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We don't expect to trap any GICv3 register for host handling,
apart from ICC_SRE_EL1 and the SGI registers. If they trap,
that's because the guest is playing with us despite being
told it doesn't have a GICv3.
If it does, UNDEF is what it will get.
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240827152517.3909653-10-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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On platforms that require emulation of the CPU interface, we still
need to honor the traps requested by the guest (ICH_HCR_EL2 as well
as the FGTs for ICC_IGRPEN{0,1}_EL1.
Check for these bits early and lail out if any trap applies.
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240827152517.3909653-9-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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We so far only write the ICH_HCR_EL2 config in two situations:
- when we need to emulate the GICv3 CPU interface due to HW bugs
- when we do direct injection, as the virtual CPU interface needs
to be enabled
This is all good. But it also means that we don't do anything special
when we emulate a GICv2, or that there is no GIC at all.
What happens in this case when the guest uses the GICv3 system
registers? The *guest* gets a trap for a sysreg access (EC=0x18)
while we'd really like it to get an UNDEF.
Fixing this is a bit involved:
- we need to set all the required trap bits (TC, TALL0, TALL1, TDIR)
- for these traps to take effect, we need to (counter-intuitively)
set ICC_SRE_EL1.SRE to 1 so that the above traps take priority.
Note that doesn't fully work when GICv2 emulation is enabled, as
we cannot set ICC_SRE_EL1.SRE to 1 (it breaks Group0 delivery as
IRQ).
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240827152517.3909653-3-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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* kvm-arm64/tlbi-fixes-6.12:
: .
: A couple of TLB invalidation fixes, only affecting pKVM
: out of tree, courtesy of Will Deacon.
: .
KVM: arm64: Ensure TLBI uses correct VMID after changing context
KVM: arm64: Invalidate EL1&0 TLB entries for all VMIDs in nvhe hyp init
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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Just like the rest of the FP/SIMD state, FPMR needs to be context
switched.
The only interesting thing here is that we need to treat the pKVM
part a bit differently, as the host FP state is never written back
to the vcpu thread, but instead stored locally and eagerly restored.
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240820131802.3547589-5-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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When the target context passed to enter_vmid_context() matches the
current running context, the function returns early without manipulating
the registers of the stage-2 MMU. This can result in a stale VMID due to
the lack of an ISB instruction in exit_vmid_context() after writing the
VTTBR when ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_AT is not enabled.
For example, with pKVM enabled:
// Initially running in host context
enter_vmid_context(guest);
-> __load_stage2(guest); isb // Writes VTCR & VTTBR
exit_vmid_context(guest);
-> __load_stage2(host); // Restores VTCR & VTTBR
enter_vmid_context(host);
-> Returns early as we're already in host context
tlbi vmalls12e1is // !!! Can use the stale VMID as we
// haven't performed context
// synchronisation since restoring
// VTTBR.VMID
Add an unconditional ISB instruction to exit_vmid_context() after
restoring the VTTBR. This already existed for the
ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_AT path, so we can simply hoist that onto
the common path.
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Cc: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Fixes: 58f3b0fc3b87 ("KVM: arm64: Support TLB invalidation in guest context")
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240814123429.20457-3-will@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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When initialising the nVHE hypervisor, we invalidate potentially stale
TLB entries for the EL1&0 regime using a 'vmalls12e1' invalidation.
However, this invalidation operation applies only to the active VMID
and therefore we could proceed with stale TLB entries for other VMIDs.
Replace the operation with an 'alle1' which applies to all entries for
the EL1&0 regime, regardless of the VMID.
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Fixes: 1025c8c0c6ac ("KVM: arm64: Wrap the host with a stage 2")
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240814123429.20457-2-will@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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This DSB guarantees page table updates have been made visible to the
hardware table walker. Moving the DSB from stage2_split_walker() to
after the walk is finished in kvm_pgtable_stage2_split() results in a
roughly 70% reduction in Clear Dirty Log Time in
dirty_log_perf_test (modified to use eager page splitting) when using
huge pages. This gain holds steady through a range of vcpus
used (tested 1-64) and memory used (tested 1-64GB).
This is safe to do because nothing else is using the page tables while
they are still being mapped and this is how other page table walkers
already function. None of them have a data barrier in the walker
itself because relative ordering of table PTEs to table contents comes
from the release semantics of stage2_make_pte().
Signed-off-by: Colton Lewis <coltonlewis@google.com>
Acked-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240808174243.2836363-1-coltonlewis@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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Tidy up some of the PAuth trapping code to clear up some comments
and avoid clang/checkpatch warnings. Also, don't bother setting
PAuth HCR_EL2 bits in pKVM, since it's handled by the hypervisor.
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240722163311.1493879-1-tabba@google.com
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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Add -Wno-override-init to the build flags for sys_regs.c,
handle_exit.c, and switch.c to fix warnings like the following:
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c:271:43: warning: initialized field overwritten [-Woverride-init]
271 | [ESR_ELx_EC_CP15_32] = kvm_hyp_handle_cp15_32,
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Signed-off-by: Sebastian Ott <sebott@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240723101204.7356-2-sebott@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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Pull kvm updates from Paolo Bonzini:
"ARM:
- Initial infrastructure for shadow stage-2 MMUs, as part of nested
virtualization enablement
- Support for userspace changes to the guest CTR_EL0 value, enabling
(in part) migration of VMs between heterogenous hardware
- Fixes + improvements to pKVM's FF-A proxy, adding support for v1.1
of the protocol
- FPSIMD/SVE support for nested, including merged trap configuration
and exception routing
- New command-line parameter to control the WFx trap behavior under
KVM
- Introduce kCFI hardening in the EL2 hypervisor
- Fixes + cleanups for handling presence/absence of FEAT_TCRX
- Miscellaneous fixes + documentation updates
LoongArch:
- Add paravirt steal time support
- Add support for KVM_DIRTY_LOG_INITIALLY_SET
- Add perf kvm-stat support for loongarch
RISC-V:
- Redirect AMO load/store access fault traps to guest
- perf kvm stat support
- Use guest files for IMSIC virtualization, when available
s390:
- Assortment of tiny fixes which are not time critical
x86:
- Fixes for Xen emulation
- Add a global struct to consolidate tracking of host values, e.g.
EFER
- Add KVM_CAP_X86_APIC_BUS_CYCLES_NS to allow configuring the
effective APIC bus frequency, because TDX
- Print the name of the APICv/AVIC inhibits in the relevant
tracepoint
- Clean up KVM's handling of vendor specific emulation to
consistently act on "compatible with Intel/AMD", versus checking
for a specific vendor
- Drop MTRR virtualization, and instead always honor guest PAT on
CPUs that support self-snoop
- Update to the newfangled Intel CPU FMS infrastructure
- Don't advertise IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_OVF_CTRL as an MSR-to-be-saved, as
it reads '0' and writes from userspace are ignored
- Misc cleanups
x86 - MMU:
- Small cleanups, renames and refactoring extracted from the upcoming
Intel TDX support
- Don't allocate kvm_mmu_page.shadowed_translation for shadow pages
that can't hold leafs SPTEs
- Unconditionally drop mmu_lock when allocating TDP MMU page tables
for eager page splitting, to avoid stalling vCPUs when splitting
huge pages
- Bug the VM instead of simply warning if KVM tries to split a SPTE
that is non-present or not-huge. KVM is guaranteed to end up in a
broken state because the callers fully expect a valid SPTE, it's
all but dangerous to let more MMU changes happen afterwards
x86 - AMD:
- Make per-CPU save_area allocations NUMA-aware
- Force sev_es_host_save_area() to be inlined to avoid calling into
an instrumentable function from noinstr code
- Base support for running SEV-SNP guests. API-wise, this includes a
new KVM_X86_SNP_VM type, encrypting/measure the initial image into
guest memory, and finalizing it before launching it. Internally,
there are some gmem/mmu hooks needed to prepare gmem-allocated
pages before mapping them into guest private memory ranges
This includes basic support for attestation guest requests, enough
to say that KVM supports the GHCB 2.0 specification
There is no support yet for loading into the firmware those signing
keys to be used for attestation requests, and therefore no need yet
for the host to provide certificate data for those keys.
To support fetching certificate data from userspace, a new KVM exit
type will be needed to handle fetching the certificate from
userspace.
An attempt to define a new KVM_EXIT_COCO / KVM_EXIT_COCO_REQ_CERTS
exit type to handle this was introduced in v1 of this patchset, but
is still being discussed by community, so for now this patchset
only implements a stub version of SNP Extended Guest Requests that
does not provide certificate data
x86 - Intel:
- Remove an unnecessary EPT TLB flush when enabling hardware
- Fix a series of bugs that cause KVM to fail to detect nested
pending posted interrupts as valid wake eents for a vCPU executing
HLT in L2 (with HLT-exiting disable by L1)
- KVM: x86: Suppress MMIO that is triggered during task switch
emulation
Explicitly suppress userspace emulated MMIO exits that are
triggered when emulating a task switch as KVM doesn't support
userspace MMIO during complex (multi-step) emulation
Silently ignoring the exit request can result in the
WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu->mmio_needed) firing if KVM exits to userspace
for some other reason prior to purging mmio_needed
See commit 0dc902267cb3 ("KVM: x86: Suppress pending MMIO write
exits if emulator detects exception") for more details on KVM's
limitations with respect to emulated MMIO during complex emulator
flows
Generic:
- Rename the AS_UNMOVABLE flag that was introduced for KVM to
AS_INACCESSIBLE, because the special casing needed by these pages
is not due to just unmovability (and in fact they are only
unmovable because the CPU cannot access them)
- New ioctl to populate the KVM page tables in advance, which is
useful to mitigate KVM page faults during guest boot or after live
migration. The code will also be used by TDX, but (probably) not
through the ioctl
- Enable halt poll shrinking by default, as Intel found it to be a
clear win
- Setup empty IRQ routing when creating a VM to avoid having to
synchronize SRCU when creating a split IRQCHIP on x86
- Rework the sched_in/out() paths to replace kvm_arch_sched_in() with
a flag that arch code can use for hooking both sched_in() and
sched_out()
- Take the vCPU @id as an "unsigned long" instead of "u32" to avoid
truncating a bogus value from userspace, e.g. to help userspace
detect bugs
- Mark a vCPU as preempted if and only if it's scheduled out while in
the KVM_RUN loop, e.g. to avoid marking it preempted and thus
writing guest memory when retrieving guest state during live
migration blackout
Selftests:
- Remove dead code in the memslot modification stress test
- Treat "branch instructions retired" as supported on all AMD Family
17h+ CPUs
- Print the guest pseudo-RNG seed only when it changes, to avoid
spamming the log for tests that create lots of VMs
- Make the PMU counters test less flaky when counting LLC cache
misses by doing CLFLUSH{OPT} in every loop iteration"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (227 commits)
crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_VLEK_LOAD command
KVM: x86/pmu: Add kvm_pmu_call() to simplify static calls of kvm_pmu_ops
KVM: x86: Introduce kvm_x86_call() to simplify static calls of kvm_x86_ops
KVM: x86: Replace static_call_cond() with static_call()
KVM: SEV: Provide support for SNP_EXTENDED_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event
x86/sev: Move sev_guest.h into common SEV header
KVM: SEV: Provide support for SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event
KVM: x86: Suppress MMIO that is triggered during task switch emulation
KVM: x86/mmu: Clean up make_huge_page_split_spte() definition and intro
KVM: x86/mmu: Bug the VM if KVM tries to split a !hugepage SPTE
KVM: selftests: x86: Add test for KVM_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY
KVM: x86: Implement kvm_arch_vcpu_pre_fault_memory()
KVM: x86/mmu: Make kvm_mmu_do_page_fault() return mapped level
KVM: x86/mmu: Account pf_{fixed,emulate,spurious} in callers of "do page fault"
KVM: x86/mmu: Bump pf_taken stat only in the "real" page fault handler
KVM: Add KVM_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY vcpu ioctl to pre-populate guest memory
KVM: Document KVM_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY ioctl
mm, virt: merge AS_UNMOVABLE and AS_INACCESSIBLE
perf kvm: Add kvm-stat for loongarch64
LoongArch: KVM: Add PV steal time support in guest side
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD
KVM/arm64 changes for 6.11
- Initial infrastructure for shadow stage-2 MMUs, as part of nested
virtualization enablement
- Support for userspace changes to the guest CTR_EL0 value, enabling
(in part) migration of VMs between heterogenous hardware
- Fixes + improvements to pKVM's FF-A proxy, adding support for v1.1 of
the protocol
- FPSIMD/SVE support for nested, including merged trap configuration
and exception routing
- New command-line parameter to control the WFx trap behavior under KVM
- Introduce kCFI hardening in the EL2 hypervisor
- Fixes + cleanups for handling presence/absence of FEAT_TCRX
- Miscellaneous fixes + documentation updates
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux
Pull arm64 updates from Catalin Marinas:
"The biggest part is the virtual CPU hotplug that touches ACPI,
irqchip. We also have some GICv3 optimisation for pseudo-NMIs that has
been queued via the arm64 tree. Otherwise the usual perf updates,
kselftest, various small cleanups.
Core:
- Virtual CPU hotplug support for arm64 ACPI systems
- cpufeature infrastructure cleanups and making the FEAT_ECBHB ID
bits visible to guests
- CPU errata: expand the speculative SSBS workaround to more CPUs
- GICv3, use compile-time PMR values: optimise the way regular IRQs
are masked/unmasked when GICv3 pseudo-NMIs are used, removing the
need for a static key in fast paths by using a priority value
chosen dynamically at boot time
ACPI:
- 'acpi=nospcr' option to disable SPCR as default console for arm64
- Move some ACPI code (cpuidle, FFH) to drivers/acpi/arm64/
Perf updates:
- Rework of the IMX PMU driver to enable support for I.MX95
- Enable support for tertiary match groups in the CMN PMU driver
- Initial refactoring of the CPU PMU code to prepare for the fixed
instruction counter introduced by Arm v9.4
- Add missing PMU driver MODULE_DESCRIPTION() strings
- Hook up DT compatibles for recent CPU PMUs
Kselftest updates:
- Kernel mode NEON fp-stress
- Cleanups, spelling mistakes
Miscellaneous:
- arm64 Documentation update with a minor clarification on TBI
- Fix missing IPI statistics
- Implement raw_smp_processor_id() using thread_info rather than a
per-CPU variable (better code generation)
- Make MTE checking of in-kernel asynchronous tag faults conditional
on KASAN being enabled
- Minor cleanups, typos"
* tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux: (69 commits)
selftests: arm64: tags: remove the result script
selftests: arm64: tags_test: conform test to TAP output
perf: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION() macros
arm64: smp: Fix missing IPI statistics
irqchip/gic-v3: Fix 'broken_rdists' unused warning when !SMP and !ACPI
ACPI: Add acpi=nospcr to disable ACPI SPCR as default console on ARM64
Documentation: arm64: Update memory.rst for TBI
arm64/cpufeature: Replace custom macros with fields from ID_AA64PFR0_EL1
KVM: arm64: Replace custom macros with fields from ID_AA64PFR0_EL1
perf: arm_pmuv3: Include asm/arm_pmuv3.h from linux/perf/arm_pmuv3.h
perf: arm_v6/7_pmu: Drop non-DT probe support
perf/arm: Move 32-bit PMU drivers to drivers/perf/
perf: arm_pmuv3: Drop unnecessary IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64) check
perf: arm_pmuv3: Avoid assigning fixed cycle counter with threshold
arm64: Kconfig: Fix dependencies to enable ACPI_HOTPLUG_CPU
perf: imx_perf: add support for i.MX95 platform
perf: imx_perf: fix counter start and config sequence
perf: imx_perf: refactor driver for imx93
perf: imx_perf: let the driver manage the counter usage rather the user
perf: imx_perf: add macro definitions for parsing config attr
...
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* kvm-arm64/nv-tcr2:
: Fixes to the handling of TCR_EL1, courtesy of Marc Zyngier
:
: Series addresses a couple gaps that are present in KVM (from cover
: letter):
:
: - VM configuration: HCRX_EL2.TCR2En is forced to 1, and we blindly
: save/restore stuff.
:
: - trap bit description and routing: none, obviously, since we make a
: point in not trapping.
KVM: arm64: Honor trap routing for TCR2_EL1
KVM: arm64: Make PIR{,E0}_EL1 save/restore conditional on FEAT_TCRX
KVM: arm64: Make TCR2_EL1 save/restore dependent on the VM features
KVM: arm64: Get rid of HCRX_GUEST_FLAGS
KVM: arm64: Correctly honor the presence of FEAT_TCRX
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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* kvm-arm64/nv-sve:
: CPTR_EL2, FPSIMD/SVE support for nested
:
: This series brings support for honoring the guest hypervisor's CPTR_EL2
: trap configuration when running a nested guest, along with support for
: FPSIMD/SVE usage at L1 and L2.
KVM: arm64: Allow the use of SVE+NV
KVM: arm64: nv: Add additional trap setup for CPTR_EL2
KVM: arm64: nv: Add trap description for CPTR_EL2
KVM: arm64: nv: Add TCPAC/TTA to CPTR->CPACR conversion helper
KVM: arm64: nv: Honor guest hypervisor's FP/SVE traps in CPTR_EL2
KVM: arm64: nv: Load guest FP state for ZCR_EL2 trap
KVM: arm64: nv: Handle CPACR_EL1 traps
KVM: arm64: Spin off helper for programming CPTR traps
KVM: arm64: nv: Ensure correct VL is loaded before saving SVE state
KVM: arm64: nv: Use guest hypervisor's max VL when running nested guest
KVM: arm64: nv: Save guest's ZCR_EL2 when in hyp context
KVM: arm64: nv: Load guest hyp's ZCR into EL1 state
KVM: arm64: nv: Handle ZCR_EL2 traps
KVM: arm64: nv: Forward SVE traps to guest hypervisor
KVM: arm64: nv: Forward FP/ASIMD traps to guest hypervisor
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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* kvm-arm64/el2-kcfi:
: kCFI support in the EL2 hypervisor, courtesy of Pierre-Clément Tosi
:
: Enable the usage fo CONFIG_CFI_CLANG (kCFI) for hardening indirect
: branches in the EL2 hypervisor. Unlike kernel support for the feature,
: CFI failures at EL2 are always fatal.
KVM: arm64: nVHE: Support CONFIG_CFI_CLANG at EL2
KVM: arm64: Introduce print_nvhe_hyp_panic helper
arm64: Introduce esr_brk_comment, esr_is_cfi_brk
KVM: arm64: VHE: Mark __hyp_call_panic __noreturn
KVM: arm64: nVHE: gen-hyprel: Skip R_AARCH64_ABS32
KVM: arm64: nVHE: Simplify invalid_host_el2_vect
KVM: arm64: Fix __pkvm_init_switch_pgd call ABI
KVM: arm64: Fix clobbered ELR in sync abort/SError
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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* kvm-arm64/shadow-mmu:
: Shadow stage-2 MMU support for NV, courtesy of Marc Zyngier
:
: Initial implementation of shadow stage-2 page tables to support a guest
: hypervisor. In the author's words:
:
: So here's the 10000m (approximately 30000ft for those of you stuck
: with the wrong units) view of what this is doing:
:
: - for each {VMID,VTTBR,VTCR} tuple the guest uses, we use a
: separate shadow s2_mmu context. This context has its own "real"
: VMID and a set of page tables that are the combination of the
: guest's S2 and the host S2, built dynamically one fault at a time.
:
: - these shadow S2 contexts are ephemeral, and behave exactly as
: TLBs. For all intent and purposes, they *are* TLBs, and we discard
: them pretty often.
:
: - TLB invalidation takes three possible paths:
:
: * either this is an EL2 S1 invalidation, and we directly emulate
: it as early as possible
:
: * or this is an EL1 S1 invalidation, and we need to apply it to
: the shadow S2s (plural!) that match the VMID set by the L1 guest
:
: * or finally, this is affecting S2, and we need to teardown the
: corresponding part of the shadow S2s, which invalidates the TLBs
KVM: arm64: nv: Truely enable nXS TLBI operations
KVM: arm64: nv: Add handling of NXS-flavoured TLBI operations
KVM: arm64: nv: Add handling of range-based TLBI operations
KVM: arm64: nv: Add handling of outer-shareable TLBI operations
KVM: arm64: nv: Invalidate TLBs based on shadow S2 TTL-like information
KVM: arm64: nv: Tag shadow S2 entries with guest's leaf S2 level
KVM: arm64: nv: Handle FEAT_TTL hinted TLB operations
KVM: arm64: nv: Handle TLBI IPAS2E1{,IS} operations
KVM: arm64: nv: Handle TLBI ALLE1{,IS} operations
KVM: arm64: nv: Handle TLBI VMALLS12E1{,IS} operations
KVM: arm64: nv: Handle TLB invalidation targeting L2 stage-1
KVM: arm64: nv: Handle EL2 Stage-1 TLB invalidation
KVM: arm64: nv: Add Stage-1 EL2 invalidation primitives
KVM: arm64: nv: Unmap/flush shadow stage 2 page tables
KVM: arm64: nv: Handle shadow stage 2 page faults
KVM: arm64: nv: Implement nested Stage-2 page table walk logic
KVM: arm64: nv: Support multiple nested Stage-2 mmu structures
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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This replaces custom macros usage (i.e ID_AA64PFR0_EL1_ELx_64BIT_ONLY and
ID_AA64PFR0_EL1_ELx_32BIT_64BIT) and instead directly uses register fields
from ID_AA64PFR0_EL1 sysreg definition.
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: kvmarm@lists.linux.dev
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240613102710.3295108-2-anshuman.khandual@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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As per the architecture, if FEAT_S1PIE is implemented, then FEAT_TCRX
must be implemented as well.
Take advantage of this to avoid checking for S1PIE when TCRX isn't
implemented.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240625130042.259175-6-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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As for other registers, save/restore of TCR2_EL1 should be gated
on the feature being actually present.
In the case of a nVHE hypervisor, it is perfectly fine to leave
the host value in the register, as HCRX_EL2.TCREn==0 imposes that
TCR2_EL1 is treated as 0.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240625130042.259175-4-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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We need to teach KVM a couple of new tricks. CPTR_EL2 and its
VHE accessor CPACR_EL1 need to be handled specially:
- CPACR_EL1 is trapped on VHE so that we can track the TCPAC
and TTA bits
- CPTR_EL2.{TCPAC,E0POE} are propagated from L1 to L2
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240620164653.1130714-15-oliver.upton@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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Start folding the guest hypervisor's FP/SVE traps into the value
programmed in hardware. Note that as of writing this is dead code, since
KVM does a full put() / load() for every nested exception boundary which
saves + flushes the FP/SVE state.
However, this will become useful when we can keep the guest's FP/SVE
state alive across a nested exception boundary and the host no longer
needs to conservatively program traps.
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240620164653.1130714-12-oliver.upton@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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Round out the ZCR_EL2 gymnastics by loading SVE state in the fast path
when the guest hypervisor tries to access SVE state.
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240620164653.1130714-11-oliver.upton@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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Handle CPACR_EL1 accesses when running a VHE guest. In order to
limit the cost of the emulation, implement it ass a shallow exit.
In the other cases:
- this is a nVHE L1 which will write to memory, and we don't trap
- this is a L2 guest:
* the L1 has CPTR_EL2.TCPAC==0, and the L2 has direct register
access
* the L1 has CPTR_EL2.TCPAC==1, and the L2 will trap, but the
handling is defered to the general handling for forwarding
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240620164653.1130714-10-oliver.upton@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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A subsequent change to KVM will add preliminary support for merging a
guest hypervisor's CPTR traps with that of KVM. Prepare by spinning off
a new helper for managing CPTR traps.
Avoid reading CPACR_EL1 for the baseline trap config, and start off with
the most restrictive set of traps that is subsequently relaxed.
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240620164653.1130714-9-oliver.upton@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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The max VL for nested guests is additionally constrained by the max VL
selected by the guest hypervisor. Use that instead of KVM's max VL when
running a nested guest.
Note that the guest hypervisor's ZCR_EL2 is sanitised against the VM's
max VL at the time of access, so there's no additional handling required
at the time of use.
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240620164653.1130714-7-oliver.upton@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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Load the guest hypervisor's ZCR_EL2 into the corresponding EL1 register
when restoring SVE state, as ZCR_EL2 affects the VL in the hypervisor
context.
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240620164653.1130714-5-oliver.upton@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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Similar to FPSIMD traps, don't load SVE state if the guest hypervisor
has SVE traps enabled and forward the trap instead. Note that ZCR_EL2
will require some special handling, as it takes a sysreg trap to EL2
when HCR_EL2.NV = 1.
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240620164653.1130714-3-oliver.upton@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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Give precedence to the guest hypervisor's trap configuration when
routing an FP/ASIMD trap taken to EL2. Take advantage of the
infrastructure for translating CPTR_EL2 into the VHE (i.e. EL1) format
and base the trap decision solely on the VHE view of the register. The
in-memory value of CPTR_EL2 will always be up to date for the guest
hypervisor (more on that later), so just read it directly from memory.
Bury all of this behind a macro keyed off of the CPTR bitfield in
anticipation of supporting other traps (e.g. SVE).
[maz: account for HCR_EL2.E2H when testing for TFP/FPEN, with
all the hard work actually being done by Chase Conklin]
[ oliver: translate nVHE->VHE format for testing traps; macro for reuse
in other CPTR_EL2.xEN fields ]
Signed-off-by: Jintack Lim <jintack.lim@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240620164653.1130714-2-oliver.upton@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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The compiler implements kCFI by adding type information (u32) above
every function that might be indirectly called and, whenever a function
pointer is called, injects a read-and-compare of that u32 against the
value corresponding to the expected type. In case of a mismatch, a BRK
instruction gets executed. When the hypervisor triggers such an
exception in nVHE, it panics and triggers and exception return to EL1.
Therefore, teach nvhe_hyp_panic_handler() to detect kCFI errors from the
ESR and report them. If necessary, remind the user that EL2 kCFI is not
affected by CONFIG_CFI_PERMISSIVE.
Pass $(CC_FLAGS_CFI) to the compiler when building the nVHE hyp code.
Use SYM_TYPED_FUNC_START() for __pkvm_init_switch_pgd, as nVHE can't
call it directly and must use a PA function pointer from C (because it
is part of the idmap page), which would trigger a kCFI failure if the
type ID wasn't present.
Signed-off-by: Pierre-Clément Tosi <ptosi@google.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240610063244.2828978-9-ptosi@google.com
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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Given that the sole purpose of __hyp_call_panic() is to call panic(), a
__noreturn function, give it the __noreturn attribute, removing the need
for its caller to use unreachable().
Signed-off-by: Pierre-Clément Tosi <ptosi@google.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240610063244.2828978-6-ptosi@google.com
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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Ignore R_AARCH64_ABS32 relocations, instead of panicking, when emitting
the relocation table of the hypervisor. The toolchain might produce them
when generating function calls with kCFI to represent the 32-bit type ID
which can then be resolved across compilation units at link time. These
are NOT actual 32-bit addresses and are therefore not needed in the
final (runtime) relocation table (which is unlikely to use 32-bit
absolute addresses for arm64 anyway).
Signed-off-by: Pierre-Clément Tosi <ptosi@google.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240610063244.2828978-5-ptosi@google.com
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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The invalid_host_el2_vect macro is used by EL2{t,h} handlers in nVHE
*host* context, which should never run with a guest context loaded.
Therefore, remove the superfluous vCPU context check and branch
unconditionally to hyp_panic.
Signed-off-by: Pierre-Clément Tosi <ptosi@google.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240610063244.2828978-4-ptosi@google.com
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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Fix the mismatch between the (incorrect) C signature, C call site, and
asm implementation by aligning all three on an API passing the
parameters (pgd and SP) separately, instead of as a bundled struct.
Remove the now unnecessary memory accesses while the MMU is off from the
asm, which simplifies the C caller (as it does not need to convert a VA
struct pointer to PA) and makes the code slightly more robust by
offsetting the struct fields from C and properly expressing the call to
the C compiler (e.g. type checker and kCFI).
Fixes: f320bc742bc2 ("KVM: arm64: Prepare the creation of s1 mappings at EL2")
Signed-off-by: Pierre-Clément Tosi <ptosi@google.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240610063244.2828978-3-ptosi@google.com
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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When the hypervisor receives a SError or synchronous exception (EL2h)
while running with the __kvm_hyp_vector and if ELR_EL2 doesn't point to
an extable entry, it panics indirectly by overwriting ELR with the
address of a panic handler in order for the asm routine it returns to to
ERET into the handler.
However, this clobbers ELR_EL2 for the handler itself. As a result,
hyp_panic(), when retrieving what it believes to be the PC where the
exception happened, actually ends up reading the address of the panic
handler that called it! This results in an erroneous and confusing panic
message where the source of any synchronous exception (e.g. BUG() or
kCFI) appears to be __guest_exit_panic, making it hard to locate the
actual BRK instruction.
Therefore, store the original ELR_EL2 in the per-CPU kvm_hyp_ctxt and
point the sysreg to a routine that first restores it to its previous
value before running __guest_exit_panic.
Fixes: 7db21530479f ("KVM: arm64: Restore hyp when panicking in guest context")
Signed-off-by: Pierre-Clément Tosi <ptosi@google.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240610063244.2828978-2-ptosi@google.com
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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Latest kid on the block: NXS (Non-eXtra-Slow) TLBI operations.
Let's add those in bulk (NSH, ISH, OSH, both normal and range)
as they directly map to their XS (the standard ones) counterparts.
Not a lot to say about them, they are basically useless.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240614144552.2773592-17-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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We already support some form of range operation by handling FEAT_TTL,
but so far the "arbitrary" range operations are unsupported.
Let's fix that.
For EL2 S1, this is simple enough: we just map both NSH, ISH and OSH
instructions onto the ISH version for EL1.
For TLBI instructions affecting EL1 S1, we use the same model as
their non-range counterpart to invalidate in the context of the
correct VMID.
For TLBI instructions affecting S2, we interpret the data passed
by the guest to compute the range and use that to tear-down part
of the shadow S2 range and invalidate the TLBs.
Finally, we advertise FEAT_TLBIRANGE if the host supports it.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240614144552.2773592-16-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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Our handling of outer-shareable TLBIs is pretty basic: we just
map them to the existing inner-shareable ones, because we really
don't have anything else.
The only significant change is that we can now advertise FEAT_TLBIOS
support if the host supports it.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240614144552.2773592-15-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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Due to the way FEAT_NV2 suppresses traps when accessing EL2
system registers, we can't track when the guest changes its
HCR_EL2.TGE setting. This means we always trap EL1 TLBIs,
even if they don't affect any L2 guest.
Given that invalidating the EL2 TLBs doesn't require any messing
with the shadow stage-2 page-tables, we can simply emulate the
instructions early and return directly to the guest.
This is conditioned on the instruction being an EL1 one and
the guest's HCR_EL2.{E2H,TGE} being {1,1} (indicating that
the instruction targets the EL2 S1 TLBs), or the instruction
being one of the EL2 ones (which are not ambiguous).
EL1 TLBIs issued with HCR_EL2.{E2H,TGE}={1,0} are not handled
here, and cause a full exit so that they can be handled in
the context of a VMID.
Co-developed-by: Jintack Lim <jintack.lim@linaro.org>
Co-developed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jintack Lim <jintack.lim@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240614144552.2773592-7-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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Provide the primitives required to handle TLB invalidation for
Stage-1 EL2 TLBs, which by definition do not require messing
with the Stage-2 page tables.
Co-developed-by: Jintack Lim <jintack.lim@linaro.org>
Co-developed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jintack Lim <jintack.lim@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240614144552.2773592-6-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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Now that the layout of the structures is compatible with 1.1 it is time
to probe the 1.1 version of the FF-A protocol inside the hypervisor. If
the TEE doesn't support it, it should return the minimum supported
version.
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Ene <sebastianene@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
Tested-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240613132035.1070360-5-sebastianene@google.com
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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The FF-A spec 1.2 reserves the following ranges for identifying FF-A
calls:
0x84000060-0x840000FF: FF-A 32-bit calls
0xC4000060-0xC40000FF: FF-A 64-bit calls.
Use the range identification according to the spec and allow calls that
are currently out of the range(eg. FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_REQ2) to be
identified correctly.
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Ene <sebastianene@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
Tested-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240613132035.1070360-4-sebastianene@google.com
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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Handle the FFA_PARTITION_INFO_GET host call inside the pKVM hypervisor
and copy the response message back to the host buffers.
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Ene <sebastianene@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
Tested-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240613132035.1070360-3-sebastianene@google.com
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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The pKVM hypervisor initializes with FF-A version 1.0. The spec requires
that no other FF-A calls to be issued before the version negotiation
phase is complete. Split the hypervisor proxy initialization code in two
parts so that we can move the later one after the host negotiates its
version.
Without trapping the call, the host drivers can negotiate a higher
version number with TEE which can result in a different memory layout
described during the memory sharing calls.
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Ene <sebastianene@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
Tested-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240613132035.1070360-2-sebastianene@google.com
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
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According to the FF-A spec (Buffer states and ownership), after a
producer has written into a buffer, it is "full" and now owned by the
consumer. The producer won't be able to use that buffer, until the
consumer hands it over with an invocation such as RX_RELEASE.
It is clear in the following paragraph (Transfer of buffer ownership),
that MEM_RETRIEVE_RESP is transferring the ownership from producer (in
our case SPM) to consumer (hypervisor). RX_RELEASE is therefore
mandatory here.
It is less clear though what is happening with MEM_FRAG_TX. But this
invocation, as a response to MEM_FRAG_RX writes into the same hypervisor
RX buffer (see paragraph "Transmission of transaction descriptor in
fragments"). Also this is matching the TF-A implementation where the RX
buffer is marked "full" during a MEM_FRAG_RX.
Release the RX hypervisor buffer in those two cases. This will unblock
later invocations using this buffer which would otherwise fail.
(RETRIEVE_REQ, MEM_FRAG_RX and PARTITION_INFO_GET).
Signed-off-by: Vincent Donnefort <vdonnefort@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240611175317.1220842-1-vdonnefort@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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KVM (and pKVM) do not support SME guests. Therefore KVM ensures
that the host's SME state is flushed and that SME controls for
enabling access to ZA storage and for streaming are disabled.
pKVM needs to protect against a buggy/malicious host. Ensure that
it wouldn't run a guest when protected mode is enabled should any
of the SME controls be enabled.
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240603122852.3923848-10-tabba@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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When setting/clearing CPACR bits for EL0 and EL1, use the ELx
format of the bits, which covers both. This makes the code
clearer, and reduces the chances of accidentally missing a bit.
No functional change intended.
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240603122852.3923848-9-tabba@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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Now that we have introduced finalize_init_hyp_mode(), lets
consolidate the initializing of the host_data fpsimd_state and
sve state.
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240603122852.3923848-8-tabba@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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When running in protected mode we don't want to leak protected
guest state to the host, including whether a guest has used
fpsimd/sve. Therefore, eagerly restore the host state on guest
exit when running in protected mode, which happens only if the
guest has used fpsimd/sve.
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240603122852.3923848-7-tabba@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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Protected mode needs to maintain (save/restore) the host's sve
state, rather than relying on the host kernel to do that. This is
to avoid leaking information to the host about guests and the
type of operations they are performing.
As a first step towards that, allocate memory mapped at hyp, per
cpu, for the host sve state. The following patch will use this
memory to save/restore the host state.
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240603122852.3923848-6-tabba@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
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