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crng_init is protected by primary_crng->lock, so keep holding that lock
when incrementing crng_init from 0 to 1 in crng_fast_load(). The call to
pr_notice() can wait until the lock is released; this code path cannot
be reached twice, as crng_fast_load() aborts early if crng_init > 0.
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Rather than use spinlocks to protect batched entropy, we can instead
disable interrupts locally, since we're dealing with per-cpu data, and
manage resets with a basic generation counter. At the same time, we
can't quite do this on PREEMPT_RT, where we still want spinlocks-as-
mutexes semantics. So we use a local_lock_t, which provides the right
behavior for each. Because this is a per-cpu lock, that generation
counter is still doing the necessary CPU-to-CPU communication.
This should improve performance a bit. It will also fix the linked splat
that Jonathan received with a PROVE_RAW_LOCK_NESTING=y.
Reviewed-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Jonathan Neuschäfer <j.neuschaefer@gmx.net>
Tested-by: Jonathan Neuschäfer <j.neuschaefer@gmx.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YfMa0QgsjCVdRAvJ@latitude/
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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The primary_crng is always reseeded from the input_pool, while the NUMA
crngs are always reseeded from the primary_crng. Remove the redundant
'use_input_pool' parameter from crng_reseed() and just directly check
whether the crng is the primary_crng.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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This is called from various hwgenerator drivers, so rather than having
one "safe" version for userspace and one "unsafe" version for the
kernel, just make everything safe; the checks are cheap and sensible to
have anyway.
Reported-by: Sultan Alsawaf <sultan@kerneltoast.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Now that POOL_BITS == POOL_MIN_BITS, we must unconditionally wake up
entropy writers after every extraction. Therefore there's no point of
write_wakeup_threshold, so we can move it to the dustbin of unused
compatibility sysctls. While we're at it, we can fix a small comparison
where we were waking up after <= min rather than < min.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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30e37ec516ae ("random: account for entropy loss due to overwrites")
assumed that adding new entropy to the LFSR pool probabilistically
cancelled out old entropy there, so entropy was credited asymptotically,
approximating Shannon entropy of independent sources (rather than a
stronger min-entropy notion) using 1/8th fractional bits and replacing
a constant 2-2/√𝑒 term (~0.786938) with 3/4 (0.75) to slightly
underestimate it. This wasn't superb, but it was perhaps better than
nothing, so that's what was done. Which entropy specifically was being
cancelled out and how much precisely each time is hard to tell, though
as I showed with the attack code in my previous commit, a motivated
adversary with sufficient information can actually cancel out
everything.
Since we're no longer using an LFSR for entropy accumulation, this
probabilistic cancellation is no longer relevant. Rather, we're now
using a computational hash function as the accumulator and we've
switched to working in the random oracle model, from which we can now
revisit the question of min-entropy accumulation, which is done in
detail in <https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/198>.
Consider a long input bit string that is built by concatenating various
smaller independent input bit strings. Each one of these inputs has a
designated min-entropy, which is what we're passing to
credit_entropy_bits(h). When we pass the concatenation of these to a
random oracle, it means that an adversary trying to receive back the
same reply as us would need to become certain about each part of the
concatenated bit string we passed in, which means becoming certain about
all of those h values. That means we can estimate the accumulation by
simply adding up the h values in calls to credit_entropy_bits(h);
there's no probabilistic cancellation at play like there was said to be
for the LFSR. Incidentally, this is also what other entropy accumulators
based on computational hash functions do as well.
So this commit replaces credit_entropy_bits(h) with essentially `total =
min(POOL_BITS, total + h)`, done with a cmpxchg loop as before.
What if we're wrong and the above is nonsense? It's not, but let's
assume we don't want the actual _behavior_ of the code to change much.
Currently that behavior is not extracting from the input pool until it
has 128 bits of entropy in it. With the old algorithm, we'd hit that
magic 128 number after roughly 256 calls to credit_entropy_bits(1). So,
we can retain more or less the old behavior by waiting to extract from
the input pool until it hits 256 bits of entropy using the new code. For
people concerned about this change, it means that there's not that much
practical behavioral change. And for folks actually trying to model
the behavior rigorously, it means that we have an even higher margin
against attacks.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jean-Philippe Aumasson <jeanphilippe.aumasson@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Our pool is 256 bits, and we only ever use all of it or don't use it at
all, which is decided by whether or not it has at least 128 bits in it.
So we can drastically simplify the accounting and cmpxchg loop to do
exactly this. While we're at it, we move the minimum bit size into a
constant so it can be shared between the two places where it matters.
The reason we want any of this is for the case in which an attacker has
compromised the current state, and then bruteforces small amounts of
entropy added to it. By demanding a particular minimum amount of entropy
be present before reseeding, we make that bruteforcing difficult.
Note that this rationale no longer includes anything about /dev/random
blocking at the right moment, since /dev/random no longer blocks (except
for at ~boot), but rather uses the crng. In a former life, /dev/random
was different and therefore required a more nuanced account(), but this
is no longer.
Behaviorally, nothing changes here. This is just a simplification of
the code.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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The current 4096-bit LFSR used for entropy collection had a few
desirable attributes for the context in which it was created. For
example, the state was huge, which meant that /dev/random would be able
to output quite a bit of accumulated entropy before blocking. It was
also, in its time, quite fast at accumulating entropy byte-by-byte,
which matters given the varying contexts in which mix_pool_bytes() is
called. And its diffusion was relatively high, which meant that changes
would ripple across several words of state rather quickly.
However, it also suffers from a few security vulnerabilities. In
particular, inputs learned by an attacker can be undone, but moreover,
if the state of the pool leaks, its contents can be controlled and
entirely zeroed out. I've demonstrated this attack with this SMT2
script, <https://xn--4db.cc/5o9xO8pb>, which Boolector/CaDiCal solves in
a matter of seconds on a single core of my laptop, resulting in little
proof of concept C demonstrators such as <https://xn--4db.cc/jCkvvIaH/c>.
For basically all recent formal models of RNGs, these attacks represent
a significant cryptographic flaw. But how does this manifest
practically? If an attacker has access to the system to such a degree
that he can learn the internal state of the RNG, arguably there are
other lower hanging vulnerabilities -- side-channel, infoleak, or
otherwise -- that might have higher priority. On the other hand, seed
files are frequently used on systems that have a hard time generating
much entropy on their own, and these seed files, being files, often leak
or are duplicated and distributed accidentally, or are even seeded over
the Internet intentionally, where their contents might be recorded or
tampered with. Seen this way, an otherwise quasi-implausible
vulnerability is a bit more practical than initially thought.
Another aspect of the current mix_pool_bytes() function is that, while
its performance was arguably competitive for the time in which it was
created, it's no longer considered so. This patch improves performance
significantly: on a high-end CPU, an i7-11850H, it improves performance
of mix_pool_bytes() by 225%, and on a low-end CPU, a Cortex-A7, it
improves performance by 103%.
This commit replaces the LFSR of mix_pool_bytes() with a straight-
forward cryptographic hash function, BLAKE2s, which is already in use
for pool extraction. Universal hashing with a secret seed was considered
too, something along the lines of <https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/338>,
but the requirement for a secret seed makes for a chicken & egg problem.
Instead we go with a formally proven scheme using a computational hash
function, described in sections 5.1, 6.4, and B.1.8 of
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/198>.
BLAKE2s outputs 256 bits, which should give us an appropriate amount of
min-entropy accumulation, and a wide enough margin of collision
resistance against active attacks. mix_pool_bytes() becomes a simple
call to blake2s_update(), for accumulation, while the extraction step
becomes a blake2s_final() to generate a seed, with which we can then do
a HKDF-like or BLAKE2X-like expansion, the first part of which we fold
back as an init key for subsequent blake2s_update()s, and the rest we
produce to the caller. This then is provided to our CRNG like usual. In
that expansion step, we make opportunistic use of 32 bytes of RDRAND
output, just as before. We also always reseed the crng with 32 bytes,
unconditionally, or not at all, rather than sometimes with 16 as before,
as we don't win anything by limiting beyond the 16 byte threshold.
Going for a hash function as an entropy collector is a conservative,
proven approach. The result of all this is a much simpler and much less
bespoke construction than what's there now, which not only plugs a
vulnerability but also improves performance considerably.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Jean-Philippe Aumasson <jeanphilippe.aumasson@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Merge series from Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>:
DT bindings for stacked and parallel flash/memory devices.
base-commit: e783362eb54cd99b2cac8b3a9aeac942e6f6ac07
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The functions copy_page_to_iter_pipe() and push_pipe() can both
allocate a new pipe_buffer, but the "flags" member initializer is
missing.
Fixes: 241699cd72a8 ("new iov_iter flavour: pipe-backed")
To: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
To: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Max Kellermann <max.kellermann@ionos.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Resending this to properly add it to the patch tracker - thanks for letting
me know, Arnd :)
When ARM is enabled, and BITREVERSE is disabled,
Kbuild gives the following warning:
WARNING: unmet direct dependencies detected for HAVE_ARCH_BITREVERSE
Depends on [n]: BITREVERSE [=n]
Selected by [y]:
- ARM [=y] && (CPU_32v7M [=n] || CPU_32v7 [=y]) && !CPU_32v6 [=n]
This is because ARM selects HAVE_ARCH_BITREVERSE
without selecting BITREVERSE, despite
HAVE_ARCH_BITREVERSE depending on BITREVERSE.
This unmet dependency bug was found by Kismet,
a static analysis tool for Kconfig. Please advise if this
is not the appropriate solution.
Signed-off-by: Julian Braha <julianbraha@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
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The kgdb code needs to register an undef hook for the Thumb UDF
instruction that will fault in order to be functional on Thumb2
platforms.
Reported-by: Johannes Stezenbach <js@sig21.net>
Tested-by: Johannes Stezenbach <js@sig21.net>
Fixes: 5cbad0ebf45c ("kgdb: support for ARCH=arm")
Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
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We need to provide a destroy callback to release the extra fields.
Fixes: 3b9e2ea6c11b ("netfilter: nft_limit: move stateful fields out of expression data")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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Unregister flowtable hooks before they are releases via
nf_tables_flowtable_destroy() otherwise hook core reports UAF.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in nf_hook_entries_grow+0x5a7/0x700 net/netfilter/core.c:142 net/netfilter/core.c:142
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880736f7438 by task syz-executor579/3666
CPU: 0 PID: 3666 Comm: syz-executor579 Not tainted 5.16.0-rc5-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] lib/dump_stack.c:106
dump_stack_lvl+0x1dc/0x2d8 lib/dump_stack.c:106 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description+0x65/0x380 mm/kasan/report.c:247 mm/kasan/report.c:247
__kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:433 [inline]
__kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:433 [inline] mm/kasan/report.c:450
kasan_report+0x19a/0x1f0 mm/kasan/report.c:450 mm/kasan/report.c:450
nf_hook_entries_grow+0x5a7/0x700 net/netfilter/core.c:142 net/netfilter/core.c:142
__nf_register_net_hook+0x27e/0x8d0 net/netfilter/core.c:429 net/netfilter/core.c:429
nf_register_net_hook+0xaa/0x180 net/netfilter/core.c:571 net/netfilter/core.c:571
nft_register_flowtable_net_hooks+0x3c5/0x730 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:7232 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:7232
nf_tables_newflowtable+0x2022/0x2cf0 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:7430 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:7430
nfnetlink_rcv_batch net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:513 [inline]
nfnetlink_rcv_skb_batch net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:634 [inline]
nfnetlink_rcv_batch net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:513 [inline] net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:652
nfnetlink_rcv_skb_batch net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:634 [inline] net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:652
nfnetlink_rcv+0x10e6/0x2550 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:652 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:652
__nft_release_hook() calls nft_unregister_flowtable_net_hooks() which
only unregisters the hooks, then after RCU grace period, it is
guaranteed that no packets add new entries to the flowtable (no flow
offload rules and flowtable hooks are reachable from packet path), so it
is safe to call nf_flow_table_free() which cleans up the remaining
entries from the flowtable (both software and hardware) and it unbinds
the flow_block.
Fixes: ff4bf2f42a40 ("netfilter: nf_tables: add nft_unregister_flowtable_hook()")
Reported-by: syzbot+e918523f77e62790d6d9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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...to help userland apps that need to identify FUSE mounts.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
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Without the terminator, if a con_id is passed to gpio_find() that
does not exist in the lookup table the function will not stop looping
correctly, and eventually cause an oops.
Fixes: 19d8d6e36b4b ("platform/x86: int3472: Pass tps68470_regulator_platform_data to the tps68470-regulator MFD-cell")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Scally <djrscally@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220216225304.53911-5-djrscally@gmail.com
Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
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Use of_device_get_match_data() to simplify the code.
Reported-by: Zeal Robot <zealci@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Minghao Chi (CGEL ZTE) <chi.minghao@zte.com.cn>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220221020233.1925154-1-chi.minghao@zte.com.cn
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
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Provide an example of how to describe two flashes in eg. stacked mode.
Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
Reviewed-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220126112608.955728-4-miquel.raynal@bootlin.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
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Describe two new memories modes:
- A stacked mode when the bus is common but the address space extended
with an additinals wires.
- A parallel mode with parallel busses accessing parallel flashes where
the data is spread.
Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
Acked-by: Pratyush Yadav <p.yadav@ti.com>
Reviewed-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220126112608.955728-3-miquel.raynal@bootlin.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
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The Xilinx QSPI controller has two advanced modes which allow the
controller to behave differently and consider two flashes as one single
storage.
One of these two modes is quite complex to support from a binding point
of view and is the dual parallel memories. In this mode, each byte of
data is stored in both devices: the even bits in one, the odd bits in
the other. The split is automatically handled by the QSPI controller and
is transparent for the user.
The other mode is simpler to support, it is called dual stacked
memories. The controller shares the same SPI bus but each of the devices
contain half of the data. Once in this mode, the controller does not
follow CS requests but instead internally wires the two CS levels with
the value of the most significant address bit.
Supporting these two modes will involve core changes which include the
possibility of providing two CS for a single SPI device
Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
Acked-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Pratyush Yadav <p.yadav@ti.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220126112608.955728-2-miquel.raynal@bootlin.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
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Experimentation shows that PHY detect might fail when the code attempts
MDIO bus read immediately after clock enable. Add delay to stabilize the
clock before bus access.
PHY detect failure started to show after commit 7590fc6f80ac ("net:
mdio: Demote probed message to debug print") that removed coincidental
delay between clock enable and bus access.
10ms is meant to match the time it take to send the probed message over
UART at 115200 bps. This might be a far overshoot.
Fixes: 23a890d493e3 ("net: mdio: Add the reset function for IPQ MDIO driver")
Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach <baruch.siach@siklu.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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If an application calls io_uring_enter(2) with a timespec passed in,
convert that timespec to ktime_t rather than jiffies. The latter does
not provide the granularity the application may expect, and may in
fact provided different granularity on different systems, depending
on what the HZ value is configured at.
Turn the timespec into an absolute ktime_t, and use that with
schedule_hrtimeout() instead.
Link: https://github.com/axboe/liburing/issues/531
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Bob Chen <chenbo.chen@alibaba-inc.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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We encounter a tcp drop issue in our cloud environment. Packet GROed in
host forwards to a VM virtio_net nic with net_failover enabled. VM acts
as a IPVS LB with ipip encapsulation. The full path like:
host gro -> vm virtio_net rx -> net_failover rx -> ipvs fullnat
-> ipip encap -> net_failover tx -> virtio_net tx
When net_failover transmits a ipip pkt (gso_type = 0x0103, which means
SKB_GSO_TCPV4, SKB_GSO_DODGY and SKB_GSO_IPXIP4), there is no gso
did because it supports TSO and GSO_IPXIP4. But network_header points to
inner ip header.
Call Trace:
tcp4_gso_segment ------> return NULL
inet_gso_segment ------> inner iph, network_header points to
ipip_gso_segment
inet_gso_segment ------> outer iph
skb_mac_gso_segment
Afterwards virtio_net transmits the pkt, only inner ip header is modified.
And the outer one just keeps unchanged. The pkt will be dropped in remote
host.
Call Trace:
inet_gso_segment ------> inner iph, outer iph is skipped
skb_mac_gso_segment
__skb_gso_segment
validate_xmit_skb
validate_xmit_skb_list
sch_direct_xmit
__qdisc_run
__dev_queue_xmit ------> virtio_net
dev_hard_start_xmit
__dev_queue_xmit ------> net_failover
ip_finish_output2
ip_output
iptunnel_xmit
ip_tunnel_xmit
ipip_tunnel_xmit ------> ipip
dev_hard_start_xmit
__dev_queue_xmit
ip_finish_output2
ip_output
ip_forward
ip_rcv
__netif_receive_skb_one_core
netif_receive_skb_internal
napi_gro_receive
receive_buf
virtnet_poll
net_rx_action
The root cause of this issue is specific with the rare combination of
SKB_GSO_DODGY and a tunnel device that adds an SKB_GSO_ tunnel option.
SKB_GSO_DODGY is set from external virtio_net. We need to reset network
header when callbacks.gso_segment() returns NULL.
This patch also includes ipv6_gso_segment(), considering SIT, etc.
Fixes: cb32f511a70b ("ipip: add GSO/TSO support")
Signed-off-by: Tao Liu <thomas.liu@ucloud.cn>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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When an application accesses a mapped frame buffer backed by deferred
I/O, it receives a segmentation fault. Fix this by removing the check
for VM_IO in do_page_fault().
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Tested-by: Michael Schmitz <schmitzmic@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220128173006.1713210-1-geert@linux-m68k.org
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To avoid 'warning: no previous prototype for' errors, declare all the
parse_bootinfo and config function prototypes into asm/config.h and
include it in arch/m68k/kernel/setup_mm.c and arch/m68k/*/config.c.
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220121200738.2577697-2-laurent@vivier.eu
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
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After the introduction of the dedicated struct slab to describe slab
pages by commit d122019bf061 ("mm: Split slab into its own type") and
the following removal of the corresponding struct page's fields by
commit 07f910f9b729 ("mm: Remove slab from struct page") the
memcg_slabinfo tool broke. An attempt to run it produces a trace like
this:
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/usr/bin/drgn", line 33, in <module>
sys.exit(load_entry_point('drgn==0.0.16', 'console_scripts', 'drgn')())
File "/usr/lib64/python3.9/site-packages/drgn/internal/cli.py", line 133, in main
runpy.run_path(args.script[0], init_globals=init_globals, run_name="__main__")
File "/usr/lib64/python3.9/runpy.py", line 268, in run_path
return _run_module_code(code, init_globals, run_name,
File "/usr/lib64/python3.9/runpy.py", line 97, in _run_module_code
_run_code(code, mod_globals, init_globals,
File "/usr/lib64/python3.9/runpy.py", line 87, in _run_code
exec(code, run_globals)
File "memcg_slabinfo.py", line 226, in <module>
main()
File "memcg_slabinfo.py", line 199, in main
cache = page.slab_cache
AttributeError: 'struct page' has no member 'slab_cache'
The problem can be fixed by explicitly casting struct page * to struct
slab * for slab pages. The tools works as expected with this fix, e.g.:
cred_jar 776 776 192 21 1 : tunables 0 0 0 : slabdata 547 547 0
kmalloc-cg-32 6 6 32 128 1 : tunables 0 0 0 : slabdata 9 9 0
files_cache 3 3 832 39 8 : tunables 0 0 0 : slabdata 8 8 0
kmalloc-cg-512 1 1 512 32 4 : tunables 0 0 0 : slabdata 10 10 0
task_struct 10 10 6720 4 8 : tunables 0 0 0 : slabdata 63 63 0
mm_struct 3 3 1664 19 8 : tunables 0 0 0 : slabdata 9 9 0
kmalloc-cg-16 1 1 16 256 1 : tunables 0 0 0 : slabdata 8 8 0
pde_opener 1 1 40 102 1 : tunables 0 0 0 : slabdata 8 8 0
anon_vma_chain 375 375 64 64 1 : tunables 0 0 0 : slabdata 81 81 0
radix_tree_node 3 3 584 28 4 : tunables 0 0 0 : slabdata 419 419 0
dentry 98 98 312 26 2 : tunables 0 0 0 : slabdata 1420 1420 0
btrfs_inode 3 3 2368 13 8 : tunables 0 0 0 : slabdata 730 730 0
signal_cache 3 3 1600 20 8 : tunables 0 0 0 : slabdata 17 17 0
sighand_cache 3 3 2240 14 8 : tunables 0 0 0 : slabdata 20 20 0
filp 90 90 512 32 4 : tunables 0 0 0 : slabdata 95 95 0
anon_vma 214 214 200 20 1 : tunables 0 0 0 : slabdata 162 162 0
kmalloc-cg-1k 1 1 1024 32 8 : tunables 0 0 0 : slabdata 22 22 0
pid 10 10 256 32 2 : tunables 0 0 0 : slabdata 14 14 0
kmalloc-cg-64 2 2 64 64 1 : tunables 0 0 0 : slabdata 8 8 0
kmalloc-cg-96 3 3 96 42 1 : tunables 0 0 0 : slabdata 8 8 0
sock_inode_cache 5 5 1408 23 8 : tunables 0 0 0 : slabdata 29 29 0
UNIX 7 7 1920 17 8 : tunables 0 0 0 : slabdata 21 21 0
inode_cache 36 36 1152 28 8 : tunables 0 0 0 : slabdata 680 680 0
proc_inode_cache 26 26 1224 26 8 : tunables 0 0 0 : slabdata 64 64 0
kmalloc-cg-2k 2 2 2048 16 8 : tunables 0 0 0 : slabdata 9 9 0
v2: change naming and count_partial()/count_free()/for_each_slab()
signatures to work with slabs, suggested by Matthew Wilcox
Fixes: 07f910f9b729 ("mm: Remove slab from struct page")
Reported-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Tested-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-patches/Yg2cKKnIboNu7j+p@carbon.DHCP.thefacebook.com/
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Merge the generic_handle_irq_safe() API back into irq/core.
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Commit c37495d6254c ("slab: add __alloc_size attributes for better
bounds checking") added __alloc_size attributes to a bunch of kmalloc
function prototypes. Unfortunately the change to __kmalloc_track_caller
seems to cause clang to generate broken code and the first time this is
called when booting, the box will crash.
While the compiler problems are being reworked and attempted to be
solved [1], let's just drop the attribute to solve the issue now. Once
it is resolved it can be added back.
[1] https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1599
Fixes: c37495d6254c ("slab: add __alloc_size attributes for better bounds checking")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: llvm@lists.linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Acked-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220218131358.3032912-1-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
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Provide generic_handle_irq_safe() which can used from any context.
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@natalenko.name>
Reviewed-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220211181500.1856198-2-bigeasy@linutronix.de
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We need to use phy_name() to convert the PHY value into a human-readable
character in the error message.
Fixes: a6a128116e55 ("drm/i915/dg2: Wait for SNPS PHY calibration during display init")
Signed-off-by: Matt Roper <matthew.d.roper@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Swathi Dhanavanthri <swathi.dhanavanthri@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220215163545.2175730-1-matthew.d.roper@intel.com
(cherry picked from commit 84073e568eec7b586b2f6fd5fb2fb08f59edec54)
Signed-off-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com>
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If the only thing that is changing is SAGV vs. no SAGV but
the number of active planes and the total data rates end up
unchanged we currently bail out of intel_bw_atomic_check()
early and forget to actually compute the new WGV point
mask and thus won't actually enable/disable SAGV as requested.
This ends up poorly if we end up running with SAGV enabled
when we shouldn't. Usually ends up in underruns.
To fix this let's go through the QGV point mask computation
if either the data rates/number of planes, or the state
of SAGV is changing.
v2: Check more carefully if things are changing to avoid
the extra calculations/debugs from introducing unwanted
overhead
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Stanislav Lisovskiy <stanislav.lisovskiy@intel.com> #v1
Fixes: 20f505f22531 ("drm/i915: Restrict qgv points which don't have enough bandwidth.")
Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220218064039.12834-3-ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com
(cherry picked from commit 6b728595ffa51c087343c716bccbfc260f120e72)
Signed-off-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com>
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When changing between SAGV vs. no SAGV on tgl+ we have to
update the use_sagv_wm flag for all the crtcs or else
an active pipe not already in the state will end up using
the wrong watermarks. That is especially bad when we end up
with the tighter non-SAGV watermarks with SAGV enabled.
Usually ends up in underruns.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Stanislav Lisovskiy <stanislav.lisovskiy@intel.com>
Fixes: 7241c57d3140 ("drm/i915: Add TGL+ SAGV support")
Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220218064039.12834-2-ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com
(cherry picked from commit 8dd8ffb824ca7b897ce9f2082ffa7e64831c22dc)
Signed-off-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com>
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BIOS may leave a TypeC PHY in a connected state even though the
corresponding port is disabled. This will prevent any hotplug events
from being signalled (after the monitor deasserts and then reasserts its
HPD) until the PHY is disconnected and so the driver will not detect a
connected sink. Rebooting with the PHY in the connected state also
results in a system hang.
Fix the above by disconnecting TypeC PHYs on disabled ports.
Before commit 64851a32c463e5 the PHY connected state was read out even
for disabled ports and later the PHY got disconnected as a side effect
of a tc_port_lock/unlock() sequence (during connector probing), hence
recovering the port's hotplug functionality.
Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/-/issues/5014
Fixes: 64851a32c463 ("drm/i915/tc: Add a mode for the TypeC PHY's disconnected state")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.16+
Cc: José Roberto de Souza <jose.souza@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Imre Deak <imre.deak@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: José Roberto de Souza <jose.souza@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220217152237.670220-1-imre.deak@intel.com
(cherry picked from commit ed0ccf349ffd9c80e7376d4d8c608643de990e86)
Signed-off-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com>
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adlp+ adds some extra bits to the QGV point mask. The code attempts
to handle that but forgot to actually make sure we can store those
bits in the bw state. Fix it.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Stanislav Lisovskiy <stanislav.lisovskiy@intel.com>
Fixes: 192fbfb76744 ("drm/i915: Implement PSF GV point support")
Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220214091811.13725-4-ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com
Reviewed-by: Stanislav Lisovskiy <stanislav.lisovskiy@intel.com>
(cherry picked from commit c0299cc9840b3805205173cc77782f317b78ea0e)
Signed-off-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com>
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reporting
With unprivileged eBPF enabled, eIBRS (without retpoline) is vulnerable
to Spectre v2 BHB-based attacks.
When both are enabled, print a warning message and report it in the
'spectre_v2' sysfs vulnerabilities file.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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Update the doc with the new fun.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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Thanks to the chaps at VUsec it is now clear that eIBRS is not
sufficient, therefore allow enabling of retpolines along with eIBRS.
Add spectre_v2=eibrs, spectre_v2=eibrs,lfence and
spectre_v2=eibrs,retpoline options to explicitly pick your preferred
means of mitigation.
Since there's new mitigations there's also user visible changes in
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2 to reflect these
new mitigations.
[ bp: Massage commit message, trim error messages,
do more precise eIBRS mode checking. ]
Co-developed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Patrick Colp <patrick.colp@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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The RETPOLINE_AMD name is unfortunate since it isn't necessarily
AMD only, in fact Hygon also uses it. Furthermore it will likely be
sufficient for some Intel processors. Therefore rename the thing to
RETPOLINE_LFENCE to better describe what it is.
Add the spectre_v2=retpoline,lfence option as an alias to
spectre_v2=retpoline,amd to preserve existing setups. However, the output
of /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2 will be changed.
[ bp: Fix typos, massage. ]
Co-developed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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Add support for the following Telit LE910R1 compositions:
0x701a: rndis, tty, tty, tty
0x701b: ecm, tty, tty, tty
0x9201: tty
Signed-off-by: Daniele Palmas <dnlplm@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220218134552.4051-1-dnlplm@gmail.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
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Dell DW5829e same as DW5821e except CAT level.
DW5821e supports CAT16 but DW5829e supports CAT9.
There are 2 types product of DW5829e: normal and eSIM.
So we will add 2 PID for DW5829e.
And for each PID, it support MBIM or RMNET.
Let's see test evidence as below:
DW5829e MBIM mode:
T: Bus=04 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=01 Cnt=01 Dev#= 4 Spd=5000 MxCh= 0
D: Ver= 3.10 Cls=ef(misc ) Sub=02 Prot=01 MxPS= 9 #Cfgs= 2
P: Vendor=413c ProdID=81e6 Rev=03.18
S: Manufacturer=Dell Inc.
S: Product=DW5829e Snapdragon X20 LTE
S: SerialNumber=0123456789ABCDEF
C: #Ifs= 7 Cfg#= 2 Atr=a0 MxPwr=896mA
I: If#=0x0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=02(commc) Sub=0e Prot=00 Driver=cdc_mbim
I: If#=0x1 Alt= 1 #EPs= 2 Cls=0a(data ) Sub=00 Prot=02 Driver=cdc_mbim
I: If#=0x2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option
I: If#=0x3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option
I: If#=0x4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option
I: If#=0x5 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option
I: If#=0x6 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=(none)
DW5829e RMNET mode:
T: Bus=04 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=01 Cnt=01 Dev#= 5 Spd=5000 MxCh= 0
D: Ver= 3.10 Cls=ef(misc ) Sub=02 Prot=01 MxPS= 9 #Cfgs= 1
P: Vendor=413c ProdID=81e6 Rev=03.18
S: Manufacturer=Dell Inc.
S: Product=DW5829e Snapdragon X20 LTE
S: SerialNumber=0123456789ABCDEF
C: #Ifs= 6 Cfg#= 1 Atr=a0 MxPwr=896mA
I: If#=0x0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=qmi_wwan
I: If#=0x1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=03(HID ) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=usbhid
I: If#=0x2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option
I: If#=0x3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option
I: If#=0x4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option
I: If#=0x5 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option
DW5829e-eSIM MBIM mode:
T: Bus=04 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=01 Cnt=01 Dev#= 6 Spd=5000 MxCh= 0
D: Ver= 3.10 Cls=ef(misc ) Sub=02 Prot=01 MxPS= 9 #Cfgs= 2
P: Vendor=413c ProdID=81e4 Rev=03.18
S: Manufacturer=Dell Inc.
S: Product=DW5829e-eSIM Snapdragon X20 LTE
S: SerialNumber=0123456789ABCDEF
C: #Ifs= 7 Cfg#= 2 Atr=a0 MxPwr=896mA
I: If#=0x0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=02(commc) Sub=0e Prot=00 Driver=cdc_mbim
I: If#=0x1 Alt= 1 #EPs= 2 Cls=0a(data ) Sub=00 Prot=02 Driver=cdc_mbim
I: If#=0x2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option
I: If#=0x3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option
I: If#=0x4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option
I: If#=0x5 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option
I: If#=0x6 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=(none)
DW5829e-eSIM RMNET mode:
T: Bus=04 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=01 Cnt=01 Dev#= 7 Spd=5000 MxCh= 0
D: Ver= 3.10 Cls=ef(misc ) Sub=02 Prot=01 MxPS= 9 #Cfgs= 1
P: Vendor=413c ProdID=81e4 Rev=03.18
S: Manufacturer=Dell Inc.
S: Product=DW5829e-eSIM Snapdragon X20 LTE
S: SerialNumber=0123456789ABCDEF
C: #Ifs= 6 Cfg#= 1 Atr=a0 MxPwr=896mA
I: If#=0x0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=qmi_wwan
I: If#=0x1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=03(HID ) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=usbhid
I: If#=0x2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option
I: If#=0x3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option
I: If#=0x4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option
I: If#=0x5 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option
BTW, the interface 0x6 of MBIM mode is GNSS port, which not same as NMEA
port. So it's banned from serial option driver.
The remaining interfaces 0x2-0x5 are: MODEM, MODEM, NMEA, DIAG.
Signed-off-by: Slark Xiao <slark_xiao@163.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220214021401.6264-1-slark_xiao@163.com
[ johan: drop unnecessary reservation of interface 1 ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
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This reverts commit 46ee4abb10a07bd8f8ce910ee6b4ae6a947d7f63.
CH341 has Product ID 0x5512 in EPP/MEM mode which is used for
I2C/SPI/GPIO interfaces. In asynchronous serial interface mode
CH341 has PID 0x5523 which is already in the table.
Mode is selected by corresponding jumper setting.
Signed-off-by: Dmytro Bagrii <dimich.dmb@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220210164137.4376-1-dimich.dmb@gmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YJ0OCS/sh+1ifD/q@hovoldconsulting.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
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Syzbot reported an slab-out-of-bounds Read in thrustmaster_probe() bug.
The root case is in missing validation check of actual number of endpoints.
Code should not blindly access usb_host_interface::endpoint array, since
it may contain less endpoints than code expects.
Fix it by adding missing validaion check and print an error if
number of endpoints do not match expected number
Fixes: c49c33637802 ("HID: support for initialization of some Thrustmaster wheels")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+35eebd505e97d315d01c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
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The imx_pgc_power_down() starts by enabling the domain clocks, and thus
disables them in the error path. Commit 18c98573a4cf ("soc: imx: gpcv2:
add domain option to keep domain clocks enabled") made the clock enable
conditional, but forgot to add the same condition to the error path.
This can result in a clock enable/disable imbalance. Fix it.
Fixes: 18c98573a4cf ("soc: imx: gpcv2: add domain option to keep domain clocks enabled")
Signed-off-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
Reviewed-by: Lucas Stach <l.stach@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>
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Tejas reported the following recursive locking issue:
swapper/0/1 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff8881074fd0a0 (&md->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: msi_get_virq+0x30/0xc0
but task is already holding lock:
ffff8881017cd6a0 (&md->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __pci_enable_msi_range+0xf2/0x290
stack backtrace:
__mutex_lock+0x9d/0x920
msi_get_virq+0x30/0xc0
pci_irq_vector+0x26/0x30
vmd_msi_init+0xcc/0x210
msi_domain_alloc+0xbf/0x150
msi_domain_alloc_irqs_descs_locked+0x3e/0xb0
__pci_enable_msi_range+0x155/0x290
pci_alloc_irq_vectors_affinity+0xba/0x100
pcie_port_device_register+0x307/0x550
pcie_portdrv_probe+0x3c/0xd0
pci_device_probe+0x95/0x110
This is caused by the VMD MSI code which does a lookup of the Linux
interrupt number for an VMD managed MSI[X] vector. The lookup function
tries to acquire the already held mutex.
Avoid that by caching the Linux interrupt number at initialization time
instead of looking it up over and over.
Fixes: 82ff8e6b78fc ("PCI/MSI: Use msi_get_virq() in pci_get_vector()")
Reported-by: "Surendrakumar Upadhyay, TejaskumarX" <tejaskumarx.surendrakumar.upadhyay@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: "Surendrakumar Upadhyay, TejaskumarX" <tejaskumarx.surendrakumar.upadhyay@intel.com>
Cc: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87a6euub2a.ffs@tglx
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull locking fix from Borislav Petkov:
"Fix a NULL ptr dereference when dumping lockdep chains through
/proc/lockdep_chains"
* tag 'locking_urgent_for_v5.17_rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
lockdep: Correct lock_classes index mapping
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Borislav Petkov:
- Fix the ptrace regset xfpregs_set() callback to behave according to
the ABI
- Handle poisoned pages properly in the SGX reclaimer code
* tag 'x86_urgent_for_v5.17_rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/ptrace: Fix xfpregs_set()'s incorrect xmm clearing
x86/sgx: Fix missing poison handling in reclaimer
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull scheduler fix from Borislav Petkov:
"Fix task exposure order when forking tasks"
* tag 'sched_urgent_for_v5.17_rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
sched: Fix yet more sched_fork() races
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ras/ras
Pull EDAC fix from Borislav Petkov:
"Fix a long-standing struct alignment bug in the EDAC struct allocation
code"
* tag 'edac_urgent_for_v5.17_rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ras/ras:
EDAC: Fix calculation of returned address and next offset in edac_align_ptr()
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/scsi
Pull SCSI fixes from James Bottomley:
"Three fixes, all in drivers.
The ufs and qedi fixes are minor; the lpfc one is a bit bigger because
it involves adding a heuristic to detect and deal with common but not
standards compliant behaviour"
* tag 'scsi-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/scsi:
scsi: ufs: core: Fix divide by zero in ufshcd_map_queues()
scsi: lpfc: Fix pt2pt NVMe PRLI reject LOGO loop
scsi: qedi: Fix ABBA deadlock in qedi_process_tmf_resp() and qedi_process_cmd_cleanup_resp()
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