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2025-03-05docs: Kconfig: fix defconfig descriptionSatoru Takeuchi
Commit 2a86f6612164 ("kbuild: use KBUILD_DEFCONFIG as the fallback for DEFCONFIG_LIST") removed arch/$ARCH/defconfig; however, the document has not been updated to reflect this change yet. Signed-off-by: Satoru Takeuchi <satoru.takeuchi@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
2025-03-05kbuild: hdrcheck: fix cross build with clangArnd Bergmann
The headercheck tries to call clang with a mix of compiler arguments that don't include the target architecture. When building e.g. x86 headers on arm64, this produces a warning like clang: warning: unknown platform, assuming -mfloat-abi=soft Add in the KBUILD_CPPFLAGS, which contain the target, in order to make it build properly. See also 1b71c2fb04e7 ("kbuild: userprogs: fix bitsize and target detection on clang"). Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Fixes: feb843a469fb ("kbuild: add $(CLANG_FLAGS) to KBUILD_CPPFLAGS") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
2025-03-04Merge tag 'devicetree-fixes-for-6.14-2' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/robh/linux Pull devicetree fix from Rob Herring: - Revert reserved-memory 'alignment' property to use '#address-cells' instead of '#size-cells'. What's in use trumps the spec. * tag 'devicetree-fixes-for-6.14-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/robh/linux: Revert "of: reserved-memory: Fix using wrong number of cells to get property 'alignment'"
2025-03-05kbuild: userprogs: use correct lld when linking through clangThomas Weißschuh
The userprog infrastructure links objects files through $(CC). Either explicitly by manually calling $(CC) on multiple object files or implicitly by directly compiling a source file to an executable. The documentation at Documentation/kbuild/llvm.rst indicates that ld.lld would be used for linking if LLVM=1 is specified. However clang instead will use either a globally installed cross linker from $PATH called ${target}-ld or fall back to the system linker, which probably does not support crosslinking. For the normal kernel build this is not an issue because the linker is always executed directly, without the compiler being involved. Explicitly pass --ld-path to clang so $(LD) is respected. As clang 13.0.1 is required to build the kernel, this option is available. Fixes: 7f3a59db274c ("kbuild: add infrastructure to build userspace programs") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # needs wrapping in $(cc-option) for < 6.9 Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
2025-03-04fs/pipe: Read pipe->{head,tail} atomically outside pipe->mutexLinus Torvalds
pipe_readable(), pipe_writable(), and pipe_poll() can read "pipe->head" and "pipe->tail" outside of "pipe->mutex" critical section. When the head and the tail are read individually in that order, there is a window for interruption between the two reads in which both the head and the tail can be updated by concurrent readers and writers. One of the problematic scenarios observed with hackbench running multiple groups on a large server on a particular pipe inode is as follows: pipe->head = 36 pipe->tail = 36 hackbench-118762 [057] ..... 1029.550548: pipe_write: *wakes up: pipe not full* hackbench-118762 [057] ..... 1029.550548: pipe_write: head: 36 -> 37 [tail: 36] hackbench-118762 [057] ..... 1029.550548: pipe_write: *wake up next reader 118740* hackbench-118762 [057] ..... 1029.550548: pipe_write: *wake up next writer 118768* hackbench-118768 [206] ..... 1029.55055X: pipe_write: *writer wakes up* hackbench-118768 [206] ..... 1029.55055X: pipe_write: head = READ_ONCE(pipe->head) [37] ... CPU 206 interrupted (exact wakeup was not traced but 118768 did read head at 37 in traces) hackbench-118740 [057] ..... 1029.550558: pipe_read: *reader wakes up: pipe is not empty* hackbench-118740 [057] ..... 1029.550558: pipe_read: tail: 36 -> 37 [head = 37] hackbench-118740 [057] ..... 1029.550559: pipe_read: *pipe is empty; wakeup writer 118768* hackbench-118740 [057] ..... 1029.550559: pipe_read: *sleeps* hackbench-118766 [185] ..... 1029.550592: pipe_write: *New writer comes in* hackbench-118766 [185] ..... 1029.550592: pipe_write: head: 37 -> 38 [tail: 37] hackbench-118766 [185] ..... 1029.550592: pipe_write: *wakes up reader 118766* hackbench-118740 [185] ..... 1029.550598: pipe_read: *reader wakes up; pipe not empty* hackbench-118740 [185] ..... 1029.550599: pipe_read: tail: 37 -> 38 [head: 38] hackbench-118740 [185] ..... 1029.550599: pipe_read: *pipe is empty* hackbench-118740 [185] ..... 1029.550599: pipe_read: *reader sleeps; wakeup writer 118768* ... CPU 206 switches back to writer hackbench-118768 [206] ..... 1029.550601: pipe_write: tail = READ_ONCE(pipe->tail) [38] hackbench-118768 [206] ..... 1029.550601: pipe_write: pipe_full()? (u32)(37 - 38) >= 16? Yes hackbench-118768 [206] ..... 1029.550601: pipe_write: *writer goes back to sleep* [ Tasks 118740 and 118768 can then indefinitely wait on each other. ] The unsigned arithmetic in pipe_occupancy() wraps around when "pipe->tail > pipe->head" leading to pipe_full() returning true despite the pipe being empty. The case of genuine wraparound of "pipe->head" is handled since pipe buffer has data allowing readers to make progress until the pipe->tail wraps too after which the reader will wakeup a sleeping writer, however, mistaking the pipe to be full when it is in fact empty can lead to readers and writers waiting on each other indefinitely. This issue became more problematic and surfaced as a hang in hackbench after the optimization in commit aaec5a95d596 ("pipe_read: don't wake up the writer if the pipe is still full") significantly reduced the number of spurious wakeups of writers that had previously helped mask the issue. To avoid missing any updates between the reads of "pipe->head" and "pipe->write", unionize the two with a single unsigned long "pipe->head_tail" member that can be loaded atomically. Using "pipe->head_tail" to read the head and the tail ensures the lockless checks do not miss any updates to the head or the tail and since those two are only updated under "pipe->mutex", it ensures that the head is always ahead of, or equal to the tail resulting in correct calculations. [ prateek: commit log, testing on x86 platforms. ] Reported-and-debugged-by: Swapnil Sapkal <swapnil.sapkal@amd.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/e813814e-7094-4673-bc69-731af065a0eb@amd.com/ Reported-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/Z8Wn0nTvevLRG_4m@example.org/ Fixes: 8cefc107ca54 ("pipe: Use head and tail pointers for the ring, not cursor and length") Tested-by: Swapnil Sapkal <swapnil.sapkal@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Tested-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2025-03-04sched_ext: Add trace point to track sched_ext core eventsChangwoo Min
Add tracing support to track sched_ext core events (/sched_ext/sched_ext_event). This may be useful for debugging sched_ext schedulers that trigger a particular event. The trace point can be used as other trace points, so it can be used in, for example, `perf trace` and BPF programs, as follows: ====== $> sudo perf trace -e sched_ext:sched_ext_event --filter 'name == "SCX_EV_ENQ_SLICE_DFL"' ====== ====== struct tp_sched_ext_event { struct trace_entry ent; u32 __data_loc_name; s64 delta; }; SEC("tracepoint/sched_ext/sched_ext_event") int rtp_add_event(struct tp_sched_ext_event *ctx) { char event_name[128]; unsigned short offset = ctx->__data_loc_name & 0xFFFF; bpf_probe_read_str((void *)event_name, 128, (char *)ctx + offset); bpf_printk("name %s delta %lld", event_name, ctx->delta); return 0; } ====== Signed-off-by: Changwoo Min <changwoo@igalia.com> Acked-by: Andrea Righi <arighi@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
2025-03-04sched_ext: Change the event type from u64 to s64Changwoo Min
The event count could be negative in the future, so change the event type from u64 to s64. Signed-off-by: Changwoo Min <changwoo@igalia.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
2025-03-04kbuild: clang: Support building UM with SUBARCH=i386Kees Cook
The UM builds distinguish i386 from x86_64 via SUBARCH, but we don't support building i386 directly with Clang. To make SUBARCH work for i386 UM, we need to explicitly test for it. This lets me run i386 KUnit tests with Clang: $ ./tools/testing/kunit/kunit.py run \ --make_options LLVM=1 \ --make_options SUBARCH=i386 ... Fixes: c7500c1b53bf ("um: Allow builds with Clang") Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250304162124.it.785-kees@kernel.org Tested-by: David Gow <davidgow@google.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
2025-03-04KVM: x86: Explicitly zero EAX and EBX when PERFMON_V2 isn't supported by KVMXiaoyao Li
Fix a goof where KVM sets CPUID.0x80000022.EAX to CPUID.0x80000022.EBX instead of zeroing both when PERFMON_V2 isn't supported by KVM. In practice, barring a buggy CPU (or vCPU model when running nested) only the !enable_pmu case is affected, as KVM always supports PERFMON_V2 if it's available in hardware, i.e. CPUID.0x80000022.EBX will be '0' if PERFMON_V2 is unsupported. For the !enable_pmu case, the bug is relatively benign as KVM will refuse to enable PMU capabilities, but a VMM that reflects KVM's supported CPUID into the guest could inadvertently induce #GPs in the guest due to advertising support for MSRs that KVM refuses to emulate. Fixes: 94cdeebd8211 ("KVM: x86/cpuid: Add AMD CPUID ExtPerfMonAndDbg leaf 0x80000022") Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250304082314.472202-3-xiaoyao.li@intel.com [sean: massage shortlog and changelog, tag for stable] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2025-03-04Merge tag 'wireless-2025-03-04' of ↵Jakub Kicinski
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/wireless/wireless Johannes Berg says: ==================== bugfixes for 6.14: * regressions from this cycle: - mac80211: fix sparse warning for monitor - nl80211: disable multi-link reconfiguration (needs fixing) * older issues: - cfg80211: reject badly combined cooked monitor, fix regulatory hint validity checks - mac80211: handle TXQ flush w/o driver per-sta flush, fix debugfs for monitor, fix element inheritance - iwlwifi: fix rfkill, dead firmware handling, rate API version, free A-MSDU handling, avoid large allocations, fix string format - brcmfmac: fix power handling on some boards * tag 'wireless-2025-03-04' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/wireless/wireless: wifi: nl80211: disable multi-link reconfiguration wifi: cfg80211: regulatory: improve invalid hints checking wifi: brcmfmac: keep power during suspend if board requires it wifi: mac80211: Fix sparse warning for monitor_sdata wifi: mac80211: fix vendor-specific inheritance wifi: mac80211: fix MLE non-inheritance parsing wifi: iwlwifi: Fix A-MSDU TSO preparation wifi: iwlwifi: Free pages allocated when failing to build A-MSDU wifi: iwlwifi: limit printed string from FW file wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: use the right version of the rate API wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: don't try to talk to a dead firmware wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: don't dump the firmware state upon RFKILL while suspend wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: clean up ROC on failure wifi: iwlwifi: fw: avoid using an uninitialized variable wifi: iwlwifi: fw: allocate chained SG tables for dump wifi: mac80211: remove debugfs dir for virtual monitor wifi: mac80211: Cleanup sta TXQs on flush wifi: nl80211: reject cooked mode if it is set along with other flags ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250304124435.126272-3-johannes@sipsolutions.net Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2025-03-04s390/ftrace: Fix return address recovery of traced functionSumanth Korikkar
When fgraph is enabled the traced function return address is replaced with trampoline return_to_handler(). The original return address of the traced function is saved in per task return stack along with a stack pointer for reliable stack unwinding via function_graph_enter_regs(). During stack unwinding e.g. for livepatching, ftrace_graph_ret_addr() identifies the original return address of the traced function with the saved stack pointer. With a recent change, the stack pointers passed to ftrace_graph_ret_addr() and function_graph_enter_regs() do not match anymore, and therefore the original return address is not found. Pass the correct stack pointer to function_graph_enter_regs() to fix this. Fixes: 7495e179b478 ("s390/tracing: Enable HAVE_FTRACE_GRAPH_FUNC") Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sumanth Korikkar <sumanthk@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
2025-03-04selftests/vDSO: Fix GNU hash table entry size for s390xThomas Weißschuh
Commit 14be4e6f3522 ("selftests: vDSO: fix ELF hash table entry size for s390x") changed the type of the ELF hash table entries to 64bit on s390x. However the *GNU* hash tables entries are always 32bit. The "bucket" pointer is shared between both hash algorithms. On s390, this caused the GNU hash algorithm to access its 32-bit entries as if they were 64-bit, triggering compiler warnings (assignment between "Elf64_Xword *" and "Elf64_Word *") and runtime crashes. Introduce a new dedicated "gnu_bucket" pointer which is used by the GNU hash. Fixes: e0746bde6f82 ("selftests/vDSO: support DT_GNU_HASH") Reviewed-by: Jens Remus <jremus@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250217-selftests-vdso-s390-gnu-hash-v2-1-f6c2532ffe2a@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
2025-03-04s390/traps: Fix test_monitor_call() inline assemblyHeiko Carstens
The test_monitor_call() inline assembly uses the xgr instruction, which also modifies the condition code, to clear a register. However the clobber list of the inline assembly does not specify that the condition code is modified, which may lead to incorrect code generation. Use the lhi instruction instead to clear the register without that the condition code is modified. Furthermore this limits clearing to the lower 32 bits of val, since its type is int. Fixes: 17248ea03674 ("s390: fix __EMIT_BUG() macro") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Juergen Christ <jchrist@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
2025-03-04ALSA: hda: realtek: fix incorrect IS_REACHABLE() usageArnd Bergmann
The alternative path leads to a build error after a recent change: sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c: In function 'alc233_fixup_lenovo_low_en_micmute_led': include/linux/stddef.h:9:14: error: called object is not a function or function pointer 9 | #define NULL ((void *)0) | ^ sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c:5041:49: note: in expansion of macro 'NULL' 5041 | #define alc233_fixup_lenovo_line2_mic_hotkey NULL | ^~~~ sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c:5063:9: note: in expansion of macro 'alc233_fixup_lenovo_line2_mic_hotkey' 5063 | alc233_fixup_lenovo_line2_mic_hotkey(codec, fix, action); Using IS_REACHABLE() is somewhat questionable here anyway since it leads to the input code not working when the HDA driver is builtin but input is in a loadable module. Replace this with a hard compile-time dependency on CONFIG_INPUT. In practice this won't chance much other than solve the compiler error because it is rare to require sound output but no input support. Fixes: f603b159231b ("ALSA: hda/realtek - add supported Mic Mute LED for Lenovo platform") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250304142620.582191-1-arnd@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2025-03-04ASoC: cs42l43: Add jack delay debounce after suspendMaciej Strozek
Hardware reports jack absent after reset/suspension regardless of jack state, so introduce an additional delay only in suspension case to allow proper detection to take place after a short delay. Signed-off-by: Maciej Strozek <mstrozek@opensource.cirrus.com> Reviewed-by: Charles Keepax <ckeepax@opensource.cirrus.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250304140504.139245-1-mstrozek@opensource.cirrus.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
2025-03-04usb: xhci: Fix host controllers "dying" after suspend and resumeMichal Pecio
A recent cleanup went a bit too far and dropped clearing the cycle bit of link TRBs, so it stays different from the rest of the ring half of the time. Then a race occurs: if the xHC reaches such link TRB before more commands are queued, the link's cycle bit unintentionally matches the xHC's cycle so it follows the link and waits for further commands. If more commands are queued before the xHC gets there, inc_enq() flips the bit so the xHC later sees a mismatch and stops executing commands. This function is called before suspend and 50% of times after resuming the xHC is doomed to get stuck sooner or later. Then some Stop Endpoint command fails to complete in 5 seconds and this shows up xhci_hcd 0000:00:10.0: xHCI host not responding to stop endpoint command xhci_hcd 0000:00:10.0: xHCI host controller not responding, assume dead xhci_hcd 0000:00:10.0: HC died; cleaning up followed by loss of all USB decives on the affected bus. That's if you are lucky, because if Set Deq gets stuck instead, the failure is silent. Likely responsible for kernel bug 219824. I found this while searching for possible causes of that regression and reproduced it locally before hearing back from the reporter. To repro, simply wait for link cycle to become set (debugfs), then suspend, resume and wait. To accelerate the failure I used a script which repeatedly starts and stops a UVC camera. Some HCs get fully reinitialized on resume and they are not affected. Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219824 Fixes: 36b972d4b7ce ("usb: xhci: improve xhci_clear_command_ring()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Michal Pecio <michal.pecio@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250304113147.3322584-2-mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-03-04net: hns3: make sure ptp clock is unregister and freed if ↵Peiyang Wang
hclge_ptp_get_cycle returns an error During the initialization of ptp, hclge_ptp_get_cycle might return an error and returned directly without unregister clock and free it. To avoid that, call hclge_ptp_destroy_clock to unregist and free clock if hclge_ptp_get_cycle failed. Fixes: 8373cd38a888 ("net: hns3: change the method of obtaining default ptp cycle") Signed-off-by: Peiyang Wang <wangpeiyang1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jijie Shao <shaojijie@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250228105258.1243461-1-shaojijie@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
2025-03-04wifi: nl80211: disable multi-link reconfigurationJohannes Berg
Both the APIs in cfg80211 and the implementation in mac80211 aren't really ready yet, we have a large number of fixes. In addition, it's not possible right now to discover support for this feature from userspace. Disable it for now, there's no rush. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250303110538.fbeef42a5687.Iab122c22137e5675ebd99f5c031e30c0e5c7af2e@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2025-03-04arm64: dts: rockchip: Add missing PCIe supplies to RockPro64 board dtsiDragan Simic
Add missing "vpcie0v9-supply" and "vpcie1v8-supply" properties to the "pcie0" node in the Pine64 RockPro64 board dtsi file. This eliminates the following warnings from the kernel log: rockchip-pcie f8000000.pcie: supply vpcie1v8 not found, using dummy regulator rockchip-pcie f8000000.pcie: supply vpcie0v9 not found, using dummy regulator These additions improve the accuracy of hardware description of the RockPro64 and, in theory, they should result in no functional changes to the way board works after the changes, because the "vcca_0v9" and "vcca_1v8" regulators are always enabled. [1][2] However, extended reliability testing, performed by Chris, [3] has proven that the age-old issues with some PCI Express cards, when used with a Pine64 RockPro64, are also resolved. Those issues were already mentioned in the commit 43853e843aa6 (arm64: dts: rockchip: Remove unsupported node from the Pinebook Pro dts, 2024-04-01), together with a brief description of the out-of-tree enumeration delay patch that reportedly resolves those issues. In a nutshell, booting a RockPro64 with some PCI Express cards attached to it caused a kernel oops. [4] Symptomatically enough, to the commit author's best knowledge, only the Pine64 RockPro64, out of all RK3399-based boards and devices supported upstream, has been reported to suffer from those PCI Express issues, and only the RockPro64 had some of the PCI Express supplies missing in its DT. Thus, perhaps some weird timing issues exist that caused the "vcca_1v8" always-on regulator, which is part of the RK808 PMIC, to actually not be enabled before the PCI Express is initialized and enumerated on the RockPro64, causing oopses with some PCIe cards, and the aforementioned enumeration delay patch [4] probably acted as just a workaround for the underlying timing issue. Admittedly, the Pine64 RockPro64 is a bit specific board by having a standard PCI Express slot, allowing use of various standard cards, but pretty much standard PCI Express cards have been attached to other RK3399 boards as well, and the commit author is unaware ot such issues reported for them. It's quite hard to be sure that the PCI Express issues are fully resolved by these additions to the DT, without some really extensive and time-consuming testing. However, these additions to the DT can result in good things and improvements anyway, making them perfectly safe from the standpoint of being unable to do any harm or cause some unforeseen regressions. These changes apply to the both supported hardware revisions of the Pine64 RockPro64, i.e. to the production-run revisions 2.0 and 2.1. [1][2] [1] https://files.pine64.org/doc/rockpro64/rockpro64_v21-SCH.pdf [2] https://files.pine64.org/doc/rockpro64/rockpro64_v20-SCH.pdf [3] https://z9.de/hedgedoc/s/nF4d5G7rg#reboot-tests-for-PCIe-improvements [4] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230509153912.515218-1-vincenzopalazzodev@gmail.com/T/#u Fixes: bba821f5479e ("arm64: dts: rockchip: add PCIe nodes on rk3399-rockpro64") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Vincenzo Palazzo <vincenzopalazzodev@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Geis <pgwipeout@gmail.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <helgaas@kernel.org> Reported-by: Diederik de Haas <didi.debian@cknow.org> Tested-by: Chris Vogel <chris@z9.de> Signed-off-by: Dragan Simic <dsimic@manjaro.org> Tested-by: Diederik de Haas <didi.debian@cknow.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b39cfd7490d8194f053bf3971f13a43472d1769e.1740941097.git.dsimic@manjaro.org Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner <heiko@sntech.de>
2025-03-04net: dsa: rtl8366rb: don't prompt users for LED controlJakub Kicinski
Make NET_DSA_REALTEK_RTL8366RB_LEDS a hidden symbol. It seems very unlikely user would want to intentionally disable it. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250228004534.3428681-1-kuba@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
2025-03-04be2net: fix sleeping while atomic bugs in be_ndo_bridge_getlinkNikolay Aleksandrov
Partially revert commit b71724147e73 ("be2net: replace polling with sleeping in the FW completion path") w.r.t mcc mutex it introduces and the use of usleep_range. The be2net be_ndo_bridge_getlink() callback is called with rcu_read_lock, so this code has been broken for a long time. Both the mutex_lock and the usleep_range can cause the issue Ian Kumlien reported[1]. The call path is: be_ndo_bridge_getlink -> be_cmd_get_hsw_config -> be_mcc_notify_wait -> be_mcc_wait_compl -> usleep_range() [1] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAA85sZveppNgEVa_FD+qhOMtG_AavK9_mFiU+jWrMtXmwqefGA@mail.gmail.com/ Tested-by: Ian Kumlien <ian.kumlien@gmail.com> Fixes: b71724147e73 ("be2net: replace polling with sleeping in the FW completion path") Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250227164129.1201164-1-razor@blackwall.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
2025-03-04x86/cpu: Properly parse CPUID leaf 0x2 TLB descriptor 0x63Ahmed S. Darwish
CPUID leaf 0x2's one-byte TLB descriptors report the number of entries for specific TLB types, among other properties. Typically, each emitted descriptor implies the same number of entries for its respective TLB type(s). An emitted 0x63 descriptor is an exception: it implies 4 data TLB entries for 1GB pages and 32 data TLB entries for 2MB or 4MB pages. For the TLB descriptors parsing code, the entry count for 1GB pages is encoded at the intel_tlb_table[] mapping, but the 2MB/4MB entry count is totally ignored. Update leaf 0x2's parsing logic 0x2 to account for 32 data TLB entries for 2MB/4MB pages implied by the 0x63 descriptor. Fixes: e0ba94f14f74 ("x86/tlb_info: get last level TLB entry number of CPU") Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwi@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: stable@kernel.org Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250304085152.51092-4-darwi@linutronix.de
2025-03-04x86/cpu: Validate CPUID leaf 0x2 EDX outputAhmed S. Darwish
CPUID leaf 0x2 emits one-byte descriptors in its four output registers EAX, EBX, ECX, and EDX. For these descriptors to be valid, the most significant bit (MSB) of each register must be clear. Leaf 0x2 parsing at intel.c only validated the MSBs of EAX, EBX, and ECX, but left EDX unchecked. Validate EDX's most-significant bit as well. Fixes: e0ba94f14f74 ("x86/tlb_info: get last level TLB entry number of CPU") Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwi@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: stable@kernel.org Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250304085152.51092-3-darwi@linutronix.de
2025-03-04x86/cacheinfo: Validate CPUID leaf 0x2 EDX outputAhmed S. Darwish
CPUID leaf 0x2 emits one-byte descriptors in its four output registers EAX, EBX, ECX, and EDX. For these descriptors to be valid, the most significant bit (MSB) of each register must be clear. The historical Git commit: 019361a20f016 ("- pre6: Intel: start to add Pentium IV specific stuff (128-byte cacheline etc)...") introduced leaf 0x2 output parsing. It only validated the MSBs of EAX, EBX, and ECX, but left EDX unchecked. Validate EDX's most-significant bit. Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwi@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250304085152.51092-2-darwi@linutronix.de
2025-03-04init: add initramfs_internal.hDavid Disseldorp
The new header only exports a single unpack function and a CPIO_HDRLEN constant for future test use. Signed-off-by: David Disseldorp <ddiss@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250304061020.9815-2-ddiss@suse.de Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-03-04Merge patch series "some pipe + wait stuff"Christian Brauner
Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com> says: As a side effect of looking at the pipe hang I came up with 3 changes to consider for -next. The first one is a trivial clean up which I wont mind if it merely gets folded into someone else's change for pipes. The second one reduces page alloc/free calls for the backing area (60% less during a kernel build in my testing). I already posted this, but the cc list was not proper. The last one concerns the wait/wakeup mechanism and drops one lock trip in the common case after waking up. * patches from https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250303230409.452687-1-mjguzik@gmail.com: wait: avoid spurious calls to prepare_to_wait_event() in ___wait_event() pipe: cache 2 pages instead of 1 pipe: drop an always true check in anon_pipe_write() Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250303230409.452687-1-mjguzik@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-03-04wait: avoid spurious calls to prepare_to_wait_event() in ___wait_event()Mateusz Guzik
In vast majority of cases the condition determining whether the thread can proceed is true after the first wake up. However, even in that case the thread ends up calling into prepare_to_wait_event() again, suffering a spurious irq + lock trip. Then it calls into finish_wait() to unlink itself. Note that in case of a pending signal the work done by prepare_to_wait_event() gets ignored even without the change. pre-check the condition after waking up instead. Stats gathared during a kernel build: bpftrace -e 'kprobe:prepare_to_wait_event,kprobe:finish_wait \ { @[probe] = count(); }' @[kprobe:finish_wait]: 392483 @[kprobe:prepare_to_wait_event]: 778690 As in calls to prepare_to_wait_event() almost double calls to finish_wait(). This evens out with the patch. Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250303230409.452687-4-mjguzik@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-03-04pipe: cache 2 pages instead of 1Mateusz Guzik
User data is kept in a circular buffer backed by pages allocated as needed. Only having space for one spare is still prone to having to resort to allocation / freeing. In my testing this decreases page allocs by 60% during a kernel build. Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250303230409.452687-3-mjguzik@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-03-04pipe: drop an always true check in anon_pipe_write()Mateusz Guzik
The check operates on the stale value of 'head' and always loops back. Just do it unconditionally. No functional changes. Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250303230409.452687-2-mjguzik@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-03-04Merge patch series "mount: handle mount propagation for detached mount trees"Christian Brauner
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> says: In commit ee2e3f50629f ("mount: fix mounting of detached mounts onto targets that reside on shared mounts") I fixed a bug where propagating the source mount tree of an anonymous mount namespace into a target mount tree of a non-anonymous mount namespace could be used to trigger an integer overflow in the non-anonymous mount namespace causing any new mounts to fail. The cause of this was that the propagation algorithm was unable to recognize mounts from the source mount tree that were already propagated into the target mount tree and then reappeared as propagation targets when walking the destination propagation mount tree. When fixing this I disabled mount propagation into anonymous mount namespaces. Make it possible for anonymous mount namespace to receive mount propagation events correctly. This is no also a correctness issue now that we allow mounting detached mount trees onto detached mount trees. Mark the source anonymous mount namespace with MNTNS_PROPAGATING indicating that all mounts belonging to this mount namespace are currently in the process of being propagated and make the propagation algorithm discard those if they appear as propagation targets. * patches from https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250225-work-mount-propagation-v1-0-e6e3724500eb@kernel.org: selftests: test subdirectory mounting selftests: add test for detached mount tree propagation mount: handle mount propagation for detached mount trees Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250225-work-mount-propagation-v1-0-e6e3724500eb@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-03-04selftests: test subdirectory mountingChristian Brauner
This tests mounting a subdirectory without ever having to expose the filesystem to a non-anonymous mount namespace. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250225-work-mount-propagation-v1-3-e6e3724500eb@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-03-04selftests: add test for detached mount tree propagationChristian Brauner
Test that detached mount trees receive propagation events. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250225-work-mount-propagation-v1-2-e6e3724500eb@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-03-04fs: namespace: fix uninitialized variable useArnd Bergmann
clang correctly notices that the 'uflags' variable initialization only happens in some cases: fs/namespace.c:4622:6: error: variable 'uflags' is used uninitialized whenever 'if' condition is false [-Werror,-Wsometimes-uninitialized] 4622 | if (flags & MOVE_MOUNT_F_EMPTY_PATH) uflags = AT_EMPTY_PATH; | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ fs/namespace.c:4623:48: note: uninitialized use occurs here 4623 | from_name = getname_maybe_null(from_pathname, uflags); | ^~~~~~ fs/namespace.c:4622:2: note: remove the 'if' if its condition is always true 4622 | if (flags & MOVE_MOUNT_F_EMPTY_PATH) uflags = AT_EMPTY_PATH; | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Fixes: b1e9423d65e3 ("fs: support getname_maybe_null() in move_mount()") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250226081201.1876195-1-arnd@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-03-04mount: handle mount propagation for detached mount treesChristian Brauner
In commit ee2e3f50629f ("mount: fix mounting of detached mounts onto targets that reside on shared mounts") I fixed a bug where propagating the source mount tree of an anonymous mount namespace into a target mount tree of a non-anonymous mount namespace could be used to trigger an integer overflow in the non-anonymous mount namespace causing any new mounts to fail. The cause of this was that the propagation algorithm was unable to recognize mounts from the source mount tree that were already propagated into the target mount tree and then reappeared as propagation targets when walking the destination propagation mount tree. When fixing this I disabled mount propagation into anonymous mount namespaces. Make it possible for anonymous mount namespace to receive mount propagation events correctly. This is no also a correctness issue now that we allow mounting detached mount trees onto detached mount trees. Mark the source anonymous mount namespace with MNTNS_PROPAGATING indicating that all mounts belonging to this mount namespace are currently in the process of being propagated and make the propagation algorithm discard those if they appear as propagation targets. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250225-work-mount-propagation-v1-1-e6e3724500eb@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-03-04fs: allow creating detached mounts from fsmount() file descriptorsChristian Brauner
The previous patch series only enabled the creation of detached mounts from detached mounts that were created via open_tree(). In such cases we know that the origin sequence number for the newly created anonymous mount namespace will be set to the sequence number of the mount namespace the source mount belonged to. But fsmount() creates an anonymous mount namespace that does not have an origin mount namespace as the anonymous mount namespace was derived from a filesystem context created via fsopen(). Account for this case and allow the creation of detached mounts from mounts created via fsmount(). Consequently, any such detached mount created from an fsmount() mount will also have a zero origin sequence number. This allows to mount subdirectories without ever having to expose the filesystem to a a non-anonymous mount namespace: fd_context = sys_fsopen("tmpfs", 0); sys_fsconfig(fd_context, FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE, NULL, NULL, 0); fd_tmpfs = sys_fsmount(fd_context, 0, 0); mkdirat(fd_tmpfs, "subdir", 0755); fd_tree = sys_open_tree(fd_tmpfs, "subdir", OPEN_TREE_CLONE); sys_move_mount(fd_tree, "", -EBADF, "/mnt", MOVE_MOUNT_F_EMPTY_PATH); Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-03-04Merge patch series "fs: expand abilities of anonymous mount namespaces"Christian Brauner
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> says: This series expands the abilities of anonymous mount namespaces. Terminology =========== detached mount: A detached mount is a mount belonging to an anonymous mount namespace. anonymous mount namespace: An anonymous mount namespace is a mount namespace that does not appear in nsfs. This means neither can it be setns()ed into nor can it be persisted through bind-mounts. attached mount: An attached mount is a mount belonging to a non-anonymous mount namespace. non-anonymous mount namespace: A non-anonymous mount namespace is a mount namespace that does appear in nsfs. This means it can be setns()ed into and can be persisted through bind-mounts. mount namespace sequence number: Each non-anonymous mount namespace has a unique 64bit sequence number that is assigned when the mount namespace is created. The sequence number uniquely identifies a non-anonymous mount namespace. One of the purposes of the sequence number is to prevent mount namespace loops. These can occur when an nsfs mount namespace file is bind mounted into a mount namespace that was created after it. Such loops are prevented by verifying that the sequence number of the target mount namespace is smaller than the sequence number of the nsfs mount namespace file. In other words, the target mount namespace must have been created before the nsfs file mount namespace. In contrast, anonymous mount namespaces don't have a sequence number assigned. Anonymous mount namespaces do not appear in any nsfs instances and can thus not be pinned by bind-mounting them anywhere. They can thus not be used to form cycles. Creating detached mounts from detached mounts ============================================= Currently, detached mounts can only be created from attached mounts. This limitaton prevents various use-cases. For example, the ability to mount a subdirectory without ever having to make the whole filesystem visible first. The current permission model for OPEN_TREE_CLONE flag of the open_tree() system call is: (1) Check that the caller is privileged over the owning user namespace of it's current mount namespace. (2) Check that the caller is located in the mount namespace of the mount it wants to create a detached copy of. While it is not strictly necessary to do it this way it is consistently applied in the new mount api. This model will also be used when allowing the creation of detached mount from another detached mount. The (1) requirement can simply be met by performing the same check as for the non-detached case, i.e., verify that the caller is privileged over its current mount namespace. To meet the (2) requirement it must be possible to infer the origin mount namespace that the anonymous mount namespace of the detached mount was created from. The origin mount namespace of an anonymous mount is the mount namespace that the mounts that were copied into the anonymous mount namespace originate from. In order to check the origin mount namespace of an anonymous mount namespace two methods come to mind: (i) stash a reference to the original mount namespace in the anonymous mount namespace (ii) record the sequence number of the original mount namespace in the anonymous mount namespace The (i) option has more complicated consequences and implications than (ii). For example, it would pin the origin mount namespace. Even with a passive reference it would pointlessly pin memory as access to the origin mount namespace isn't required. With (ii) in place it is possible to perform an equivalent check (2') to (2). The origin mount namespace of the anonymous mount namespace must be the same as the caller's mount namespace. To establish this the sequence number of the caller's mount namespace and the origin sequence number of the anonymous mount namespace are compared. The caller is always located in a non-anonymous mount namespace since anonymous mount namespaces cannot be setns()ed into. The caller's mount namespace will thus always have a valid sequence number. The owning namespace of any mount namespace, anonymous or non-anonymous, can never change. A mount attached to a non-anonymous mount namespace can never change mount namespace. If the sequence number of the non-anonymous mount namespace and the origin sequence number of the anonymous mount namespace match, the owning namespaces must match as well. Hence, the capability check on the owning namespace of the caller's mount namespace ensures that the caller has the ability to copy the mount tree. Mounting detached mounts onto detached mounts ============================================= Currently, detached mounts can only be mounted onto attached mounts. This limitation makes it impossible to assemble a new private rootfs and move it into place. Instead, a detached tree must be created, attached, then mounted open and then either moved or detached again. Lift this restriction. In order to allow mounting detached mounts onto other detached mounts the same permission model used for creating detached mounts from detached mounts can be used (cf. above). Allowing to mount detached mounts onto detached mounts leaves three cases to consider: (1) The source mount is an attached mount and the target mount is a detached mount. This would be equivalent to moving a mount between different mount namespaces. A caller could move an attached mount to a detached mount. The detached mount can now be freely attached to any mount namespace. This changes the current delegatioh model significantly for no good reason. So this will fail. (2) Anonymous mount namespaces are always attached fully, i.e., it is not possible to only attach a subtree of an anoymous mount namespace. This simplifies the implementation and reasoning. Consequently, if the anonymous mount namespace of the source detached mount and the target detached mount are the identical the mount request will fail. (3) The source mount's anonymous mount namespace is different from the target mount's anonymous mount namespace. In this case the source anonymous mount namespace of the source mount tree must be freed after its mounts have been moved to the target anonymous mount namespace. The source anonymous mount namespace must be empty afterwards. By allowing to mount detached mounts onto detached mounts a caller may do the following: fd_tree1 = open_tree(-EBADF, "/mnt", OPEN_TREE_CLONE) fd_tree2 = open_tree(-EBADF, "/tmp", OPEN_TREE_CLONE) fd_tree1 and fd_tree2 refer to two different detached mount trees that belong to two different anonymous mount namespace. It is important to note that fd_tree1 and fd_tree2 both refer to the root of their respective anonymous mount namespaces. By allowing to mount detached mounts onto detached mounts the caller may now do: move_mount(fd_tree1, "", fd_tree2, "", MOVE_MOUNT_F_EMPTY_PATH | MOVE_MOUNT_T_EMPTY_PATH) This will cause the detached mount referred to by fd_tree1 to be mounted on top of the detached mount referred to by fd_tree2. Thus, the detached mount fd_tree1 is moved from its separate anonymous mount namespace into fd_tree2's anonymous mount namespace. It also means that while fd_tree2 continues to refer to the root of its respective anonymous mount namespace fd_tree1 doesn't anymore. This has the consequence that only fd_tree2 can be moved to another anonymous or non-anonymous mount namespace. Moving fd_tree1 will now fail as fd_tree1 doesn't refer to the root of an anoymous mount namespace anymore. Now fd_tree1 and fd_tree2 refer to separate detached mount trees referring to the same anonymous mount namespace. This is conceptually fine. The new mount api does allow for this to happen already via: mount -t tmpfs tmpfs /mnt mkdir -p /mnt/A mount -t tmpfs tmpfs /mnt/A fd_tree3 = open_tree(-EBADF, "/mnt", OPEN_TREE_CLONE | AT_RECURSIVE) fd_tree4 = open_tree(-EBADF, "/mnt/A", 0) Both fd_tree3 and fd_tree4 refer to two different detached mount trees but both detached mount trees refer to the same anonymous mount namespace. An as with fd_tree1 and fd_tree2, only fd_tree3 may be moved another mount namespace as fd_tree3 refers to the root of the anonymous mount namespace just while fd_tree4 doesn't. However, there's an important difference between the fd_tree3/fd_tree4 and the fd_tree1/fd_tree2 example. Closing fd_tree4 and releasing the respective struct file will have no further effect on fd_tree3's detached mount tree. However, closing fd_tree3 will cause the mount tree and the respective anonymous mount namespace to be destroyed causing the detached mount tree of fd_tree4 to be invalid for further mounting. By allowing to mount detached mounts on detached mounts as in the fd_tree1/fd_tree2 example both struct files will affect each other. Both fd_tree1 and fd_tree2 refer to struct files that have FMODE_NEED_UNMOUNT set. When either one of them is closed it ends up unmounting the mount tree. The problem is that both will unconditionally free the mount namespace and may end up causing UAFs for each other. Another problem stems from the fact that fd_tree1 doesn't refer to the root of the anonymous mount namespace. So ignoring the UAF issue, if fd_tree2 were to be closed after fd_tree1, then fd_tree1 would free only a part of the mount tree while leaking the rest of the mount tree. Multiple solutions for this problem come to mind: (1) Reference Counting Anonymous Mount Namespaces A solution to this problem would be reference counting anonymous mount namespaces. The source detached mount tree acquires a reference when it is moved into the anonymous mount namespace of the target mount tree. When fd_tree1 is closed the mount tree isn't unmounted and the anonymous mount namespace shared between the detached mount tree at fd_tree1 and fd_tree2 isn't freed. However, this has another problem. When fd_tree2 is closed before fd_tree1 then closing fd_tree1 will cause the mount tree to be unmounted and the anonymous mount namespace to be destroyed. However, fd_tree1 only refers to a part of the mounts that the shared anonymous mount namespace has collected. So this would leak mounts. (2) Removing FMODE_NEED_UNMOUNT from the struct file of the source detached mount tree In the current state of the mount api the creation of two file descriptors that refer to different detached mount trees but to the same anonymous mount namespace is already possible. See the fd_tree3/fd_tree4 examples above. In those cases only one of the two file descriptors will actually end up unmounting and destroying the detached mount tree. Whether or not a struct file needs to unmount and destroy an anonymous mount namespace is governed by the FMODE_NEED_UNMOUNT flag. In the fd_tree3/fd_tree4 example above only fd_tree3 will refer to a struct file that has FMODE_NEED_UNMOUNT set. A similar solution would work for mounting detached mounts onto detached mounts. When the source detached mount tree is moved to the target detached mount tree and thus from the source anonymous mount namespace to the target anonymous mount namespace the FMODE_NEED_UNMOUNT flag will be removed from the struct file of the source detached mount tree. In the above example the FMODE_NEED_UNMOUNT would be removed from the struct file that fd_tree1 refers to. This requires that the source file descriptor fd_tree1 needs to be kept open until move_mount() is finished so that FMODE_NEED_UNMOUNT can be removed: move_mount(fd_tree1, "", fd_tree2, "", MOVE_MOUNT_F_EMPTY_PATH | MOVE_MOUNT_T_EMPTY_PATH) /* * Remove FMODE_NEED_UNMOUNT so closing fd_tree1 will leave the * mount tree alone. */ close(fd_tree1); /* * Remove the whole mount tree including all the mounts that * were moved from fd_tree1 into fd_tree2. */ close(fd_tree2); Since the source detached mount tree fd_tree1 has now become an attached mount tree, i.e., fd_tree1_mnt->mnt_parent == fd_tree2_mnt is is ineligible for attaching again as move_mount() requires that a detached mount tree can only be attached if it is the root of an anonymous mount namespace. Removing FMODE_NEED_UNMOUNT doesn't require to hold @namespace_sem. Attaching @fd_tree1 to @fd_tree2 requires holding @namespace_sem and so does dissolve_on_fput() should @fd_tree2 have been closed concurrently. While removing FMODE_NEED_UNMOUNT can be done it would require some ugly hacking similar to what's done for splice to remove FMODE_NOWAIT. That's ugly. (3) Use the fact that @fd_tree1 will have a parent mount once it has been attached to @fd_tree2. When dissolve_on_fput() is called the mount that has been passed in will refer to the root of the anonymous mount namespace. If it doesn't it would mean that mounts are leaked. So before allowing to mount detached mounts onto detached mounts this would be a bug. Now that detached mounts can be mounted onto detached mounts it just means that the mount has been attached to another anonymous mount namespace and thus dissolve_on_fput() must not unmount the mount tree or free the anonymous mount namespace as the file referring to the root of the namespace hasn't been closed yet. If it had been closed yet it would be obvious because the mount namespace would be NULL, i.e., the @fd_tree1 would have already been unmounted. If @fd_tree1 hasn't been unmounted yet and has a parent mount it is safe to skip any cleanup as closing @fd_tree2 will take care of all cleanup operations. Imho, (3) is the cleanest solution and thus has been chosen. * patches from https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250221-brauner-open_tree-v1-0-dbcfcb98c676@kernel.org: selftests: seventh test for mounting detached mounts onto detached mounts selftests: sixth test for mounting detached mounts onto detached mounts selftests: fifth test for mounting detached mounts onto detached mounts selftests: fourth test for mounting detached mounts onto detached mounts selftests: third test for mounting detached mounts onto detached mounts selftests: second test for mounting detached mounts onto detached mounts selftests: first test for mounting detached mounts onto detached mounts fs: mount detached mounts onto detached mounts fs: support getname_maybe_null() in move_mount() selftests: create detached mounts from detached mounts fs: create detached mounts from detached mounts fs: add may_copy_tree() fs: add fastpath for dissolve_on_fput() fs: add assert for move_mount() fs: add mnt_ns_empty() helper fs: record sequence number of origin mount namespace Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250221-brauner-open_tree-v1-0-dbcfcb98c676@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-03-04selftests: seventh test for mounting detached mounts onto detached mountsChristian Brauner
Add a test to verify that detached mounts behave correctly. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250221-brauner-open_tree-v1-16-dbcfcb98c676@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-03-04selftests: sixth test for mounting detached mounts onto detached mountsChristian Brauner
Add a test to verify that detached mounts behave correctly. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250221-brauner-open_tree-v1-15-dbcfcb98c676@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-03-04selftests: fifth test for mounting detached mounts onto detached mountsChristian Brauner
Add a test to verify that detached mounts behave correctly. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250221-brauner-open_tree-v1-14-dbcfcb98c676@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-03-04selftests: fourth test for mounting detached mounts onto detached mountsChristian Brauner
Add a test to verify that detached mounts behave correctly. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250221-brauner-open_tree-v1-13-dbcfcb98c676@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-03-04selftests: third test for mounting detached mounts onto detached mountsChristian Brauner
Add a test to verify that detached mounts behave correctly. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250221-brauner-open_tree-v1-12-dbcfcb98c676@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-03-04selftests: second test for mounting detached mounts onto detached mountsChristian Brauner
Add a test to verify that detached mounts behave correctly. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250221-brauner-open_tree-v1-11-dbcfcb98c676@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-03-04selftests: first test for mounting detached mounts onto detached mountsChristian Brauner
Add a test to verify that detached mounts behave correctly. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250221-brauner-open_tree-v1-10-dbcfcb98c676@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-03-04fs: mount detached mounts onto detached mountsChristian Brauner
Currently, detached mounts can only be mounted onto attached mounts. This limitation makes it impossible to assemble a new private rootfs and move it into place. That's an extremely powerful concept for container and service workloads that we should support. Right now, a detached tree must be created, attached, then it can gain additional mounts and then it can either be moved (if it doesn't reside under a shared mount) or a detached mount created again. Lift this restriction. In order to allow mounting detached mounts onto other detached mounts the same permission model used for creating detached mounts from detached mounts can be used: (1) Check that the caller is privileged over the owning user namespace of it's current mount namespace. (2) Check that the caller is located in the mount namespace of the mount it wants to create a detached copy of. The origin mount namespace of the anonymous mount namespace must be the same as the caller's mount namespace. To establish this the sequence number of the caller's mount namespace and the origin sequence number of the anonymous mount namespace are compared. The caller is always located in a non-anonymous mount namespace since anonymous mount namespaces cannot be setns()ed into. The caller's mount namespace will thus always have a valid sequence number. The owning namespace of any mount namespace, anonymous or non-anonymous, can never change. A mount attached to a non-anonymous mount namespace can never change mount namespace. If the sequence number of the non-anonymous mount namespace and the origin sequence number of the anonymous mount namespace match, the owning namespaces must match as well. Hence, the capability check on the owning namespace of the caller's mount namespace ensures that the caller has the ability to attach the mount tree. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250221-brauner-open_tree-v1-9-dbcfcb98c676@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-03-04fs: support getname_maybe_null() in move_mount()Christian Brauner
Allow move_mount() to work with NULL path arguments. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250221-brauner-open_tree-v1-8-dbcfcb98c676@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-03-04selftests: create detached mounts from detached mountsChristian Brauner
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250221-brauner-open_tree-v1-7-dbcfcb98c676@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-03-04fs: create detached mounts from detached mountsChristian Brauner
Add the ability to create detached mounts from detached mounts. Currently, detached mounts can only be created from attached mounts. This limitaton prevents various use-cases. For example, the ability to mount a subdirectory without ever having to make the whole filesystem visible first. The current permission model for the OPEN_TREE_CLONE flag of the open_tree() system call is: (1) Check that the caller is privileged over the owning user namespace of it's current mount namespace. (2) Check that the caller is located in the mount namespace of the mount it wants to create a detached copy of. While it is not strictly necessary to do it this way it is consistently applied in the new mount api. This model will also be used when allowing the creation of detached mount from another detached mount. The (1) requirement can simply be met by performing the same check as for the non-detached case, i.e., verify that the caller is privileged over its current mount namespace. To meet the (2) requirement it must be possible to infer the origin mount namespace that the anonymous mount namespace of the detached mount was created from. The origin mount namespace of an anonymous mount is the mount namespace that the mounts that were copied into the anonymous mount namespace originate from. The origin mount namespace of the anonymous mount namespace must be the same as the caller's mount namespace. To establish this the sequence number of the caller's mount namespace and the origin sequence number of the anonymous mount namespace are compared. The caller is always located in a non-anonymous mount namespace since anonymous mount namespaces cannot be setns()ed into. The caller's mount namespace will thus always have a valid sequence number. The owning namespace of any mount namespace, anonymous or non-anonymous, can never change. A mount attached to a non-anonymous mount namespace can never change mount namespace. If the sequence number of the non-anonymous mount namespace and the origin sequence number of the anonymous mount namespace match, the owning namespaces must match as well. Hence, the capability check on the owning namespace of the caller's mount namespace ensures that the caller has the ability to copy the mount tree. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250221-brauner-open_tree-v1-6-dbcfcb98c676@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-03-04fs: add may_copy_tree()Christian Brauner
Add a helper that verifies whether a caller may copy a given mount tree. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250221-brauner-open_tree-v1-5-dbcfcb98c676@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-03-04fs: add fastpath for dissolve_on_fput()Christian Brauner
Instead of acquiring the namespace semaphore and the mount lock everytime we close a file with FMODE_NEED_UNMOUNT set add a fastpath that checks whether we need to at all. Most of the time the caller will have attached the mount to the filesystem hierarchy and there's nothing to do. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250221-brauner-open_tree-v1-4-dbcfcb98c676@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2025-03-04fs: add assert for move_mount()Christian Brauner
After we've attached a detached mount tree the anonymous mount namespace must be empty. Add an assert and make this assumption explicit. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250221-brauner-open_tree-v1-3-dbcfcb98c676@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>