| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|---|
|
SECTION_SIZE and SECTION_MASK macros are not getting used anymore. But
they do conflict with existing definitions on arm64 platform causing
following warning during build. Lets drop these unused macros.
mm/memremap.c:16: warning: "SECTION_MASK" redefined
#define SECTION_MASK ~((1UL << PA_SECTION_SHIFT) - 1)
arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-hwdef.h:79: note: this is the location of the previous definition
#define SECTION_MASK (~(SECTION_SIZE-1))
mm/memremap.c:17: warning: "SECTION_SIZE" redefined
#define SECTION_SIZE (1UL << PA_SECTION_SHIFT)
arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-hwdef.h:78: note: this is the location of the previous definition
#define SECTION_SIZE (_AC(1, UL) << SECTION_SHIFT)
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1569312010-31313-1-git-send-email-anshuman.khandual@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Cc: Logan Gunthorpe <logang@deltatee.com>
Cc: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Calling 'panic()' on a kernel with CONFIG_PREEMPT=y can leave the
calling CPU in an infinite loop, but with interrupts and preemption
enabled. From this state, userspace can continue to be scheduled,
despite the system being "dead" as far as the kernel is concerned.
This is easily reproducible on arm64 when booting with "nosmp" on the
command line; a couple of shell scripts print out a periodic "Ping"
message whilst another triggers a crash by writing to
/proc/sysrq-trigger:
| sysrq: Trigger a crash
| Kernel panic - not syncing: sysrq triggered crash
| CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: init Not tainted 5.2.15 #1
| Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
| Call trace:
| dump_backtrace+0x0/0x148
| show_stack+0x14/0x20
| dump_stack+0xa0/0xc4
| panic+0x140/0x32c
| sysrq_handle_reboot+0x0/0x20
| __handle_sysrq+0x124/0x190
| write_sysrq_trigger+0x64/0x88
| proc_reg_write+0x60/0xa8
| __vfs_write+0x18/0x40
| vfs_write+0xa4/0x1b8
| ksys_write+0x64/0xf0
| __arm64_sys_write+0x14/0x20
| el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xb0/0x168
| el0_svc_handler+0x28/0x78
| el0_svc+0x8/0xc
| Kernel Offset: disabled
| CPU features: 0x0002,24002004
| Memory Limit: none
| ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: sysrq triggered crash ]---
| Ping 2!
| Ping 1!
| Ping 1!
| Ping 2!
The issue can also be triggered on x86 kernels if CONFIG_SMP=n,
otherwise local interrupts are disabled in 'smp_send_stop()'.
Disable preemption in 'panic()' before re-enabling interrupts.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191002123538.22609-1-will@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/BX1W47JXPMR8.58IYW53H6M5N@dragonstone
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Xogium <contact@xogium.me>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
ocfs2_info_scan_inode_alloc()
In ocfs2_info_scan_inode_alloc(), there is an if statement on line 283
to check whether inode_alloc is NULL:
if (inode_alloc)
When inode_alloc is NULL, it is used on line 287:
ocfs2_inode_lock(inode_alloc, &bh, 0);
ocfs2_inode_lock_full_nested(inode, ...)
struct ocfs2_super *osb = OCFS2_SB(inode->i_sb);
Thus, a possible null-pointer dereference may occur.
To fix this bug, inode_alloc is checked on line 286.
This bug is found by a static analysis tool STCheck written by us.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190726033717.32359-1-baijiaju1990@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
In ocfs2_write_end_nolock(), there are an if statement on lines 1976,
2047 and 2058, to check whether handle is NULL:
if (handle)
When handle is NULL, it is used on line 2045:
ocfs2_update_inode_fsync_trans(handle, inode, 1);
oi->i_sync_tid = handle->h_transaction->t_tid;
Thus, a possible null-pointer dereference may occur.
To fix this bug, handle is checked before calling
ocfs2_update_inode_fsync_trans().
This bug is found by a static analysis tool STCheck written by us.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190726033705.32307-1-baijiaju1990@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
In ocfs2_xa_prepare_entry(), there is an if statement on line 2136 to
check whether loc->xl_entry is NULL:
if (loc->xl_entry)
When loc->xl_entry is NULL, it is used on line 2158:
ocfs2_xa_add_entry(loc, name_hash);
loc->xl_entry->xe_name_hash = cpu_to_le32(name_hash);
loc->xl_entry->xe_name_offset = cpu_to_le16(loc->xl_size);
and line 2164:
ocfs2_xa_add_namevalue(loc, xi);
loc->xl_entry->xe_value_size = cpu_to_le64(xi->xi_value_len);
loc->xl_entry->xe_name_len = xi->xi_name_len;
Thus, possible null-pointer dereferences may occur.
To fix these bugs, if loc-xl_entry is NULL, ocfs2_xa_prepare_entry()
abnormally returns with -EINVAL.
These bugs are found by a static analysis tool STCheck written by us.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove now-unused ocfs2_xa_add_entry()]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190726101447.9153-1-baijiaju1990@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Unused portion of a part-written fs-block-sized block is not set to zero
in unaligned append direct write.This can lead to serious data
inconsistencies.
Ocfs2 manage disk with cluster size(for example, 1M), part-written in
one cluster will change the cluster state from UN-WRITTEN to WRITTEN,
VFS(function dio_zero_block) doesn't do the cleaning because bh's state
is not set to NEW in function ocfs2_dio_wr_get_block when we write a
WRITTEN cluster. For example, the cluster size is 1M, file size is 8k
and we direct write from 14k to 15k, then 12k~14k and 15k~16k will
contain dirty data.
We have to deal with two cases:
1.The starting position of direct write is outside the file.
2.The starting position of direct write is located in the file.
We need set bh's state to NEW in the first case. In the second case, we
need mapped twice because bh's state of area out file should be set to
NEW while area in file not.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding style fixes]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5292e287-8f1a-fd4a-1a14-661e555e0bed@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jia Guo <guojia12@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Yiwen Jiang <jiangyiwen@huawei.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Currently execution of panic() continues until Xen's panic notifier
(xen_panic_event()) is called at which point we make a hypercall that
never returns.
This means that any notifier that is supposed to be called later as
well as significant part of panic() code (such as pstore writes from
kmsg_dump()) is never executed.
There is no reason for xen_panic_event() to be this last point in
execution since panic()'s emergency_restart() will call into
xen_emergency_restart() from where we can perform our hypercall.
Nevertheless, we will provide xen_legacy_crash boot option that will
preserve original behavior during crash. This option could be used,
for example, if running kernel dumper (which happens after panic
notifiers) is undesirable.
Reported-by: James Dingwall <james@dingwall.me.uk>
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
|
|
If we cannot claim the timeline->mutex while preparing for a wait on it,
we have to skip the timeline. In doing so, treat it as active so that
under a intel_gt_wait_for_idle() loop, we repeat the wait after
scheduling away.
Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20191006165002.30312-4-chris@chris-wilson.co.uk
|
|
Disable irqs around updating the context image to keep lockdep happy:
<4>[ 673.483340] WARNING: possible irq lock inversion dependency detected
<4>[ 673.483342] 5.4.0-rc1-CI-Trybot_5118+ #1 Tainted: G U
<4>[ 673.483342] --------------------------------------------------------
<4>[ 673.483343] swapper/2/0 just changed the state of lock:
<4>[ 673.483344] ffff88845db885a0 (&i915_request_get(rq)->submit/1){-...}, at: __i915_sw_fence_complete+0x1b2/0x250 [i915]
<4>[ 673.483387] but this lock took another, HARDIRQ-unsafe lock in the past:
<4>[ 673.483388] (&ce->pin_mutex/2){+...}
<4>[ 673.483389]
and interrupts could create inverse lock ordering between them.
<4>[ 673.483390]
other info that might help us debug this:
<4>[ 673.483390] Chain exists of:
&i915_request_get(rq)->submit/1 --> &engine->active.lock --> &ce->pin_mutex/2
<4>[ 673.483392] Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:
<4>[ 673.483392] CPU0 CPU1
<4>[ 673.483393] ---- ----
<4>[ 673.483393] lock(&ce->pin_mutex/2);
<4>[ 673.483394] local_irq_disable();
<4>[ 673.483395] lock(&i915_request_get(rq)->submit/1);
<4>[ 673.483396] lock(&engine->active.lock);
<4>[ 673.483396] <Interrupt>
<4>[ 673.483397] lock(&i915_request_get(rq)->submit/1);
<4>[ 673.483398]
*** DEADLOCK ***
<4>[ 673.483398] 2 locks held by swapper/2/0:
<4>[ 673.483399] #0: ffff8883f61ac9b0 (&(>->irq_lock)->rlock){-.-.}, at: gen11_gt_irq_handler+0x42/0x280 [i915]
<4>[ 673.483433] #1: ffff88845db8c418 (&(&rq->lock)->rlock){-.-.}, at: intel_engine_breadcrumbs_irq+0x34a/0x5a0 [i915]
<4>[ 673.483463]
the shortest dependencies between 2nd lock and 1st lock:
<4>[ 673.483466] -> (&ce->pin_mutex/2){+...} ops: 614520 {
<4>[ 673.483468] HARDIRQ-ON-W at:
<4>[ 673.483471] lock_acquire+0xa7/0x1c0
<4>[ 673.483501] live_unlite_restore+0x1d8/0x6c0 [i915]
<4>[ 673.483543] __i915_subtests+0xb8/0x210 [i915]
<4>[ 673.483581] __run_selftests+0x112/0x170 [i915]
<4>[ 673.483615] i915_live_selftests+0x2c/0x60 [i915]
<4>[ 673.483644] i915_pci_probe+0x93/0x1b0 [i915]
<4>[ 673.483646] pci_device_probe+0x9e/0x120
<4>[ 673.483648] really_probe+0xea/0x420
<4>[ 673.483649] driver_probe_device+0x10b/0x120
<4>[ 673.483651] device_driver_attach+0x4a/0x50
<4>[ 673.483652] __driver_attach+0x97/0x130
<4>[ 673.483653] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc0
<4>[ 673.483654] bus_add_driver+0x142/0x220
<4>[ 673.483655] driver_register+0x56/0xf0
<4>[ 673.483657] do_one_initcall+0x58/0x2ff
<4>[ 673.483659] do_init_module+0x56/0x1f8
<4>[ 673.483660] load_module+0x243e/0x29f0
<4>[ 673.483661] __do_sys_finit_module+0xe9/0x110
<4>[ 673.483662] do_syscall_64+0x4f/0x210
<4>[ 673.483665] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
<4>[ 673.483665] INITIAL USE at:
<4>[ 673.483667] lock_acquire+0xa7/0x1c0
<4>[ 673.483698] live_unlite_restore+0x1d8/0x6c0 [i915]
<4>[ 673.483733] __i915_subtests+0xb8/0x210 [i915]
<4>[ 673.483764] __run_selftests+0x112/0x170 [i915]
<4>[ 673.483793] i915_live_selftests+0x2c/0x60 [i915]
<4>[ 673.483821] i915_pci_probe+0x93/0x1b0 [i915]
<4>[ 673.483822] pci_device_probe+0x9e/0x120
<4>[ 673.483824] really_probe+0xea/0x420
<4>[ 673.483825] driver_probe_device+0x10b/0x120
<4>[ 673.483826] device_driver_attach+0x4a/0x50
<4>[ 673.483827] __driver_attach+0x97/0x130
<4>[ 673.483828] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc0
<4>[ 673.483829] bus_add_driver+0x142/0x220
<4>[ 673.483830] driver_register+0x56/0xf0
<4>[ 673.483831] do_one_initcall+0x58/0x2ff
<4>[ 673.483833] do_init_module+0x56/0x1f8
<4>[ 673.483834] load_module+0x243e/0x29f0
<4>[ 673.483835] __do_sys_finit_module+0xe9/0x110
<4>[ 673.483836] do_syscall_64+0x4f/0x210
<4>[ 673.483837] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
<4>[ 673.483838] }
<4>[ 673.483868] ... key at: [<ffffffffa0a8f132>] __key.70113+0x2/0xffffffffffef2ed0 [i915]
<4>[ 673.483869] ... acquired at:
<4>[ 673.483935] __execlists_reset+0xfb/0xc20 [i915]
<4>[ 673.483965] execlists_reset+0x3d/0x50 [i915]
<4>[ 673.483995] intel_engine_reset+0xdf/0x230 [i915]
<4>[ 673.484022] live_preempt_hang+0x1d7/0x2e0 [i915]
<4>[ 673.484064] __i915_subtests+0xb8/0x210 [i915]
<4>[ 673.484130] __run_selftests+0x112/0x170 [i915]
<4>[ 673.484163] i915_live_selftests+0x2c/0x60 [i915]
<4>[ 673.484193] i915_pci_probe+0x93/0x1b0 [i915]
<4>[ 673.484194] pci_device_probe+0x9e/0x120
<4>[ 673.484195] really_probe+0xea/0x420
<4>[ 673.484196] driver_probe_device+0x10b/0x120
<4>[ 673.484197] device_driver_attach+0x4a/0x50
<4>[ 673.484198] __driver_attach+0x97/0x130
<4>[ 673.484199] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc0
<4>[ 673.484200] bus_add_driver+0x142/0x220
<4>[ 673.484202] driver_register+0x56/0xf0
<4>[ 673.484203] do_one_initcall+0x58/0x2ff
<4>[ 673.484204] do_init_module+0x56/0x1f8
<4>[ 673.484205] load_module+0x243e/0x29f0
<4>[ 673.484206] __do_sys_finit_module+0xe9/0x110
<4>[ 673.484207] do_syscall_64+0x4f/0x210
<4>[ 673.484208] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
<4>[ 673.484209] -> (&engine->active.lock){..-.} ops: 972791 {
<4>[ 673.484211] IN-SOFTIRQ-W at:
<4>[ 673.484213] lock_acquire+0xa7/0x1c0
<4>[ 673.484214] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x33/0x50
<4>[ 673.484244] execlists_submission_tasklet+0xaf/0x100 [i915]
<4>[ 673.484246] tasklet_action_common.isra.18+0x6c/0x1c0
<4>[ 673.484247] __do_softirq+0xdf/0x47f
<4>[ 673.484248] irq_exit+0xba/0xc0
<4>[ 673.484249] do_IRQ+0x83/0x160
<4>[ 673.484250] ret_from_intr+0x0/0x1d
<4>[ 673.484252] cpuidle_enter_state+0xb2/0x450
<4>[ 673.484253] cpuidle_enter+0x24/0x40
<4>[ 673.484254] do_idle+0x1e7/0x250
<4>[ 673.484256] cpu_startup_entry+0x14/0x20
<4>[ 673.484257] start_secondary+0x15f/0x1b0
<4>[ 673.484258] secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0
<4>[ 673.484259] INITIAL USE at:
<4>[ 673.484261] lock_acquire+0xa7/0x1c0
<4>[ 673.484290] intel_engine_init_active+0x7e/0xb0 [i915]
<4>[ 673.484305] intel_engines_setup+0x1cd/0x3b0 [i915]
<4>[ 673.484305] i915_gem_init+0x12d/0x900 [i915]
<4>[ 673.484305] i915_driver_probe+0xb70/0x15d0 [i915]
<4>[ 673.484305] i915_pci_probe+0x43/0x1b0 [i915]
<4>[ 673.484305] pci_device_probe+0x9e/0x120
<4>[ 673.484305] really_probe+0xea/0x420
<4>[ 673.484305] driver_probe_device+0x10b/0x120
<4>[ 673.484305] device_driver_attach+0x4a/0x50
<4>[ 673.484305] __driver_attach+0x97/0x130
<4>[ 673.484305] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc0
<4>[ 673.484305] bus_add_driver+0x142/0x220
<4>[ 673.484305] driver_register+0x56/0xf0
<4>[ 673.484305] do_one_initcall+0x58/0x2ff
<4>[ 673.484305] do_init_module+0x56/0x1f8
<4>[ 673.484305] load_module+0x243e/0x29f0
<4>[ 673.484305] __do_sys_finit_module+0xe9/0x110
<4>[ 673.484305] do_syscall_64+0x4f/0x210
<4>[ 673.484305] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
<4>[ 673.484305] }
<4>[ 673.484305] ... key at: [<ffffffffa0a8f160>] __key.70307+0x0/0xffffffffffef2ea0 [i915]
<4>[ 673.484305] ... acquired at:
<4>[ 673.484305] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x33/0x50
<4>[ 673.484305] execlists_submit_request+0x2b/0x1e0 [i915]
<4>[ 673.484305] submit_notify+0xa8/0x13c [i915]
<4>[ 673.484305] __i915_sw_fence_complete+0x81/0x250 [i915]
<4>[ 673.484305] i915_sw_fence_wake+0x51/0x70 [i915]
<4>[ 673.484305] __i915_sw_fence_complete+0x1ee/0x250 [i915]
<4>[ 673.484305] dma_i915_sw_fence_wake+0x1b/0x30 [i915]
<4>[ 673.484305] dma_fence_signal_locked+0x9e/0x1b0
<4>[ 673.484305] dma_fence_signal+0x1f/0x40
<4>[ 673.484305] fence_work+0x28/0x80 [i915]
<4>[ 673.484305] process_one_work+0x26a/0x620
<4>[ 673.484305] worker_thread+0x37/0x380
<4>[ 673.484305] kthread+0x119/0x130
<4>[ 673.484305] ret_from_fork+0x24/0x50
<4>[ 673.484305] -> (&i915_request_get(rq)->submit/1){-...} ops: 857694 {
<4>[ 673.484305] IN-HARDIRQ-W at:
<4>[ 673.484305] lock_acquire+0xa7/0x1c0
<4>[ 673.484305] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave_nested+0x39/0x50
<4>[ 673.484305] __i915_sw_fence_complete+0x1b2/0x250 [i915]
<4>[ 673.484305] intel_engine_breadcrumbs_irq+0x3d0/0x5a0 [i915]
<4>[ 673.484305] cs_irq_handler+0x39/0x50 [i915]
<4>[ 673.484305] gen11_gt_irq_handler+0x17b/0x280 [i915]
<4>[ 673.484305] gen11_irq_handler+0x54/0xf0 [i915]
<4>[ 673.484305] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x41/0x2c0
<4>[ 673.484305] handle_irq_event_percpu+0x2b/0x70
<4>[ 673.484305] handle_irq_event+0x2f/0x50
<4>[ 673.484305] handle_edge_irq+0x99/0x1b0
<4>[ 673.484305] do_IRQ+0x7e/0x160
<4>[ 673.484305] ret_from_intr+0x0/0x1d
<4>[ 673.484305] cpuidle_enter_state+0xb2/0x450
<4>[ 673.484305] cpuidle_enter+0x24/0x40
<4>[ 673.484305] do_idle+0x1e7/0x250
<4>[ 673.484305] cpu_startup_entry+0x14/0x20
<4>[ 673.484305] start_secondary+0x15f/0x1b0
<4>[ 673.484305] secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0
<4>[ 673.484305] INITIAL USE at:
<4>[ 673.484305] lock_acquire+0xa7/0x1c0
<4>[ 673.484305] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave_nested+0x39/0x50
<4>[ 673.484305] __i915_sw_fence_complete+0x1b2/0x250 [i915]
<4>[ 673.484305] __engine_park+0x233/0x420 [i915]
<4>[ 673.484305] ____intel_wakeref_put_last+0x1c/0x70 [i915]
<4>[ 673.484305] intel_gt_resume+0x202/0x2c0 [i915]
<4>[ 673.484305] i915_gem_init+0x36e/0x900 [i915]
<4>[ 673.484305] i915_driver_probe+0xb70/0x15d0 [i915]
<4>[ 673.484305] i915_pci_probe+0x43/0x1b0 [i915]
<4>[ 673.484305] pci_device_probe+0x9e/0x120
<4>[ 673.484305] really_probe+0xea/0x420
<4>[ 673.484305] driver_probe_device+0x10b/0x120
<4>[ 673.484305] device_driver_attach+0x4a/0x50
<4>[ 673.484305] __driver_attach+0x97/0x130
<4>[ 673.484305] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc0
<4>[ 673.484305] bus_add_driver+0x142/0x220
<4>[ 673.484305] driver_register+0x56/0xf0
<4>[ 673.484305] do_one_initcall+0x58/0x2ff
<4>[ 673.484305] do_init_module+0x56/0x1f8
<4>[ 673.484305] load_module+0x243e/0x29f0
<4>[ 673.484305] __do_sys_finit_module+0xe9/0x110
<4>[ 673.484305] do_syscall_64+0x4f/0x210
<4>[ 673.484305] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
<4>[ 673.484305] }
<4>[ 673.484305] ... key at: [<ffffffffa0a8f6a1>] __key.80173+0x1/0xffffffffffef2960 [i915]
<4>[ 673.484305] ... acquired at:
<4>[ 673.484305] mark_lock+0x382/0x500
<4>[ 673.484305] __lock_acquire+0x7e1/0x15d0
<4>[ 673.484305] lock_acquire+0xa7/0x1c0
<4>[ 673.484305] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave_nested+0x39/0x50
<4>[ 673.484305] __i915_sw_fence_complete+0x1b2/0x250 [i915]
<4>[ 673.484305] intel_engine_breadcrumbs_irq+0x3d0/0x5a0 [i915]
<4>[ 673.484305] cs_irq_handler+0x39/0x50 [i915]
<4>[ 673.484305] gen11_gt_irq_handler+0x17b/0x280 [i915]
<4>[ 673.484305] gen11_irq_handler+0x54/0xf0 [i915]
<4>[ 673.484305] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x41/0x2c0
<4>[ 673.484305] handle_irq_event_percpu+0x2b/0x70
<4>[ 673.484305] handle_irq_event+0x2f/0x50
<4>[ 673.484305] handle_edge_irq+0x99/0x1b0
<4>[ 673.484305] do_IRQ+0x7e/0x160
<4>[ 673.484305] ret_from_intr+0x0/0x1d
<4>[ 673.484305] cpuidle_enter_state+0xb2/0x450
<4>[ 673.484305] cpuidle_enter+0x24/0x40
<4>[ 673.484305] do_idle+0x1e7/0x250
<4>[ 673.484305] cpu_startup_entry+0x14/0x20
<4>[ 673.484305] start_secondary+0x15f/0x1b0
<4>[ 673.484305] secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0
<4>[ 673.484305]
stack backtrace:
<4>[ 673.484305] CPU: 2 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/2 Tainted: G U 5.4.0-rc1-CI-Trybot_5118+ #1
<4>[ 673.484305] Hardware name: Intel Corporation Ice Lake Client Platform/IceLake U DDR4 SODIMM PD RVP TLC, BIOS ICLSFWR1.R00.3183.A00.1905020411 05/02/2019
<4>[ 673.484305] Call Trace:
<4>[ 673.484305] <IRQ>
<4>[ 673.484305] dump_stack+0x67/0x9b
<4>[ 673.484305] check_usage_forwards+0x13c/0x150
<4>[ 673.484305] ? mark_lock+0x382/0x500
<4>[ 673.484305] mark_lock+0x382/0x500
<4>[ 673.484305] ? check_usage_backwards+0x140/0x140
<4>[ 673.484305] __lock_acquire+0x7e1/0x15d0
<4>[ 673.484305] ? debug_object_deactivate+0x17e/0x190
<4>[ 673.484305] lock_acquire+0xa7/0x1c0
<4>[ 673.484305] ? __i915_sw_fence_complete+0x1b2/0x250 [i915]
<4>[ 673.484305] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave_nested+0x39/0x50
<4>[ 673.484305] ? __i915_sw_fence_complete+0x1b2/0x250 [i915]
<4>[ 673.484305] __i915_sw_fence_complete+0x1b2/0x250 [i915]
<4>[ 673.484305] intel_engine_breadcrumbs_irq+0x3d0/0x5a0 [i915]
<4>[ 673.484305] cs_irq_handler+0x39/0x50 [i915]
<4>[ 673.484305] gen11_gt_irq_handler+0x17b/0x280 [i915]
<4>[ 673.484305] gen11_irq_handler+0x54/0xf0 [i915]
<4>[ 673.484305] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x41/0x2c0
<4>[ 673.484305] handle_irq_event_percpu+0x2b/0x70
<4>[ 673.484305] handle_irq_event+0x2f/0x50
<4>[ 673.484305] handle_edge_irq+0x99/0x1b0
<4>[ 673.484305] do_IRQ+0x7e/0x160
<4>[ 673.484305] common_interrupt+0xf/0xf
<4>[ 673.484305] </IRQ>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20191004203121.31138-1-chris@chris-wilson.co.uk
|
|
As we may signal a request and take the engine->active.lock within the
signaler, the engine submission paths have to use a nested annotation on
their requests -- but we guarantee that we can never submit on the same
engine as the signaling fence.
<4>[ 723.763281] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
<4>[ 723.763285] 5.3.0-g80fa0e042cdb-drmtip_379+ #1 Tainted: G U
<4>[ 723.763288] ------------------------------------------------------
<4>[ 723.763291] gem_exec_await/1388 is trying to acquire lock:
<4>[ 723.763294] ffff93a7b53221d8 (&engine->active.lock){..-.}, at: execlists_submit_request+0x2b/0x1e0 [i915]
<4>[ 723.763378]
but task is already holding lock:
<4>[ 723.763381] ffff93a7c25f6d20 (&i915_request_get(rq)->submit/1){-.-.}, at: __i915_sw_fence_complete+0x1b2/0x250 [i915]
<4>[ 723.763420]
which lock already depends on the new lock.
<4>[ 723.763423]
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
<4>[ 723.763427]
-> #2 (&i915_request_get(rq)->submit/1){-.-.}:
<4>[ 723.763434] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave_nested+0x39/0x50
<4>[ 723.763478] __i915_sw_fence_complete+0x1b2/0x250 [i915]
<4>[ 723.763513] intel_engine_breadcrumbs_irq+0x3aa/0x5e0 [i915]
<4>[ 723.763600] cs_irq_handler+0x49/0x50 [i915]
<4>[ 723.763659] gen11_gt_irq_handler+0x17b/0x280 [i915]
<4>[ 723.763690] gen11_irq_handler+0x54/0xf0 [i915]
<4>[ 723.763695] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x41/0x2d0
<4>[ 723.763699] handle_irq_event_percpu+0x2b/0x70
<4>[ 723.763702] handle_irq_event+0x2f/0x50
<4>[ 723.763706] handle_edge_irq+0xee/0x1a0
<4>[ 723.763709] do_IRQ+0x7e/0x160
<4>[ 723.763712] ret_from_intr+0x0/0x1d
<4>[ 723.763717] __slab_alloc.isra.28.constprop.33+0x4f/0x70
<4>[ 723.763720] kmem_cache_alloc+0x28d/0x2f0
<4>[ 723.763724] vm_area_dup+0x15/0x40
<4>[ 723.763727] dup_mm+0x2dd/0x550
<4>[ 723.763730] copy_process+0xf21/0x1ef0
<4>[ 723.763734] _do_fork+0x71/0x670
<4>[ 723.763737] __se_sys_clone+0x6e/0xa0
<4>[ 723.763741] do_syscall_64+0x4f/0x210
<4>[ 723.763744] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
<4>[ 723.763747]
-> #1 (&(&rq->lock)->rlock#2){-.-.}:
<4>[ 723.763752] _raw_spin_lock+0x2a/0x40
<4>[ 723.763789] __unwind_incomplete_requests+0x3eb/0x450 [i915]
<4>[ 723.763825] __execlists_submission_tasklet+0x9ec/0x1d60 [i915]
<4>[ 723.763864] execlists_submission_tasklet+0x34/0x50 [i915]
<4>[ 723.763874] tasklet_action_common.isra.5+0x47/0xb0
<4>[ 723.763878] __do_softirq+0xd8/0x4ae
<4>[ 723.763881] irq_exit+0xa9/0xc0
<4>[ 723.763883] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0xb7/0x280
<4>[ 723.763887] apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20
<4>[ 723.763892] cpuidle_enter_state+0xae/0x450
<4>[ 723.763895] cpuidle_enter+0x24/0x40
<4>[ 723.763899] do_idle+0x1e7/0x250
<4>[ 723.763902] cpu_startup_entry+0x14/0x20
<4>[ 723.763905] start_secondary+0x15f/0x1b0
<4>[ 723.763908] secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0
<4>[ 723.763911]
-> #0 (&engine->active.lock){..-.}:
<4>[ 723.763916] __lock_acquire+0x15d8/0x1ea0
<4>[ 723.763919] lock_acquire+0xa6/0x1c0
<4>[ 723.763922] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x33/0x50
<4>[ 723.763956] execlists_submit_request+0x2b/0x1e0 [i915]
<4>[ 723.764002] submit_notify+0xa8/0x13c [i915]
<4>[ 723.764035] __i915_sw_fence_complete+0x81/0x250 [i915]
<4>[ 723.764054] i915_sw_fence_wake+0x51/0x64 [i915]
<4>[ 723.764054] __i915_sw_fence_complete+0x1ee/0x250 [i915]
<4>[ 723.764054] dma_i915_sw_fence_wake_timer+0x14/0x20 [i915]
<4>[ 723.764054] dma_fence_signal_locked+0x9e/0x1c0
<4>[ 723.764054] dma_fence_signal+0x1f/0x40
<4>[ 723.764054] vgem_fence_signal_ioctl+0x67/0xc0 [vgem]
<4>[ 723.764054] drm_ioctl_kernel+0x83/0xf0
<4>[ 723.764054] drm_ioctl+0x2f3/0x3b0
<4>[ 723.764054] do_vfs_ioctl+0xa0/0x6f0
<4>[ 723.764054] ksys_ioctl+0x35/0x60
<4>[ 723.764054] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x11/0x20
<4>[ 723.764054] do_syscall_64+0x4f/0x210
<4>[ 723.764054] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
<4>[ 723.764054]
other info that might help us debug this:
<4>[ 723.764054] Chain exists of:
&engine->active.lock --> &(&rq->lock)->rlock#2 --> &i915_request_get(rq)->submit/1
<4>[ 723.764054] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
<4>[ 723.764054] CPU0 CPU1
<4>[ 723.764054] ---- ----
<4>[ 723.764054] lock(&i915_request_get(rq)->submit/1);
<4>[ 723.764054] lock(&(&rq->lock)->rlock#2);
<4>[ 723.764054] lock(&i915_request_get(rq)->submit/1);
<4>[ 723.764054] lock(&engine->active.lock);
<4>[ 723.764054]
*** DEADLOCK ***
Bugzilla: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111862
Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20191004194758.19679-1-chris@chris-wilson.co.uk
|
|
Avoid going to the base i915 device when we already have a path from gt
to the runtime powermanagement interface. The benefit is that it looks a
bit more self-consistent to always be acquiring the gt->uncore->rpm for
use with the gt->uncore.
Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Daniele Ceraolo Spurio <daniele.ceraolospurio@intel.com>
Cc: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20191007154531.1750-1-chris@chris-wilson.co.uk
|
|
Don't populate the array hw_engine_mask on the stack but instead make it
static. Makes the object code smaller by 316 bytes.
Before:
text data bss dec hex filename
34004 4388 320 38712 9738 gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_reset.o
After:
text data bss dec hex filename
33528 4548 320 38396 95fc gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_reset.o
(gcc version 9.2.1, amd64)
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20191007154151.23245-1-colin.king@canonical.com
|
|
Participate in device cgroup. All kfd devices are exposed via /dev/kfd.
So use /dev/dri/renderN node.
Before exposing the device to a task check if it has permission to
access it. If the task (based on its cgroup) can access /dev/dri/renderN
then expose the device via kfd node.
If the task cannot access /dev/dri/renderN then process device data
(pdd) is not created. This will ensure that task cannot use the device.
In sysfs topology, all device nodes are visible irrespective of the task
cgroup. The sysfs node directories are created at driver load time and
cannot be changed dynamically. However, access to information inside
nodes is controlled based on the task's cgroup permissions.
Signed-off-by: Harish Kasiviswanathan <Harish.Kasiviswanathan@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Felix Kuehling <Felix.Kuehling@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
|
|
For AMD compute (amdkfd) driver.
All AMD compute devices are exported via single device node /dev/kfd. As
a result devices cannot be controlled individually using device cgroup.
AMD compute devices will rely on its graphics counterpart that exposes
/dev/dri/renderN node for each device. For each task (based on its
cgroup), KFD driver will check if /dev/dri/renderN node is accessible
before exposing it.
Signed-off-by: Harish Kasiviswanathan <Harish.Kasiviswanathan@amd.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Felix Kuehling <Felix.Kuehling@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
|
|
Add proper ifdefs around CIK code in kfd setup.
Reviewed-by: Felix Kuehling <Felix.Kuehling@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
|
|
Adjust indentation from spaces to tab (+optional two spaces) as in
coding style with command like:
$ sed -e 's/^ /\t/' -i */Kconfig
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
|
|
The vram vendor can be found as a separate sysfs file at:
/sys/class/drm/card[X]/device/mem_info_vram_vendor
The vram vendor is displayed as a string value.
v2: Use correct bit masking, and cache vram_vendor in gmc
v3: Drop unused functions for vram width, type, and vendor
Signed-off-by: Ori Messinger <ori.messinger@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
|
|
In the current code if "device_info" is ever NULL then the kernel will
Oops so probably || was intended instead of &&.
Fixes: e392c887df97 ("drm/amdkfd: Use array to probe kfd2kgd_calls")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
|
|
The error handling is off by one. We should not free the first
"tables[i].bo" without decrementing "i" because that might result in a
double free. The second problem is that when an error occurs, then the
zeroth element "tables[0].bo" isn't freed.
I had make "i" signed int for the error handling to work, so I just
updated "ret" as well as a clean up.
Fixes: f96357a991b9 ("drm/amd/powerplay: implement smu_init(fini)_fb_allocations function")
Reviewed-by: Kevin Wang <kevin1.wang@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
|
|
This function needs to drop the mutex before returning.
Fixes: f7e3a5776fa6 ("drm/amd/powerplay: check SMU engine readiness before proceeding on S3 resume")
Reviewed-by: Kevin Wang <kevin1.wang@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
|
|
In non-ETSI regulatory domains scan is blocked when operating channel
is a DFS channel. For ETSI, however, once DFS channel is marked as
available after the CAC, this channel will remain available (for some
time) even after leaving this channel.
Therefore a scan can be done without any impact on the availability
of the DFS channel as no new CAC is required after the scan.
Enable scan in mac80211 in these cases.
Signed-off-by: Aaron Komisar <aaron.komisar@tandemg.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1570024728-17284-1-git-send-email-aaron.komisar@tandemg.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
|
|
Fixes gcc '-Wunused-but-set-variable' warning:
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce110/dce110_hw_sequencer.c: In function dce110_enable_audio_stream:
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce110/dce110_hw_sequencer.c:949:23: warning: variable pp_smu set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce110/dce110_hw_sequencer.c: In function dce110_disable_audio_stream:
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce110/dce110_hw_sequencer.c:983:23: warning: variable pp_smu set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce110/dce110_hw_sequencer.c: In function dce110_program_front_end_for_pipe:
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce110/dce110_hw_sequencer.c:2429:19: warning: variable old_pipe set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
'pp_smu' is not used since commit 170a2398d2d8 ("drm/amd/display:
make clk_mgr call enable_pme_wa")
'old_pipe' is not used since commit 65d38262b3e8 ("drm/amd/display:
fbc state could not reach while enable fbc")
Reviewed-by: Harry Wentland <harry.wentland@amd.com>
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: zhengbin <zhengbin13@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
|
|
Fixes gcc '-Wunused-but-set-variable' warning:
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dcn20/dcn20_dpp.c: In function dpp2_get_optimal_number_of_taps:
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dcn20/dcn20_dpp.c:359:11: warning: variable pixel_width set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
It is not used since commit f7de96ee8b5f ("drm/amd/display:
Add DCN2 DPP")
Reviewed-by: Harry Wentland <harry.wentland@amd.com>
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: zhengbin <zhengbin13@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
|
|
'v_ratio_chroma'
Fixes gcc '-Wunused-but-set-variable' warning:
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dcn20/dcn20_dwb_scl.c: In function dwb_program_horz_scalar:
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dcn20/dcn20_dwb_scl.c:725:11: warning: variable h_ratio_chroma set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dcn20/dcn20_dwb_scl.c: In function dwb_program_vert_scalar:
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dcn20/dcn20_dwb_scl.c:806:11: warning: variable v_ratio_chroma set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
They are not used since commit 345429a67c48 ("drm/amd/display:
Add DCN2 DWB")
Reviewed-by: Harry Wentland <harry.wentland@amd.com>
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: zhengbin <zhengbin13@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
|
|
Fixes gcc '-Wunused-but-set-variable' warning:
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dsc/rc_calc.c: In function calc_rc_params:
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dsc/rc_calc.c:180:6: warning: variable source_bpp set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
It is not used since commit 97bda0322b8a ("drm/amd/display:
Add DSC support for Navi (v2)")
Reviewed-by: Harry Wentland <harry.wentland@amd.com>
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: zhengbin <zhengbin13@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
|
|
Fix sparse warnings:
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/core/dc_link.c:687:6: warning: symbol 'wait_for_alt_mode' was not declared. Should it be static?
Reviewed-by: Harry Wentland <harry.wentland@amd.com>
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: zhengbin <zhengbin13@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
|
|
Function kgd2kfd_init is missing a void argument, add it
to clean up the non-ANSI function declaration.
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
|
|
Remove duplicated include.
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
|
|
It's only used in amdgpu_device.c and the naming also
reflects that. Move it there.
Reviewed-by: Andrey Grodzovsky <andrey.grodzovsky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
|
|
Fixes gcc '-Wunused-but-set-variable' warning:
rivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../display/modules/freesync/freesync.c:
In function mod_freesync_get_settings:
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../display/modules/freesync/freesync.c:984:24:
warning: variable core_freesync set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
It is not used since commit 98e6436d3af5 ("drm/amd/display: Refactor FreeSync module")
Reviewed-by: Harry Wentland <harry.wentland@amd.com>
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
|
|
p and g are switched in 'amdpgu_dm'
Reviewed-by: Harry Wentland <harry.wentland@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
|
|
Previously only PCIe-optimized SDMA engine hqds were
exposed in debug fs. Print all SDMA engine hqds.
Reported-by: Jonathan Kim <Jonathan.Kim@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Kim <Jonathan.Kim@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Oak Zeng <Oak.Zeng@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Felix Kuehling <Felix.Kuehling@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
|
|
On device initialization, a chunk of GTT memory is pre-allocated for
HIQ and all SDMA queues mqd. The size of this allocation was wrong.
The correct sdma engine number should be PCIe-optimized SDMA engine
number plus xgmi SDMA engine number.
Reported-by: Jonathan Kim <Jonathan.Kim@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Kim <Jonathan.Kim@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Oak Zeng <Oak.Zeng@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Felix Kuehling <Felix.Kuehling@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
|
|
Don't set a struct pointer to NULL before freeing its members. It's
hard to see what's happening due to a local pointer-to-pointer data
aliasing con->eh_data.
Signed-off-by: Felix Kuehling <Felix.Kuehling@amd.com>
Tested-by: Philip Cox <Philip.Cox@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Hawking Zhang <Hawking.Zhang@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
|
|
We can process deauth frames and all, but we drop them very
early in the RX path today - this could never have worked.
Fixes: 2cc59e784b54 ("mac80211: reply to AUTH with DEAUTH if sta allocation fails in IBSS")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191004123706.15768-2-luca@coelho.fi
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
|
|
For the kernel space, all ebreak instructions are determined at compile
time because the kernel space debugging module is currently unsupported.
Hence, it should be treated as a bug if an ebreak instruction which does
not belong to BUG_TRAP_TYPE_WARN or BUG_TRAP_TYPE_BUG is executed in
kernel space. For the userspace, debugging module or user problem may
intentionally insert an ebreak instruction to trigger a SIGTRAP signal.
To approach the above two situations, the do_trap_break() will direct
the BUG_TRAP_TYPE_NONE ebreak exception issued in kernel space to die()
and will send a SIGTRAP to the trapped process only when the ebreak is
in userspace.
Signed-off-by: Vincent Chen <vincent.chen@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
[paul.walmsley@sifive.com: fixed checkpatch issue]
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
|
|
On RISC-V, when the kernel runs code on behalf of a user thread, and the
kernel executes a WARN() or WARN_ON(), the user thread will be sent
a bogus SIGTRAP. Fix the RISC-V kernel code to not send a SIGTRAP when
a WARN()/WARN_ON() is executed.
Signed-off-by: Vincent Chen <vincent.chen@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
[paul.walmsley@sifive.com: fixed subject]
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
|
|
When the CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG is disabled by disabling CONFIG_BUG, if a
kernel thread is trapped by BUG(), the whole system will be in the
loop that infinitely handles the ebreak exception instead of entering the
die function. To fix this problem, the do_trap_break() will always call
the die() to deal with the break exception as the type of break is
BUG_TRAP_TYPE_BUG.
Signed-off-by: Vincent Chen <vincent.chen@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
|
|
In commit 9f79b78ef744 ("Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to
unsafe_put_user()") I made filldir() use unsafe_put_user(), which
improves code generation on x86 enormously.
But because we didn't have a "unsafe_copy_to_user()", the dirent name
copy was also done by hand with unsafe_put_user() in a loop, and it
turns out that a lot of other architectures didn't like that, because
unlike x86, they have various alignment issues.
Most non-x86 architectures trap and fix it up, and some (like xtensa)
will just fail unaligned put_user() accesses unconditionally. Which
makes that "copy using put_user() in a loop" not work for them at all.
I could make that code do explicit alignment etc, but the architectures
that don't like unaligned accesses also don't really use the fancy
"user_access_begin/end()" model, so they might just use the regular old
__copy_to_user() interface.
So this commit takes that looping implementation, turns it into the x86
version of "unsafe_copy_to_user()", and makes other architectures
implement the unsafe copy version as __copy_to_user() (the same way they
do for the other unsafe_xyz() accessor functions).
Note that it only does this for the copying _to_ user space, and we
still don't have a unsafe version of copy_from_user().
That's partly because we have no current users of it, but also partly
because the copy_from_user() case is slightly different and cannot
efficiently be implemented in terms of a unsafe_get_user() loop (because
gcc can't do asm goto with outputs).
It would be trivial to do this using "rep movsb", which would work
really nicely on newer x86 cores, but really badly on some older ones.
Al Viro is looking at cleaning up all our user copy routines to make
this all a non-issue, but for now we have this simple-but-stupid version
for x86 that works fine for the dirent name copy case because those
names are short strings and we simply don't need anything fancier.
Fixes: 9f79b78ef744 ("Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to unsafe_put_user()")
Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Reported-and-tested-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
cfg80211_update_notlisted_nontrans() leaves the RCU critical session
too early, while still using nontrans_ssid which is RCU protected. In
addition, it performs a bunch of RCU pointer update operations such
as rcu_access_pointer and rcu_assign_pointer.
The caller, cfg80211_inform_bss_frame_data(), also accesses the RCU
pointer without holding the lock.
Just wrap all of this with bss_lock.
Signed-off-by: Sara Sharon <sara.sharon@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191004123706.15768-3-luca@coelho.fi
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
|
|
In nl80211_get_ftm_responder_stats, a new skb is created via nlmsg_new
named msg. If nl80211hdr_put() fails, then msg should be released. The
return statement should be replace by goto to error handling code.
Fixes: 81e54d08d9d8 ("cfg80211: support FTM responder configuration/statistics")
Signed-off-by: Navid Emamdoost <navid.emamdoost@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191004194220.19412-1-navid.emamdoost@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
|
|
Fix typo s/mechansim/mechanism/
Signed-off-by: Antonio Borneo <antonio.borneo@st.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
The static structure tilcdc_plane_funcs, of type drm_plane_funcs, is
used only when passed the fourth argument to drm_plane_init(); however,
this fourth parameter is declared as const in the function definition.
Hence make tilcdc_plane_funcs constant as well.
Issue found with Coccinelle.
Signed-off-by: Nishka Dasgupta <nishkadg.linux@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jyri Sarha <jsarha@ti.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20190813090503.9063-1-nishkadg.linux@gmail.com
|
|
Since dropping the set-to-gtt-domain in commit a679f58d0510 ("drm/i915:
Flush pages on acquisition"), we no longer mark the contents as dirty on
a write fault. This has the issue of us then not marking the pages as
dirty on releasing the buffer, which means the contents are not written
out to the swap device (should we ever pick that buffer as a victim).
Notably, this is visible in the dumb buffer interface used for cursors.
Having updated the cursor contents via mmap, and swapped away, if the
shrinker should evict the old cursor, upon next reuse, the cursor would
be invisible.
E.g. echo 80 > /proc/sys/kernel/sysrq ; echo f > /proc/sysrq-trigger
Bugzilla: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111541
Fixes: a679f58d0510 ("drm/i915: Flush pages on acquisition")
Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Matthew Auld <matthew.william.auld@gmail.com>
Cc: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.2+
Reviewed-by: Matthew Auld <matthew.william.auld@gmail.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20190920121821.7223-1-chris@chris-wilson.co.uk
(cherry picked from commit 5028851cdfdf78dc22eacbc44a0ab0b3f599ee4a)
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
|
|
Force bonded requests to run on distinct engines so that they cannot be
shuffled onto the same engine where timeslicing will reverse the order.
A bonded request will often wait on a semaphore signaled by its master,
creating an implicit dependency -- if we ignore that implicit dependency
and allow the bonded request to run on the same engine and before its
master, we will cause a GPU hang. [Whether it will hang the GPU is
debatable, we should keep on timeslicing and each timeslice should be
"accidentally" counted as forward progress, in which case it should run
but at one-half to one-third speed.]
We can prevent this inversion by restricting which engines we allow
ourselves to jump to upon preemption, i.e. baking in the arrangement
established at first execution. (We should also consider capturing the
implicit dependency using i915_sched_add_dependency(), but first we need
to think about the constraints that requires on the execution/retirement
ordering.)
Fixes: 8ee36e048c98 ("drm/i915/execlists: Minimalistic timeslicing")
References: ee1136908e9b ("drm/i915/execlists: Virtual engine bonding")
Testcase: igt/gem_exec_balancer/bonded-slice
Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Mika Kuoppala <mika.kuoppala@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20190923152844.8914-3-chris@chris-wilson.co.uk
(cherry picked from commit e2144503bf3b22275dd33cef2880e1cb5fb200c5)
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
|
|
The officially validated plane width limit is 4k on skl+, however
we already had people using 5k displays before we started to enforce
the limit. Also it seems Windows allows 5k resolutions as well
(though not sure if they do it with one plane or two).
According to hw folks 5k should work with the possible
exception of the following features:
- Ytile (already limited to 4k)
- FP16 (already limited to 4k)
- render compression (already limited to 4k)
- KVMR sprite and cursor (don't care)
- horizontal panning (need to verify this)
- pipe and plane scaling (need to verify this)
So apart from last two items on that list we are already
fine. We should really verify what happens with those last
two items but I don't have a 5k display on hand atm so it'll
have to wait.
In the meantime let's just bump the limit back up to 5k since
several users have already been using it without apparent issues.
At least we'll be no worse off than we were prior to lowering
the limits.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Sean Paul <sean@poorly.run>
Cc: José Roberto de Souza <jose.souza@intel.com>
Tested-by: Leho Kraav <leho@kraav.com>
Fixes: 372b9ffb5799 ("drm/i915: Fix skl+ max plane width")
Bugzilla: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111501
Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20190905135044.2001-1-ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com
Reviewed-by: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Paul <sean@poorly.run>
(cherry picked from commit bed34ef544f9ab37ab349c04cf4142282c4dcf5d)
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
|
|
When using virtual engines, the rq->engine is not stable until we hold
the engine->active.lock (as the virtual engine may be exchanged with the
sibling). Since commit 22b7a426bbe1 ("drm/i915/execlists: Preempt-to-busy")
we may retire a request concurrently with resubmitting it to HW, we need
to be extra careful to verify we are holding the correct lock for the
request's active list. This is similar to the issue we saw with
rescheduling the virtual requests, see sched_lock_engine().
Or else:
<4> [876.736126] list_add corruption. prev->next should be next (ffff8883f931a1f8), but was dead000000000100. (prev=ffff888361ffa610).
<4> [876.736136] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 21 at lib/list_debug.c:28 __list_add_valid+0x4d/0x70
<4> [876.736137] Modules linked in: i915(+) amdgpu gpu_sched ttm vgem snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic mei_hdcp x86_pkg_temp_thermal coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul snd_intel_nhlt snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core ghash_clmulni_intel e1000e cdc_ether usbnet mii snd_pcm ptp pps_core mei_me mei prime_numbers btusb btrtl btbcm btintel bluetooth ecdh_generic ecc [last unloaded: i915]
<4> [876.736154] CPU: 2 PID: 21 Comm: ksoftirqd/2 Tainted: G U 5.3.0-CI-CI_DRM_6898+ #1
<4> [876.736156] Hardware name: Intel Corporation Ice Lake Client Platform/IceLake U DDR4 SODIMM PD RVP TLC, BIOS ICLSFWR1.R00.3183.A00.1905020411 05/02/2019
<4> [876.736157] RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid+0x4d/0x70
<4> [876.736159] Code: c3 48 89 d1 48 c7 c7 20 33 0e 82 48 89 c2 e8 4a 4a bc ff 0f 0b 31 c0 c3 48 89 c1 4c 89 c6 48 c7 c7 70 33 0e 82 e8 33 4a bc ff <0f> 0b 31 c0 c3 48 89 f2 4c 89 c1 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7 c0 33 0e 82 e8
<4> [876.736160] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000018bd30 EFLAGS: 00010082
<4> [876.736162] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888361ffc840 RCX: 0000000000000104
<4> [876.736163] RDX: 0000000080000104 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
<4> [876.736164] RBP: ffffc9000018bd68 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
<4> [876.736165] R10: 00000000aed95de3 R11: 000000007fe927eb R12: ffff888361ffca10
<4> [876.736166] R13: ffff888361ffa610 R14: ffff888361ffc880 R15: ffff8883f931a1f8
<4> [876.736168] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88849fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
<4> [876.736169] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
<4> [876.736170] CR2: 00007f093a9173c0 CR3: 00000003bba08005 CR4: 0000000000760ee0
<4> [876.736171] PKRU: 55555554
<4> [876.736172] Call Trace:
<4> [876.736226] __i915_request_submit+0x152/0x370 [i915]
<4> [876.736263] __execlists_submission_tasklet+0x6da/0x1f50 [i915]
<4> [876.736293] ? execlists_submission_tasklet+0x29/0x50 [i915]
<4> [876.736321] execlists_submission_tasklet+0x34/0x50 [i915]
<4> [876.736325] tasklet_action_common.isra.5+0x47/0xb0
<4> [876.736328] __do_softirq+0xd8/0x4ae
<4> [876.736332] ? smpboot_thread_fn+0x23/0x280
<4> [876.736334] ? smpboot_thread_fn+0x6b/0x280
<4> [876.736336] run_ksoftirqd+0x2b/0x50
<4> [876.736338] smpboot_thread_fn+0x1d3/0x280
<4> [876.736341] ? sort_range+0x20/0x20
<4> [876.736343] kthread+0x119/0x130
<4> [876.736345] ? kthread_park+0xa0/0xa0
<4> [876.736347] ret_from_fork+0x24/0x50
<4> [876.736353] irq event stamp: 2290145
<4> [876.736356] hardirqs last enabled at (2290144): [<ffffffff8123cde8>] __slab_free+0x3e8/0x500
<4> [876.736358] hardirqs last disabled at (2290145): [<ffffffff819cfb4d>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xd/0x50
<4> [876.736360] softirqs last enabled at (2290114): [<ffffffff81c0033e>] __do_softirq+0x33e/0x4ae
<4> [876.736361] softirqs last disabled at (2290119): [<ffffffff810b815b>] run_ksoftirqd+0x2b/0x50
<4> [876.736363] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 21 at lib/list_debug.c:28 __list_add_valid+0x4d/0x70
<4> [876.736364] ---[ end trace 3e58d6c7356c65bf ]---
<4> [876.736406] ------------[ cut here ]------------
<4> [876.736415] list_del corruption. prev->next should be ffff888361ffca10, but was ffff88840ac2c730
<4> [876.736421] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 5490 at lib/list_debug.c:53 __list_del_entry_valid+0x79/0x90
<4> [876.736422] Modules linked in: i915(+) amdgpu gpu_sched ttm vgem snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic mei_hdcp x86_pkg_temp_thermal coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul snd_intel_nhlt snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core ghash_clmulni_intel e1000e cdc_ether usbnet mii snd_pcm ptp pps_core mei_me mei prime_numbers btusb btrtl btbcm btintel bluetooth ecdh_generic ecc [last unloaded: i915]
<4> [876.736433] CPU: 2 PID: 5490 Comm: i915_selftest Tainted: G U W 5.3.0-CI-CI_DRM_6898+ #1
<4> [876.736435] Hardware name: Intel Corporation Ice Lake Client Platform/IceLake U DDR4 SODIMM PD RVP TLC, BIOS ICLSFWR1.R00.3183.A00.1905020411 05/02/2019
<4> [876.736436] RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid+0x79/0x90
<4> [876.736438] Code: 0b 31 c0 c3 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7 30 34 0e 82 e8 ae 49 bc ff 0f 0b 31 c0 c3 48 89 f2 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7 68 34 0e 82 e8 97 49 bc ff <0f> 0b 31 c0 c3 48 c7 c7 a8 34 0e 82 e8 86 49 bc ff 0f 0b 31 c0 c3
<4> [876.736439] RSP: 0018:ffffc900003ef758 EFLAGS: 00010086
<4> [876.736440] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888361ffc840 RCX: 0000000000000002
<4> [876.736442] RDX: 0000000080000002 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
<4> [876.736443] RBP: ffffc900003ef780 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
<4> [876.736444] R10: 000000001418e4b7 R11: 000000007f0ea93b R12: ffff888361ffcab8
<4> [876.736445] R13: ffff88843b6d0000 R14: 000000000000217c R15: 0000000000000001
<4> [876.736447] FS: 00007f4e6f255240(0000) GS:ffff88849fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
<4> [876.736448] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
<4> [876.736449] CR2: 00007f093a9173c0 CR3: 00000003bba08005 CR4: 0000000000760ee0
<4> [876.736450] PKRU: 55555554
<4> [876.736451] Call Trace:
<4> [876.736488] i915_request_retire+0x224/0x8e0 [i915]
<4> [876.736521] i915_request_create+0x4b/0x1b0 [i915]
<4> [876.736550] nop_virtual_engine+0x230/0x4d0 [i915]
Fixes: 22b7a426bbe1 ("drm/i915/execlists: Preempt-to-busy")
Bugzilla: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111695
Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Mika Kuoppala <mika.kuoppala@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com>
Cc: Matthew Auld <matthew.auld@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20190918145453.8800-1-chris@chris-wilson.co.uk
(cherry picked from commit 37fa0de3c137d5f54f7e64f53495c9d501d42a4d)
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
|
|
A few times in CI, we have detected a GPU hang on our Haswell GT2
systems with the characteristic IPEHR of 0x780c0000. When the PSMI w/a
was first introducted, it was applied to all Haswell, but later on we
found an erratum that supposedly restricted the issue to GT1 and so
constrained it only be applied on GT1. That may have been a mistake...
Bugzilla: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111692
Fixes: 167bc759e823 ("drm/i915: Restrict PSMI context load w/a to Haswell GT1")
References: 2c550183476d ("drm/i915: Disable PSMI sleep messages on all rings around context switches")
Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Mika Kuoppala <mika.kuoppala@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Mika Kuoppala <mika.kuoppala@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20190917194746.26710-1-chris@chris-wilson.co.uk
(cherry picked from commit 56c05de6bd773b96deca379370965c49042b5fbf)
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
|
|
While srcu may use an integer tag, it does not exclude potential error
codes and so may overlap with our own use of -EINTR. Use a separate
outparam to store the tag, and report the error code separately.
Fixes: 2caffbf11762 ("drm/i915: Revoke mmaps and prevent access to fence registers across reset")
Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Mika Kuoppala <mika.kuoppala@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Mika Kuoppala <mika.kuoppala@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20190912160834.30601-1-chris@chris-wilson.co.uk
(cherry picked from commit eebab60f224fcfd560957715d08c31564d8672ed)
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
|
|
This allows userspace to use "legacy" mode for push constants, where
they are committed at 3DPRIMITIVE or flush time, rather than being
committed at 3DSTATE_BINDING_TABLE_POINTERS_XS time. Gen6-8 and Gen11
both use the "legacy" behavior - only Gen9 works in the "new" way.
Conflating push constants with binding tables is painful for userspace,
we would like to be able to avoid doing so.
Signed-off-by: Kenneth Graunke <kenneth@whitecape.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20190911014801.26821-1-kenneth@whitecape.org
(cherry picked from commit 0606259e3b3a1220a0f04a92a1654a3f674f47ee)
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
|
