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Change an instance of down_write_killable() to a simple down_write() where
there is no user process that might want to interrupt the operation.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240430-vv-dax_abi_fixes-v3-3-e3dcd755774c@intel.com
Fixes: c05ae9d85b47 ("dax/bus.c: replace driver-core lock usage by a local rwsem")
Signed-off-by: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com>
Reported-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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Commit c05ae9d85b47 ("dax/bus.c: replace driver-core lock usage by a local
rwsem") aimed to undo device_lock() abuses for protecting changes to
dax-driver internal data-structures like the dax_region resource tree to
device-dax-instance range structures. However, the device_lock() was
legitimately enforcing that devices to be deleted were not current
actively attached to any driver nor assigned any capacity from the region.
As a result of the device_lock restoration in delete_store(), the
conditional locking in unregister_dev_dax() and unregister_dax_mapping()
can be removed.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240430-vv-dax_abi_fixes-v3-2-e3dcd755774c@intel.com
Fixes: c05ae9d85b47 ("dax/bus.c: replace driver-core lock usage by a local rwsem")
Signed-off-by: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com>
Reported-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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Patch series "dax/bus.c: Fixups for dax-bus locking", v3.
Commit Fixes: c05ae9d85b47 ("dax/bus.c: replace driver-core lock usage by
a local rwsem") introduced a few problems that this series aims to fix.
Add back device_lock() where it was correctly used (during device
manipulation operations), remove conditional locking in
unregister_dax_dev() and unregister_dax_mapping(), use non-interruptible
versions of rwsem locks when not called from a user process, and fix up a
write vs. read usage of an rwsem.
This patch (of 4):
In [1], Dan points out that all of the WARN_ON_ONCE() usage in the
referenced patch should be replaced with lockdep_assert_held, or
lockdep_held_assert_write(). Replace these as appropriate.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240430-vv-dax_abi_fixes-v3-0-e3dcd755774c@intel.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/65f0b5ef41817_aa222941a@dwillia2-mobl3.amr.corp.intel.com.notmuch [1]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240430-vv-dax_abi_fixes-v3-1-e3dcd755774c@intel.com
Fixes: c05ae9d85b47 ("dax/bus.c: replace driver-core lock usage by a local rwsem")
Signed-off-by: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com>
Reported-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Cc: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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A memcg pointer in the per-cpu stock can be accessed by
drain_all_stock() and consume_stock() in parallel, causing a potential
race, which is believed to e harmless.
KCSAN shows this data-race clearly in the splat below:
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in drain_all_stock.part.0 / try_charge_memcg
write to 0xffff88903f8b0788 of 4 bytes by task 35901 on cpu 2:
try_charge_memcg (mm/memcontrol.c:2323 mm/memcontrol.c:2746)
__mem_cgroup_charge (mm/memcontrol.c:7287 mm/memcontrol.c:7301)
do_anonymous_page (mm/memory.c:1054 mm/memory.c:4375 mm/memory.c:4433)
__handle_mm_fault (mm/memory.c:3878 mm/memory.c:5300 mm/memory.c:5441)
handle_mm_fault (mm/memory.c:5606)
do_user_addr_fault (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1363)
exc_page_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:37
./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:72
arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1513
arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1563)
asm_exc_page_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:623)
read to 0xffff88903f8b0788 of 4 bytes by task 287 on cpu 27:
drain_all_stock.part.0 (mm/memcontrol.c:2433)
mem_cgroup_css_offline (mm/memcontrol.c:5398 mm/memcontrol.c:5687)
css_killed_work_fn (kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:5521 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:5794)
process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3254)
worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3329 kernel/workqueue.c:3416)
kthread (kernel/kthread.c:388)
ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147)
ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:257)
value changed: 0x00000014 -> 0x00000013
This happens because drain_all_stock() is reading stock->nr_pages, while
consume_stock() might be updating the same address, causing a potential
data-race.
Make the shared addresses bulletproof regarding to reads and writes,
similarly to what stock->cached_objcg and stock->cached.
Annotate all accesses to stock->nr_pages with READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE().
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240501095420.679208-1-leitao@debian.org
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Acked-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeel.butt@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Muchun Song <songmuchun@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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__split_huge_pmd_locked() can be called for a present THP, devmap or
(non-present) migration entry. It calls pmdp_invalidate() unconditionally
on the pmdp and only determines if it is present or not based on the
returned old pmd. This is a problem for the migration entry case because
pmd_mkinvalid(), called by pmdp_invalidate() must only be called for a
present pmd.
On arm64 at least, pmd_mkinvalid() will mark the pmd such that any future
call to pmd_present() will return true. And therefore any lockless
pgtable walker could see the migration entry pmd in this state and start
interpretting the fields as if it were present, leading to BadThings (TM).
GUP-fast appears to be one such lockless pgtable walker.
x86 does not suffer the above problem, but instead pmd_mkinvalid() will
corrupt the offset field of the swap entry within the swap pte. See link
below for discussion of that problem.
Fix all of this by only calling pmdp_invalidate() for a present pmd. And
for good measure let's add a warning to all implementations of
pmdp_invalidate[_ad](). I've manually reviewed all other
pmdp_invalidate[_ad]() call sites and believe all others to be conformant.
This is a theoretical bug found during code review. I don't have any test
case to trigger it in practice.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240501143310.1381675-1-ryan.roberts@arm.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/0dd7827a-6334-439a-8fd0-43c98e6af22b@arm.com/
Fixes: 84c3fc4e9c56 ("mm: thp: check pmd migration entry in common path")
Signed-off-by: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Zi Yan <ziy@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Andreas Larsson <andreas@gaisler.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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An invalidated pmd should still cause pmd_leaf() to return true. Let's
test for that to ensure all arches remain consistent.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240501144439.1389048-1-ryan.roberts@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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The memcg stats update functions can take arbitrary integer but the only
input which make sense is enum memcg_stat_item and we don't want these
functions to be called with arbitrary integer, so replace the parameter
type with enum memcg_stat_item and compiler will be able to warn if memcg
stat update functions are called with incorrect index value.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240501172617.678560-9-shakeel.butt@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeel.butt@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: T.J. Mercier <tjmercier@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Yosry Ahmed <yosryahmed@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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To reduce memory usage by the memcg events and stats, the kernel uses
indirection table and only allocate stats and events which are being used
by the memcg code. To make this more robust, let's add warnings where
unexpected stats and events indexes are used.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240501172617.678560-8-shakeel.butt@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeel.butt@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: T.J. Mercier <tjmercier@google.com>
Cc: Yosry Ahmed <yosryahmed@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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WORKINGSET_NODES is not exposed in the memcg stats and thus there is no
need to use the memcg specific stat update functions for it. In future if
we decide to expose WORKINGSET_NODES in the memcg stats, we can revert
this patch.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240501172617.678560-7-shakeel.butt@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeel.butt@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: T.J. Mercier <tjmercier@google.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Yosry Ahmed <yosryahmed@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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There are no memcg specific stats for NR_SHMEM_PMDMAPPED and
NR_FILE_PMDMAPPED. Let's remove them.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240501172617.678560-6-shakeel.butt@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeel.butt@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosryahmed@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: T.J. Mercier <tjmercier@google.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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At the moment, the amount of memory allocated for stats related structs in
the mem_cgroup corresponds to the size of enum node_stat_item. However
not all fields in enum node_stat_item have corresponding memcg stats. So,
let's use indirection mechanism similar to the one used for memcg vmstats
management.
For a given x86_64 config, the size of stats with and without patch is:
structs size in bytes w/o with
struct lruvec_stats 1128 648
struct lruvec_stats_percpu 752 432
struct memcg_vmstats 1832 1352
struct memcg_vmstats_percpu 1280 960
The memory savings are further compounded by the fact that these structs
are allocated for each cpu and for each node. To be precise, for each
memcg the memory saved would be:
Memory saved = ((21 * 3 * NR_NODES) + (21 * 2 * NR_NODES * NR_CPUS) +
(21 * 3) + (21 * 2 * NR_CPUS)) * sizeof(long)
Where 21 is the number of fields eliminated.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240501172617.678560-5-shakeel.butt@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeel.butt@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: T.J. Mercier <tjmercier@google.com>
Cc: Yosry Ahmed <yosryahmed@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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The percpu memory used by memcg's memory statistics is already accounted.
For consistency, let's enable accounting for vmstats and lruvec stats as
well.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240501172617.678560-4-shakeel.butt@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeel.butt@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosryahmed@google.com>
Reviewed-by: T.J. Mercier <tjmercier@google.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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To decouple the dependency of lruvec_stats on NR_VM_NODE_STAT_ITEMS, we
need to dynamically allocate lruvec_stats in the mem_cgroup_per_node
structure. Also move the definition of lruvec_stats_percpu and
lruvec_stats and related functions to the memcontrol.c to facilitate later
patches. No functional changes in the patch.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240501172617.678560-3-shakeel.butt@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeel.butt@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosryahmed@google.com>
Reviewed-by: T.J. Mercier <tjmercier@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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Patch series "memcg: reduce memory consumption by memcg stats", v4.
Most of the memory overhead of a memcg object is due to memcg stats
maintained by the kernel. Since stats updates happen in performance
critical codepaths, the stats are maintained per-cpu and numa specific
stats are maintained per-node * per-cpu. This drastically increase the
overhead on large machines i.e. large of CPUs and multiple numa nodes.
This patch series tries to reduce the overhead by at least not allocating
the memory for stats which are not memcg specific.
This patch (of 8):
mem_cgroup_events_index is a translation table to get the right index of
the memcg relevant entry for the general vm_event_item. At the moment, it
is defined as integer array. However on a typical system the max entry of
vm_event_item (NR_VM_EVENT_ITEMS) is 113, so we don't need to use int as
storage type of the array. For now just use int8_t as type and add a
BUILD_BUG_ON().
Another benefit of this change is that the translation table fits in 2
cachelines while previously it would require 8 cachelines (assuming 64
bytes cacheline).
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240501172617.678560-1-shakeel.butt@linux.dev
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240501172617.678560-2-shakeel.butt@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeel.butt@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosryahmed@google.com>
Reviewed-by: T.J. Mercier <tjmercier@google.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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Fix spelling mistakes in the comments.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240501231317.24648-1-sauravshah.31@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Saurav Shah <sauravshah.31@gmail.com>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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Let's document why hugetlb still uses folio_mapcount() and is prone to
leaking memory between processes, for example using vmsplice() that still
uses FOLL_GET.
More details can be found in [1], especially around how hugetlb pages
cannot really be overcommitted, and why we don't particularly care about
these vmsplice() leaks for hugetlb -- in contrast to ordinary memory.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/8b42a24d-caf0-46ef-9e15-0f88d47d2f21@redhat.com/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240502085259.103784-3-david@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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Patch series "selftests: mm: cow: flag vmsplice() hugetlb tests as XFAIL".
The failing hugetlb vmsplice() COW tests keep confusing people, and having
tests that have been failing for years and likely will keep failing for
years to come because nobody cares enough is rather suboptimal. Let's
mark them as XFAIL and document why fixing them is not that easy as it
would appear at first sight.
More details can be found in [1], especially around how hugetlb pages
cannot really be overcommitted, and why we don't particularly care about
these vmsplice() leaks for hugetlb -- in contrast to ordinary memory.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/8b42a24d-caf0-46ef-9e15-0f88d47d2f21@redhat.com/
This patch (of 2):
The vmsplice() hugetlb tests have been failing right from the start, and
we documented that in the introducing commit 7dad331be781 ("selftests/vm:
anon_cow: hugetlb tests"):
Note that some tests cases still fail. This will, for example, be
fixed once vmsplice properly uses FOLL_PIN instead of FOLL_GET for
pinning. With 2 MiB and 1 GiB hugetlb on x86_64, the expected
failures are:
Until vmsplice() is changed, these tests will likely keep failing: hugetlb
COW reuse logic is harder to change, because using the same COW reuse
logic as we use for !hugetlb could harm other (sane) users when running
out of free hugetlb pages.
More details can be found in [1], especially around how hugetlb pages
cannot really be overcommitted, and why we don't particularly care about
these vmsplice() leaks for hugetlb -- in contrast to ordinary memory.
These (expected) failures keep confusing people, so flag them accordingly.
Before:
$ ./cow
[...]
Bail out! 8 out of 778 tests failed
# Totals: pass:769 fail:8 xfail:0 xpass:0 skip:1 error:0
$ echo $?
1
After:
$ ./cow
[...]
# Totals: pass:769 fail:0 xfail:8 xpass:0 skip:1 error:0
$ echo $?
0
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/8b42a24d-caf0-46ef-9e15-0f88d47d2f21@redhat.com/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240502085259.103784-1-david@redhat.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240502085259.103784-2-david@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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The GHCB protocol version may be different from one guest to the next.
Add a field to track it for each KVM instance and extend KVM_SEV_INIT2
to allow it to be configured by userspace.
Now that all SEV-ES support for GHCB protocol version 2 is in place, go
ahead and default to it when creating SEV-ES guests through the new
KVM_SEV_INIT2 interface. Keep the older KVM_SEV_ES_INIT interface
restricted to GHCB protocol version 1.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240501071048.2208265-5-michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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GHCB version 2 adds support for a GHCB-based termination request that
a guest can issue when it reaches an error state and wishes to inform
the hypervisor that it should be terminated. Implement support for that
similarly to GHCB MSR-based termination requests that are already
available to SEV-ES guests via earlier versions of the GHCB protocol.
See 'Termination Request' in the 'Invoking VMGEXIT' section of the GHCB
specification for more details.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240501071048.2208265-4-michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Version 2 of the GHCB specification introduced advertisement of features
that are supported by the Hypervisor.
Now that KVM supports version 2 of the GHCB specification, bump the
maximum supported protocol version.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240501071048.2208265-3-michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Add support for AP Reset Hold being invoked using the GHCB MSR protocol,
available in version 2 of the GHCB specification.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240501071048.2208265-2-michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Zero out all of kvm_caps when loading a new vendor module to ensure that
KVM can't inadvertently rely on global initialization of a field, and add
a comment above the definition of kvm_caps to call out that all fields
needs to be explicitly computed during vendor module load.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240423165328.2853870-4-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Effectively reset supported_mce_cap on vendor module load to ensure that
capabilities aren't unintentionally preserved across module reload, e.g.
if kvm-intel.ko added a module param to control LMCE support, or if
someone somehow managed to load a vendor module that doesn't support LMCE
after loading and unloading kvm-intel.ko.
Practically speaking, this bug is a non-issue as kvm-intel.ko doesn't have
a module param for LMCE, and there is no system in the world that supports
both kvm-intel.ko and kvm-amd.ko.
Fixes: c45dcc71b794 ("KVM: VMX: enable guest access to LMCE related MSRs")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240423165328.2853870-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Recompute the entire set of supported VM types when a vendor module is
loaded, as preserving supported_vm_types across vendor module unload and
reload can result in VM types being incorrectly treated as supported.
E.g. if a vendor module is loaded with TDP enabled, unloaded, and then
reloaded with TDP disabled, KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM will be incorrectly
retained. Ditto for SEV_VM and SEV_ES_VM and their respective module
params in kvm-amd.ko.
Fixes: 2a955c4db1dd ("KVM: x86: Add supported_vm_types to kvm_caps")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240423165328.2853870-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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KVM/riscv changes for 6.10
- Support guest breakpoints using ebreak
- Introduce per-VCPU mp_state_lock and reset_cntx_lock
- Virtualize SBI PMU snapshot and counter overflow interrupts
- New selftests for SBI PMU and Guest ebreak
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvms390/linux into HEAD
KVM: s390: Fix for 6.9
Fix wild read on capability check.
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The debug print clearly lacks a \n at the end. Add it.
Fixes: 8f86c82aba8b ("drm/connector: demote connector force-probes for non-master clients")
Reviewed-by: Abhinav Kumar <quic_abhinavk@quicinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Ser <contact@emersion.fr>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20240502153234.1.I2052f01c8d209d9ae9c300b87c6e4f60bd3cc99e@changeid
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Commit 1f2bcb8c8ccd ("gpio: protect the descriptor label with SRCU")
caused a massive drop in performance of requesting GPIO lines due to the
call to synchronize_srcu() on each label change. Rework the code to not
wait until all read-only users are done with reading the label but
instead atomically replace the label pointer and schedule its release
after all read-only critical sections are done.
To that end wrap the descriptor label in a struct that also contains the
rcu_head struct required for deferring tasks using call_srcu() and stop
using kstrdup_const() as we're required to allocate memory anyway. Just
allocate enough for the label string and rcu_head in one go.
Reported-by: Neil Armstrong <neil.armstrong@linaro.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-gpio/CAMRc=Mfig2oooDQYTqo23W3PXSdzhVO4p=G4+P8y1ppBOrkrJQ@mail.gmail.com/
Fixes: 1f2bcb8c8ccd ("gpio: protect the descriptor label with SRCU")
Suggested-by: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Neil Armstrong <neil.armstrong@linaro.org> # on SM8650-QRD
Acked-by: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240507121346.16969-1-brgl@bgdev.pl
Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@linaro.org>
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WARN if __kvm_faultin_pfn() generates a "no slot" pfn, and gracefully
handle the unexpected behavior instead of continuing on with dangerous
state, e.g. tdp_mmu_map_handle_target_level() _only_ checks fault->slot,
and so could install a bogus PFN into the guest.
The existing code is functionally ok, because kvm_faultin_pfn() pre-checks
all of the cases that result in KVM_PFN_NOSLOT, but it is unnecessarily
unsafe as it relies on __gfn_to_pfn_memslot() getting the _exact_ same
memslot, i.e. not a re-retrieved pointer with KVM_MEMSLOT_INVALID set.
And checking only fault->slot would fall apart if KVM ever added a flag or
condition that forced emulation, similar to how KVM handles writes to
read-only memslots.
Cc: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240228024147.41573-17-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Explicitly set "pfn" and "hva" to error values in kvm_mmu_do_page_fault()
to harden KVM against using "uninitialized" values. In quotes because the
fields are actually zero-initialized, and zero is a legal value for both
page frame numbers and virtual addresses. E.g. failure to set "pfn" prior
to creating an SPTE could result in KVM pointing at physical address '0',
which is far less desirable than KVM generating a SPTE with reserved PA
bits set and thus effectively killing the VM.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240228024147.41573-16-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Explicitly set fault->hva to KVM_HVA_ERR_BAD when handling a "no slot"
fault to ensure that KVM doesn't use a bogus virtual address, e.g. if
there *was* a slot but it's unusable (APIC access page), or if there
really was no slot, in which case fault->hva will be '0' (which is a
legal address for x86).
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240228024147.41573-15-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Handle the "no memslot" case at the beginning of kvm_faultin_pfn(), just
after the private versus shared check, so that there's no need to
repeatedly query whether or not a slot exists. This also makes it more
obvious that, except for private vs. shared attributes, the process of
faulting in a pfn simply doesn't apply to gfns without a slot.
Opportunistically stuff @fault's metadata in kvm_handle_noslot_fault() so
that it doesn't need to be duplicated in all paths that invoke
kvm_handle_noslot_fault(), and to minimize the probability of not stuffing
the right fields.
Leave the existing handle behind, but convert it to a WARN, to guard
against __kvm_faultin_pfn() unexpectedly nullifying fault->slot.
Cc: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240228024147.41573-14-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Move the checks related to the validity of an access to a memslot from the
inner __kvm_faultin_pfn() to its sole caller, kvm_faultin_pfn(). This
allows emulating accesses to the APIC access page, which don't need to
resolve a pfn, even if there is a relevant in-progress mmu_notifier
invalidation. Ditto for accesses to KVM internal memslots from L2, which
KVM also treats as emulated MMIO.
More importantly, this will allow for future cleanup by having the
"no memslot" case bail from kvm_faultin_pfn() very early on.
Go to rather extreme and gross lengths to make the change a glorified
nop, e.g. call into __kvm_faultin_pfn() even when there is no slot, as the
related code is very subtle. E.g. fault->slot can be nullified if it
points at the APIC access page, some flows in KVM x86 expect fault->pfn
to be KVM_PFN_NOSLOT, while others check only fault->slot, etc.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240228024147.41573-13-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Explicitly detect and disallow private accesses to emulated MMIO in
kvm_handle_noslot_fault() instead of relying on kvm_faultin_pfn_private()
to perform the check. This will allow the page fault path to go straight
to kvm_handle_noslot_fault() without bouncing through __kvm_faultin_pfn().
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20240228024147.41573-12-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Allow mapping KVM's internal memslots used for EPT without unrestricted
guest into L2, i.e. allow mapping the hidden TSS and the identity mapped
page tables into L2. Unlike the APIC access page, there is no correctness
issue with letting L2 access the "hidden" memory. Allowing these memslots
to be mapped into L2 fixes a largely theoretical bug where KVM could
incorrectly emulate subsequent _L1_ accesses as MMIO, and also ensures
consistent KVM behavior for L2.
If KVM is using TDP, but L1 is using shadow paging for L2, then routing
through kvm_handle_noslot_fault() will incorrectly cache the gfn as MMIO,
and create an MMIO SPTE. Creating an MMIO SPTE is ok, but only because
kvm_mmu_page_role.guest_mode ensure KVM uses different roots for L1 vs.
L2. But vcpu->arch.mmio_gfn will remain valid, and could cause KVM to
incorrectly treat an L1 access to the hidden TSS or identity mapped page
tables as MMIO.
Furthermore, forcing L2 accesses to be treated as "no slot" faults doesn't
actually prevent exposing KVM's internal memslots to L2, it simply forces
KVM to emulate the access. In most cases, that will trigger MMIO,
amusingly due to filling vcpu->arch.mmio_gfn, but also because
vcpu_is_mmio_gpa() unconditionally treats APIC accesses as MMIO, i.e. APIC
accesses are ok. But the hidden TSS and identity mapped page tables could
go either way (MMIO or access the private memslot's backing memory).
Alternatively, the inconsistent emulator behavior could be addressed by
forcing MMIO emulation for L2 access to all internal memslots, not just to
the APIC. But that's arguably less correct than letting L2 access the
hidden TSS and identity mapped page tables, not to mention that it's
*extremely* unlikely anyone cares what KVM does in this case. From L1's
perspective there is R/W memory at those memslots, the memory just happens
to be initialized with non-zero data. Making the memory disappear when it
is accessed by L2 is far more magical and arbitrary than the memory
existing in the first place.
The APIC access page is special because KVM _must_ emulate the access to
do the right thing (emulate an APIC access instead of reading/writing the
APIC access page). And despite what commit 3a2936dedd20 ("kvm: mmu: Don't
expose private memslots to L2") said, it's not just necessary when L1 is
accelerating L2's virtual APIC, it's just as important (likely *more*
imporant for correctness when L1 is passing through its own APIC to L2.
Fixes: 3a2936dedd20 ("kvm: mmu: Don't expose private memslots to L2")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240228024147.41573-11-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Prioritize private vs. shared gfn attribute checks above slot validity
checks to ensure a consistent userspace ABI. E.g. as is, KVM will exit to
userspace if there is no memslot, but emulate accesses to the APIC access
page even if the attributes mismatch.
Fixes: 8dd2eee9d526 ("KVM: x86/mmu: Handle page fault for private memory")
Cc: Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240228024147.41573-10-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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WARN and skip the emulated MMIO fastpath if a private, reserved page fault
is encountered, as private+reserved should be an impossible combination
(KVM should never create an MMIO SPTE for a private access).
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20240228024147.41573-9-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Right now the error code is not used when an async page fault is completed.
This is not a problem in the current code, but it is untidy. For protected
VMs, we will also need to check that the page attributes match the current
state of the page, because asynchronous page faults can only occur on
shared pages (private pages go through kvm_faultin_pfn_private() instead of
__gfn_to_pfn_memslot()).
Start by piping the error code from kvm_arch_setup_async_pf() to
kvm_arch_async_page_ready() via the architecture-specific async page
fault data. For now, it can be used to assert that there are no
async page faults on private memory.
Extracted from a patch by Isaku Yamahata.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Add and use a synthetic, KVM-defined page fault error code to indicate
whether a fault is to private vs. shared memory. TDX and SNP have
different mechanisms for reporting private vs. shared, and KVM's
software-protected VMs have no mechanism at all. Usurp an error code
flag to avoid having to plumb another parameter to kvm_mmu_page_fault()
and friends.
Alternatively, KVM could borrow AMD's PFERR_GUEST_ENC_MASK, i.e. set it
for TDX and software-protected VMs as appropriate, but that would require
*clearing* the flag for SEV and SEV-ES VMs, which support encrypted
memory at the hardware layer, but don't utilize private memory at the
KVM layer.
Opportunistically add a comment to call out that the logic for software-
protected VMs is (and was before this commit) broken for nested MMUs, i.e.
for nested TDP, as the GPA is an L2 GPA. Punt on trying to play nice with
nested MMUs as there is a _lot_ of functionality that simply doesn't work
for software-protected VMs, e.g. all of the paths where KVM accesses guest
memory need to be updated to be aware of private vs. shared memory.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20240228024147.41573-6-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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WARN if bits 63:32 are non-zero when handling an intercepted legacy #PF,
as the error code for #PF is limited to 32 bits (and in practice, 16 bits
on Intel CPUS). This behavior is architectural, is part of KVM's ABI
(see kvm_vcpu_events.error_code), and is explicitly documented as being
preserved for intecerpted #PF in both the APM:
The error code saved in EXITINFO1 is the same as would be pushed onto
the stack by a non-intercepted #PF exception in protected mode.
and even more explicitly in the SDM as VMCS.VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE is a
32-bit field.
Simply drop the upper bits if hardware provides garbage, as spurious
information should do no harm (though in all likelihood hardware is buggy
and the kernel is doomed).
Handling all upper 32 bits in the #PF path will allow moving the sanity
check on synthetic checks from kvm_mmu_page_fault() to npf_interception(),
which in turn will allow deriving PFERR_PRIVATE_ACCESS from AMD's
PFERR_GUEST_ENC_MASK without running afoul of the sanity check.
Note, this is also why Intel uses bit 15 for SGX (highest bit on Intel CPUs)
and AMD uses bit 31 for RMP (highest bit on AMD CPUs); using the highest
bit minimizes the probability of a collision with the "other" vendor,
without needing to plumb more bits through microcode.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240228024147.41573-7-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Plumb the full 64-bit error code throughout the page fault handling code
so that KVM can use the upper 32 bits, e.g. SNP's PFERR_GUEST_ENC_MASK
will be used to determine whether or not a fault is private vs. shared.
Note, passing the 64-bit error code to FNAME(walk_addr)() does NOT change
the behavior of permission_fault() when invoked in the page fault path, as
KVM explicitly clears PFERR_IMPLICIT_ACCESS in kvm_mmu_page_fault().
Continue passing '0' from the async #PF worker, as guest_memfd and thus
private memory doesn't support async page faults.
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
[mdr: drop references/changes on rebase, update commit message]
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
[sean: drop truncation in call to FNAME(walk_addr)(), rewrite changelog]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240228024147.41573-5-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Move the sanity check that hardware never sets bits that collide with KVM-
define synthetic bits from kvm_mmu_page_fault() to npf_interception(),
i.e. make the sanity check #NPF specific. The legacy #PF path already
WARNs if _any_ of bits 63:32 are set, and the error code that comes from
VMX's EPT Violatation and Misconfig is 100% synthesized (KVM morphs VMX's
EXIT_QUALIFICATION into error code flags).
Add a compile-time assert in the legacy #PF handler to make sure that KVM-
define flags are covered by its existing sanity check on the upper bits.
Opportunistically add a description of PFERR_IMPLICIT_ACCESS, since we
are removing the comment that defined it.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240228024147.41573-8-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Define more #NPF error code flags that are relevant to SEV+ (mostly SNP)
guests, as specified by the APM:
* Bit 31 (RMP): Set to 1 if the fault was caused due to an RMP check or a
VMPL check failure, 0 otherwise.
* Bit 34 (ENC): Set to 1 if the guest’s effective C-bit was 1, 0 otherwise.
* Bit 35 (SIZEM): Set to 1 if the fault was caused by a size mismatch between
PVALIDATE or RMPADJUST and the RMP, 0 otherwise.
* Bit 36 (VMPL): Set to 1 if the fault was caused by a VMPL permission
check failure, 0 otherwise.
Note, the APM is *extremely* misleading, and strongly implies that the
above flags can _only_ be set for #NPF exits from SNP guests. That is a
lie, as bit 34 (C-bit=1, i.e. was encrypted) can be set when running _any_
flavor of SEV guest on SNP capable hardware.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20240228024147.41573-4-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Open code the bit number directly in the PFERR_* masks and drop the
intermediate PFERR_*_BIT defines, as having to bounce through two macros
just to see which flag corresponds to which bit is quite annoying, as is
having to define two macros just to add recognition of a new flag.
Use ternary operator to derive the bit in permission_fault(), the one
function that actually needs the bit number as part of clever shifting
to avoid conditional branches. Generally the compiler is able to turn
it into a conditional move, and if not it's not really a big deal.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <20240228024147.41573-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Exit to userspace with -EFAULT / KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT if a private fault
triggers emulation of any kind, as KVM doesn't currently support emulating
access to guest private memory. Practically speaking, private faults and
emulation are already mutually exclusive, but there are many flow that
can result in KVM returning RET_PF_EMULATE, and adding one last check
to harden against weird, unexpected combinations and/or KVM bugs is
inexpensive.
Suggested-by: Yan Zhao <yan.y.zhao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20240228024147.41573-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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gs_msg_ops_kvmhv_nestedv2_config_fill_info()
The return value of kvmppc_gse_put_buff_info() is not assigned to 'rc' and
'rc' is uninitialized at this point.
So the error handling can not work.
Assign the expected value to 'rc' to fix the issue.
Fixes: 19d31c5f1157 ("KVM: PPC: Add support for nestedv2 guests")
Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>
Reviewed-by: Vaibhav Jain <vaibhav@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/a7ed4cc12e0a0bbd97fac44fe6c222d1c393ec95.1706441651.git.christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr
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The documentation mentions KVM_CAP_PPC_RADIX_MMU, but the defines in the
kvm headers spell it KVM_CAP_PPC_MMU_RADIX. Similarly with
KVM_CAP_PPC_MMU_HASH_V3.
Fixes: c92701322711 ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Add userspace interfaces for POWER9 MMU")
Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au>
Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20230411061446.26324-1-joel@jms.id.au
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This part was commented from commit 2f4cf5e42d13 ("Add book3s.c")
in about 14 years before.
If there are no plans to enable this part code in the future,
we can remove this dead code.
Signed-off-by: Kunwu Chan <chentao@kylinos.cn>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20240125083348.533883-1-chentao@kylinos.cn
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This reverts commit 180c6b072bf3 ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV nestedv2: Do not
cancel pending decrementer exception") [1] which prevented canceling a
pending HDEC exception for nestedv2 KVM guests. It was done to avoid
overhead of a H_GUEST_GET_STATE hcall to read the 'DEC expiry TB' register
which was higher compared to handling extra decrementer exceptions.
However recent benchmarks indicate that overhead of not handling 'DECR'
expiry for Nested KVM Guest(L2) is higher and results in much larger exits
to Pseries Host(L1) as indicated by the Unixbench-arithoh bench[2]
Metric | Current upstream | Revert [1] | Difference %
========================================================================
arithoh-count (10) | 3244831634 | 3403089673 | +04.88%
kvm_hv:kvm_guest_exit | 513558 | 152441 | -70.32%
probe:kvmppc_gsb_recv | 28060 | 28110 | +00.18%
N=1
As indicated by the data above that reverting [1] results in substantial
reduction in number of L2->L1 exits with only slight increase in number of
H_GUEST_GET_STATE hcalls to read the value of 'DEC expiry TB'. This results
in an overall ~4% improvement of arithoh[2] throughput.
[1] commit 180c6b072bf3 ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV nestedv2: Do not cancel pending decrementer exception")
[2] https://github.com/kdlucas/byte-unixbench/
Fixes: 180c6b072bf3 ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV nestedv2: Do not cancel pending decrementer exception")
Signed-off-by: Vaibhav Jain <vaibhav@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20240415035731.103097-1-vaibhav@linux.ibm.com
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When deleting many controllers one-by-one, it takes a very
long time as these work elements may serialize as they are
scheduled on the executing cpu instead of spreading. In general
nvmet_wq can definitely be used for long standing work elements
so its better to make it unbound regardless.
Signed-off-by: Sagi Grimberg <sagi.grimberg@vastdata.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
|
