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XSAVEC is the user space counterpart of XSAVES which cannot save supervisor
state. In virtualization scenarios the hypervisor does not expose XSAVES
but XSAVEC to the guest, though the kernel does not make use of it.
That's unfortunate because XSAVEC uses the compacted format of saving the
XSTATE. This is more efficient in terms of storage space vs. XSAVE[OPT] as
it does not create holes for XSTATE components which are not supported or
enabled by the kernel but are available in hardware. There is room for
further optimizations when XSAVEC/S and XGETBV1 are supported.
In order to support XSAVEC:
- Define the XSAVEC ASM macro as it's not yet supported by the required
minimal toolchain.
- Create a software defined X86_FEATURE_XCOMPACTED to select the compacted
XSTATE buffer format for both XSAVEC and XSAVES.
- Make XSAVEC an option in the 'XSAVE' ASM alternatives
Requested-by: Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220404104820.598704095@linutronix.de
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When a machine error is graded as PANIC by the AMD grading logic, the
MCE handler calls mce_panic(). The notification chain does not come
into effect so the AMD EDAC driver does not decode the errors. In these
cases, the messages displayed to the user are more cryptic and miss
information that might be relevant, like the context in which the error
took place.
Add messages to the grading logic for machine errors so that it is clear
what error it was.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Signed-off-by: Carlos Bilbao <carlos.bilbao@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220405183212.354606-3-carlos.bilbao@amd.com
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The MCE handler needs to understand the severity of the machine errors to
act accordingly. Simplify the AMD grading logic following a logic that
closely resembles the descriptions of the public PPR documents. This will
help include more fine-grained grading of errors in the future.
[ bp: Touchups. ]
Signed-off-by: Carlos Bilbao <carlos.bilbao@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220405183212.354606-2-carlos.bilbao@amd.com
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull perf fixes from Borislav Petkov:
- Add Sapphire Rapids CPU support
- Fix a perf vmalloc-ed buffer mapping error (PERF_USE_VMALLOC in use)
* tag 'perf_urgent_for_v5.18_rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
perf/x86/cstate: Add SAPPHIRERAPIDS_X CPU support
perf/core: Fix perf_mmap fail when CONFIG_PERF_USE_VMALLOC enabled
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Pull kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
"The main and larger change here is a workaround for AMD's lack of
cache coherency for encrypted-memory guests.
I have another patch pending, but it's waiting for review from the
architecture maintainers.
RISC-V:
- Remove 's' & 'u' as valid ISA extension
- Do not allow disabling the base extensions 'i'/'m'/'a'/'c'
x86:
- Fix NMI watchdog in guests on AMD
- Fix for SEV cache incoherency issues
- Don't re-acquire SRCU lock in complete_emulated_io()
- Avoid NULL pointer deref if VM creation fails
- Fix race conditions between APICv disabling and vCPU creation
- Bugfixes for disabling of APICv
- Preserve BSP MSR_KVM_POLL_CONTROL across suspend/resume
selftests:
- Do not use bitfields larger than 32-bits, they differ between GCC
and clang"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm:
kvm: selftests: introduce and use more page size-related constants
kvm: selftests: do not use bitfields larger than 32-bits for PTEs
KVM: SEV: add cache flush to solve SEV cache incoherency issues
KVM: SVM: Flush when freeing encrypted pages even on SME_COHERENT CPUs
KVM: SVM: Simplify and harden helper to flush SEV guest page(s)
KVM: selftests: Silence compiler warning in the kvm_page_table_test
KVM: x86/pmu: Update AMD PMC sample period to fix guest NMI-watchdog
x86/kvm: Preserve BSP MSR_KVM_POLL_CONTROL across suspend/resume
KVM: SPDX style and spelling fixes
KVM: x86: Skip KVM_GUESTDBG_BLOCKIRQ APICv update if APICv is disabled
KVM: x86: Pend KVM_REQ_APICV_UPDATE during vCPU creation to fix a race
KVM: nVMX: Defer APICv updates while L2 is active until L1 is active
KVM: x86: Tag APICv DISABLE inhibit, not ABSENT, if APICv is disabled
KVM: Initialize debugfs_dentry when a VM is created to avoid NULL deref
KVM: Add helpers to wrap vcpu->srcu_idx and yell if it's abused
KVM: RISC-V: Use kvm_vcpu.srcu_idx, drop RISC-V's unnecessary copy
KVM: x86: Don't re-acquire SRCU lock in complete_emulated_io()
RISC-V: KVM: Restrict the extensions that can be disabled
RISC-V: KVM: Remove 's' & 'u' as valid ISA extension
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Remove CONFIG_NOINSTR_VALIDATION's dependency on HAVE_OBJTOOL, since
other arches might want to implement objtool without it.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/488e94f69db4df154499bc098573d90e5db1c826.1650300597.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
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Objtool has some hacks in place to workaround toolchain limitations
which otherwise would break no-instrumentation rules. Make the hacks
explicit (and optional for other arches) by turning it into a cmdline
option and kernel config option.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b326eeb9c33231b9dfbb925f194ed7ee40edcd7c.1650300597.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
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Objtool secretly does a jump label hack to overcome the limitations of
the toolchain. Make the hack explicit (and optional for other arches)
by turning it into a cmdline option and kernel config option.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/3bdcbfdd27ecb01ddec13c04bdf756a583b13d24.1650300597.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
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Now that stack validation is an optional feature of objtool, add
CONFIG_OBJTOOL and replace most usages of CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION with
it.
CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION can now be considered to be frame-pointer
specific. CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC is already inherently valid for live
patching, so no need to "validate" it.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/939bf3d85604b2a126412bf11af6e3bd3b872bcb.1650300597.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
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Merge the x86/urgent objtool/IBT changes as a base
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
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With SIGTRAP on perf events, we have encountered termination of
processes due to user space attempting to block delivery of SIGTRAP.
Consider this case:
<set up SIGTRAP on a perf event>
...
sigset_t s;
sigemptyset(&s);
sigaddset(&s, SIGTRAP | <and others>);
sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &s, ...);
...
<perf event triggers>
When the perf event triggers, while SIGTRAP is blocked, force_sig_perf()
will force the signal, but revert back to the default handler, thus
terminating the task.
This makes sense for error conditions, but not so much for explicitly
requested monitoring. However, the expectation is still that signals
generated by perf events are synchronous, which will no longer be the
case if the signal is blocked and delivered later.
To give user space the ability to clearly distinguish synchronous from
asynchronous signals, introduce siginfo_t::si_perf_flags and
TRAP_PERF_FLAG_ASYNC (opted for flags in case more binary information is
required in future).
The resolution to the problem is then to (a) no longer force the signal
(avoiding the terminations), but (b) tell user space via si_perf_flags
if the signal was synchronous or not, so that such signals can be
handled differently (e.g. let user space decide to ignore or consider
the data imprecise).
The alternative of making the kernel ignore SIGTRAP on perf events if
the signal is blocked may work for some usecases, but likely causes
issues in others that then have to revert back to interception of
sigprocmask() (which we want to avoid). [ A concrete example: when using
breakpoint perf events to track data-flow, in a region of code where
signals are blocked, data-flow can no longer be tracked accurately.
When a relevant asynchronous signal is received after unblocking the
signal, the data-flow tracking logic needs to know its state is
imprecise. ]
Fixes: 97ba62b27867 ("perf: Add support for SIGTRAP on perf events")
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220404111204.935357-1-elver@google.com
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Flush the CPU caches when memory is reclaimed from an SEV guest (where
reclaim also includes it being unmapped from KVM's memslots). Due to lack
of coherency for SEV encrypted memory, failure to flush results in silent
data corruption if userspace is malicious/broken and doesn't ensure SEV
guest memory is properly pinned and unpinned.
Cache coherency is not enforced across the VM boundary in SEV (AMD APM
vol.2 Section 15.34.7). Confidential cachelines, generated by confidential
VM guests have to be explicitly flushed on the host side. If a memory page
containing dirty confidential cachelines was released by VM and reallocated
to another user, the cachelines may corrupt the new user at a later time.
KVM takes a shortcut by assuming all confidential memory remain pinned
until the end of VM lifetime. Therefore, KVM does not flush cache at
mmu_notifier invalidation events. Because of this incorrect assumption and
the lack of cache flushing, malicous userspace can crash the host kernel:
creating a malicious VM and continuously allocates/releases unpinned
confidential memory pages when the VM is running.
Add cache flush operations to mmu_notifier operations to ensure that any
physical memory leaving the guest VM get flushed. In particular, hook
mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start and mmu_notifier_release events and
flush cache accordingly. The hook after releasing the mmu lock to avoid
contention with other vCPUs.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Sean Christpherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reported-by: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220421031407.2516575-4-mizhang@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Use clflush_cache_range() to flush the confidential memory when
SME_COHERENT is supported in AMD CPU. Cache flush is still needed since
SME_COHERENT only support cache invalidation at CPU side. All confidential
cache lines are still incoherent with DMA devices.
Cc: stable@vger.kerel.org
Fixes: add5e2f04541 ("KVM: SVM: Add support for the SEV-ES VMSA")
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220421031407.2516575-3-mizhang@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Rework sev_flush_guest_memory() to explicitly handle only a single page,
and harden it to fall back to WBINVD if VM_PAGE_FLUSH fails. Per-page
flushing is currently used only to flush the VMSA, and in its current
form, the helper is completely broken with respect to flushing actual
guest memory, i.e. won't work correctly for an arbitrary memory range.
VM_PAGE_FLUSH takes a host virtual address, and is subject to normal page
walks, i.e. will fault if the address is not present in the host page
tables or does not have the correct permissions. Current AMD CPUs also
do not honor SMAP overrides (undocumented in kernel versions of the APM),
so passing in a userspace address is completely out of the question. In
other words, KVM would need to manually walk the host page tables to get
the pfn, ensure the pfn is stable, and then use the direct map to invoke
VM_PAGE_FLUSH. And the latter might not even work, e.g. if userspace is
particularly evil/clever and backs the guest with Secret Memory (which
unmaps memory from the direct map).
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Fixes: add5e2f04541 ("KVM: SVM: Add support for the SEV-ES VMSA")
Reported-by: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220421031407.2516575-2-mizhang@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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NMI-watchdog is one of the favorite features of kernel developers,
but it does not work in AMD guest even with vPMU enabled and worse,
the system misrepresents this capability via /proc.
This is a PMC emulation error. KVM does not pass the latest valid
value to perf_event in time when guest NMI-watchdog is running, thus
the perf_event corresponding to the watchdog counter will enter the
old state at some point after the first guest NMI injection, forcing
the hardware register PMC0 to be constantly written to 0x800000000001.
Meanwhile, the running counter should accurately reflect its new value
based on the latest coordinated pmc->counter (from vPMC's point of view)
rather than the value written directly by the guest.
Fixes: 168d918f2643 ("KVM: x86: Adjust counter sample period after a wrmsr")
Reported-by: Dongli Cao <caodongli@kingsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
Reviewed-by: Yanan Wang <wangyanan55@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Yanan Wang <wangyanan55@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220409015226.38619-1-likexu@tencent.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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MSR_KVM_POLL_CONTROL is cleared on reset, thus reverting guests to
host-side polling after suspend/resume. Non-bootstrap CPUs are
restored correctly by the haltpoll driver because they are hot-unplugged
during suspend and hot-plugged during resume; however, the BSP
is not hotpluggable and remains in host-sde polling mode after
the guest resume. The makes the guest pay for the cost of vmexits
every time the guest enters idle.
Fix it by recording BSP's haltpoll state and resuming it during guest
resume.
Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Message-Id: <1650267752-46796-1-git-send-email-wanpengli@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Skip the APICv inhibit update for KVM_GUESTDBG_BLOCKIRQ if APICv is
disabled at the module level to avoid having to acquire the mutex and
potentially process all vCPUs. The DISABLE inhibit will (barring bugs)
never be lifted, so piling on more inhibits is unnecessary.
Fixes: cae72dcc3b21 ("KVM: x86: inhibit APICv when KVM_GUESTDBG_BLOCKIRQ active")
Cc: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220420013732.3308816-5-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Make a KVM_REQ_APICV_UPDATE request when creating a vCPU with an
in-kernel local APIC and APICv enabled at the module level. Consuming
kvm_apicv_activated() and stuffing vcpu->arch.apicv_active directly can
race with __kvm_set_or_clear_apicv_inhibit(), as vCPU creation happens
before the vCPU is fully onlined, i.e. it won't get the request made to
"all" vCPUs. If APICv is globally inhibited between setting apicv_active
and onlining the vCPU, the vCPU will end up running with APICv enabled
and trigger KVM's sanity check.
Mark APICv as active during vCPU creation if APICv is enabled at the
module level, both to be optimistic about it's final state, e.g. to avoid
additional VMWRITEs on VMX, and because there are likely bugs lurking
since KVM checks apicv_active in multiple vCPU creation paths. While
keeping the current behavior of consuming kvm_apicv_activated() is
arguably safer from a regression perspective, force apicv_active so that
vCPU creation runs with deterministic state and so that if there are bugs,
they are found sooner than later, i.e. not when some crazy race condition
is hit.
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 484 at arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:9877 vcpu_enter_guest+0x2ae3/0x3ee0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:9877
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 484 Comm: syz-executor361 Not tainted 5.16.13 #2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1~cloud0 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:vcpu_enter_guest+0x2ae3/0x3ee0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:9877
Call Trace:
<TASK>
vcpu_run arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:10039 [inline]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x337/0x15e0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:10234
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x4d2/0xc80 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:3727
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:874 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:860 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x16d/0x1d0 fs/ioctl.c:860
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
The bug was hit by a syzkaller spamming VM creation with 2 vCPUs and a
call to KVM_SET_GUEST_DEBUG.
r0 = openat$kvm(0xffffffffffffff9c, &(0x7f0000000000), 0x0, 0x0)
r1 = ioctl$KVM_CREATE_VM(r0, 0xae01, 0x0)
ioctl$KVM_CAP_SPLIT_IRQCHIP(r1, 0x4068aea3, &(0x7f0000000000)) (async)
r2 = ioctl$KVM_CREATE_VCPU(r1, 0xae41, 0x0) (async)
r3 = ioctl$KVM_CREATE_VCPU(r1, 0xae41, 0x400000000000002)
ioctl$KVM_SET_GUEST_DEBUG(r3, 0x4048ae9b, &(0x7f00000000c0)={0x5dda9c14aa95f5c5})
ioctl$KVM_RUN(r2, 0xae80, 0x0)
Reported-by: Gaoning Pan <pgn@zju.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Yongkang Jia <kangel@zju.edu.cn>
Fixes: 8df14af42f00 ("kvm: x86: Add support for dynamic APICv activation")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220420013732.3308816-4-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Defer APICv updates that occur while L2 is active until nested VM-Exit,
i.e. until L1 regains control. vmx_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl() assumes L1
is active and (a) stomps all over vmcs02 and (b) neglects to ever updated
vmcs01. E.g. if vmcs12 doesn't enable the TPR shadow for L2 (and thus no
APICv controls), L1 performs nested VM-Enter APICv inhibited, and APICv
becomes unhibited while L2 is active, KVM will set various APICv controls
in vmcs02 and trigger a failed VM-Entry. The kicker is that, unless
running with nested_early_check=1, KVM blames L1 and chaos ensues.
In all cases, ignoring vmcs02 and always deferring the inhibition change
to vmcs01 is correct (or at least acceptable). The ABSENT and DISABLE
inhibitions cannot truly change while L2 is active (see below).
IRQ_BLOCKING can change, but it is firmly a best effort debug feature.
Furthermore, only L2's APIC is accelerated/virtualized to the full extent
possible, e.g. even if L1 passes through its APIC to L2, normal MMIO/MSR
interception will apply to the virtual APIC managed by KVM.
The exception is the SELF_IPI register when x2APIC is enabled, but that's
an acceptable hole.
Lastly, Hyper-V's Auto EOI can technically be toggled if L1 exposes the
MSRs to L2, but for that to work in any sane capacity, L1 would need to
pass through IRQs to L2 as well, and IRQs must be intercepted to enable
virtual interrupt delivery. I.e. exposing Auto EOI to L2 and enabling
VID for L2 are, for all intents and purposes, mutually exclusive.
Lack of dynamic toggling is also why this scenario is all but impossible
to encounter in KVM's current form. But a future patch will pend an
APICv update request _during_ vCPU creation to plug a race where a vCPU
that's being created doesn't get included in the "all vCPUs request"
because it's not yet visible to other vCPUs. If userspaces restores L2
after VM creation (hello, KVM selftests), the first KVM_RUN will occur
while L2 is active and thus service the APICv update request made during
VM creation.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220420013732.3308816-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Set the DISABLE inhibit, not the ABSENT inhibit, if APICv is disabled via
module param. A recent refactoring to add a wrapper for setting/clearing
inhibits unintentionally changed the flag, probably due to a copy+paste
goof.
Fixes: 4f4c4a3ee53c ("KVM: x86: Trace all APICv inhibit changes and capture overall status")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220420013732.3308816-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Add wrappers to acquire/release KVM's SRCU lock when stashing the index
in vcpu->src_idx, along with rudimentary detection of illegal usage,
e.g. re-acquiring SRCU and thus overwriting vcpu->src_idx. Because the
SRCU index is (currently) either 0 or 1, illegal nesting bugs can go
unnoticed for quite some time and only cause problems when the nested
lock happens to get a different index.
Wrap the WARNs in PROVE_RCU=y, and make them ONCE, otherwise KVM will
likely yell so loudly that it will bring the kernel to its knees.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Tested-by: Fabiano Rosas <farosas@linux.ibm.com>
Message-Id: <20220415004343.2203171-4-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Don't re-acquire SRCU in complete_emulated_io() now that KVM acquires the
lock in kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run(). More importantly, don't overwrite
vcpu->srcu_idx. If the index acquired by complete_emulated_io() differs
from the one acquired by kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run(), KVM will effectively
leak a lock and hang if/when synchronize_srcu() is invoked for the
relevant grace period.
Fixes: 8d25b7beca7e ("KVM: x86: pull kvm->srcu read-side to kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220415004343.2203171-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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objdump complains:
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: __tdx_hypercall()+0x74: unreachable instruction
because __tdx_hypercall_failed() won't return but panic the guest.
Annotate that that is ok and desired.
Fixes: eb94f1b6a70a ("x86/tdx: Add __tdx_module_call() and __tdx_hypercall() helper functions")
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220420115025.5448-1-bp@alien8.de
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During patch review, it was decided the SNP guest driver name should not
be SEV-SNP specific, but should be generic for use with anything SEV.
However, this feedback was missed and the driver name, and many of the
driver functions and structures, are SEV-SNP name specific. Rename the
driver to "sev-guest" (to match the misc device that is created) and
update some of the function and structure names, too.
While in the file, adjust the one pr_err() message to be a dev_err()
message so that the message, if issued, uses the driver name.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/307710bb5515c9088a19fd0b930268c7300479b2.1650464054.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
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The first "if" condition in __memcpy_flushcache is supposed to align the
"dest" variable to 8 bytes and copy data up to this alignment. However,
this condition may misbehave if "size" is greater than 4GiB.
The statement min_t(unsigned, size, ALIGN(dest, 8) - dest); casts both
arguments to unsigned int and selects the smaller one. However, the
cast truncates high bits in "size" and it results in misbehavior.
For example:
suppose that size == 0x100000001, dest == 0x200000002
min_t(unsigned, size, ALIGN(dest, 8) - dest) == min_t(0x1, 0xe) == 0x1;
...
dest += 0x1;
so we copy just one byte "and" dest remains unaligned.
This patch fixes the bug by replacing unsigned with size_t.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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The helpers in arch/x86/boot/compressed/efi.c might be used during
early boot to access the EFI system/config tables, and in some cases
these EFI helpers might attempt to print debug/error messages, before
console_init() has been called.
__putstr() checks some variables to avoid printing anything before
the console has been initialized, but this isn't enough since those
variables live in .bss, which may not have been cleared yet. This can
lead to a triple-fault occurring, primarily when booting in legacy/CSM
mode (where EFI helpers will attempt to print some debug messages).
Fix this by declaring these globals in .data section instead so there
is no dependency on .bss being cleared before accessing them.
Fixes: c01fce9cef849 ("x86/compressed: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup")
Reported-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Suggested-by: Thomas Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220420152613.145077-1-michael.roth@amd.com
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Adding initial PCI ids for RPL-P.
RPL-P behaves identically to ADL-P from i915's point of view.
Changes since V1 :
- SUBPLATFORM ADL_N and RPL_P clash as both are ADLP
based - Matthew R
Bspec: 55376
Signed-off-by: Matt Atwood <matthew.s.atwood@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Madhumitha Tolakanahalli Pradeep <madhumitha.tolakanahalli.pradeep@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejas Upadhyay <tejaskumarx.surendrakumar.upadhyay@intel.com>
[mattrope: Corrected comment formatting to match coding style]
Signed-off-by: Matt Roper <matthew.d.roper@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220418062157.2974665-1-tejaskumarx.surendrakumar.upadhyay@intel.com
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For unwinding sanity, a function shouldn't jump to the middle of another
function. Move the short string user copy code out to a separate
non-function code snippet.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/9519e4853148b765e047967708f2b61e56c93186.1649718562.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
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There is only one m in becoming.
Signed-off-by: Nur Hussein <hussein@unixcat.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220417192454.10247-1-hussein@unixcat.org
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The startup_xen() kernel entry point is referenced by the ".note.Xen"
section, and is the real entry point of the VM. Control transfer is
through IRET, which *could* set NEED_ENDBR, however Xen currently does
no such thing.
Add ANNOTATE_NOENDBR to silence future objtool warnings.
Fixes: ed53a0d97192 ("x86/alternative: Use .ibt_endbr_seal to seal indirect calls")
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/a87bd48b06d11ec4b98122a429e71e489b4e48c3.1650300597.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
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The __put_user_nocheck*() inner labels are exported, so in keeping with
the "allow exported functions to be indirectly called" policy, add
ENDBR.
Fixes: ed53a0d97192 ("x86/alternative: Use .ibt_endbr_seal to seal indirect calls")
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/207f02177a23031091d1a608de6049a9e5e8ff80.1650300597.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
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The retpolines are exported, so they're referenced by ksymtab sections.
But they're never indirect-branched to, so add ANNOTATE_NOENDBR.
Fixes: ed53a0d97192 ("x86/alternative: Use .ibt_endbr_seal to seal indirect calls")
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b6ec963dfd9301b6b1d74ef7758fcb0b540d6c6c.1650300597.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
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The static call trampoline is never indirect-branched to, but is
referenced by the static call key. Add ANNOTATE_NOENDBR.
Fixes: ed53a0d97192 ("x86/alternative: Use .ibt_endbr_seal to seal indirect calls")
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1b5b54aad7d81241dabe5e0c9b40dea64b540b00.1650300597.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
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Objtool can figure out that some \cfunc()s are noreturn and then
complains about certain instances having unreachable tails:
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: asm_exc_xen_unknown_trap()+0x16: unreachable instruction
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220408094718.441854969@infradead.org
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SYM_CODE_START*() doesn't get auto-validated and needs an UNWIND hint
to get checked, add one.
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: pvh_start_xen()+0x0: unreachable
Reported-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reported-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220408094718.321246297@infradead.org
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A crash was observed in the ORC unwinder:
BUG: stack guard page was hit at 000000000dd984a2 (stack is 00000000d1caafca..00000000613712f0)
kernel stack overflow (page fault): 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 93 PID: 23787 Comm: context_switch1 Not tainted 5.4.145 #1
RIP: 0010:unwind_next_frame
Call Trace:
<NMI>
perf_callchain_kernel
get_perf_callchain
perf_callchain
perf_prepare_sample
perf_event_output_forward
__perf_event_overflow
perf_ibs_handle_irq
perf_ibs_nmi_handler
nmi_handle
default_do_nmi
do_nmi
end_repeat_nmi
This was really two bugs:
1) The perf IBS code passed inconsistent regs to the unwinder.
2) The unwinder didn't handle the bad input gracefully.
Fix the latter bug. The ORC unwinder needs to be immune against bad
inputs. The problem is that stack_access_ok() doesn't recheck the
validity of the full range of registers after switching to the next
valid stack with get_stack_info(). Fix that.
[ jpoimboe: rewrote commit log ]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Monakhov <dmtrmonakhov@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1650353656-956624-1-git-send-email-dmtrmonakhov@yandex-team.ru
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
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From the perspective of Intel cstate residency counters,
SAPPHIRERAPIDS_X is the same as ICELAKE_X.
Share the code with it. And update the comments for SAPPHIRERAPIDS_X.
Signed-off-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220415104520.2737004-1-rui.zhang@intel.com
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When resuming from system sleep state, restore_processor_state()
restores the boot CPU MSRs. These MSRs could be emulated by microcode.
If microcode is not loaded yet, writing to emulated MSRs leads to
unchecked MSR access error:
...
PM: Calling lapic_suspend+0x0/0x210
unchecked MSR access error: WRMSR to 0x10f (tried to write 0x0...0) at rIP: ... (native_write_msr)
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? restore_processor_state
x86_acpi_suspend_lowlevel
acpi_suspend_enter
suspend_devices_and_enter
pm_suspend.cold
state_store
kobj_attr_store
sysfs_kf_write
kernfs_fop_write_iter
new_sync_write
vfs_write
ksys_write
__x64_sys_write
do_syscall_64
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
RIP: 0033:0x7fda13c260a7
To ensure microcode emulated MSRs are available for restoration, load
the microcode on the boot CPU before restoring these MSRs.
[ Pawan: write commit message and productize it. ]
Fixes: e2a1256b17b1 ("x86/speculation: Restore speculation related MSRs during S3 resume")
Reported-by: Kyle D. Pelton <kyle.d.pelton@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Kyle D. Pelton <kyle.d.pelton@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215841
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/4350dfbf785cd482d3fafa72b2b49c83102df3ce.1650386317.git.pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/lenb/linux
Pull turbostat changes for 5.19 from Len Brown:
"Chen Yu (1):
tools/power turbostat: Support thermal throttle count print
Dan Merillat (1):
tools/power turbostat: fix dump for AMD cpus
Len Brown (5):
tools/power turbostat: tweak --show and --hide capability
tools/power turbostat: fix ICX DRAM power numbers
tools/power turbostat: be more useful as non-root
tools/power turbostat: No build warnings with -Wextra
tools/power turbostat: version 2022.04.16
Sumeet Pawnikar (2):
tools/power turbostat: Add Power Limit4 support
tools/power turbostat: print power values upto three decimal
Zephaniah E. Loss-Cutler-Hull (2):
tools/power turbostat: Allow -e for all names.
tools/power turbostat: Allow printing header every N iterations"
* 'turbostat' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/lenb/linux:
tools/power turbostat: version 2022.04.16
tools/power turbostat: No build warnings with -Wextra
tools/power turbostat: be more useful as non-root
tools/power turbostat: fix ICX DRAM power numbers
tools/power turbostat: Support thermal throttle count print
tools/power turbostat: Allow printing header every N iterations
tools/power turbostat: Allow -e for all names.
tools/power turbostat: print power values upto three decimal
tools/power turbostat: Add Power Limit4 support
tools/power turbostat: fix dump for AMD cpus
tools/power turbostat: tweak --show and --hide capability
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The spacing is off in the memory encryption features message on AMD
platforms that support memory encryption, e.g.:
"Memory Encryption Features active:AMD SEV SEV-ES"
There is no space before "AMD" and two spaces after it. Fix this so that
the message is spaced properly:
"Memory Encryption Features active: AMD SEV SEV-ES"
Fixes: 968b493173ac ("x86/mm: Make DMA memory shared for TD guest")
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/02401f3024b18e90bc2508147e22e729436cb6d9.1650298573.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
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Intel is subdividing the mobile segment with additional models
with the same codename. Using the Intel "N" and "P" suffices
for these will be less confusing than trying to map to some
different naming convention.
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YlS7n7Xtso9BXZA2@agluck-desk3.sc.intel.com
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<asm/dma-mapping.h> gets pulled in by all drivers using the DMA API.
Remove x86 internal variables and unnecessary includes from it.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
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Reuse the generic swiotlb initialization for xen-swiotlb. For ARM/ARM64
this works trivially, while for x86 xen_swiotlb_fixup needs to be passed
as the remap argument to swiotlb_init_remap/swiotlb_init_late.
Note that the lower bound of the swiotlb size is changed to the smaller
IO_TLB_MIN_SLABS based value with this patch, but that is fine as the
2MB value used in Xen before was just an optimization and is not the
hard lower bound.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
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To shared more code between swiotlb and xen-swiotlb, offer a
swiotlb_init_remap interface and add a remap callback to
swiotlb_init_late that will allow Xen to remap the buffer without
duplicating much of the logic.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
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Let the caller chose a zone to allocate from. This will be used
later on by the xen-swiotlb initialization on arm.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
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Pass a boolean flag to indicate if swiotlb needs to be enabled based on
the addressing needs, and replace the verbose argument with a set of
flags, including one to force enable bounce buffering.
Note that this patch removes the possibility to force xen-swiotlb use
with the swiotlb=force parameter on the command line on x86 (arm and
arm64 never supported that), but this interface will be restored shortly.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
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Move enabling SWIOTLB_FORCE for guest memory encryption into common code.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
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The IOMMU table tries to separate the different IOMMUs into different
backends, but actually requires various cross calls.
Rewrite the code to do the generic swiotlb/swiotlb-xen setup directly
in pci-dma.c and then just call into the IOMMU drivers.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
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swiotlb_late_init_with_default_size is an overly verbose name that
doesn't even catch what the function is doing, given that the size is
not just a default but the actual requested size.
Rename it to swiotlb_init_late.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
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Copy the needed symbols only and remove the kernel proper includes.
No functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YlCKWhMJEMUgJmjF@zn.tnic
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