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2018-07-20x86/mm/pti: Introduce pti_finalize()Joerg Roedel
Introduce a new function to finalize the kernel mappings for the userspace page-table after all ro/nx protections have been applied to the kernel mappings. Also move the call to pti_clone_kernel_text() to that function so that it will run on 32 bit kernels too. Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com> Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca> Cc: joro@8bytes.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-30-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
2018-07-20x86/mm/pti: Keep permissions when cloning kernel text in pti_clone_kernel_text()Joerg Roedel
Mapping the kernel text area to user-space makes only sense if it has the same permissions as in the kernel page-table. If permissions are different this will cause a TLB reload when using the kernel page-table, which is as good as not mapping it at all. On 64-bit kernels this patch makes no difference, as the whole range cloned by pti_clone_kernel_text() is mapped RO anyway. On 32 bit there are writeable mappings in the range, so just keep the permissions as they are. Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com> Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca> Cc: joro@8bytes.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-29-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
2018-07-20x86/mm/pti: Make pti_clone_kernel_text() compile on 32 bitJoerg Roedel
The pti_clone_kernel_text() function references __end_rodata_hpage_align, which is only present on x86-64. This makes sense as the end of the rodata section is not huge-page aligned on 32 bit. Nevertheless a symbol is required for the function that points at the right address for both 32 and 64 bit. Introduce __end_rodata_aligned for that purpose and use it in pti_clone_kernel_text(). Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com> Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca> Cc: joro@8bytes.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-28-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
2018-07-20x86/mm/pti: Clone CPU_ENTRY_AREA on PMD level on x86_32Joerg Roedel
Cloning on the P4D level would clone the complete kernel address space into the user-space page-tables for PAE kernels. Cloning on PMD level is fine for PAE and legacy paging. Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com> Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca> Cc: joro@8bytes.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-27-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
2018-07-20x86/mm/pti: Add an overflow check to pti_clone_pmds()Joerg Roedel
The addr counter will overflow if the last PMD of the address space is cloned, resulting in an endless loop. Check for that and bail out of the loop when it happens. Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com> Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca> Cc: joro@8bytes.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-25-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
2018-07-20x86/pgtable/32: Allocate 8k page-tables when PTI is enabledJoerg Roedel
Allocate a kernel and a user page-table root when PTI is enabled. Also allocate a full page per root for PAE because otherwise the bit to flip in CR3 to switch between them would be non-constant, which creates a lot of hassle. Keep that for a later optimization. Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com> Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca> Cc: joro@8bytes.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-18-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
2018-07-20x86/pgtable: Rename pti_set_user_pgd() to pti_set_user_pgtbl()Joerg Roedel
The way page-table folding is implemented on 32 bit, these functions are not only setting, but also PUDs and even PMDs. Give the function a more generic name to reflect that. Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com> Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca> Cc: joro@8bytes.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-16-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
2018-07-17x86/mm/tlb: Skip atomic operations for 'init_mm' in switch_mm_irqs_off()Rik van Riel
Song Liu noticed switch_mm_irqs_off() taking a lot of CPU time in recent kernels,using 1.8% of a 48 CPU system during a netperf to localhost run. Digging into the profile, we noticed that cpumask_clear_cpu and cpumask_set_cpu together take about half of the CPU time taken by switch_mm_irqs_off(). However, the CPUs running netperf end up switching back and forth between netperf and the idle task, which does not require changes to the mm_cpumask. Furthermore, the init_mm cpumask ends up being the most heavily contended one in the system. Simply skipping changes to mm_cpumask(&init_mm) reduces overhead. Reported-and-tested-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: efault@gmx.de Cc: kernel-team@fb.com Cc: luto@kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180716190337.26133-8-riel@surriel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-07-17x86/mm/tlb: Always use lazy TLB modeRik van Riel
Now that CPUs in lazy TLB mode no longer receive TLB shootdown IPIs, except at page table freeing time, and idle CPUs will no longer get shootdown IPIs for things like mprotect and madvise, we can always use lazy TLB mode. Tested-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: efault@gmx.de Cc: kernel-team@fb.com Cc: luto@kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180716190337.26133-7-riel@surriel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-07-17x86/mm/tlb: Only send page table free TLB flush to lazy TLB CPUsRik van Riel
CPUs in !is_lazy have either received TLB flush IPIs earlier on during the munmap (when the user memory was unmapped), or have context switched and reloaded during that stage of the munmap. Page table free TLB flushes only need to be sent to CPUs in lazy TLB mode, which TLB contents might not yet be up to date yet. Tested-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: efault@gmx.de Cc: kernel-team@fb.com Cc: luto@kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180716190337.26133-6-riel@surriel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-07-17x86/mm/tlb: Make lazy TLB mode lazierRik van Riel
Lazy TLB mode can result in an idle CPU being woken up by a TLB flush, when all it really needs to do is reload %CR3 at the next context switch, assuming no page table pages got freed. Memory ordering is used to prevent race conditions between switch_mm_irqs_off, which checks whether .tlb_gen changed, and the TLB invalidation code, which increments .tlb_gen whenever page table entries get invalidated. The atomic increment in inc_mm_tlb_gen is its own barrier; the context switch code adds an explicit barrier between reading tlbstate.is_lazy and next->context.tlb_gen. Unlike the 2016 version of this patch, CPUs with cpu_tlbstate.is_lazy set are not removed from the mm_cpumask(mm), since that would prevent the TLB flush IPIs at page table free time from being sent to all the CPUs that need them. This patch reduces total CPU use in the system by about 1-2% for a memcache workload on two socket systems, and by about 1% for a heavily multi-process netperf between two systems. Tested-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: efault@gmx.de Cc: kernel-team@fb.com Cc: luto@kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180716190337.26133-5-riel@surriel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-07-17x86/mm/tlb: Restructure switch_mm_irqs_off()Rik van Riel
Move some code that will be needed for the lazy -> !lazy state transition when a lazy TLB CPU has gotten out of date. No functional changes, since the if (real_prev == next) branch always returns. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: efault@gmx.de Cc: kernel-team@fb.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180716190337.26133-4-riel@surriel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-07-17x86/mm/tlb: Leave lazy TLB mode at page table free timeRik van Riel
Andy discovered that speculative memory accesses while in lazy TLB mode can crash a system, when a CPU tries to dereference a speculative access using memory contents that used to be valid page table memory, but have since been reused for something else and point into la-la land. The latter problem can be prevented in two ways. The first is to always send a TLB shootdown IPI to CPUs in lazy TLB mode, while the second one is to only send the TLB shootdown at page table freeing time. The second should result in fewer IPIs, since operationgs like mprotect and madvise are very common with some workloads, but do not involve page table freeing. Also, on munmap, batching of page table freeing covers much larger ranges of virtual memory than the batching of unmapped user pages. Tested-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: efault@gmx.de Cc: kernel-team@fb.com Cc: luto@kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180716190337.26133-3-riel@surriel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-07-16x86/pti: Make pti_set_kernel_image_nonglobal() staticJiang Biao
pti_set_kernel_image_nonglobal() is only used in pti.c, make it static. Signed-off-by: Jiang Biao <jiang.biao2@zte.com.cn> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: luto@kernel.org Cc: hpa@zytor.com Cc: albcamus@gmail.com Cc: zhong.weidong@zte.com.cn Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531713820-24544-4-git-send-email-jiang.biao2@zte.com.cn
2018-07-06x86/numa_emulation: Introduce uniform split capabilityDan Williams
The current NUMA emulation capabilities for splitting System RAM by a fixed size or by a set number of nodes may result in some nodes being larger than others. The implementation prioritizes establishing a minimum usable memory size over satisfying the requested number of NUMA nodes. Introduce a uniform split capability that evenly partitions each physical NUMA node into N emulated nodes. For example numa=fake=3U creates 6 emulated nodes total on a system that has 2 physical nodes. This capability is useful for debugging and evaluating platform memory-side-cache capabilities as described by the ACPI HMAT (see 5.2.27.5 Memory Side Cache Information Structure in ACPI 6.2a) Compare numa=fake=6 that results in only 5 nodes being created against numa=fake=3U which takes the 2 physical nodes and evenly divides them. numa=fake=6 available: 5 nodes (0-4) node 0 cpus: 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 node 0 size: 2648 MB node 0 free: 2443 MB node 1 cpus: 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 node 1 size: 2672 MB node 1 free: 2442 MB node 2 cpus: 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 node 2 size: 5291 MB node 2 free: 5278 MB node 3 cpus: 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 node 3 size: 2677 MB node 3 free: 2665 MB node 4 cpus: 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 node 4 size: 2676 MB node 4 free: 2663 MB node distances: node 0 1 2 3 4 0: 10 20 10 20 20 1: 20 10 20 10 10 2: 10 20 10 20 20 3: 20 10 20 10 10 4: 20 10 20 10 10 numa=fake=3U available: 6 nodes (0-5) node 0 cpus: 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 node 0 size: 2900 MB node 0 free: 2637 MB node 1 cpus: 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 node 1 size: 3023 MB node 1 free: 3012 MB node 2 cpus: 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 node 2 size: 2015 MB node 2 free: 2004 MB node 3 cpus: 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 node 3 size: 2704 MB node 3 free: 2522 MB node 4 cpus: 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 node 4 size: 2709 MB node 4 free: 2698 MB node 5 cpus: 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 node 5 size: 2612 MB node 5 free: 2601 MB node distances: node 0 1 2 3 4 5 0: 10 10 10 20 20 20 1: 10 10 10 20 20 20 2: 10 10 10 20 20 20 3: 20 20 20 10 10 10 4: 20 20 20 10 10 10 5: 20 20 20 10 10 10 Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang@gmail.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/153089328617.27680.14930758266174305832.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-07-06x86/numa_emulation: Fix emulated-to-physical node mappingDan Williams
Without this change the distance table calculation for emulated nodes may use the wrong numa node and report an incorrect distance. Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang@gmail.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/153089328103.27680.14778434392225818887.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-07-04x86/mm: Add TLB purge to free pmd/pte page interfacesToshi Kani
ioremap() calls pud_free_pmd_page() / pmd_free_pte_page() when it creates a pud / pmd map. The following preconditions are met at their entry. - All pte entries for a target pud/pmd address range have been cleared. - System-wide TLB purges have been peformed for a target pud/pmd address range. The preconditions assure that there is no stale TLB entry for the range. Speculation may not cache TLB entries since it requires all levels of page entries, including ptes, to have P & A-bits set for an associated address. However, speculation may cache pud/pmd entries (paging-structure caches) when they have P-bit set. Add a system-wide TLB purge (INVLPG) to a single page after clearing pud/pmd entry's P-bit. SDM 4.10.4.1, Operation that Invalidate TLBs and Paging-Structure Caches, states that: INVLPG invalidates all paging-structure caches associated with the current PCID regardless of the liner addresses to which they correspond. Fixes: 28ee90fe6048 ("x86/mm: implement free pmd/pte page interfaces") Signed-off-by: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: mhocko@suse.com Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: hpa@zytor.com Cc: cpandya@codeaurora.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180627141348.21777-4-toshi.kani@hpe.com
2018-07-04ioremap: Update pgtable free interfaces with addrChintan Pandya
The following kernel panic was observed on ARM64 platform due to a stale TLB entry. 1. ioremap with 4K size, a valid pte page table is set. 2. iounmap it, its pte entry is set to 0. 3. ioremap the same address with 2M size, update its pmd entry with a new value. 4. CPU may hit an exception because the old pmd entry is still in TLB, which leads to a kernel panic. Commit b6bdb7517c3d ("mm/vmalloc: add interfaces to free unmapped page table") has addressed this panic by falling to pte mappings in the above case on ARM64. To support pmd mappings in all cases, TLB purge needs to be performed in this case on ARM64. Add a new arg, 'addr', to pud_free_pmd_page() and pmd_free_pte_page() so that TLB purge can be added later in seprate patches. [toshi.kani@hpe.com: merge changes, rewrite patch description] Fixes: 28ee90fe6048 ("x86/mm: implement free pmd/pte page interfaces") Signed-off-by: Chintan Pandya <cpandya@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: mhocko@suse.com Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: hpa@zytor.com Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180627141348.21777-3-toshi.kani@hpe.com
2018-07-04x86/mm: Disable ioremap free page handling on x86-PAEToshi Kani
ioremap() supports pmd mappings on x86-PAE. However, kernel's pmd tables are not shared among processes on x86-PAE. Therefore, any update to sync'd pmd entries need re-syncing. Freeing a pte page also leads to a vmalloc fault and hits the BUG_ON in vmalloc_sync_one(). Disable free page handling on x86-PAE. pud_free_pmd_page() and pmd_free_pte_page() simply return 0 if a given pud/pmd entry is present. This assures that ioremap() does not update sync'd pmd entries at the cost of falling back to pte mappings. Fixes: 28ee90fe6048 ("x86/mm: implement free pmd/pte page interfaces") Reported-by: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Signed-off-by: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: mhocko@suse.com Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: hpa@zytor.com Cc: cpandya@codeaurora.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180627141348.21777-2-toshi.kani@hpe.com
2018-06-27x86/mm: Clean up the printk()s in show_fault_oops()Dmitry Vyukov
- Remove 'nx_warning' and 'smep_warning', which are just pointless obfuscation. - Also convert to pr_crit(). Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180627090715.28076-1-dvyukov@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-06-27x86/speculation/l1tf: Protect PAE swap entries against L1TFVlastimil Babka
The PAE 3-level paging code currently doesn't mitigate L1TF by flipping the offset bits, and uses the high PTE word, thus bits 32-36 for type, 37-63 for offset. The lower word is zeroed, thus systems with less than 4GB memory are safe. With 4GB to 128GB the swap type selects the memory locations vulnerable to L1TF; with even more memory, also the swap offfset influences the address. This might be a problem with 32bit PAE guests running on large 64bit hosts. By continuing to keep the whole swap entry in either high or low 32bit word of PTE we would limit the swap size too much. Thus this patch uses the whole PAE PTE with the same layout as the 64bit version does. The macros just become a bit tricky since they assume the arch-dependent swp_entry_t to be 32bit. Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
2018-06-26x86/mm: Get rid of KERN_CONT in show_fault_oops()Dmitry Vyukov
KERN_CONT leads to split lines in kernel output and complicates useful changes to printk like printing context before each line. Only acceptable use of continuations is basically boot-time testing. Get rid of it. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180625123808.227417-1-dvyukov@gmail.com [ Removed unnecessary parentheses and prettified the printk statement. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-06-22Merge branch 'linus' into x86/urgentThomas Gleixner
Required to queue a dependent fix.
2018-06-21x86/speculation/l1tf: Extend 64bit swap file size limitVlastimil Babka
The previous patch has limited swap file size so that large offsets cannot clear bits above MAX_PA/2 in the pte and interfere with L1TF mitigation. It assumed that offsets are encoded starting with bit 12, same as pfn. But on x86_64, offsets are encoded starting with bit 9. Thus the limit can be raised by 3 bits. That means 16TB with 42bit MAX_PA and 256TB with 46bit MAX_PA. Fixes: 377eeaa8e11f ("x86/speculation/l1tf: Limit swap file size to MAX_PA/2") Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2018-06-21x86/platform/UV: Add adjustable set memory block size functionmike.travis@hpe.com
Add a new function to "adjust" the current fixed UV memory block size of 2GB so it can be changed to a different physical boundary. This is out of necessity so arch dependent code can accommodate specific BIOS requirements which can align these new PMEM modules at less than the default boundaries. A "set order" type of function was used to insure that the memory block size will be a power of two value without requiring a validity check. 64GB was chosen as the upper limit for memory block size values to accommodate upcoming 4PB systems which have 6 more bits of physical address space (46 becoming 52). Signed-off-by: Mike Travis <mike.travis@hpe.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Banman <andrew.banman@hpe.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Dimitri Sivanich <dimitri.sivanich@hpe.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Russ Anderson <russ.anderson@hpe.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: dan.j.williams@intel.com Cc: jgross@suse.com Cc: kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com Cc: mhocko@suse.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/lkml/20180524201711.609546602@stormcage.americas.sgi.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-06-20x86/speculation/l1tf: Limit swap file size to MAX_PA/2Andi Kleen
For the L1TF workaround its necessary to limit the swap file size to below MAX_PA/2, so that the higher bits of the swap offset inverted never point to valid memory. Add a mechanism for the architecture to override the swap file size check in swapfile.c and add a x86 specific max swapfile check function that enforces that limit. The check is only enabled if the CPU is vulnerable to L1TF. In VMs with 42bit MAX_PA the typical limit is 2TB now, on a native system with 46bit PA it is 32TB. The limit is only per individual swap file, so it's always possible to exceed these limits with multiple swap files or partitions. Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
2018-06-20x86/speculation/l1tf: Disallow non privileged high MMIO PROT_NONE mappingsAndi Kleen
For L1TF PROT_NONE mappings are protected by inverting the PFN in the page table entry. This sets the high bits in the CPU's address space, thus making sure to point to not point an unmapped entry to valid cached memory. Some server system BIOSes put the MMIO mappings high up in the physical address space. If such an high mapping was mapped to unprivileged users they could attack low memory by setting such a mapping to PROT_NONE. This could happen through a special device driver which is not access protected. Normal /dev/mem is of course access protected. To avoid this forbid PROT_NONE mappings or mprotect for high MMIO mappings. Valid page mappings are allowed because the system is then unsafe anyways. It's not expected that users commonly use PROT_NONE on MMIO. But to minimize any impact this is only enforced if the mapping actually refers to a high MMIO address (defined as the MAX_PA-1 bit being set), and also skip the check for root. For mmaps this is straight forward and can be handled in vm_insert_pfn and in remap_pfn_range(). For mprotect it's a bit trickier. At the point where the actual PTEs are accessed a lot of state has been changed and it would be difficult to undo on an error. Since this is a uncommon case use a separate early page talk walk pass for MMIO PROT_NONE mappings that checks for this condition early. For non MMIO and non PROT_NONE there are no changes. Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
2018-06-15treewide: use PHYS_ADDR_MAX to avoid type casting ULLONG_MAXStefan Agner
With PHYS_ADDR_MAX there is now a type safe variant for all bits set. Make use of it. Patch created using a semantic patch as follows: // <smpl> @@ typedef phys_addr_t; @@ -(phys_addr_t)ULLONG_MAX +PHYS_ADDR_MAX // </smpl> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180419214204.19322-1-stefan@agner.ch Signed-off-by: Stefan Agner <stefan@agner.ch> Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> [arm64] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-06-15mm: fix devmem_is_allowed() for sub-page System RAM intersectionsDan Williams
Hussam reports: I was poking around and for no real reason, I did cat /dev/mem and strings /dev/mem. Then I saw the following warning in dmesg. I saved it and rebooted immediately. memremap attempted on mixed range 0x000000000009c000 size: 0x1000 ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 11810 at kernel/memremap.c:98 memremap+0x104/0x170 [..] Call Trace: xlate_dev_mem_ptr+0x25/0x40 read_mem+0x89/0x1a0 __vfs_read+0x36/0x170 The memremap() implementation checks for attempts to remap System RAM with MEMREMAP_WB and instead redirects those mapping attempts to the linear map. However, that only works if the physical address range being remapped is page aligned. In low memory we have situations like the following: 00000000-00000fff : Reserved 00001000-0009fbff : System RAM 0009fc00-0009ffff : Reserved ...where System RAM intersects Reserved ranges on a sub-page page granularity. Given that devmem_is_allowed() special cases any attempt to map System RAM in the first 1MB of memory, replace page_is_ram() with the more precise region_intersects() to trap attempts to map disallowed ranges. Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199999 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/152856436164.18127.2847888121707136898.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com Fixes: 92281dee825f ("arch: introduce memremap()") Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Reported-by: Hussam Al-Tayeb <me@hussam.eu.org> Tested-by: Hussam Al-Tayeb <me@hussam.eu.org> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-06-10Merge branch 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 updates and fixes from Thomas Gleixner: - Fix the (late) fallout from the vector management rework causing hlist corruption and irq descriptor reference leaks caused by a missing sanity check. The straight forward fix triggered another long standing issue to surface. The pre rework code hid the issue due to being way slower, but now the chance that user space sees an EBUSY error return when updating irq affinities is way higher, though quite a bunch of userspace tools do not handle it properly despite the fact that EBUSY could be returned for at least 10 years. It turned out that the EBUSY return can be avoided completely by utilizing the existing delayed affinity update mechanism for irq remapped scenarios as well. That's a bit more error handling in the kernel, but avoids fruitless fingerpointing discussions with tool developers. - Decouple PHYSICAL_MASK from AMD SME as its going to be required for the upcoming Intel memory encryption support as well. - Handle legacy device ACPI detection properly for newer platforms - Fix the wrong argument ordering in the vector allocation tracepoint - Simplify the IDT setup code for the APIC=n case - Use the proper string helpers in the MTRR code - Remove a stale unused VDSO source file - Convert the microcode update lock to a raw spinlock as its used in atomic context. * 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/intel_rdt: Enable CMT and MBM on new Skylake stepping x86/apic/vector: Print APIC control bits in debugfs genirq/affinity: Defer affinity setting if irq chip is busy x86/platform/uv: Use apic_ack_irq() x86/ioapic: Use apic_ack_irq() irq_remapping: Use apic_ack_irq() x86/apic: Provide apic_ack_irq() genirq/migration: Avoid out of line call if pending is not set genirq/generic_pending: Do not lose pending affinity update x86/apic/vector: Prevent hlist corruption and leaks x86/vector: Fix the args of vector_alloc tracepoint x86/idt: Simplify the idt_setup_apic_and_irq_gates() x86/platform/uv: Remove extra parentheses x86/mm: Decouple dynamic __PHYSICAL_MASK from AMD SME x86: Mark native_set_p4d() as __always_inline x86/microcode: Make the late update update_lock a raw lock for RT x86/mtrr: Convert to use strncpy_from_user() helper x86/mtrr: Convert to use match_string() helper x86/vdso: Remove unused file x86/i8237: Register device based on FADT legacy boot flag
2018-06-07mm: add pt_mm to struct pageMatthew Wilcox
For pgd page table pages, x86 overloads the page->index field to store a pointer to the mm_struct. Rename this to pt_mm so it's visible to other users. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180518194519.3820-13-willy@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-06-06x86/mm: Decouple dynamic __PHYSICAL_MASK from AMD SMEKirill A. Shutemov
AMD SME claims one bit from physical address to indicate whether the page is encrypted or not. To achieve that we clear out the bit from __PHYSICAL_MASK. The capability to adjust __PHYSICAL_MASK is required beyond AMD SME. For instance for upcoming Intel Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption. Factor it out into a separate feature with own Kconfig handle. It also helps with overhead of AMD SME. It saves more than 3k in .text on defconfig + AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT: add/remove: 3/2 grow/shrink: 5/110 up/down: 189/-3753 (-3564) We would need to return to this once we have infrastructure to patch constants in code. That's good candidate for it. Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180518113028.79825-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
2018-06-04Merge branch 'x86-debug-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 debug updates from Ingo Molnar: "This contains the x86 oops code printing reorganization and cleanups from Borislav Betkov, with a particular focus in enhancing opcode dumping all around" * 'x86-debug-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/dumpstack: Explain the reasoning for the prologue and buffer size x86/dumpstack: Save first regs set for the executive summary x86/dumpstack: Add a show_ip() function x86/fault: Dump user opcode bytes on fatal faults x86/dumpstack: Add loglevel argument to show_opcodes() x86/dumpstack: Improve opcodes dumping in the code section x86/dumpstack: Carve out code-dumping into a function x86/dumpstack: Unexport oops_begin() x86/dumpstack: Remove code_bytes
2018-06-04Merge branch 'x86-cleanups-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 cleanups from Ingo Molnar: "Misc cleanups" * 'x86-cleanups-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/apm: Fix spelling mistake: "caculate" -> "calculate" x86/mtrr: Rename main.c to mtrr.c and remove duplicate prefixes x86: Remove pr_fmt duplicate logging prefixes x86/early-quirks: Rename duplicate define of dev_err x86/bpf: Clean up non-standard comments, to make the code more readable
2018-06-04Merge branch 'x86-boot-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 boot updates from Ingo Molnar: - Centaur CPU updates (David Wang) - AMD and other CPU topology enumeration improvements and fixes (Borislav Petkov, Thomas Gleixner, Suravee Suthikulpanit) - Continued 5-level paging work (Kirill A. Shutemov) * 'x86-boot-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/mm: Mark __pgtable_l5_enabled __initdata x86/mm: Mark p4d_offset() __always_inline x86/mm: Introduce the 'no5lvl' kernel parameter x86/mm: Stop pretending pgtable_l5_enabled is a variable x86/mm: Unify pgtable_l5_enabled usage in early boot code x86/boot/compressed/64: Fix trampoline page table address calculation x86/CPU: Move x86_cpuinfo::x86_max_cores assignment to detect_num_cpu_cores() x86/Centaur: Report correct CPU/cache topology x86/CPU: Move cpu_detect_cache_sizes() into init_intel_cacheinfo() x86/CPU: Make intel_num_cpu_cores() generic x86/CPU: Move cpu local function declarations to local header x86/CPU/AMD: Derive CPU topology from CPUID function 0xB when available x86/CPU: Modify detect_extended_topology() to return result x86/CPU/AMD: Calculate last level cache ID from number of sharing threads x86/CPU: Rename intel_cacheinfo.c to cacheinfo.c perf/events/amd/uncore: Fix amd_uncore_llc ID to use pre-defined cpu_llc_id x86/CPU/AMD: Have smp_num_siblings and cpu_llc_id always be present x86/Centaur: Initialize supported CPU features properly
2018-06-04Merge branch 'siginfo-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace Pull siginfo updates from Eric Biederman: "This set of changes close the known issues with setting si_code to an invalid value, and with not fully initializing struct siginfo. There remains work to do on nds32, arc, unicore32, powerpc, arm, arm64, ia64 and x86 to get the code that generates siginfo into a simpler and more maintainable state. Most of that work involves refactoring the signal handling code and thus careful code review. Also not included is the work to shrink the in kernel version of struct siginfo. That depends on getting the number of places that directly manipulate struct siginfo under control, as it requires the introduction of struct kernel_siginfo for the in kernel things. Overall this set of changes looks like it is making good progress, and with a little luck I will be wrapping up the siginfo work next development cycle" * 'siginfo-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (46 commits) signal/sh: Stop gcc warning about an impossible case in do_divide_error signal/mips: Report FPE_FLTUNK for undiagnosed floating point exceptions signal/um: More carefully relay signals in relay_signal. signal: Extend siginfo_layout with SIL_FAULT_{MCEERR|BNDERR|PKUERR} signal: Remove unncessary #ifdef SEGV_PKUERR in 32bit compat code signal/signalfd: Add support for SIGSYS signal/signalfd: Remove __put_user from signalfd_copyinfo signal/xtensa: Use force_sig_fault where appropriate signal/xtensa: Consistenly use SIGBUS in do_unaligned_user signal/um: Use force_sig_fault where appropriate signal/sparc: Use force_sig_fault where appropriate signal/sparc: Use send_sig_fault where appropriate signal/sh: Use force_sig_fault where appropriate signal/s390: Use force_sig_fault where appropriate signal/riscv: Replace do_trap_siginfo with force_sig_fault signal/riscv: Use force_sig_fault where appropriate signal/parisc: Use force_sig_fault where appropriate signal/parisc: Use force_sig_mceerr where appropriate signal/openrisc: Use force_sig_fault where appropriate signal/nios2: Use force_sig_fault where appropriate ...
2018-05-19x86/mm: Stop pretending pgtable_l5_enabled is a variableKirill A. Shutemov
pgtable_l5_enabled is defined using cpu_feature_enabled() but we refer to it as a variable. This is misleading. Make pgtable_l5_enabled() a function. We cannot literally define it as a function due to circular dependencies between header files. Function-alike macros is close enough. Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180518103528.59260-4-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-05-19x86/mm: Unify pgtable_l5_enabled usage in early boot codeKirill A. Shutemov
Usually pgtable_l5_enabled is defined using cpu_feature_enabled(). cpu_feature_enabled() is not available in early boot code. We use several different preprocessor tricks to get around it. It's messy. Unify them all. If cpu_feature_enabled() is not yet available, USE_EARLY_PGTABLE_L5 can be defined before all includes. It makes pgtable_l5_enabled rely on __pgtable_l5_enabled variable instead. This approach fits all early users. Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180518103528.59260-3-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-05-14x86/pkeys: Override pkey when moving away from PROT_EXECDave Hansen
I got a bug report that the following code (roughly) was causing a SIGSEGV: mprotect(ptr, size, PROT_EXEC); mprotect(ptr, size, PROT_NONE); mprotect(ptr, size, PROT_READ); *ptr = 100; The problem is hit when the mprotect(PROT_EXEC) is implicitly assigned a protection key to the VMA, and made that key ACCESS_DENY|WRITE_DENY. The PROT_NONE mprotect() failed to remove the protection key, and the PROT_NONE-> PROT_READ left the PTE usable, but the pkey still in place and left the memory inaccessible. To fix this, we ensure that we always "override" the pkee at mprotect() if the VMA does not have execute-only permissions, but the VMA has the execute-only pkey. We had a check for PROT_READ/WRITE, but it did not work for PROT_NONE. This entirely removes the PROT_* checks, which ensures that PROT_NONE now works. Reported-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Michael Ellermen <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 62b5f7d013f ("mm/core, x86/mm/pkeys: Add execute-only protection keys support") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180509171351.084C5A71@viggo.jf.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-05-13x86: Remove pr_fmt duplicate logging prefixesJoe Perches
Converting pr_fmt from a default simple #define to use KBUILD_MODNAME added some duplicate prefixes. Remove the duplicate prefixes. Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/e7b709a2b040af7faa81b0aa2c3a125aed628a82.1525964383.git.joe@perches.com
2018-04-26x86/fault: Dump user opcode bytes on fatal faultsBorislav Petkov
Sometimes it is useful to see which user opcode bytes RIP points to when a fault happens: be it to rule out RIP corruption, to dump info early during boot, when doing core dumps is impossible due to not having a writable filesystem yet. Sometimes it is useful if debugging an issue and one doesn't have access to the executable which caused the fault in order to disassemble it. That last aspect might have some security implications so show_unhandled_signals could be revisited for that or a new config option added. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180417161124.5294-7-bp@alien8.de
2018-04-25signal: Ensure every siginfo we send has all bits initializedEric W. Biederman
Call clear_siginfo to ensure every stack allocated siginfo is properly initialized before being passed to the signal sending functions. Note: It is not safe to depend on C initializers to initialize struct siginfo on the stack because C is allowed to skip holes when initializing a structure. The initialization of struct siginfo in tracehook_report_syscall_exit was moved from the helper user_single_step_siginfo into tracehook_report_syscall_exit itself, to make it clear that the local variable siginfo gets fully initialized. In a few cases the scope of struct siginfo has been reduced to make it clear that siginfo siginfo is not used on other paths in the function in which it is declared. Instances of using memset to initialize siginfo have been replaced with calls clear_siginfo for clarity. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-04-25x86/pti: Disallow global kernel text with RANDSTRUCTDave Hansen
commit 26d35ca6c3776784f8156e1d6f80cc60d9a2a915 RANDSTRUCT derives its hardening benefits from the attacker's lack of knowledge about the layout of kernel data structures. Keep the kernel image non-global in cases where RANDSTRUCT is in use to help keep the layout a secret. Fixes: 8c06c7740 (x86/pti: Leave kernel text global for !PCID) Reported-by: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180420222026.D0B4AAC9@viggo.jf.intel.com
2018-04-25x86/pti: Reduce amount of kernel text allowed to be GlobalDave Hansen
commit abb67605203687c8b7943d760638d0301787f8d9 Kees reported to me that I made too much of the kernel image global. It was far more than just text: I think this is too much set global: _end is after data, bss, and brk, and all kinds of other stuff that could hold secrets. I think this should match what mark_rodata_ro() is doing. This does exactly that. We use __end_rodata_hpage_align as our marker both because it is huge-page-aligned and it does not contain any sections we expect to hold secrets. Kees's logic was that r/o data is in the kernel image anyway and, in the case of traditional distributions, can be freely downloaded from the web, so there's no reason to hide it. Fixes: 8c06c7740 (x86/pti: Leave kernel text global for !PCID) Reported-by: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180420222023.1C8B2B20@viggo.jf.intel.com
2018-04-25x86/pti: Fix boot warning from Global-bit settingDave Hansen
commit 231df823c4f04176f607afc4576c989895cff40e The pageattr.c code attempts to process "faults" when it goes looking for PTEs to change and finds non-present entries. It allows these faults in the linear map which is "expected to have holes", but WARN()s about them elsewhere, like when called on the kernel image. However, change_page_attr_clear() is now called on the kernel image in the process of trying to clear the Global bit. This trips the warning in __cpa_process_fault() if a non-present PTE is encountered in the kernel image. The "holes" in the kernel image result from free_init_pages()'s use of set_memory_np(). These holes are totally fine, and result from normal operation, just as they would be in the kernel linear map. Just silence the warning when holes in the kernel image are encountered. Fixes: 39114b7a7 (x86/pti: Never implicitly clear _PAGE_GLOBAL for kernel image) Reported-by: Mariusz Ceier <mceier@gmail.com> Reported-by: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@nokia.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@nokia.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180420222021.1C7D2B3F@viggo.jf.intel.com
2018-04-25x86/pti: Fix boot problems from Global-bit settingDave Hansen
commit 16dce603adc9de4237b7bf2ff5c5290f34373e7b Part of the global bit _setting_ patches also includes clearing the Global bit when it should not be enabled. That is done with set_memory_nonglobal(), which uses change_page_attr_clear() in pageattr.c under the covers. The TLB flushing code inside pageattr.c has has checks like BUG_ON(irqs_disabled()), looking for interrupt disabling that might cause deadlocks. But, these also trip in early boot on certain preempt configurations. Just copy the existing BUG_ON() sequence from cpa_flush_range() to the other two sites and check for early boot. Fixes: 39114b7a7 (x86/pti: Never implicitly clear _PAGE_GLOBAL for kernel image) Reported-by: Mariusz Ceier <mceier@gmail.com> Reported-by: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@nokia.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@nokia.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180420222019.20C4A410@viggo.jf.intel.com
2018-04-17x86/mm: Prevent kernel Oops in PTDUMP code with HIGHPTE=yJoerg Roedel
The walk_pte_level() function just uses __va to get the virtual address of the PTE page, but that breaks when the PTE page is not in the direct mapping with HIGHPTE=y. The result is an unhandled kernel paging request at some random address when accessing the current_kernel or current_user file. Use the correct API to access PTE pages. Fixes: fe770bf0310d ('x86: clean up the page table dumper and add 32-bit support') Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: jgross@suse.com Cc: JBeulich@suse.com Cc: hpa@zytor.com Cc: aryabinin@virtuozzo.com Cc: kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1523971636-4137-1-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
2018-04-15Merge branch 'x86-pti-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 pti updates from Thomas Gleixner: "Another series of PTI related changes: - Remove the manual stack switch for user entries from the idtentry code. This debloats entry by 5k+ bytes of text. - Use the proper types for the asm/bootparam.h defines to prevent user space compile errors. - Use PAGE_GLOBAL for !PCID systems to gain back performance - Prevent setting of huge PUD/PMD entries when the entries are not leaf entries otherwise the entries to which the PUD/PMD points to and are populated get lost" * 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/pgtable: Don't set huge PUD/PMD on non-leaf entries x86/pti: Leave kernel text global for !PCID x86/pti: Never implicitly clear _PAGE_GLOBAL for kernel image x86/pti: Enable global pages for shared areas x86/mm: Do not forbid _PAGE_RW before init for __ro_after_init x86/mm: Comment _PAGE_GLOBAL mystery x86/mm: Remove extra filtering in pageattr code x86/mm: Do not auto-massage page protections x86/espfix: Document use of _PAGE_GLOBAL x86/mm: Introduce "default" kernel PTE mask x86/mm: Undo double _PAGE_PSE clearing x86/mm: Factor out pageattr _PAGE_GLOBAL setting x86/entry/64: Drop idtentry's manual stack switch for user entries x86/uapi: Fix asm/bootparam.h userspace compilation errors
2018-04-12x86/pgtable: Don't set huge PUD/PMD on non-leaf entriesJoerg Roedel
The pmd_set_huge() and pud_set_huge() functions are used from the generic ioremap() code to establish large mappings where this is possible. But the generic ioremap() code does not check whether the PMD/PUD entries are already populated with a non-leaf entry, so that any page-table pages these entries point to will be lost. Further, on x86-32 with SHARED_KERNEL_PMD=0, this causes a BUG_ON() in vmalloc_sync_one() when PMD entries are synced from swapper_pg_dir to the current page-table. This happens because the PMD entry from swapper_pg_dir was promoted to a huge-page entry while the current PGD still contains the non-leaf entry. Because both entries are present and point to a different page, the BUG_ON() triggers. This was actually triggered with pti-x32 enabled in a KVM virtual machine by the graphics driver. A real and better fix for that would be to improve the page-table handling in the generic ioremap() code. But that is out-of-scope for this patch-set and left for later work. Reported-by: David H. Gutteridge <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180411152437.GC15462@8bytes.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-04-12x86/pti: Leave kernel text global for !PCIDDave Hansen
Global pages are bad for hardening because they potentially let an exploit read the kernel image via a Meltdown-style attack which makes it easier to find gadgets. But, global pages are good for performance because they reduce TLB misses when making user/kernel transitions, especially when PCIDs are not available, such as on older hardware, or where a hypervisor has disabled them for some reason. This patch implements a basic, sane policy: If you have PCIDs, you only map a minimal amount of kernel text global. If you do not have PCIDs, you map all kernel text global. This policy effectively makes PCIDs something that not only adds performance but a little bit of hardening as well. I ran a simple "lseek" microbenchmark[1] to test the benefit on a modern Atom microserver. Most of the benefit comes from applying the series before this patch ("entry only"), but there is still a signifiant benefit from this patch. No Global Lines (baseline ): 6077741 lseeks/sec 88 Global Lines (entry only): 7528609 lseeks/sec (+23.9%) 94 Global Lines (this patch): 8433111 lseeks/sec (+38.8%) [1.] https://github.com/antonblanchard/will-it-scale/blob/master/tests/lseek1.c Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180406205518.E3D989EB@viggo.jf.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>