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flag
disable_irq() after request_irq() still has a time gap in which
interrupts can come. request_irq() with IRQF_NO_AUTOEN flag will
disable IRQ auto-enable because of requesting.
this patch is made base on "add IRQF_NO_AUTOEN for request_irq" which
is being merged: https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/1388765/
Signed-off-by: Tian Tao <tiantao6@hisilicon.com>
Acked-by: Vadim Pasternak <vadimp@nvidia.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1617785983-28878-1-git-send-email-tiantao6@hisilicon.com
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
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Tag for the input subsystem to pick up
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There is a timer wrap issue on dra7 for the ARM architected timer.
In a typical clock configuration the timer fails to wrap after 388 days.
To work around the issue, we need to use timer-ti-dm timers instead.
Let's prepare for adding support for percpu timers by adding a common
dmtimer_clkevt_init_common() and call it from dmtimer_clockevent_init().
This patch makes no intentional functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210323074326.28302-2-tony@atomide.com
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Experimentally have found PV on hvs4 reports fifo full
error with expected settings and does not with one less
This appears as:
[drm:drm_atomic_helper_wait_for_flip_done] *ERROR* [CRTC:82:crtc-3] flip_done timed out
with bit 10 of PV_STAT set "HVS driving pixels when the PV FIFO is full"
Fixes: c8b75bca92cb ("drm/vc4: Add KMS support for Raspberry Pi.")
Signed-off-by: Dom Cobley <popcornmix@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <maxime@cerno.tech>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20210318161328.1471556-3-maxime@cerno.tech
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The vc4_plane_atomic_async_update function assigns twice in a row the
src_h field in the drm_plane_state structure to the same value. Remove
the second one.
Reviewed-by: Dave Stevenson <dave.stevenson@raspberrypi.com>
Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <maxime@cerno.tech>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20210318161328.1471556-2-maxime@cerno.tech
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In case nl80211_parse_unsol_bcast_probe_resp() results in an
error, need to "goto out" instead of just returning to free
possibly allocated data.
Fixes: 7443dcd1f171 ("nl80211: Unsolicited broadcast probe response support")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210408142833.d8bc2e2e454a.If290b1ba85789726a671ff0b237726d4851b5b0f@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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We need to check the length of this element so that we don't
access data beyond its end. Fix that.
Fixes: 9eaffe5078ca ("cfg80211: convert S1G beacon to scan results")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210408142826.f6f4525012de.I9fdeff0afdc683a6024e5ea49d2daa3cd2459d11@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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Allow for a randomized stack offset on a per-syscall basis, with roughly
5 bits of entropy. (And include AAPCS rationale AAPCS thanks to Mark
Rutland.)
In order to avoid unconditional stack canaries on syscall entry (due to
the use of alloca()), also disable stack protector to avoid triggering
needless checks and slowing down the entry path. As there is no general
way to control stack protector coverage with a function attribute[1],
this must be disabled at the compilation unit level. This isn't a problem
here, though, since stack protector was not triggered before: examining
the resulting syscall.o, there are no changes in canary coverage (none
before, none now).
[1] a working __attribute__((no_stack_protector)) has been added to GCC
and Clang but has not been released in any version yet:
https://gcc.gnu.org/git/gitweb.cgi?p=gcc.git;h=346b302d09c1e6db56d9fe69048acb32fbb97845
https://reviews.llvm.org/rG4fbf84c1732fca596ad1d6e96015e19760eb8a9b
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210401232347.2791257-6-keescook@chromium.org
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For validating the stack offset behavior, report the offset from a given
process's first seen stack address. Add s script to calculate the results
to the LKDTM kselftests.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210401232347.2791257-7-keescook@chromium.org
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Allow for a randomized stack offset on a per-syscall basis, with roughly
5-6 bits of entropy, depending on compiler and word size. Since the
method of offsetting uses macros, this cannot live in the common entry
code (the stack offset needs to be retained for the life of the syscall,
which means it needs to happen at the actual entry point).
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210401232347.2791257-5-keescook@chromium.org
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This provides the ability for architectures to enable kernel stack base
address offset randomization. This feature is controlled by the boot
param "randomize_kstack_offset=on/off", with its default value set by
CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT.
This feature is based on the original idea from the last public release
of PaX's RANDKSTACK feature: https://pax.grsecurity.net/docs/randkstack.txt
All the credit for the original idea goes to the PaX team. Note that
the design and implementation of this upstream randomize_kstack_offset
feature differs greatly from the RANDKSTACK feature (see below).
Reasoning for the feature:
This feature aims to make harder the various stack-based attacks that
rely on deterministic stack structure. We have had many such attacks in
past (just to name few):
https://jon.oberheide.org/files/infiltrate12-thestackisback.pdf
https://jon.oberheide.org/files/stackjacking-infiltrate11.pdf
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2016/06/exploiting-recursion-in-linux-kernel_20.html
As Linux kernel stack protections have been constantly improving
(vmap-based stack allocation with guard pages, removal of thread_info,
STACKLEAK), attackers have had to find new ways for their exploits
to work. They have done so, continuing to rely on the kernel's stack
determinism, in situations where VMAP_STACK and THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK_STRUCT
were not relevant. For example, the following recent attacks would have
been hampered if the stack offset was non-deterministic between syscalls:
https://repositorio-aberto.up.pt/bitstream/10216/125357/2/374717.pdf
(page 70: targeting the pt_regs copy with linear stack overflow)
https://a13xp0p0v.github.io/2020/02/15/CVE-2019-18683.html
(leaked stack address from one syscall as a target during next syscall)
The main idea is that since the stack offset is randomized on each system
call, it is harder for an attack to reliably land in any particular place
on the thread stack, even with address exposures, as the stack base will
change on the next syscall. Also, since randomization is performed after
placing pt_regs, the ptrace-based approach[1] to discover the randomized
offset during a long-running syscall should not be possible.
Design description:
During most of the kernel's execution, it runs on the "thread stack",
which is pretty deterministic in its structure: it is fixed in size,
and on every entry from userspace to kernel on a syscall the thread
stack starts construction from an address fetched from the per-cpu
cpu_current_top_of_stack variable. The first element to be pushed to the
thread stack is the pt_regs struct that stores all required CPU registers
and syscall parameters. Finally the specific syscall function is called,
with the stack being used as the kernel executes the resulting request.
The goal of randomize_kstack_offset feature is to add a random offset
after the pt_regs has been pushed to the stack and before the rest of the
thread stack is used during the syscall processing, and to change it every
time a process issues a syscall. The source of randomness is currently
architecture-defined (but x86 is using the low byte of rdtsc()). Future
improvements for different entropy sources is possible, but out of scope
for this patch. Further more, to add more unpredictability, new offsets
are chosen at the end of syscalls (the timing of which should be less
easy to measure from userspace than at syscall entry time), and stored
in a per-CPU variable, so that the life of the value does not stay
explicitly tied to a single task.
As suggested by Andy Lutomirski, the offset is added using alloca()
and an empty asm() statement with an output constraint, since it avoids
changes to assembly syscall entry code, to the unwinder, and provides
correct stack alignment as defined by the compiler.
In order to make this available by default with zero performance impact
for those that don't want it, it is boot-time selectable with static
branches. This way, if the overhead is not wanted, it can just be
left turned off with no performance impact.
The generated assembly for x86_64 with GCC looks like this:
...
ffffffff81003977: 65 8b 05 02 ea 00 7f mov %gs:0x7f00ea02(%rip),%eax
# 12380 <kstack_offset>
ffffffff8100397e: 25 ff 03 00 00 and $0x3ff,%eax
ffffffff81003983: 48 83 c0 0f add $0xf,%rax
ffffffff81003987: 25 f8 07 00 00 and $0x7f8,%eax
ffffffff8100398c: 48 29 c4 sub %rax,%rsp
ffffffff8100398f: 48 8d 44 24 0f lea 0xf(%rsp),%rax
ffffffff81003994: 48 83 e0 f0 and $0xfffffffffffffff0,%rax
...
As a result of the above stack alignment, this patch introduces about
5 bits of randomness after pt_regs is spilled to the thread stack on
x86_64, and 6 bits on x86_32 (since its has 1 fewer bit required for
stack alignment). The amount of entropy could be adjusted based on how
much of the stack space we wish to trade for security.
My measure of syscall performance overhead (on x86_64):
lmbench: /usr/lib/lmbench/bin/x86_64-linux-gnu/lat_syscall -N 10000 null
randomize_kstack_offset=y Simple syscall: 0.7082 microseconds
randomize_kstack_offset=n Simple syscall: 0.7016 microseconds
So, roughly 0.9% overhead growth for a no-op syscall, which is very
manageable. And for people that don't want this, it's off by default.
There are two gotchas with using the alloca() trick. First,
compilers that have Stack Clash protection (-fstack-clash-protection)
enabled by default (e.g. Ubuntu[3]) add pagesize stack probes to
any dynamic stack allocations. While the randomization offset is
always less than a page, the resulting assembly would still contain
(unreachable!) probing routines, bloating the resulting assembly. To
avoid this, -fno-stack-clash-protection is unconditionally added to
the kernel Makefile since this is the only dynamic stack allocation in
the kernel (now that VLAs have been removed) and it is provably safe
from Stack Clash style attacks.
The second gotcha with alloca() is a negative interaction with
-fstack-protector*, in that it sees the alloca() as an array allocation,
which triggers the unconditional addition of the stack canary function
pre/post-amble which slows down syscalls regardless of the static
branch. In order to avoid adding this unneeded check and its associated
performance impact, architectures need to carefully remove uses of
-fstack-protector-strong (or -fstack-protector) in the compilation units
that use the add_random_kstack() macro and to audit the resulting stack
mitigation coverage (to make sure no desired coverage disappears). No
change is visible for this on x86 because the stack protector is already
unconditionally disabled for the compilation unit, but the change is
required on arm64. There is, unfortunately, no attribute that can be
used to disable stack protector for specific functions.
Comparison to PaX RANDKSTACK feature:
The RANDKSTACK feature randomizes the location of the stack start
(cpu_current_top_of_stack), i.e. including the location of pt_regs
structure itself on the stack. Initially this patch followed the same
approach, but during the recent discussions[2], it has been determined
to be of a little value since, if ptrace functionality is available for
an attacker, they can use PTRACE_PEEKUSR/PTRACE_POKEUSR to read/write
different offsets in the pt_regs struct, observe the cache behavior of
the pt_regs accesses, and figure out the random stack offset. Another
difference is that the random offset is stored in a per-cpu variable,
rather than having it be per-thread. As a result, these implementations
differ a fair bit in their implementation details and results, though
obviously the intent is similar.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/kernel-hardening/2236FBA76BA1254E88B949DDB74E612BA4BC57C1@IRSMSX102.ger.corp.intel.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/kernel-hardening/20190329081358.30497-1-elena.reshetova@intel.com/
[3] https://lists.ubuntu.com/archives/ubuntu-devel/2019-June/040741.html
Co-developed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210401232347.2791257-4-keescook@chromium.org
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The state of CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON (and ...ON_FREE...) did not
change the assembly ordering of the static branches: they were always out
of line. Use the new jump_label macros to check the CONFIG settings to
default to the "expected" state, which slightly optimizes the resulting
assembly code.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210401232347.2791257-3-keescook@chromium.org
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As shown in the comment in jump_label.h, choosing the initial state of
static branches changes the assembly layout. If the condition is expected
to be likely it's inline, and if unlikely it is out of line via a jump.
A few places in the kernel use (or could be using) a CONFIG to choose the
default state, which would give a small performance benefit to their
compile-time declared default. Provide the infrastructure to do this.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210401232347.2791257-2-keescook@chromium.org
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Right now, if a call to kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_sp returns false, the caller
will skip the TLB flush, which is wrong. There are two ways to fix
it:
- since kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_sp will not yield and therefore will not flush
the TLB itself, we could change the call to kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_sp to
use "flush |= ..."
- or we can chain the flush argument through kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_sp down
to __kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_gfn_range. Note that kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_sp will
neither yield nor flush, so flush would never go from true to
false.
This patch does the former to simplify application to stable kernels,
and to make it further clearer that kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_sp will not flush.
Cc: seanjc@google.com
Fixes: 048f49809c526 ("KVM: x86/mmu: Ensure TLBs are flushed for TDP MMU during NX zapping")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.10.x: 048f49809c: KVM: x86/mmu: Ensure TLBs are flushed for TDP MMU during NX zapping
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.10.x: 33a3164161: KVM: x86/mmu: Don't allow TDP MMU to yield when recovering NX pages
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Add calls to disable the clock and unmap the timer base address in case
of any failures.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Dinh Nguyen <dinguyen@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210322121844.2271041-1-dinguyen@kernel.org
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Add a compatible string for WPCM450, which has essentially the same
timer controller.
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Neuschäfer <j.neuschaefer@gmx.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210320181610.680870-11-j.neuschaefer@gmx.net
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CMTOUT_IE is only supported for older SoCs. Newer SoCs shall not set
this bit. So, add a version check.
Reported-by: Phong Hoang <phong.hoang.wz@renesas.com>
Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Reviewed-by: Niklas Söderlund <niklas.soderlund+renesas@ragnatech.se>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210309094448.31823-1-wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com
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Fix trivial typo, rename local variable from 'overflw' to 'overflow' in
pistachio_clocksource_read_cycles().
Reported-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Drew Fustini <drew@beagleboard.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210305090315.384547-1-drew@beagleboard.org
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In case of error, the function device_node_to_regmap() returns
ERR_PTR() and never returns NULL. The NULL test in the return
value check should be replaced with IS_ERR().
Fixes: ca7b72b5a5f2 ("clocksource: Add driver for the Ingenic JZ47xx OST")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210308123031.2285083-1-weiyongjun1@huawei.com
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To avoid spurious timer interrupts when KTIME_MAX is used, we need to
configure set_state_oneshot_stopped(). Although implementing this is
optional, it still affects things like power management for the extra
timer interrupt.
For more information, please see commit 8fff52fd5093 ("clockevents:
Introduce CLOCK_EVT_STATE_ONESHOT_STOPPED state") and commit cf8c5009ee37
("clockevents/drivers/arm_arch_timer: Implement
->set_state_oneshot_stopped()").
Fixes: 52762fbd1c47 ("clocksource/drivers/timer-ti-dm: Add clockevent and clocksource support")
Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210304072135.52712-4-tony@atomide.com
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When the timer is configured in posted mode, we need to check the write-
posted status register (TWPS) before writing to the register.
We now check TWPS after the write starting with commit 52762fbd1c47
("clocksource/drivers/timer-ti-dm: Add clockevent and clocksource
support").
For example, in the TRM for am571x the following is documented in chapter
"22.2.4.13.1.1 Write Posting Synchronization Mode":
"For each register, a status bit is provided in the timer write-posted
status (TWPS) register. In this mode, it is mandatory that software check
this status bit before any write access. If a write is attempted to a
register with a previous access pending, the previous access is discarded
without notice."
The regression happened when I updated the code to use standard read/write
accessors for the driver instead of using __omap_dm_timer_load_start().
We have__omap_dm_timer_load_start() check the TWPS status correctly using
__omap_dm_timer_write().
Fixes: 52762fbd1c47 ("clocksource/drivers/timer-ti-dm: Add clockevent and clocksource support")
Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210304072135.52712-2-tony@atomide.com
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Add missing bindings for M3-W+.
Signed-off-by: Niklas Söderlund <niklas.soderlund+renesas@ragnatech.se>
Reviewed-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210211143344.352588-1-niklas.soderlund+renesas@ragnatech.se
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Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com>
Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Reviewed-by: Niklas Söderlund <niklas.soderlund+renesas@ragnatech.se>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210311090918.2197-1-wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com
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The OST in the JZ4760B SoC works exactly the same as in the JZ4770. But
since the JZ4760B is older, its Device Tree string does not fall back to
the JZ4770 one; so add support for the JZ4760B compatible string here.
Signed-off-by: Paul Cercueil <paul@crapouillou.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210308212302.10288-3-paul@crapouillou.net
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Add support for the TCU (Timer/Counter Unit) of the JZ4760 and JZ4760B
SoCs.
Signed-off-by: Paul Cercueil <paul@crapouillou.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210308212302.10288-2-paul@crapouillou.net
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Add compatible strings to support the system timer, clocksource, OST,
watchdog and PWM blocks of the JZ4760 and JZ4760B SoCs.
Newer SoCs which behave like the JZ4760 or JZ4760B now see their
compatible string require a fallback compatible string that corresponds
to one of these two SoCs.
Signed-off-by: Paul Cercueil <paul@crapouillou.net>
Reviewed-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210308212302.10288-1-paul@crapouillou.net
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Add missing bindings for Gen3 SoCs.
Signed-off-by: Niklas Söderlund <niklas.soderlund+renesas@ragnatech.se>
Reviewed-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210211143102.350719-1-niklas.soderlund+renesas@ragnatech.se
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This driver is (for now) ARM specific, and currently doesn't
build with a variety of architectures (ia64, RISC-V, x86_64
at the very least).
Drop COMPILE_TEST from Kconfig until it gets sorted out.
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Neuschäfer <j.neuschaefer@gmx.net>
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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The functions msr_read() and msr_write() are not used outside of msr.c,
make them static.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Signed-off-by: Zhao Xuehui <zhaoxuehui1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210408095218.152264-1-zhaoxuehui1@huawei.com
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/westeri/thunderbolt into usb-linus
Mika writes:
thunderbolt: Fixes for v5.12-rc7
This includes two fixes:
- Fix memory leak in tb_retimer_add()
- Off by one in tb_port_find_retimer()
Both have been in linux-next without reported issues.
* tag 'thunderbolt-for-v5.12-rc7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/westeri/thunderbolt:
thunderbolt: Fix off by one in tb_port_find_retimer()
thunderbolt: Fix a leak in tb_retimer_add()
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cfg80211_inform_bss expects to receive a TSF value, but is given the
time since boot in nanoseconds. TSF values are expected to be at
microsecond scale rather than nanosecond scale.
Signed-off-by: A. Cody Schuffelen <schuffelen@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210318200419.1421034-1-schuffelen@google.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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A WARN_ON(wdev->conn) would trigger in cfg80211_sme_connect(), if multiple
send_msg(NL80211_CMD_CONNECT) system calls are made from the userland, which
should be anticipated and handled by the wireless driver. Remove this WARN_ON()
to prevent kernel panic if kernel is configured to "panic_on_warn".
Bug reported by syzbot.
Reported-by: syzbot+5f9392825de654244975@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Du Cheng <ducheng2@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210407162756.6101-1-ducheng2@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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The incorrect timeout check caused probing to happen when it did
not need to happen. This in turn caused tx performance drop
for around 5 seconds in ath10k-ct driver. Possibly that tx drop
is due to a secondary issue, but fixing the probe to not happen
when traffic is running fixes the symptom.
Signed-off-by: Ben Greear <greearb@candelatech.com>
Fixes: 9abf4e49830d ("mac80211: optimize station connection monitor")
Acked-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210330230749.14097-1-greearb@candelatech.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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Normally, TXQs have
txq->tid = tid;
txq->ac = ieee80211_ac_from_tid(tid);
However, the special management TXQ actually has
txq->tid = IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS; // 16
txq->ac = IEEE80211_AC_VO;
This makes sense, but ieee80211_ac_from_tid(16) is the same
as ieee80211_ac_from_tid(0) which is just IEEE80211_AC_BE.
Now, normally this is fine. However, if the netdev queues
were stopped, then the code in ieee80211_tx_dequeue() will
propagate the stop from the interface (vif->txqs_stopped[])
if the AC 2 (ieee80211_ac_from_tid(txq->tid)) is marked as
stopped. On wake, however, __ieee80211_wake_txqs() will wake
the TXQ if AC 0 (txq->ac) is woken up.
If a driver stops all queues with ieee80211_stop_tx_queues()
and then wakes them again with ieee80211_wake_tx_queues(),
the ieee80211_wake_txqs() tasklet will run to resync queue
and TXQ state. If all queues were woken, then what'll happen
is that _ieee80211_wake_txqs() will run in order of HW queues
0-3, typically (and certainly for iwlwifi) corresponding to
ACs 0-3, so it'll call __ieee80211_wake_txqs() for each AC in
order 0-3.
When __ieee80211_wake_txqs() is called for AC 0 (VO) that'll
wake up the management TXQ (remember its tid is 16), and the
driver's wake_tx_queue() will be called. That tries to get a
frame, which will immediately *stop* the TXQ again, because
now we check against AC 2, and AC 2 hasn't yet been marked as
woken up again in sdata->vif.txqs_stopped[] since we're only
in the __ieee80211_wake_txqs() call for AC 0.
Thus, the management TXQ will never be started again.
Fix this by checking txq->ac directly instead of calculating
the AC as ieee80211_ac_from_tid(txq->tid).
Fixes: adf8ed01e4fd ("mac80211: add an optional TXQ for other PS-buffered frames")
Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210323210500.bf4d50afea4a.I136ffde910486301f8818f5442e3c9bf8670a9c4@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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Recompiling with the new extended version of struct rfkill_event
broke systemd in *two* ways:
- It used "sizeof(struct rfkill_event)" to read the event, but
then complained if it actually got something != 8, this broke
it on new kernels (that include the updated API);
- It used sizeof(struct rfkill_event) to write a command, but
didn't implement the intended expansion protocol where the
kernel returns only how many bytes it accepted, and errored
out due to the unexpected smaller size on kernels that didn't
include the updated API.
Even though systemd has now been fixed, that fix may not be always
deployed, and other applications could potentially have similar
issues.
As such, in the interest of avoiding regressions, revert the
default API "struct rfkill_event" back to the original size.
Instead, add a new "struct rfkill_event_ext" that extends it by
the new field, and even more clearly document that applications
should be prepared for extensions in two ways:
* write might only accept fewer bytes on older kernels, and
will return how many to let userspace know which data may
have been ignored;
* read might return anything between 8 (the original size) and
whatever size the application sized its buffer at, indicating
how much event data was supported by the kernel.
Perhaps that will help avoid such issues in the future and we
won't have to come up with another version of the struct if we
ever need to extend it again.
Applications that want to take advantage of the new field will
have to be modified to use struct rfkill_event_ext instead now,
which comes with the danger of them having already been updated
to use it from 'struct rfkill_event', but I found no evidence
of that, and it's still relatively new.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.11
Reported-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com> # LLVM/Clang v12.0.0-r4 (x86-64)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210319232510.f1a139cfdd9c.Ic5c7c9d1d28972059e132ea653a21a427c326678@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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In some race conditions, with more clients and traffic configuration,
below crash is seen when making the interface down. sta->fast_rx wasn't
cleared when STA gets removed from 4-addr AP_VLAN interface. The crash is
due to try accessing 4-addr AP_VLAN interface's net_device (fast_rx->dev)
which has been deleted already.
Resolve this by clearing sta->fast_rx pointer when STA removes
from a 4-addr VLAN.
[ 239.449529] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000004
[ 239.449531] pgd = 80204000
...
[ 239.481496] CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 4.4.60 #227
[ 239.481591] Hardware name: Generic DT based system
[ 239.487665] task: be05b700 ti: be08e000 task.ti: be08e000
[ 239.492360] PC is at get_rps_cpu+0x2d4/0x31c
[ 239.497823] LR is at 0xbe08fc54
...
[ 239.778574] [<80739740>] (get_rps_cpu) from [<8073cb10>] (netif_receive_skb_internal+0x8c/0xac)
[ 239.786722] [<8073cb10>] (netif_receive_skb_internal) from [<8073d578>] (napi_gro_receive+0x48/0xc4)
[ 239.795267] [<8073d578>] (napi_gro_receive) from [<c7b83e8c>] (ieee80211_mark_rx_ba_filtered_frames+0xbcc/0x12d4 [mac80211])
[ 239.804776] [<c7b83e8c>] (ieee80211_mark_rx_ba_filtered_frames [mac80211]) from [<c7b84d4c>] (ieee80211_rx_napi+0x7b8/0x8c8 [mac8
0211])
[ 239.815857] [<c7b84d4c>] (ieee80211_rx_napi [mac80211]) from [<c7f63d7c>] (ath11k_dp_process_rx+0x7bc/0x8c8 [ath11k])
[ 239.827757] [<c7f63d7c>] (ath11k_dp_process_rx [ath11k]) from [<c7f5b6c4>] (ath11k_dp_service_srng+0x2c0/0x2e0 [ath11k])
[ 239.838484] [<c7f5b6c4>] (ath11k_dp_service_srng [ath11k]) from [<7f55b7dc>] (ath11k_ahb_ext_grp_napi_poll+0x20/0x84 [ath11k_ahb]
)
[ 239.849419] [<7f55b7dc>] (ath11k_ahb_ext_grp_napi_poll [ath11k_ahb]) from [<8073ce1c>] (net_rx_action+0xe0/0x28c)
[ 239.860945] [<8073ce1c>] (net_rx_action) from [<80324868>] (__do_softirq+0xe4/0x228)
[ 239.871269] [<80324868>] (__do_softirq) from [<80324c48>] (irq_exit+0x98/0x108)
[ 239.879080] [<80324c48>] (irq_exit) from [<8035c59c>] (__handle_domain_irq+0x90/0xb4)
[ 239.886114] [<8035c59c>] (__handle_domain_irq) from [<8030137c>] (gic_handle_irq+0x50/0x94)
[ 239.894100] [<8030137c>] (gic_handle_irq) from [<803024c0>] (__irq_svc+0x40/0x74)
Signed-off-by: Seevalamuthu Mariappan <seevalam@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1616163532-3881-1-git-send-email-seevalam@codeaurora.org
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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We've got a report about Acer Aspire E1 (PCI SSID 1025:0840) that
loses the speaker output after resume. With the comparison of COEF
dumps, it was identified that the COEF 0x0d bits 0x6000 corresponds to
the speaker amp.
This patch adds the specific quirk for the device to restore the COEF
bits at the codec (re-)initialization.
BugLink: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1183869
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210407095730.12560-1-tiwai@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
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https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/agd5f/linux into drm-fixes
amd-drm-fixes-5.12-2021-04-08:
amdgpu:
- DCN3 fix
- Fix CAC setting regression for TOPAZ
- Fix ttm regression
radeon:
- Fix ttm regression
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
From: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20210408045512.3879-1-alexander.deucher@amd.com
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We need to enable MC CAC for mclk switching to work.
Fixes: d765129a719f ("drm/amd/pm: correct sclk/mclk dpm enablement")
Bug: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/amd/-/issues/1561
Tested-by: Konstantin Kharlamov <Hi-Angel@yandex.ru>
Reviewed-by: Evan Quan <evan.quan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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|
ttm->num_pages is uint32. Hit overflow when << PAGE_SHIFT directly
Fixes: 230c079fdcf4 ("drm/ttm: make num_pages uint32_t")
Signed-off-by: xinhui pan <xinhui.pan@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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|
ttm->num_pages is uint32. Hit overflow when << PAGE_SHIFT directly
Fixes: 230c079fdcf4 ("drm/ttm: make num_pages uint32_t")
Signed-off-by: xinhui pan <xinhui.pan@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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|
There are lots of ways r/w request may continue its path after getting
REQ_F_REISSUE, it's not necessarily io-wq and can be, e.g. apoll,
and submitted via io_async_task_func() -> __io_req_task_submit()
Clear the flag right after getting it, so the next attempt is well
prepared regardless how the request will be executed.
Fixes: 230d50d448ac ("io_uring: move reissue into regular IO path")
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/11dcead939343f4e27cab0074d34afcab771bfa4.1617842918.git.asml.silence@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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|
Commit 653a5efb849a ("cifs: update super_operations to show_devname")
introduced the display of devname for cifs mounts. However, when mounting
a share which has a whitespace in the name, that exact share name is also
displayed in mountinfo. Make sure that all whitespace is escaped.
Signed-off-by: Maciek Borzecki <maciek.borzecki@gmail.com>
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.11+
Reviewed-by: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
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struct cifs_readdata is declared twice. One is declared
at 208th line.
And struct cifs_readdata is defined blew.
The declaration here is not needed. Remove the duplicate.
Signed-off-by: Wan Jiabing <wanjiabing@vivo.com>
Reviewed-by: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
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On cifs_reconnect, make sure that DNS resolution happens again.
It could be the cause of connection to go dead in the first place.
This also contains the fix for a build issue identified by Intel bot.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@cjr.nz>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.11+
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
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When the cache_type for the SCSI device is changed, the SCSI layer issues a
MODE_SELECT command. The caching mode details are communicated via a
request buffer associated with the SCSI command with data direction set as
DMA_TO_DEVICE (scsi_mode_select()). When this command reaches the libata
layer, as a part of generic initial setup, libata layer sets up the
scatterlist for the command using the SCSI command (ata_scsi_qc_new()).
This command is then translated by the libata layer into
ATA_CMD_SET_FEATURES (ata_scsi_mode_select_xlat()). The libata layer treats
this as a non-data command (ata_mselect_caching()), since it only needs an
ATA taskfile to pass the caching on/off information to the device. It does
not need the scatterlist that has been setup, so it does not perform
dma_map_sg() on the scatterlist (ata_qc_issue()). Unfortunately, when this
command reaches the libsas layer (sas_ata_qc_issue()), libsas layer sees it
as a non-data command with a scatterlist. It cannot extract the correct DMA
length since the scatterlist has not been mapped with dma_map_sg() for a
DMA operation. When this partially constructed SAS task reaches pm80xx
LLDD, it results in the following warning:
"pm80xx_chip_sata_req 6058: The sg list address
start_addr=0x0000000000000000 data_len=0x0end_addr_high=0xffffffff
end_addr_low=0xffffffff has crossed 4G boundary"
Update libsas to handle ATA non-data commands separately so num_scatter and
total_xfer_len remain 0.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210318225632.2481291-1-jollys@google.com
Fixes: 53de092f47ff ("scsi: libsas: Set data_dir as DMA_NONE if libata marks qc as NODATA")
Tested-by: Luo Jiaxing <luojiaxing@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jolly Shah <jollys@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
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In commit 9e67600ed6b8 ("scsi: iscsi: Fix race condition between login and
sync thread") I missed that libiscsi was now setting the iSCSI class state,
and that patch ended up resetting the state during conn stoppage and using
the wrong state value during ep_disconnect. This patch moves the setting of
the class state to the class module and then fixes the two issues above.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210406171746.5016-1-michael.christie@oracle.com
Fixes: 9e67600ed6b8 ("scsi: iscsi: Fix race condition between login and sync thread")
Cc: Gulam Mohamed <gulam.mohamed@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Christie <michael.christie@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
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Since commit 1b8b31a2e612 ("selinux: convert policy read-write lock to
RCU"), there is a small window during policy load where the new policy
pointer has already been installed, but some threads may still be
holding the old policy pointer in their read-side RCU critical sections.
This means that there may be conflicting attempts to add a new SID entry
to both tables via sidtab_context_to_sid().
See also (and the rest of the thread):
https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/CAFqZXNvfux46_f8gnvVvRYMKoes24nwm2n3sPbMjrB8vKTW00g@mail.gmail.com/
Fix this by installing the new policy pointer under the old sidtab's
spinlock along with marking the old sidtab as "frozen". Then, if an
attempt to add new entry to a "frozen" sidtab is detected, make
sidtab_context_to_sid() return -ESTALE to indicate that a new policy
has been installed and that the caller will have to abort the policy
transaction and try again after re-taking the policy pointer (which is
guaranteed to be a newer policy). This requires adding a retry-on-ESTALE
logic to all callers of sidtab_context_to_sid(), but fortunately these
are easy to determine and aren't that many.
This seems to be the simplest solution for this problem, even if it
looks somewhat ugly. Note that other places in the kernel (e.g.
do_mknodat() in fs/namei.c) use similar stale-retry patterns, so I think
it's reasonable.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 1b8b31a2e612 ("selinux: convert policy read-write lock to RCU")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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As INI QP does not require a recv_cq, avoid the following null pointer
dereference by checking if the qp_type is not INI before trying to extract
the recv_cq.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000e0
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 54250 Comm: mpitests-IMB-MP Not tainted 5.12.0-rc5 #1
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R320/0KM5PX, BIOS 2.7.0 08/19/2019
RIP: 0010:qedr_create_qp+0x378/0x820 [qedr]
Code: 02 00 00 50 e8 29 d4 a9 d1 48 83 c4 18 e9 65 fe ff ff 48 8b 53 10 48 8b 43 18 44 8b 82 e0 00 00 00 45 85 c0 0f 84 10 74 00 00 <8b> b8 e0 00 00 00 85 ff 0f 85 50 fd ff ff e9 fd 73 00 00 48 8d bd
RSP: 0018:ffff9c8f056f7a70 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9c8f056f7b58 RCX: 0000000000000009
RDX: ffff8c41a9744c00 RSI: ffff9c8f056f7b58 RDI: ffff8c41c0dfa280
RBP: ffff8c41c0dfa280 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8c41e06fc608 R12: ffff8c4194052000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8c4191546070 R15: ffff8c41c0dfa280
FS: 00007f78b2787b80(0000) GS:ffff8c43a3200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000000000e0 CR3: 00000001011d6002 CR4: 00000000001706f0
Call Trace:
ib_uverbs_handler_UVERBS_METHOD_QP_CREATE+0x4e4/0xb90 [ib_uverbs]
? ib_uverbs_cq_event_handler+0x30/0x30 [ib_uverbs]
ib_uverbs_run_method+0x6f6/0x7a0 [ib_uverbs]
? ib_uverbs_handler_UVERBS_METHOD_QP_DESTROY+0x70/0x70 [ib_uverbs]
? __cond_resched+0x15/0x30
? __kmalloc+0x5a/0x440
ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0x195/0x360 [ib_uverbs]
? xa_load+0x6e/0x90
? cred_has_capability+0x7c/0x130
? avc_has_extended_perms+0x17f/0x440
? vma_link+0xae/0xb0
? vma_set_page_prot+0x2a/0x60
? mmap_region+0x298/0x6c0
? do_mmap+0x373/0x520
? selinux_file_ioctl+0x17f/0x220
ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xa7/0x110 [ib_uverbs]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x84/0xc0
do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7f78b120262b
Fixes: 06e8d1df46ed ("RDMA/qedr: Add support for user mode XRC-SRQ's")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210404125501.154789-1-kamalheib1@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kamal Heib <kamalheib1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
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intel_dsm_platform_mux_info() tries to parse the ACPI package data
from _DSM for the debug information, but it assumes the fixed format
without checking what values are stored in the elements actually.
When an unexpected value is returned from BIOS, it may lead to GPF or
NULL dereference, as reported recently.
Add the checks of the contents in the returned values and skip the
values for invalid cases.
v1->v2: Check the info contents before dereferencing, too
BugLink: http://bugzilla.opensuse.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1184074
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20210402082317.871-1-tiwai@suse.de
(cherry picked from commit 337d7a1621c7f02af867229990ac67c97da1b53a)
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
|
