Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|
SEV and SEV-ES guests each have dedicated ASID ranges. Update the ASID
allocation routine to return an ASID in the respective range.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <d7aed505e31e3954268b2015bb60a1486269c780.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
The SVM host save area is used to restore some host state on VMEXIT of an
SEV-ES guest. After allocating the save area, clear it and add the
encryption mask to the SVM host save area physical address that is
programmed into the VM_HSAVE_PA MSR.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <b77aa28af6d7f1a0cb545959e08d6dc75e0c3cba.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
The GHCB specification defines how NMIs are to be handled for an SEV-ES
guest. To detect the completion of an NMI the hypervisor must not
intercept the IRET instruction (because a #VC while running the NMI will
issue an IRET) and, instead, must receive an NMI Complete exit event from
the guest.
Update the KVM support for detecting the completion of NMIs in the guest
to follow the GHCB specification. When an SEV-ES guest is active, the
IRET instruction will no longer be intercepted. Now, when the NMI Complete
exit event is received, the iret_interception() function will be called
to simulate the completion of the NMI.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <5ea3dd69b8d4396cefdc9048ebc1ab7caa70a847.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
The guest FPU state is automatically restored on VMRUN and saved on VMEXIT
by the hardware, so there is no reason to do this in KVM. Eliminate the
allocation of the guest_fpu save area and key off that to skip operations
related to the guest FPU state.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <173e429b4d0d962c6a443c4553ffdaf31b7665a4.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
SEV-ES guests do not currently support SMM. Update the has_emulated_msr()
kvm_x86_ops function to take a struct kvm parameter so that the capability
can be reported at a VM level.
Since this op is also called during KVM initialization and before a struct
kvm instance is available, comments will be added to each implementation
of has_emulated_msr() to indicate the kvm parameter can be null.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <75de5138e33b945d2fb17f81ae507bda381808e3.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Since many of the registers used by the SEV-ES are encrypted and cannot
be read or written, adjust the __get_sregs() / __set_sregs() to take into
account whether the VMSA/guest state is encrypted.
For __get_sregs(), return the actual value that is in use by the guest
for all registers being tracked using the write trap support.
For __set_sregs(), skip setting of all guest registers values.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <23051868db76400a9b07a2020525483a1e62dbcf.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
For SEV-ES guests, the interception of control register write access
is not recommended. Control register interception occurs prior to the
control register being modified and the hypervisor is unable to modify
the control register itself because the register is located in the
encrypted register state.
SEV-ES guests introduce new control register write traps. These traps
provide intercept support of a control register write after the control
register has been modified. The new control register value is provided in
the VMCB EXITINFO1 field, allowing the hypervisor to track the setting
of the guest control registers.
Add support to track the value of the guest CR8 register using the control
register write trap so that the hypervisor understands the guest operating
mode.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <5a01033f4c8b3106ca9374b7cadf8e33da852df1.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
For SEV-ES guests, the interception of control register write access
is not recommended. Control register interception occurs prior to the
control register being modified and the hypervisor is unable to modify
the control register itself because the register is located in the
encrypted register state.
SEV-ES guests introduce new control register write traps. These traps
provide intercept support of a control register write after the control
register has been modified. The new control register value is provided in
the VMCB EXITINFO1 field, allowing the hypervisor to track the setting
of the guest control registers.
Add support to track the value of the guest CR4 register using the control
register write trap so that the hypervisor understands the guest operating
mode.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <c3880bf2db8693aa26f648528fbc6e967ab46e25.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
For SEV-ES guests, the interception of control register write access
is not recommended. Control register interception occurs prior to the
control register being modified and the hypervisor is unable to modify
the control register itself because the register is located in the
encrypted register state.
SEV-ES support introduces new control register write traps. These traps
provide intercept support of a control register write after the control
register has been modified. The new control register value is provided in
the VMCB EXITINFO1 field, allowing the hypervisor to track the setting
of the guest control registers.
Add support to track the value of the guest CR0 register using the control
register write trap so that the hypervisor understands the guest operating
mode.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <182c9baf99df7e40ad9617ff90b84542705ef0d7.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
For SEV-ES guests, the interception of EFER write access is not
recommended. EFER interception occurs prior to EFER being modified and
the hypervisor is unable to modify EFER itself because the register is
located in the encrypted register state.
SEV-ES support introduces a new EFER write trap. This trap provides
intercept support of an EFER write after it has been modified. The new
EFER value is provided in the VMCB EXITINFO1 field, allowing the
hypervisor to track the setting of the guest EFER.
Add support to track the value of the guest EFER value using the EFER
write trap so that the hypervisor understands the guest operating mode.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <8993149352a3a87cd0625b3b61bfd31ab28977e1.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
For an SEV-ES guest, string-based port IO is performed to a shared
(un-encrypted) page so that both the hypervisor and guest can read or
write to it and each see the contents.
For string-based port IO operations, invoke SEV-ES specific routines that
can complete the operation using common KVM port IO support.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <9d61daf0ffda496703717218f415cdc8fd487100.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
For an SEV-ES guest, MMIO is performed to a shared (un-encrypted) page
so that both the hypervisor and guest can read or write to it and each
see the contents.
The GHCB specification provides software-defined VMGEXIT exit codes to
indicate a request for an MMIO read or an MMIO write. Add support to
recognize the MMIO requests and invoke SEV-ES specific routines that
can complete the MMIO operation. These routines use common KVM support
to complete the MMIO operation.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <af8de55127d5bcc3253d9b6084a0144c12307d4d.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Add trace events for entry to and exit from VMGEXIT MSR protocol
processing. The vCPU will be common for the trace events. The MSR
protocol processing is guided by the GHCB GPA in the VMCB, so the GHCB
GPA will represent the input and output values for the entry and exit
events, respectively. Additionally, the exit event will contain the
return code for the event.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <c5b3b440c3e0db43ff2fc02813faa94fa54896b0.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Add trace events for entry to and exit from VMGEXIT processing. The vCPU
id and the exit reason will be common for the trace events. The exit info
fields will represent the input and output values for the entry and exit
events, respectively.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <25357dca49a38372e8f483753fb0c1c2a70a6898.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
The GHCB specification defines a GHCB MSR protocol using the lower
12-bits of the GHCB MSR (in the hypervisor this corresponds to the
GHCB GPA field in the VMCB).
Function 0x100 is a request for termination of the guest. The guest has
encountered some situation for which it has requested to be terminated.
The GHCB MSR value contains the reason for the request.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <f3a1f7850c75b6ea4101e15bbb4a3af1a203f1dc.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
The GHCB specification defines a GHCB MSR protocol using the lower
12-bits of the GHCB MSR (in the hypervisor this corresponds to the
GHCB GPA field in the VMCB).
Function 0x004 is a request for CPUID information. Only a single CPUID
result register can be sent per invocation, so the protocol defines the
register that is requested. The GHCB MSR value is set to the CPUID
register value as per the specification via the VMCB GHCB GPA field.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <fd7ee347d3936e484c06e9001e340bf6387092cd.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
The GHCB specification defines a GHCB MSR protocol using the lower
12-bits of the GHCB MSR (in the hypervisor this corresponds to the
GHCB GPA field in the VMCB).
Function 0x002 is a request to set the GHCB MSR value to the SEV INFO as
per the specification via the VMCB GHCB GPA field.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <c23c163a505290a0d1b9efc4659b838c8c902cbc.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
SEV-ES adds a new VMEXIT reason code, VMGEXIT. Initial support for a
VMGEXIT includes mapping the GHCB based on the guest GPA, which is
obtained from a new VMCB field, and then validating the required inputs
for the VMGEXIT exit reason.
Since many of the VMGEXIT exit reasons correspond to existing VMEXIT
reasons, the information from the GHCB is copied into the VMCB control
exit code areas and KVM register areas. The standard exit handlers are
invoked, similar to standard VMEXIT processing. Before restarting the
vCPU, the GHCB is updated with any registers that have been updated by
the hypervisor.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <c6a4ed4294a369bd75c44d03bd7ce0f0c3840e50.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
This is a pre-patch to consolidate some exit handling code into callable
functions. Follow-on patches for SEV-ES exit handling will then be able
to use them from the sev.c file.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <5b8b0ffca8137f3e1e257f83df9f5c881c8a96a3.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
When a SHUTDOWN VMEXIT is encountered, normally the VMCB is re-initialized
so that the guest can be re-launched. But when a guest is running as an
SEV-ES guest, the VMSA cannot be re-initialized because it has been
encrypted. For now, just return -EINVAL to prevent a possible attempt at
a guest reset.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <aa6506000f6f3a574de8dbcdab0707df844cb00c.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
When a guest is running as an SEV-ES guest, it is not possible to emulate
instructions. Add support to prevent instruction emulation.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <f6355ea3024fda0a3eb5eb99c6b62dca10d792bd.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Since the guest register state of an SEV-ES guest is encrypted, debugging
is not supported. Update the code to prevent guest debugging when the
guest has protected state.
Additionally, an SEV-ES guest must only and always intercept DR7 reads and
writes. Update set_dr_intercepts() and clr_dr_intercepts() to account for
this.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <8db966fa2f9803d6454ce773863025d0e2e7f3cc.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
When a guest is running under SEV-ES, the hypervisor cannot access the
guest register state. There are numerous places in the KVM code where
certain registers are accessed that are not allowed to be accessed (e.g.
RIP, CR0, etc). Add checks to prevent register accesses and add intercept
update support at various points within the KVM code.
Also, when handling a VMGEXIT, exceptions are passed back through the
GHCB. Since the RDMSR/WRMSR intercepts (may) inject a #GP on error,
update the SVM intercepts to handle this for SEV-ES guests.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
[Redo MSR part using the .complete_emulated_msr callback. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
This will be used by SEV-ES to inject MSR failure via the GHCB.
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Simplify the four functions that handle {kernel,user} {rd,wr}msr, there
is still some repetition between the two instances of rdmsr but the
whole business of calling kvm_inject_gp and kvm_skip_emulated_instruction
can be unified nicely.
Because complete_emulated_wrmsr now becomes essentially a call to
kvm_complete_insn_gp, remove complete_emulated_msr.
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
There is no need to inject a #GP from kvm_mtrr_set_msr, kvm_emulate_wrmsr will
handle it.
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
It can take multiple iterations until all components for an attached DSI
bridge are up leading to several:
[ 3.796425] mxsfb 30320000.lcd-controller: Cannot connect bridge: -517
[ 3.816952] mxsfb 30320000.lcd-controller: [drm:mxsfb_probe [mxsfb]] *ERROR* failed to attach bridge: -517
Silence this by checking for -EPROBE_DEFER and using dev_err_probe() so
we set a deferred reason in case a dependency fails to probe (which
quickly happens on small config/DT changes due to the rather long probe
chain which can include bridges, phys, panels, backights, leds, etc.).
This also removes the only DRM_DEV_ERROR() usage, the rest of the driver
uses dev_err().
Signed-off-by: Guido Günther <agx@sigxcpu.org>
Fixes: c42001e357f7 ("drm: mxsfb: Use drm_panel_bridge")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/d5761eb871adde5464ba112b89d966568bc2ff6c.1608020391.git.agx@sigxcpu.org
|
|
I wanted to look up something and noticed the hyperlink doesn't work.
While fixing that also noticed a trivial kerneldoc comment typo in the
same section, fix that too.
Reviewed-by: Michael J. Ruhl <michael.j.ruhl@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Ser <contact@emersion.fr>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20201204200242.2671481-1-daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/maz/arm-platforms into irq/core
Pull irqchip updates for 5.11 from Marc Zyngier:
- Preliminary support for managed interrupts on platform devices
- Correctly identify allocation of MSIs proxyied by another device
- Remove the fasteoi IPI flow which has been proved useless
- Generalise the Ocelot support to new SoCs
- Improve GICv4.1 vcpu entry, matching the corresponding KVM optimisation
- Work around spurious interrupts on Qualcomm PDC
- Random fixes and cleanups
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201212135626.1479884-1-maz@kernel.org
|
|
git://anongit.freedesktop.org/drm/drm-misc into drm-next
drm-misc-next for 5.11:
UAPI Changes:
Cross-subsystem Changes:
* char/agp: Disable frontend without CONFIG_DRM_LEGACY
* mm: Fix fput in mmap error path; Introduce vma_set_file() to change
vma->vm_file
Core Changes:
* dma-buf: Use sgtables in system heap; Move heap helpers to CMA-heap code;
Skip sync for unmapped buffers; Alloc higher order pages is available;
Respect num_fences when initializing shared fence list
* doc: Improvements around DRM modes and SCALING_FILTER
* Pass full state to connector atomic functions + callee updates
* Cleanups
* shmem: Map pages with caching by default; Cleanups
* ttm: Fix DMA32 for global page pool
* fbdev: Cleanups
* fb-helper: Update framebuffer after userspace writes; Unmap console buffer
during shutdown; Rework damage handling of shadow framebuffer
Driver Changes:
* amdgpu: Multi-hop fixes, Clenaups
* imx: Fix rotation for Vivante tiled formats; Support nearest-neighour
skaling; Cleanups
* mcde: Fix RGB formats; Support DPI output; Cleanups
* meson: HDMI clock fixes
* panel: Add driver and bindings for Innolux N125HCE-GN1
* panel/s6e63m0: More backlight levels; Fix init; Cleanups
* via: Clenunps
* virtio: Use fence ID for handling fences; Cleanups
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
From: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20201127083055.GA29139@linux-uq9g
|
|
When building tinyconfig on parisc the following warnign shows up:
/tmp/arch/parisc/kernel/pci-dma.c:338:12: warning: 'proc_pcxl_dma_show' defined but not used [-Wunused-function]
static int proc_pcxl_dma_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Mark the function as __maybe_unused to fix the warning.
Signed-off-by: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
|
|
The || condition in hdev->fd_active_type != HCLGE_FD_ARFS_ACTIVE ||
hdev->fd_active_type != HCLGE_FD_RULE_NONE will always be true because
hdev->fd_active_type cannot be equal to two different values at the same
time. The expression is always true which is not correct. Fix this by
replacing || with && to correct the logic in the expression.
Addresses-Coverity: ("Constant expression result")
Fixes: 0205ec041ec6 ("net: hns3: add support for hw tc offload of tc flower")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Huazhong Tan <tanhuazhong@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201215000033.85383-1-colin.king@canonical.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
proc_fs was used, in af_packet, without a surrounding #ifdef,
although there is no hard dependency on proc_fs.
That caused the initialization of the af_packet module to fail
when CONFIG_PROC_FS=n.
Specifically, proc_create_net() was used in af_packet.c,
and when it fails, packet_net_init() returns -ENOMEM.
It will always fail when the kernel is compiled without proc_fs,
because, proc_create_net() for example always returns NULL.
The calling order that starts in af_packet.c is as follows:
packet_init()
register_pernet_subsys()
register_pernet_operations()
__register_pernet_operations()
ops_init()
ops->init() (packet_net_ops.init=packet_net_init())
proc_create_net()
It worked in the past because register_pernet_subsys()'s return value
wasn't checked before this Commit 36096f2f4fa0 ("packet: Fix error path in
packet_init.").
It always returned an error, but was not checked before, so everything
was working even when CONFIG_PROC_FS=n.
The fix here is simply to add the necessary #ifdef.
This also fixes a similar error in tls_proc.c, that was found by Jakub
Kicinski.
Fixes: d26b698dd3cd ("net/tls: add skeleton of MIB statistics")
Fixes: 36096f2f4fa0 ("packet: Fix error path in packet_init")
Signed-off-by: Yonatan Linik <yonatanlinik@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
Replace a comma between expression statements by a semicolon.
Signed-off-by: Zheng Yongjun <zhengyongjun3@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201214134314.4618-1-zhengyongjun3@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
Andra Paraschiv says:
====================
vsock: Add flags field in the vsock address
vsock enables communication between virtual machines and the host they are
running on. Nested VMs can be setup to use vsock channels, as the multi
transport support has been available in the mainline since the v5.5 Linux
kernel has been released.
Implicitly, if no host->guest vsock transport is loaded, all the vsock packets
are forwarded to the host. This behavior can be used to setup communication
channels between sibling VMs that are running on the same host. One example can
be the vsock channels that can be established within AWS Nitro Enclaves
(see Documentation/virt/ne_overview.rst).
To be able to explicitly mark a connection as being used for a certain use case,
add a flags field in the vsock address data structure. The value of the flags
field is taken into consideration when the vsock transport is assigned. This
way can distinguish between different use cases, such as nested VMs / local
communication and sibling VMs.
The flags field can be set in the user space application connect logic. On the
listen path, the field can be set in the kernel space logic.
====================
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201214161122.37717-1-andraprs@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
The vsock flags field can be set in the connect path (user space app)
and the (listen) receive path (kernel space logic).
When the vsock transport is assigned, the remote CID is used to
distinguish between types of connection.
Use the vsock flags value (in addition to the CID) from the remote
address to decide which vsock transport to assign. For the sibling VMs
use case, all the vsock packets need to be forwarded to the host, so
always assign the guest->host transport if the VMADDR_FLAG_TO_HOST flag
is set. For the other use cases, the vsock transport assignment logic is
not changed.
Changelog
v3 -> v4
* Update the "remote_flags" local variable type to reflect the change of
the "svm_flags" field to be 1 byte in size.
v2 -> v3
* Update bitwise check logic to not compare result to the flag value.
v1 -> v2
* Use bitwise operator to check the vsock flag.
* Use the updated "VMADDR_FLAG_TO_HOST" flag naming.
* Merge the checks for the g2h transport assignment in one "if" block.
Signed-off-by: Andra Paraschiv <andraprs@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
The vsock flags can be set during the connect() setup logic, when
initializing the vsock address data structure variable. Then the vsock
transport is assigned, also considering this flags field.
The vsock transport is also assigned on the (listen) receive path. The
flags field needs to be set considering the use case.
Set the value of the vsock flags of the remote address to the one
targeted for packets forwarding to the host, if the following conditions
are met:
* The source CID of the packet is higher than VMADDR_CID_HOST.
* The destination CID of the packet is higher than VMADDR_CID_HOST.
Changelog
v3 -> v4
* No changes.
v2 -> v3
* No changes.
v1 -> v2
* Set the vsock flag on the receive path in the vsock transport
assignment logic.
* Use bitwise operator for the vsock flag setup.
* Use the updated "VMADDR_FLAG_TO_HOST" flag naming.
Signed-off-by: Andra Paraschiv <andraprs@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
Check if the provided flags value from the vsock address data structure
includes the supported flags in the corresponding kernel version.
The first byte of the "svm_zero" field is used as "svm_flags", so add
the flags check instead.
Changelog
v3 -> v4
* New patch in v4.
Signed-off-by: Andra Paraschiv <andraprs@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
Add VMADDR_FLAG_TO_HOST vsock flag that is used to setup a vsock
connection where all the packets are forwarded to the host.
Then, using this type of vsock channel, vsock communication between
sibling VMs can be built on top of it.
Changelog
v3 -> v4
* Update the "VMADDR_FLAG_TO_HOST" value, as the size of the field has
been updated to 1 byte.
v2 -> v3
* Update comments to mention when the flag is set in the connect and
listen paths.
v1 -> v2
* New patch in v2, it was split from the first patch in the series.
* Remove the default value for the vsock flags field.
* Update the naming for the vsock flag to "VMADDR_FLAG_TO_HOST".
Signed-off-by: Andra Paraschiv <andraprs@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
vsock enables communication between virtual machines and the host they
are running on. With the multi transport support (guest->host and
host->guest), nested VMs can also use vsock channels for communication.
In addition to this, by default, all the vsock packets are forwarded to
the host, if no host->guest transport is loaded. This behavior can be
implicitly used for enabling vsock communication between sibling VMs.
Add a flags field in the vsock address data structure that can be used
to explicitly mark the vsock connection as being targeted for a certain
type of communication. This way, can distinguish between different use
cases such as nested VMs and sibling VMs.
This field can be set when initializing the vsock address variable used
for the connect() call.
Changelog
v3 -> v4
* Update the size of "svm_flags" field to be 1 byte instead of 2 bytes.
v2 -> v3
* Add "svm_flags" as a new field, not reusing "svm_reserved1".
v1 -> v2
* Update the field name to "svm_flags".
* Split the current patch in 2 patches.
Signed-off-by: Andra Paraschiv <andraprs@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
With NETIF_F_HW_TLS_TX packets are encrypted in HW. This cannot be
logically done when HW_CSUM offload is off.
Fixes: 2342a8512a1e ("net: Add TLS TX offload features")
Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Pismenny <borisp@nvidia.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201213143929.26253-1-tariqt@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
There are cases where a fastopen SYN may trigger either a ICMP_TOOBIG
message in the case of IPv6 or a fragmentation request in the case of
IPv4. This results in the socket stalling for a second or more as it does
not respond to the message by retransmitting the SYN frame.
Normally a SYN frame should not be able to trigger a ICMP_TOOBIG or
ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED however in the case of fastopen we can have a frame that
makes use of the entire MSS. In the case of fastopen it does, and an
additional complication is that the retransmit queue doesn't contain the
original frames. As a result when tcp_simple_retransmit is called and
walks the list of frames in the queue it may not mark the frames as lost
because both the SYN and the data packet each individually are smaller than
the MSS size after the adjustment. This results in the socket being stalled
until the retransmit timer kicks in and forces the SYN frame out again
without the data attached.
In order to resolve this we can reduce the MSS the packets are compared
to in tcp_simple_retransmit to -1 for cases where we are still in the
TCP_SYN_SENT state for a fastopen socket. Doing this we will mark all of
the packets related to the fastopen SYN as lost.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Duyck <alexanderduyck@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/160780498125.3272.15437756269539236825.stgit@localhost.localdomain
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
context
Currently ocelot_set_rx_mode calls ocelot_mact_learn directly, which has
a very nice ocelot_mact_wait_for_completion at the end. Introduced in
commit 639c1b2625af ("net: mscc: ocelot: Register poll timeout should be
wall time not attempts"), this function uses readx_poll_timeout which
triggers a lot of lockdep warnings and is also dangerous to use from
atomic context, potentially leading to lockups and panics.
Steen Hegelund added a poll timeout of 100 ms for checking the MAC
table, a duration which is clearly absurd to poll in atomic context.
So we need to defer the MAC table access to process context, which we do
via a dynamically allocated workqueue which contains all there is to
know about the MAC table operation it has to do.
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201212191612.222019-1-vladimir.oltean@nxp.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
add the code to release the nfc firmware when the firmware image size is
wrong.
Fixes: c04c674fadeb ("nfc: s3fwrn5: Add driver for Samsung S3FWRN5 NFC Chip")
Signed-off-by: Bongsu Jeon <bongsu.jeon@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201213095850.28169-1-bongsu.jeon@samsung.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
This code is copying strings in 64 bit quantities, the device
returns them in big endian. As long as we store in big endian
IOW endian on both sides matches, we're good, so swap to_be64,
not from be64.
This fixes ~60 sparse warnings.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201212234426.177015-1-kuba@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mkl/linux-can-next
Marc Kleine-Budde says:
====================
pull-request: can-next 2020-12-14
All 7 patches are by me and target the m_can driver. First there are 4 cleanup
patches (fix link to doc, fix coding style, uniform variable name usage, mark
function as static). Then the driver is converted to
pm_runtime_resume_and_get(). The next patch lets the m_can class driver
allocate the driver's private data, to get rid of one level of indirection. And
the last patch consistently uses struct m_can_classdev as drvdata over all
binding drivers.
* tag 'linux-can-next-for-5.11-20201214' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mkl/linux-can-next:
can: m_can: use struct m_can_classdev as drvdata
can: m_can: let m_can_class_allocate_dev() allocate driver specific private data
can: m_can: m_can_clk_start(): make use of pm_runtime_resume_and_get()
can: m_can: m_can_config_endisable(): mark as static
can: m_can: use cdev as name for struct m_can_classdev uniformly
can: m_can: convert indention to kernel coding style
can: m_can: update link to M_CAN user manual
====================
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201214133145.442472-1-mkl@pengutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
Ido Schimmel says:
====================
mlxsw: Introduce initial XM router support
This patch set implements initial eXtended Mezzanine (XM) router
support.
The XM is an external device connected to the Spectrum-{2,3} ASICs using
dedicated Ethernet ports. Its purpose is to increase the number of
routes that can be offloaded to hardware. This is achieved by having the
ASIC act as a cache that refers cache misses to the XM where the FIB is
stored and LPM lookup is performed.
Future patch sets will add more sophisticated cache flushing and
selftests that utilize cache counters on the ASIC, which we plan to
expose via devlink-metric [1].
Patch set overview:
Patches #1-#2 add registers to insert/remove routes to/from the XM and
to enable/disable it. Patch #3 utilizes these registers in order to
implement XM-specific router low-level operations.
Patches #4-#5 query from firmware the availability of the XM and the
local ports that are used to connect the ASIC to the XM, so that netdevs
will not be created for them.
Patches #6-#8 initialize the XM by configuring its cache parameters.
Patch #9-#10 implement cache management, so that LPM lookup will be
correctly cached in the ASIC.
Patches #11-#13 implement cache flushing, so that routes
insertions/removals to/from the XM will flush the affected entries in
the cache.
Patch #14 configures the ASIC to allocate half of its memory for the
cache, so that room will be left for other entries (e.g., FDBs,
neighbours).
Patch #15 starts using the XM for IPv4 route offload, when available.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20200817125059.193242-1-idosch@idosch.org/
====================
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201214113041.2789043-1-idosch@idosch.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
In case the eXtended mezzanine is present on the system, use it for IPv4
router offload.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
Set a profile option to instruct FW to use 1/2 of KVH for XLT cache, not
the whole one.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
Upon route insertion and removal, it is needed to flush possibly cached
entries from the XM cache. Extend XM op context to carry information
needed for the flush. Implement the flush in delayed work since for HW
design reasons there is a need to wait 50usec before the flush can be
done. If during this time comes the same flush request, consolidate it
to the first one. Implement this queued flushes by a hashtable.
v2:
* Fix GENMASK() high bit
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|