM's internal memslots to L2, it simply forces
KVM to emulate the access. In most cases, that will trigger MMIO,
amusingly due to filling vcpu->arch.mmio_gfn, but also because
vcpu_is_mmio_gpa() unconditionally treats APIC accesses as MMIO, i.e. APIC
accesses are ok. But the hidden TSS and identity mapped page tables could
go either way (MMIO or access the private memslot's backing memory).
Alternatively, the inconsistent emulator behavior could be addressed by
forcing MMIO emulation for L2 access to all internal memslots, not just to
the APIC. But that's arguably less correct than letting L2 access the
hidden TSS and identity mapped page tables, not to mention that it's
*extremely* unlikely anyone cares what KVM does in this case. From L1's
perspective there is R/W memory at those memslots, the memory just happens
to be initialized with non-zero data. Making the memory disappear when it
is accessed by L2 is far more magical and arbitrary than the memory
existing in the first place.
The APIC access page is special because KVM _must_ emulate the access to
do the right thing (emulate an APIC access instead of reading/writing the
APIC access page). And despite what commit 3a2936dedd20 ("kvm: mmu: Don't
expose private memslots to L2") said, it's not just necessary when L1 is
accelerating L2's virtual APIC, it's just as important (likely *more*
imporant for correctness when L1 is passing through its own APIC to L2.
Fixes: 3a2936dedd20 ("kvm: mmu: Don't expose private memslots to L2")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240228024147.41573-11-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Prioritize private vs. shared gfn attribute checks above slot validity
checks to ensure a consistent userspace ABI. E.g. as is, KVM will exit to
userspace if there is no memslot, but emulate accesses to the APIC access
page even if the attributes mismatch.
Fixes: 8dd2eee9d526 ("KVM: x86/mmu: Handle page fault for private memory")
Cc: Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240228024147.41573-10-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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WARN and skip the emulated MMIO fastpath if a private, reserved page fault
is encountered, as private+reserved should be an impossible combination
(KVM should never create an MMIO SPTE for a private access).
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20240228024147.41573-9-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Right now the error code is not used when an async page fault is completed.
This is not a problem in the current code, but it is untidy. For protected
VMs, we will also need to check that the page attributes match the current
state of the page, because asynchronous page faults can only occur on
shared pages (private pages go through kvm_faultin_pfn_private() instead of
__gfn_to_pfn_memslot()).
Start by piping the error code from kvm_arch_setup_async_pf() to
kvm_arch_async_page_ready() via the architecture-specific async page
fault data. For now, it can be used to assert that there are no
async page faults on private memory.
Extracted from a patch by Isaku Yamahata.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Add and use a synthetic, KVM-defined page fault error code to indicate
whether a fault is to private vs. shared memory. TDX and SNP have
different mechanisms for reporting private vs. shared, and KVM's
software-protected VMs have no mechanism at all. Usurp an error code
flag to avoid having to plumb another parameter to kvm_mmu_page_fault()
and friends.
Alternatively, KVM could borrow AMD's PFERR_GUEST_ENC_MASK, i.e. set it
for TDX and software-protected VMs as appropriate, but that would require
*clearing* the flag for SEV and SEV-ES VMs, which support encrypted
memory at the hardware layer, but don't utilize private memory at the
KVM layer.
Opportunistically add a comment to call out that the logic for software-
protected VMs is (and was before this commit) broken for nested MMUs, i.e.
for nested TDP, as the GPA is an L2 GPA. Punt on trying to play nice with
nested MMUs as there is a _lot_ of functionality that simply doesn't work
for software-protected VMs, e.g. all of the paths where KVM accesses guest
memory need to be updated to be aware of private vs. shared memory.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20240228024147.41573-6-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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WARN if bits 63:32 are non-zero when handling an intercepted legacy #PF,
as the error code for #PF is limited to 32 bits (and in practice, 16 bits
on Intel CPUS). This behavior is architectural, is part of KVM's ABI
(see kvm_vcpu_events.error_code), and is explicitly documented as being
preserved for intecerpted #PF in both the APM:
The error code saved in EXITINFO1 is the same as would be pushed onto
the stack by a non-intercepted #PF exception in protected mode.
and even more explicitly in the SDM as VMCS.VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE is a
32-bit field.
Simply drop the upper bits if hardware provides garbage, as spurious
information should do no harm (though in all likelihood hardware is buggy
and the kernel is doomed).
Handling all upper 32 bits in the #PF path will allow moving the sanity
check on synthetic checks from kvm_mmu_page_fault() to npf_interception(),
which in turn will allow deriving PFERR_PRIVATE_ACCESS from AMD's
PFERR_GUEST_ENC_MASK without running afoul of the sanity check.
Note, this is also why Intel uses bit 15 for SGX (highest bit on Intel CPUs)
and AMD uses bit 31 for RMP (highest bit on AMD CPUs); using the highest
bit minimizes the probability of a collision with the "other" vendor,
without needing to plumb more bits through microcode.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240228024147.41573-7-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Plumb the full 64-bit error code throughout the page fault handling code
so that KVM can use the upper 32 bits, e.g. SNP's PFERR_GUEST_ENC_MASK
will be used to determine whether or not a fault is private vs. shared.
Note, passing the 64-bit error code to FNAME(walk_addr)() does NOT change
the behavior of permission_fault() when invoked in the page fault path, as
KVM explicitly clears PFERR_IMPLICIT_ACCESS in kvm_mmu_page_fault().
Continue passing '0' from the async #PF worker, as guest_memfd and thus
private memory doesn't support async page faults.
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
[mdr: drop references/changes on rebase, update commit message]
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
[sean: drop truncation in call to FNAME(walk_addr)(), rewrite changelog]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240228024147.41573-5-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Move the sanity check that hardware never sets bits that collide with KVM-
define synthetic bits from kvm_mmu_page_fault() to npf_interception(),
i.e. make the sanity check #NPF specific. The legacy #PF path already
WARNs if _any_ of bits 63:32 are set, and the error code that comes from
VMX's EPT Violatation and Misconfig is 100% synthesized (KVM morphs VMX's
EXIT_QUALIFICATION into error code flags).
Add a compile-time assert in the legacy #PF handler to make sure that KVM-
define flags are covered by its existing sanity check on the upper bits.
Opportunistically add a description of PFERR_IMPLICIT_ACCESS, since we
are removing the comment that defined it.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240228024147.41573-8-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Define more #NPF error code flags that are relevant to SEV+ (mostly SNP)
guests, as specified by the APM:
* Bit 31 (RMP): Set to 1 if the fault was caused due to an RMP check or a
VMPL check failure, 0 otherwise.
* Bit 34 (ENC): Set to 1 if the guest’s effective C-bit was 1, 0 otherwise.
* Bit 35 (SIZEM): Set to 1 if the fault was caused by a size mismatch between
PVALIDATE or RMPADJUST and the RMP, 0 otherwise.
* Bit 36 (VMPL): Set to 1 if the fault was caused by a VMPL permission
check failure, 0 otherwise.
Note, the APM is *extremely* misleading, and strongly implies that the
above flags can _only_ be set for #NPF exits from SNP guests. That is a
lie, as bit 34 (C-bit=1, i.e. was encrypted) can be set when running _any_
flavor of SEV guest on SNP capable hardware.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20240228024147.41573-4-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Open code the bit number directly in the PFERR_* masks and drop the
intermediate PFERR_*_BIT defines, as having to bounce through two macros
just to see which flag corresponds to which bit is quite annoying, as is
having to define two macros just to add recognition of a new flag.
Use ternary operator to derive the bit in permission_fault(), the one
function that actually needs the bit number as part of clever shifting
to avoid conditional branches. Generally the compiler is able to turn
it into a conditional move, and if not it's not really a big deal.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <20240228024147.41573-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Exit to userspace with -EFAULT / KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT if a private fault
triggers emulation of any kind, as KVM doesn't currently support emulating
access to guest private memory. Practically speaking, private faults and
emulation are already mutually exclusive, but there are many flow that
can result in KVM returning RET_PF_EMULATE, and adding one last check
to harden against weird, unexpected combinations and/or KVM bugs is
inexpensive.
Suggested-by: Yan Zhao <yan.y.zhao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20240228024147.41573-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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When deleting many controllers one-by-one, it takes a very
long time as these work elements may serialize as they are
scheduled on the executing cpu instead of spreading. In general
nvmet_wq can definitely be used for long standing work elements
so its better to make it unbound regardless.
Signed-off-by: Sagi Grimberg <sagi.grimberg@vastdata.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
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Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>
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bch2_write_super() was looping over online devices multiple times -
dropping and retaking io_ref each time.
This meant it could race with device removal; it could increment the
sequence number on a device but fail to write it - and then if the
device was re-added, it would get confused the next time around thinking
a superblock write was silently dropped.
Fix this by taking io_ref once, and stashing pointers to online devices
in a darray.
Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>
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If nvmet_auth_ctrl_hash() fails, return the error code to its callers
Signed-off-by: Maurizio Lombardi <mlombard@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni <kch@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
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We don't need to run the validation of the XML files if we are just
compiling the kernel. Skip the validation unless the user enables
corresponding Kconfig option. This removes a warning from gen_header.py
about lxml being not installed.
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240409120108.2303d0bd@canb.auug.org.au/
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Abhinav Kumar <quic_abhinavk@quicinc.com>
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/592558/
Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@chromium.org>
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These tables were made non-const in commit 3cba4a2cdff3 ("drm/msm/a6xx:
Update ROQ size in coredump") in order to avoid powering up the GPU when
reading back a devcoredump. Instead let's just stash the count that is
potentially read from hw in struct a6xx_gpu_state_obj, and make the
tables const again.
Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@chromium.org>
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/592699/
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Commit 67889688e05b ("MAINTAINERS: update the LSM file list") adds a few
file entries to lsm-related header files. Among them, there is a reference
to include/security.h. However, security.h is located in include/linux/,
not in include/.
Hence, ./scripts/get_maintainer.pl --self-test=patterns complains about a
broken reference.
Repair this new file entry in the SECURITY SUBSYSTEM section.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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With the name that is currently looked up it is considerably easier to
understand the issue and fix the warning.
Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240507104703.2070117-2-u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
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Sandisk SN530 NVMe drives have broken MSIs. On systems without MSI-X
support, all commands time out resulting in the following message:
nvme nvme0: I/O tag 12 (100c) QID 0 timeout, completion polled
These timeouts cause the boot to take an excessively-long time (over 20
minutes) while the initial command queue is flushed.
Address this by adding a quirk for drives with buggy MSIs. The lspci
output for this device (recorded on a system with MSI-X support) is:
02:00.0 Non-Volatile memory controller: Sandisk Corp Device 5008 (rev 01) (prog-if 02 [NVM Express])
Subsystem: Sandisk Corp Device 5008
Flags: bus master, fast devsel, latency 0, IRQ 16, NUMA node 0
Memory at f7e00000 (64-bit, non-prefetchable) [size=16K]
Memory at f7e04000 (64-bit, non-prefetchable) [size=256]
Capabilities: [80] Power Management version 3
Capabilities: [90] MSI: Enable- Count=1/32 Maskable- 64bit+
Capabilities: [b0] MSI-X: Enable+ Count=17 Masked-
Capabilities: [c0] Express Endpoint, MSI 00
Capabilities: [100] Advanced Error Reporting
Capabilities: [150] Device Serial Number 00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00
Capabilities: [1b8] Latency Tolerance Reporting
Capabilities: [300] Secondary PCI Express
Capabilities: [900] L1 PM Substates
Kernel driver in use: nvme
Kernel modules: nvme
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sean Anderson <sean.anderson@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
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Commit a403997c1201 ("spi: airoha: add SPI-NAND Flash controller driver")
adds a new section AIROHA SPI SNFI DRIVER referring to the file
spi-airoha.c. The commit however adds the file spi-airoha-snfi.c.
Hence, ./scripts/get_maintainer.pl --self-test=patterns complains about a
broken reference.
Repair this file entry in the AIROHA SPI SNFI DRIVER section.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240507141449.177538-1-lukas.bulwahn@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
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The documentation had been removed, so should TOC entry.
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Fixes: 2d069c11e822 ("spi: pxa2xx: Remove outdated documentation")
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240507163131.183813ee@canb.auug.org.au
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240507132002.71938-1-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
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Merge series from Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org>:
Static 'struct snd_pcm_hardware' is not modified by few drivers and its
copy is passed to the core, so it can be made const for increased code
safety.
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Fixed: WARNING: Inline literal start-string without end-string in
Documentation/core-api/workqueue.rst
Added "*" in $type_constants2 in kernel-doc script to include "*" in the
conversion to hightlights.
Previously: %WQ_* --> ``WQ_``*
After Changes: %WQ_* --> ``WQ_*``
Need for the fix: ``* is not recognized as a valid end-string for inline
literal.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-doc/640114d2-5780-48c3-a294-c0eba230f984@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Utkarsh Tripathi <utripathi2002@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Akira Yokosawa <akiyks@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Akira Yokosawa <akiyks@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240503182650.7761-1-utripathi2002@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
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Signed-off-by: Dennis Lam <dennis.lamerice@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240502212522.4263-1-dennis.lamerice@gmail.com
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Fix spelling mistakes in the documentation.
Signed-off-by: Saurav Shah <sauravshah.31@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240501233659.25441-1-sauravshah.31@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
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Starting BDB version 239, hdr_dpcd_refresh_timeout is introduced to
backlight BDB data. Commit 700034566d68 ("drm/i915/bios: Define more BDB
contents") updated the backlight BDB data accordingly. This broke the
parsing of backlight BDB data in VBT for versions 236 - 238 (both
inclusive) and hence the backlight controls are not responding on units
with the concerned BDB version.
backlight_control information has been present in backlight BDB data
from at least BDB version 191 onwards, if not before. Hence this patch
extracts the backlight_control information for BDB version 191 or newer.
Tested on Chromebooks using Jasperlake SoC (reports bdb->version = 236).
Tested on Chromebooks using Raptorlake SoC (reports bdb->version = 251).
v2: removed checking the block size of the backlight BDB data
[vsyrjala: this is completely safe thanks to commit e163cfb4c96d
("drm/i915/bios: Make copies of VBT data blocks")]
Fixes: 700034566d68 ("drm/i915/bios: Define more BDB contents")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>
Cc: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Karthikeyan Ramasubramanian <kramasub@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20240221180622.v2.1.I0690aa3e96a83a43b3fc33f50395d334b2981826@changeid
Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com>
(cherry picked from commit c286f6a973c66c0d993ecab9f7162c790e7064c8)
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
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