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Move affinity binding of the IRQ to irq_request function in order to
bind the IRQ before inserting it to the xarray.
After this change, the IRQ is ready for use when inserted to the xarray.
Signed-off-by: Shay Drory <shayd@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Moshe Shemesh <moshe@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com>
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Currently, IRQ layer have a separate flow for ctrl and comp IRQs, and
the distinction between ctrl and comp IRQs is done in the IRQ layer.
In order to ease the coding and maintenance of the IRQ layer,
introduce a new API for requesting control IRQs -
mlx5_ctrl_irq_request(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev).
Signed-off-by: Shay Drory <shayd@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Moshe Shemesh <moshe@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com>
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Callers of this functions ignore its return value, as reported by
Wang Qing, in one of the return paths, it returns positive values.
Since return value is ignored anyways, void out the return type of the
function.
Reported-by: Wang Qing <wangqing@vivo.com>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com>
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At the moment, urandom_read() (used for /dev/urandom) resets crng_init_cnt
to zero when it is called at crng_init<2. This is inconsistent: We do it
for /dev/urandom reads, but not for the equivalent
getrandom(GRND_INSECURE).
(And worse, as Jason pointed out, we're only doing this as long as
maxwarn>0.)
crng_init_cnt is only read in crng_fast_load(); it is relevant at
crng_init==0 for determining when to switch to crng_init==1 (and where in
the RNG state array to write).
As far as I understand:
- crng_init==0 means "we have nothing, we might just be returning the same
exact numbers on every boot on every machine, we don't even have
non-cryptographic randomness; we should shove every bit of entropy we
can get into the RNG immediately"
- crng_init==1 means "well we have something, it might not be
cryptographic, but at least we're not gonna return the same data every
time or whatever, it's probably good enough for TCP and ASLR and stuff;
we now have time to build up actual cryptographic entropy in the input
pool"
- crng_init==2 means "this is supposed to be cryptographically secure now,
but we'll keep adding more entropy just to be sure".
The current code means that if someone is pulling data from /dev/urandom
fast enough at crng_init==0, we'll keep resetting crng_init_cnt, and we'll
never make forward progress to crng_init==1. It seems to be intended to
prevent an attacker from bruteforcing the contents of small individual RNG
inputs on the way from crng_init==0 to crng_init==1, but that's misguided;
crng_init==1 isn't supposed to provide proper cryptographic security
anyway, RNG users who care about getting secure RNG output have to wait
until crng_init==2.
This code was inconsistent, and it probably made things worse - just get
rid of it.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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RDRAND is not fast. RDRAND is actually quite slow. We've known this for
a while, which is why functions like get_random_u{32,64} were converted
to use batching of our ChaCha-based CRNG instead.
Yet CRNG extraction still includes a call to RDRAND, in the hot path of
every call to get_random_bytes(), /dev/urandom, and getrandom(2).
This call to RDRAND here seems quite superfluous. CRNG is already
extracting things based on a 256-bit key, based on good entropy, which
is then reseeded periodically, updated, backtrack-mutated, and so
forth. The CRNG extraction construction is something that we're already
relying on to be secure and solid. If it's not, that's a serious
problem, and it's unlikely that mixing in a measly 32 bits from RDRAND
is going to alleviate things.
And in the case where the CRNG doesn't have enough entropy yet, we're
already initializing the ChaCha key row with RDRAND in
crng_init_try_arch_early().
Removing the call to RDRAND improves performance on an i7-11850H by
370%. In other words, the vast majority of the work done by
extract_crng() prior to this commit was devoted to fetching 32 bits of
RDRAND.
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Previously, the ChaCha constants for the primary pool were only
initialized in crng_initialize_primary(), called by rand_initialize().
However, some randomness is actually extracted from the primary pool
beforehand, e.g. by kmem_cache_create(). Therefore, statically
initialize the ChaCha constants for the primary pool.
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Rather than an awkward combination of ifdefs and __maybe_unused, we can
ensure more source gets parsed, regardless of the configuration, by
using IS_ENABLED for the CONFIG_NUMA conditional code. This makes things
cleaner and easier to follow.
I've confirmed that on !CONFIG_NUMA, we don't wind up with excess code
by accident; the generated object file is the same.
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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We print out "crng init done" for !TRUST_CPU, so we should also print
out the same for TRUST_CPU.
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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If we're trusting bootloader randomness, crng_fast_load() is called by
add_hwgenerator_randomness(), which sets us to crng_init==1. However,
usually it is only called once for an initial 64-byte push, so bootloader
entropy will not mix any bytes into the input pool. So it's conceivable
that crng_init==1 when crng_initialize_primary() is called later, but
then the input pool is empty. When that happens, the crng state key will
be overwritten with extracted output from the empty input pool. That's
bad.
In contrast, if we're not trusting bootloader randomness, we call
crng_slow_load() *and* we call mix_pool_bytes(), so that later
crng_initialize_primary() isn't drawing on nothing.
In order to prevent crng_initialize_primary() from extracting an empty
pool, have the trusted bootloader case mirror that of the untrusted
bootloader case, mixing the input into the pool.
[linux@dominikbrodowski.net: rewrite commit message]
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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When crng_fast_load() is called by add_hwgenerator_randomness(), we
currently will advance to crng_init==1 once we've acquired 64 bytes, and
then throw away the rest of the buffer. Usually, that is not a problem:
When add_hwgenerator_randomness() gets called via EFI or DT during
setup_arch(), there won't be any IRQ randomness. Therefore, the 64 bytes
passed by EFI exactly matches what is needed to advance to crng_init==1.
Usually, DT seems to pass 64 bytes as well -- with one notable exception
being kexec, which hands over 128 bytes of entropy to the kexec'd kernel.
In that case, we'll advance to crng_init==1 once 64 of those bytes are
consumed by crng_fast_load(), but won't continue onward feeding in bytes
to progress to crng_init==2. This commit fixes the issue by feeding
any leftover bytes into the next phase in add_hwgenerator_randomness().
[linux@dominikbrodowski.net: rewrite commit message]
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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If the bootloader supplies sufficient material and crng_reseed() is called
very early on, but not too early that wqs aren't available yet, then we
might transition to crng_init==2 before rand_initialize()'s call to
crng_initialize_primary() made. Then, when crng_initialize_primary() is
called, if we're trusting the CPU's RDRAND instructions, we'll
needlessly reinitialize the RNG and emit a message about it. This is
mostly harmless, as numa_crng_init() will allocate and then free what it
just allocated, and excessive calls to invalidate_batched_entropy()
aren't so harmful. But it is funky and the extra message is confusing,
so avoid the re-initialization all together by checking for crng_init <
2 in crng_initialize_primary(), just as we already do in crng_reseed().
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Currently, if CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is enabled, multiple calls
to add_bootloader_randomness() are broken and can cause a NULL pointer
dereference, as noted by Ivan T. Ivanov. This is not only a hypothetical
problem, as qemu on arm64 may provide bootloader entropy via EFI and via
devicetree.
On the first call to add_hwgenerator_randomness(), crng_fast_load() is
executed, and if the seed is long enough, crng_init will be set to 1.
On subsequent calls to add_bootloader_randomness() and then to
add_hwgenerator_randomness(), crng_fast_load() will be skipped. Instead,
wait_event_interruptible() and then credit_entropy_bits() will be called.
If the entropy count for that second seed is large enough, that proceeds
to crng_reseed().
However, both wait_event_interruptible() and crng_reseed() depends
(at least in numa_crng_init()) on workqueues. Therefore, test whether
system_wq is already initialized, which is a sufficient indicator that
workqueue_init_early() has progressed far enough.
If we wind up hitting the !system_wq case, we later want to do what
would have been done there when wqs are up, so set a flag, and do that
work later from the rand_initialize() call.
Reported-by: Ivan T. Ivanov <iivanov@suse.de>
Fixes: 18b915ac6b0a ("efi/random: Treat EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL output as bootloader randomness")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
[Jason: added crng_need_done state and related logic.]
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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By using `char` instead of `unsigned char`, certain platforms will sign
extend the byte when `w = rol32(*bytes++, input_rotate)` is called,
meaning that bit 7 is overrepresented when mixing. This isn't a real
problem (unless the mixer itself is already broken) since it's still
invertible, but it's not quite correct either. Fix this by using an
explicit unsigned type.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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This commit addresses one of the lower hanging fruits of the RNG: its
usage of SHA1.
BLAKE2s is generally faster, and certainly more secure, than SHA1, which
has [1] been [2] really [3] very [4] broken [5]. Additionally, the
current construction in the RNG doesn't use the full SHA1 function, as
specified, and allows overwriting the IV with RDRAND output in an
undocumented way, even in the case when RDRAND isn't set to "trusted",
which means potential malicious IV choices. And its short length means
that keeping only half of it secret when feeding back into the mixer
gives us only 2^80 bits of forward secrecy. In other words, not only is
the choice of hash function dated, but the use of it isn't really great
either.
This commit aims to fix both of these issues while also keeping the
general structure and semantics as close to the original as possible.
Specifically:
a) Rather than overwriting the hash IV with RDRAND, we put it into
BLAKE2's documented "salt" and "personal" fields, which were
specifically created for this type of usage.
b) Since this function feeds the full hash result back into the
entropy collector, we only return from it half the length of the
hash, just as it was done before. This increases the
construction's forward secrecy from 2^80 to a much more
comfortable 2^128.
c) Rather than using the raw "sha1_transform" function alone, we
instead use the full proper BLAKE2s function, with finalization.
This also has the advantage of supplying 16 bytes at a time rather than
SHA1's 10 bytes, which, in addition to having a faster compression
function to begin with, means faster extraction in general. On an Intel
i7-11850H, this commit makes initial seeding around 131% faster.
BLAKE2s itself has the nice property of internally being based on the
ChaCha permutation, which the RNG is already using for expansion, so
there shouldn't be any issue with newness, funkiness, or surprising CPU
behavior, since it's based on something already in use.
[1] https://eprint.iacr.org/2005/010.pdf
[2] https://www.iacr.org/archive/crypto2005/36210017/36210017.pdf
[3] https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/967.pdf
[4] https://shattered.io/static/shattered.pdf
[5] https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec20-leurent.pdf
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Jean-Philippe Aumasson <jeanphilippe.aumasson@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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In preparation for using blake2s in the RNG, we change the way that it
is wired-in to the build system. Instead of using ifdefs to select the
right symbol, we use weak symbols. And because ARM doesn't need the
generic implementation, we make the generic one default only if an arch
library doesn't need it already, and then have arch libraries that do
need it opt-in. So that the arch libraries can remain tristate rather
than bool, we then split the shash part from the glue code.
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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_extract_crng() does plain loads of crng->init_time and
crng_global_init_time, which causes undefined behavior if
crng_reseed() and RNDRESEEDCRNG modify these corrently.
Use READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE() to make the behavior defined.
Don't fix the race on crng->init_time by protecting it with crng->lock,
since it's not a problem for duplicate reseedings to occur. I.e., the
lockless access with READ_ONCE() is fine.
Fixes: d848e5f8e1eb ("random: add new ioctl RNDRESEEDCRNG")
Fixes: e192be9d9a30 ("random: replace non-blocking pool with a Chacha20-based CRNG")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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extract_crng() and crng_backtrack_protect() load crng_node_pool with a
plain load, which causes undefined behavior if do_numa_crng_init()
modifies it concurrently.
Fix this by using READ_ONCE(). Note: as per the previous discussion
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20211219025139.31085-1-ebiggers@kernel.org/T/#u,
READ_ONCE() is believed to be sufficient here, and it was requested that
it be used here instead of smp_load_acquire().
Also change do_numa_crng_init() to set crng_node_pool using
cmpxchg_release() instead of mb() + cmpxchg(), as the former is
sufficient here but is more lightweight.
Fixes: 1e7f583af67b ("random: make /dev/urandom scalable for silly userspace programs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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The __IRQF_TIMER bit from the flags argument was used in
add_interrupt_randomness() to distinguish the timer interrupt from other
interrupts. This is no longer the case.
Remove the flags argument from __handle_irq_event_percpu().
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Since commit
ee3e00e9e7101 ("random: use registers from interrupted code for CPU's w/o a cycle counter")
the irq_flags argument is no longer used.
Remove unused irq_flags.
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: K. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com>
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin@microsoft.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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The section at the top of random.c which documents the input functions
available does not document add_hwgenerator_randomness() which might lead
a reader to overlook it. Add a brief note about it.
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
[Jason: reorganize position of function in doc comment and also document
add_bootloader_randomness() while we're at it.]
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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This is handy not just for humans, but also so that the 0-day bot can
automatically test posted mailing list patches against the right tree.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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The second parameter of bpf_d_path() can only accept writable
memories. Rdonly_mem obtained from bpf_per_cpu_ptr() can not
be passed into bpf_d_path for modification. This patch adds
a selftest to verify this behavior.
Signed-off-by: Hao Luo <haoluo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220106205525.2116218-1-haoluo@google.com
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This adds documention for:
- bpf_map_delete_batch()
- bpf_map_lookup_batch()
- bpf_map_lookup_and_delete_batch()
- bpf_map_update_batch()
This also updates the public API for the `keys` parameter
of `bpf_map_delete_batch()`, and both the
`keys` and `values` parameters of `bpf_map_update_batch()`
to be constants.
Signed-off-by: Grant Seltzer <grantseltzer@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220106201304.112675-1-grantseltzer@gmail.com
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"Three minor tracing fixes:
- Fix missing prototypes in sample module for direct functions
- Fix check of valid buffer in get_trace_buf()
- Fix annotations of percpu pointers"
* tag 'trace-v5.16-rc8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Tag trace_percpu_buffer as a percpu pointer
tracing: Fix check for trace_percpu_buffer validity in get_trace_buf()
ftrace/samples: Add missing prototypes direct functions
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PT_REGS*() macro on some architectures force-cast struct pt_regs to
other types (user_pt_regs, etc) and might drop volatile modifiers, if any.
Volatile isn't really required as pt_regs value isn't supposed to change
during the BPF program run, so this is correct behavior.
But progs/loop3.c relies on that volatile modifier to ensure that loop
is preserved. Fix loop3.c by declaring i and sum variables as volatile
instead. It preserves the loop and makes the test pass on all
architectures (including s390x which is currently broken).
Fixes: 3cc31d794097 ("libbpf: Normalize PT_REGS_xxx() macro definitions")
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220106205156.955373-1-andrii@kernel.org
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When a task is writing to an fd opened by a different task, the perm check
should use the cgroup namespace of the latter task. Add a test for it.
Tested-by: Michal Koutný <mkoutny@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
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When a task is writing to an fd opened by a different task, the perm check
should use the credentials of the latter task. Add a test for it.
Tested-by: Michal Koutný <mkoutny@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
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0644 is an odd perm to create a cgroup which is a directory. Use the regular
0755 instead. This is necessary for euid switching test case.
Reviewed-by: Michal Koutný <mkoutny@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
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cgroup process migration permission checks are performed at write time as
whether a given operation is allowed or not is dependent on the content of
the write - the PID. This currently uses current's cgroup namespace which is
a potential security weakness as it may allow scenarios where a less
privileged process tricks a more privileged one into writing into a fd that
it created.
This patch makes cgroup remember the cgroup namespace at the time of open
and uses it for migration permission checks instad of current's. Note that
this only applies to cgroup2 as cgroup1 doesn't have namespace support.
This also fixes a use-after-free bug on cgroupns reported in
https://lore.kernel.org/r/00000000000048c15c05d0083397@google.com
Note that backporting this fix also requires the preceding patch.
Reported-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Michal Koutný <mkoutny@suse.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Koutný <mkoutny@suse.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+50f5cf33a284ce738b62@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/00000000000048c15c05d0083397@google.com
Fixes: 5136f6365ce3 ("cgroup: implement "nsdelegate" mount option")
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
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of->priv is currently used by each interface file implementation to store
private information. This patch collects the current two private data usages
into struct cgroup_file_ctx which is allocated and freed by the common path.
This allows generic private data which applies to multiple files, which will
be used to in the following patch.
Note that cgroup_procs iterator is now embedded as procs.iter in the new
cgroup_file_ctx so that it doesn't need to be allocated and freed
separately.
v2: union dropped from cgroup_file_ctx and the procs iterator is embedded in
cgroup_file_ctx as suggested by Linus.
v3: Michal pointed out that cgroup1's procs pidlist uses of->priv too.
Converted. Didn't change to embedded allocation as cgroup1 pidlists get
stored for caching.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Michal Koutný <mkoutny@suse.com>
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cgroup process migration permission checks are performed at write time as
whether a given operation is allowed or not is dependent on the content of
the write - the PID. This currently uses current's credentials which is a
potential security weakness as it may allow scenarios where a less
privileged process tricks a more privileged one into writing into a fd that
it created.
This patch makes both cgroup2 and cgroup1 process migration interfaces to
use the credentials saved at the time of open (file->f_cred) instead of
current's.
Reported-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org>
Fixes: 187fe84067bd ("cgroup: require write perm on common ancestor when moving processes on the default hierarchy")
Reviewed-by: Michal Koutný <mkoutny@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
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ssh://gitlab.freedesktop.org/agd5f/linux into drm-fixes
amd-drm-fixes-5.16-2021-12-31:
amdgpu:
- Suspend/resume fix
- Restore runtime pm behavior with efifb
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
From: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20211231143825.11479-1-alexander.deucher@amd.com
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kfree() and bitmap_free() are the same. But using the latter is more
consistent when freeing memory allocated with bitmap_zalloc().
Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>
Tested-by: Gurucharan G <gurucharanx.g@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
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When a bitmap is local to a function, it is safe to use the non-atomic
__[set|clear]_bit(). No concurrent accesses can occur.
Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>
Tested-by: Gurucharan G <gurucharanx.g@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
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The 'possible_idx' bitmap is set just after it is zeroed, so we can save
the first step.
The 'free_idx' bitmap is used only at the end of the function as the
result of a bitmap xor operation. So there is no need to explicitly
zero it before.
So, slightly simply the code and remove 2 useless 'bitmap_zero()' call
Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>
Tested-by: Sandeep Penigalapati <sandeep.penigalapati@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
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In current switchdev implementation, every VF PR is assigned to
individual ring on switchdev ctrl VSI. For slow-path traffic, there
is a mapping VF->ring done in software based on src_vsi value (by
calling ice_eswitch_get_target_netdev function).
With this change, HW solution is introduced which is more
efficient. For each VF, src MAC (VF's MAC) filter will be created,
which forwards packets to the corresponding switchdev ctrl VSI queue
based on src MAC address.
This filter has to be removed and then replayed in case of
resetting one VF. Keep information about this rule in repr->mac_rule,
thanks to that we know which rule has to be removed and replayed
for a given VF.
In case of CORE/GLOBAL all rules are removed
automatically. We have to take care of readding them. This is done
by ice_replay_vsi_adv_rule.
When driver leaves switchdev mode, remove all advanced rules
from switchdev ctrl VSI. This is done by ice_rem_adv_rule_for_vsi.
Flag repr->rule_added is needed because in some cases reset
might be triggered before VF sends request to add MAC.
Co-developed-by: Grzegorz Nitka <grzegorz.nitka@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Grzegorz Nitka <grzegorz.nitka@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Wojciech Drewek <wojciech.drewek@intel.com>
Tested-by: Sandeep Penigalapati <sandeep.penigalapati@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
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The init_freq_invariance_cppc function is implemented in smpboot and depends on
CONFIG_SMP.
MODPOST vmlinux.symvers
MODINFO modules.builtin.modinfo
GEN modules.builtin
LD .tmp_vmlinux.kallsyms1
ld: drivers/acpi/cppc_acpi.o: in function `acpi_cppc_processor_probe':
/home/ray/brahma3/linux/drivers/acpi/cppc_acpi.c:819: undefined reference to `init_freq_invariance_cppc'
make: *** [Makefile:1161: vmlinux] Error 1
See https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/484af487-7511-647e-5c5b-33d4429acdec@infradead.org/.
Fixes: 41ea667227ba ("x86, sched: Calculate frequency invariance for AMD systems")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com>
[ rjw: Subject edits ]
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
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The AMD P-State driver is based on ACPI CPPC function, so ACPI should be
dependence of this driver in the kernel config.
In file included from ../drivers/cpufreq/amd-pstate.c:40:0:
../include/acpi/processor.h:226:2: error: unknown type name ‘phys_cpuid_t’
phys_cpuid_t phys_id; /* CPU hardware ID such as APIC ID for x86 */
^~~~~~~~~~~~
../include/acpi/processor.h:355:1: error: unknown type name ‘phys_cpuid_t’; did you mean ‘phys_addr_t’?
phys_cpuid_t acpi_get_phys_id(acpi_handle, int type, u32 acpi_id);
^~~~~~~~~~~~
phys_addr_t
CC drivers/rtc/rtc-rv3029c2.o
../include/acpi/processor.h:356:1: error: unknown type name ‘phys_cpuid_t’; did you mean ‘phys_addr_t’?
phys_cpuid_t acpi_map_madt_entry(u32 acpi_id);
^~~~~~~~~~~~
phys_addr_t
../include/acpi/processor.h:357:20: error: unknown type name ‘phys_cpuid_t’; did you mean ‘phys_addr_t’?
int acpi_map_cpuid(phys_cpuid_t phys_id, u32 acpi_id);
^~~~~~~~~~~~
phys_addr_t
See https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20e286d4-25d7-fb6e-31a1-4349c805aae3@infradead.org/.
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com>
[ rjw: Subject edits ]
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
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Add the description of @req and @boost_supported in struct amd_cpudata
kernel-doc comment to remove warnings found by running scripts/kernel-doc,
which is caused by using 'make W=1'.
drivers/cpufreq/amd-pstate.c:104: warning: Function parameter or member
'req' not described in 'amd_cpudata'
drivers/cpufreq/amd-pstate.c:104: warning: Function parameter or member
'boost_supported' not described in 'amd_cpudata'
Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Li <yang.lee@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
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ice_replay_vsi_adv_rule will replay advanced rules for a given VSI.
Exit this function when list of rules for given recipe is empty.
Do not add rule when given vsi_handle does not match vsi_handle
from the rule info.
Use ICE_MAX_NUM_RECIPES instead of ICE_SW_LKUP_LAST in order to find
advanced rules as well.
Signed-off-by: Victor Raj <victor.raj@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Wojciech Drewek <wojciech.drewek@intel.com>
Tested-by: Sandeep Penigalapati <sandeep.penigalapati@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
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This rework the handling of hci_inquiry_result_with_rssi_evt to not use
a union to represent the different inquiry responses.
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Tested-by: Soenke Huster <soenke.huster@eknoes.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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The MacBook Air 8,1 and 8,2 also need querying of LE Tx power
to be disabled for Bluetooth to work.
Signed-off-by: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@live.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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SMC connections might fail to be registered in a link group due to
unable to find a usable link during its creation. As a result,
smc_conn_create() will return a failure and most resources related
to the connection won't be applied or initialized, such as
conn->abort_work or conn->lnk.
If smc_conn_free() is invoked later, it will try to access the
uninitialized resources related to the connection, thus causing
a warning or crash.
This patch tries to fix this by resetting conn->lgr to NULL if an
abnormal exit occurs in smc_lgr_register_conn(), thus avoiding the
access to uninitialized resources in smc_conn_free().
Meanwhile, the new created link group should be terminated if smc
connections can't be registered in it. So smc_lgr_cleanup_early() is
modified to take care of link group only and invoked to terminate
unusable link group by smc_conn_create(). The call to smc_conn_free()
is moved out from smc_lgr_cleanup_early() to smc_conn_abort().
Fixes: 56bc3b2094b4 ("net/smc: assign link to a new connection")
Suggested-by: Karsten Graul <kgraul@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Wen Gu <guwen@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: Karsten Graul <kgraul@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The function devm_gpiod_get_index() return error pointers on error.
Thus devm_gpiod_get_index_optional() could return NULL and error pointers.
The same as devm_gpiod_get_optional() function. Using IS_ERR_OR_NULL()
check to catch error pointers.
Fixes: 77131dfe ("Bluetooth: hci_qca: Replace devm_gpiod_get() with devm_gpiod_get_optional()")
Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin <linmq006@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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For the possible failure of the platform_get_irq(), the returned irq
could be error number and will finally cause the failure of the
request_irq().
Consider that platform_get_irq() can now in certain cases return
-EPROBE_DEFER, and the consequences of letting request_irq() effectively
convert that into -EINVAL, even at probe time rather than later on.
So it might be better to check just now.
Fixes: 0395ffc1ee05 ("Bluetooth: hci_bcm: Add PM for BCM devices")
Signed-off-by: Jiasheng Jiang <jiasheng@iscas.ac.cn>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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As the possible failure of the allocation, the devm_ioremap() may return
NULL pointer.
Take tgec_initialization() as an example.
If allocation fails, the params->base_addr will be NULL pointer and will
be assigned to tgec->regs in tgec_config().
Then it will cause the dereference of NULL pointer in set_mac_address(),
which is called by tgec_init().
Therefore, it should be better to add the sanity check after the calling
of the devm_ioremap().
Fixes: 3933961682a3 ("fsl/fman: Add FMan MAC driver")
Signed-off-by: Jiasheng Jiang <jiasheng@iscas.ac.cn>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Laurent reported that they have seen a significant amount of TCP retransmissions
at high throughput from applications residing in network namespaces talking to
the outside world via veths. The drops were seen on the qdisc layer (fq_codel,
as per systemd default) of the phys device such as ena or virtio_net due to all
traffic hitting a _single_ TX queue _despite_ multi-queue device. (Note that the
setup was _not_ using XDP on veths as the issue is generic.)
More specifically, after edbea9220251 ("veth: Store queue_mapping independently
of XDP prog presence") which made it all the way back to v4.19.184+,
skb_record_rx_queue() would set skb->queue_mapping to 1 (given 1 RX and 1 TX
queue by default for veths) instead of leaving at 0.
This is eventually retained and callbacks like ena_select_queue() will also pick
single queue via netdev_core_pick_tx()'s ndo_select_queue() once all the traffic
is forwarded to that device via upper stack or other means. Similarly, for others
not implementing ndo_select_queue() if XPS is disabled, netdev_pick_tx() might
call into the skb_tx_hash() and check for prior skb_rx_queue_recorded() as well.
In general, it is a _bad_ idea for virtual devices like veth to mess around with
queue selection [by default]. Given dev->real_num_tx_queues is by default 1,
the skb->queue_mapping was left untouched, and so prior to edbea9220251 the
netdev_core_pick_tx() could do its job upon __dev_queue_xmit() on the phys device.
Unbreak this and restore prior behavior by removing the skb_record_rx_queue()
from veth_xmit() altogether.
If the veth peer has an XDP program attached, then it would return the first RX
queue index in xdp_md->rx_queue_index (unless configured in non-default manner).
However, this is still better than breaking the generic case.
Fixes: edbea9220251 ("veth: Store queue_mapping independently of XDP prog presence")
Fixes: 638264dc9022 ("veth: Support per queue XDP ring")
Reported-by: Laurent Bernaille <laurent.bernaille@datadoghq.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com>
Cc: Toshiaki Makita <toshiaki.makita1@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Cc: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Toshiaki Makita <toshiaki.makita1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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There are currently 2 ways to create a set of sysfs files for a
kobj_type, through the default_attrs field, and the default_groups
field. Move the ibmveth sysfs code to use default_groups
field which has been the preferred way since aa30f47cf666 ("kobject: Add
support for default attribute groups to kobj_type") so that we can soon
get rid of the obsolete default_attrs field.
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Cristobal Forno <cforno12@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Tyrel Datwyler <tyreld@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This code is holding the &ofdpa->flow_tbl_lock spinlock so it is not
allowed to sleep. That means we have to pass the OFDPA_OP_FLAG_NOWAIT
flag to ofdpa_flow_tbl_del().
Fixes: 936bd486564a ("rocker: use FIB notifications instead of switchdev calls")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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When performing an I2C transfer where the last message was a write KASAN
would complain:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in mpc_i2c_do_action+0x154/0x630
Read of size 2 at addr c814e310 by task swapper/2/0
CPU: 2 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/2 Tainted: G B 5.16.0-rc8 #1
Call Trace:
[e5ee9d50] [c08418e8] dump_stack_lvl+0x4c/0x6c (unreliable)
[e5ee9d70] [c02f8a14] print_address_description.constprop.13+0x64/0x3b0
[e5ee9da0] [c02f9030] kasan_report+0x1f0/0x204
[e5ee9de0] [c0c76ee4] mpc_i2c_do_action+0x154/0x630
[e5ee9e30] [c0c782c4] mpc_i2c_isr+0x164/0x240
[e5ee9e60] [c00f3a04] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0xf4/0x3b0
[e5ee9ec0] [c00f3d40] handle_irq_event_percpu+0x80/0x110
[e5ee9f40] [c00f3e48] handle_irq_event+0x78/0xd0
[e5ee9f60] [c00fcfec] handle_fasteoi_irq+0x19c/0x370
[e5ee9fa0] [c00f1d84] generic_handle_irq+0x54/0x80
[e5ee9fc0] [c0006b54] __do_irq+0x64/0x200
[e5ee9ff0] [c0007958] __do_IRQ+0xe8/0x1c0
[c812dd50] [e3eaab20] 0xe3eaab20
[c812dd90] [c0007a4c] do_IRQ+0x1c/0x30
[c812dda0] [c0000c04] ExternalInput+0x144/0x160
--- interrupt: 500 at arch_cpu_idle+0x34/0x60
NIP: c000b684 LR: c000b684 CTR: c0019688
REGS: c812ddb0 TRAP: 0500 Tainted: G B (5.16.0-rc8)
MSR: 00029002 <CE,EE,ME> CR: 22000488 XER: 20000000
GPR00: c10ef7fc c812de90 c80ff200 c2394718 00000001 00000001 c10e3f90 00000003
GPR08: 00000000 c0019688 c2394718 fc7d625b 22000484 00000000 21e17000 c208228c
GPR16: e3e99284 00000000 ffffffff c2390000 c001bac0 c2082288 c812df60 c001ba60
GPR24: c23949c0 00000018 00080000 00000004 c80ff200 00000002 c2348ee4 c2394718
NIP [c000b684] arch_cpu_idle+0x34/0x60
LR [c000b684] arch_cpu_idle+0x34/0x60
--- interrupt: 500
[c812de90] [c10e3f90] rcu_eqs_enter.isra.60+0xc0/0x110 (unreliable)
[c812deb0] [c10ef7fc] default_idle_call+0xbc/0x230
[c812dee0] [c00af0e8] do_idle+0x1c8/0x200
[c812df10] [c00af3c0] cpu_startup_entry+0x20/0x30
[c812df20] [c001e010] start_secondary+0x5d0/0xba0
[c812dff0] [c00028a0] __secondary_start+0x90/0xdc
This happened because we would overrun the i2c->msgs array on the final
interrupt for the I2C STOP. This didn't happen if the last message was a
read because there is no interrupt in that case. Ensure that we only
access the current message if we are not processing a I2C STOP
condition.
Fixes: 1538d82f4647 ("i2c: mpc: Interrupt driven transfer")
Reported-by: Maxime Bizon <mbizon@freebox.fr>
Signed-off-by: Chris Packham <chris.packham@alliedtelesis.co.nz>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@kernel.org>
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