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2020-01-20efi/x86: avoid KASAN false positives when accessing the 1: 1 mappingArd Biesheuvel
When installing the EFI virtual address map during early boot, we access the EFI system table to retrieve the 1:1 mapped address of the SetVirtualAddressMap() EFI runtime service. This memory is not known to KASAN, so on KASAN enabled builds, this may result in a splat like ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: user-memory-access in efi_set_virtual_address_map+0x141/0x354 Read of size 4 at addr 000000003fbeef38 by task swapper/0/0 CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.5.0-rc5+ #758 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x8b/0xbb ? efi_set_virtual_address_map+0x141/0x354 ? efi_set_virtual_address_map+0x141/0x354 __kasan_report+0x176/0x192 ? efi_set_virtual_address_map+0x141/0x354 kasan_report+0xe/0x20 efi_set_virtual_address_map+0x141/0x354 ? efi_thunk_runtime_setup+0x148/0x148 ? __inc_numa_state+0x19/0x90 ? memcpy+0x34/0x50 efi_enter_virtual_mode+0x5fd/0x67d start_kernel+0x5cd/0x682 ? mem_encrypt_init+0x6/0x6 ? x86_family+0x5/0x20 ? load_ucode_bsp+0x46/0x154 secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0 ================================================================== Since this code runs only a single time during early boot, let's annotate it as __no_sanitize_address so KASAN disregards it entirely. Fixes: 698294704573 ("efi/x86: Split SetVirtualAddresMap() wrappers into ...") Reported-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2020-01-20efi: Add tracking for dynamically allocated memmapsDan Williams
In preparation for fixing efi_memmap_alloc() leaks, add support for recording whether the memmap was dynamically allocated from slab, memblock, or is the original physical memmap provided by the platform. Given this tracking is established in efi_memmap_alloc() and needs to be carried to efi_memmap_install(), use 'struct efi_memory_map_data' to convey the flags. Some small cleanups result from this reorganization, specifically the removal of local variables for 'phys' and 'size' that are already tracked in @data. Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200113172245.27925-12-ardb@kernel.org
2020-01-20efi/x86: Limit EFI old memory map to SGI UV machinesArd Biesheuvel
We carry a quirk in the x86 EFI code to switch back to an older method of mapping the EFI runtime services memory regions, because it was deemed risky at the time to implement a new method without providing a fallback to the old method in case problems arose. Such problems did arise, but they appear to be limited to SGI UV1 machines, and so these are the only ones for which the fallback gets enabled automatically (via a DMI quirk). The fallback can be enabled manually as well, by passing efi=old_map, but there is very little evidence that suggests that this is something that is being relied upon in the field. Given that UV1 support is not enabled by default by the distros (Ubuntu, Fedora), there is no point in carrying this fallback code all the time if there are no other users. So let's move it into the UV support code, and document that efi=old_map now requires this support code to be enabled. Note that efi=old_map has been used in the past on other SGI UV machines to work around kernel regressions in production, so we keep the option to enable it by hand, but only if the kernel was built with UV support. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200113172245.27925-8-ardb@kernel.org
2020-01-20efi/x86: Avoid RWX mappings for all of DRAMArd Biesheuvel
The EFI code creates RWX mappings for all memory regions that are occupied after the stub completes, and in the mixed mode case, it even creates RWX mappings for all of the remaining DRAM as well. Let's try to avoid this, by setting the NX bit for all memory regions except the ones that are marked as EFI runtime services code [which means text+rodata+data in practice, so we cannot mark them read-only right away]. For cases of buggy firmware where boot services code is called during SetVirtualAddressMap(), map those regions with exec permissions as well - they will be unmapped in efi_free_boot_services(). Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200113172245.27925-7-ardb@kernel.org
2020-01-20efi/x86: Don't map the entire kernel text RW for mixed modeArd Biesheuvel
The mixed mode thunking routine requires a part of it to be mapped 1:1, and for this reason, we currently map the entire kernel .text read/write in the EFI page tables, which is bad. In fact, the kernel_map_pages_in_pgd() invocation that installs this mapping is entirely redundant, since all of DRAM is already 1:1 mapped read/write in the EFI page tables when we reach this point, which means that .rodata is mapped read-write as well. So let's remap both .text and .rodata read-only in the EFI page tables. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200113172245.27925-6-ardb@kernel.org
2020-01-20x86/mm: Fix NX bit clearing issue in kernel_map_pages_in_pgdArd Biesheuvel
The following commit: 15f003d20782 ("x86/mm/pat: Don't implicitly allow _PAGE_RW in kernel_map_pages_in_pgd()") modified kernel_map_pages_in_pgd() to manage writable permissions of memory mappings in the EFI page table in a different way, but in the process, it removed the ability to clear NX attributes from read-only mappings, by clobbering the clear mask if _PAGE_RW is not being requested. Failure to remove the NX attribute from read-only mappings is unlikely to be a security issue, but it does prevent us from tightening the permissions in the EFI page tables going forward, so let's fix it now. Fixes: 15f003d20782 ("x86/mm/pat: Don't implicitly allow _PAGE_RW in kernel_map_pages_in_pgd() Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200113172245.27925-5-ardb@kernel.org
2020-01-20efi/libstub/x86: Fix unused-variable warningArnd Bergmann
The only users of these got removed, so they also need to be removed to avoid warnings: arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c: In function 'setup_efi_pci': arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c:117:16: error: unused variable 'nr_pci' [-Werror=unused-variable] unsigned long nr_pci; ^~~~~~ arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c: In function 'setup_uga': arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c:244:16: error: unused variable 'nr_ugas' [-Werror=unused-variable] unsigned long nr_ugas; ^~~~~~~ Fixes: 2732ea0d5c0a ("efi/libstub: Use a helper to iterate over a EFI handle array") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200113172245.27925-4-ardb@kernel.org
2020-01-20efi/libstub/x86: Use mandatory 16-byte stack alignment in mixed modeArd Biesheuvel
Reduce the stack frame of the EFI stub's mixed mode thunk routine by 8 bytes, by moving the GDT and return addresses to EBP and EBX, which we need to preserve anyway, since their top halves will be cleared by the call into 32-bit firmware code. Doing so results in the UEFI code being entered with a 16 byte aligned stack, as mandated by the UEFI spec, fixing the last occurrence in the 64-bit kernel where we violate this requirement. Also, move the saved GDT from a global variable to an unused part of the stack frame, and touch up some other parts of the code. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200113172245.27925-3-ardb@kernel.org
2020-01-20efi/libstub/x86: Use const attribute for efi_is_64bit()Ard Biesheuvel
Reshuffle the x86 stub code a bit so that we can tag the efi_is_64bit() function with the 'const' attribute, which permits the compiler to optimize away any redundant calls. Since we have two different entry points for 32 and 64 bit firmware in the startup code, this also simplifies the C code since we'll enter it with the efi_is64 variable already set. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200113172245.27925-2-ardb@kernel.org
2020-01-20Merge tag 'v5.5-rc7' into efi/core, to pick up fixesIngo Molnar
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2020-01-20Backmerge v5.5-rc7 into drm-nextDave Airlie
msm needs 5.5-rc4, go to the latest. Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
2020-01-19Merge ra.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/netDavid S. Miller
2020-01-18Merge branch 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar: "Misc fixes: - a resctrl fix for uninitialized objects found by debugobjects - a resctrl memory leak fix - fix the unintended re-enabling of the of SME and SEV CPU flags if memory encryption was disabled at bootup via the MSR space" * 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/CPU/AMD: Ensure clearing of SME/SEV features is maintained x86/resctrl: Fix potential memory leak x86/resctrl: Fix an imbalance in domain_remove_cpu()
2020-01-18Merge branch 'ras-urgent-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 RAS fix from Ingo Molnar: "Fix a thermal throttling race that can result in easy to trigger boot crashes on certain Ice Lake platforms" * 'ras-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/mce/therm_throt: Do not access uninitialized therm_work
2020-01-18Merge branch 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull perf fixes from Ingo Molnar: "Tooling fixes, three Intel uncore driver fixes, plus an AUX events fix uncovered by the perf fuzzer" * 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: perf/x86/intel/uncore: Remove PCIe3 unit for SNR perf/x86/intel/uncore: Fix missing marker for snr_uncore_imc_freerunning_events perf/x86/intel/uncore: Add PCI ID of IMC for Xeon E3 V5 Family perf: Correctly handle failed perf_get_aux_event() perf hists: Fix variable name's inconsistency in hists__for_each() macro perf map: Set kmap->kmaps backpointer for main kernel map chunks perf report: Fix incorrectly added dimensions as switch perf data file tools lib traceevent: Fix memory leakage in filter_event
2020-01-18Merge branch 'efi-urgent-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull EFI fixes from Ingo Molnar: "Three EFI fixes: - Fix a slow-boot-scrolling regression but making sure we use WC for EFI earlycon framebuffer mappings on x86 - Fix a mixed EFI mode boot crash - Disable paging explicitly before entering startup_32() in mixed mode bootup" * 'efi-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/efistub: Disable paging at mixed mode entry efi/libstub/random: Initialize pointer variables to zero for mixed mode efi/earlycon: Fix write-combine mapping on x86
2020-01-18open: introduce openat2(2) syscallAleksa Sarai
/* Background. */ For a very long time, extending openat(2) with new features has been incredibly frustrating. This stems from the fact that openat(2) is possibly the most famous counter-example to the mantra "don't silently accept garbage from userspace" -- it doesn't check whether unknown flags are present[1]. This means that (generally) the addition of new flags to openat(2) has been fraught with backwards-compatibility issues (O_TMPFILE has to be defined as __O_TMPFILE|O_DIRECTORY|[O_RDWR or O_WRONLY] to ensure old kernels gave errors, since it's insecure to silently ignore the flag[2]). All new security-related flags therefore have a tough road to being added to openat(2). Userspace also has a hard time figuring out whether a particular flag is supported on a particular kernel. While it is now possible with contemporary kernels (thanks to [3]), older kernels will expose unknown flag bits through fcntl(F_GETFL). Giving a clear -EINVAL during openat(2) time matches modern syscall designs and is far more fool-proof. In addition, the newly-added path resolution restriction LOOKUP flags (which we would like to expose to user-space) don't feel related to the pre-existing O_* flag set -- they affect all components of path lookup. We'd therefore like to add a new flag argument. Adding a new syscall allows us to finally fix the flag-ignoring problem, and we can make it extensible enough so that we will hopefully never need an openat3(2). /* Syscall Prototype. */ /* * open_how is an extensible structure (similar in interface to * clone3(2) or sched_setattr(2)). The size parameter must be set to * sizeof(struct open_how), to allow for future extensions. All future * extensions will be appended to open_how, with their zero value * acting as a no-op default. */ struct open_how { /* ... */ }; int openat2(int dfd, const char *pathname, struct open_how *how, size_t size); /* Description. */ The initial version of 'struct open_how' contains the following fields: flags Used to specify openat(2)-style flags. However, any unknown flag bits or otherwise incorrect flag combinations (like O_PATH|O_RDWR) will result in -EINVAL. In addition, this field is 64-bits wide to allow for more O_ flags than currently permitted with openat(2). mode The file mode for O_CREAT or O_TMPFILE. Must be set to zero if flags does not contain O_CREAT or O_TMPFILE. resolve Restrict path resolution (in contrast to O_* flags they affect all path components). The current set of flags are as follows (at the moment, all of the RESOLVE_ flags are implemented as just passing the corresponding LOOKUP_ flag). RESOLVE_NO_XDEV => LOOKUP_NO_XDEV RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS => LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS => LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS RESOLVE_BENEATH => LOOKUP_BENEATH RESOLVE_IN_ROOT => LOOKUP_IN_ROOT open_how does not contain an embedded size field, because it is of little benefit (userspace can figure out the kernel open_how size at runtime fairly easily without it). It also only contains u64s (even though ->mode arguably should be a u16) to avoid having padding fields which are never used in the future. Note that as a result of the new how->flags handling, O_PATH|O_TMPFILE is no longer permitted for openat(2). As far as I can tell, this has always been a bug and appears to not be used by userspace (and I've not seen any problems on my machines by disallowing it). If it turns out this breaks something, we can special-case it and only permit it for openat(2) but not openat2(2). After input from Florian Weimer, the new open_how and flag definitions are inside a separate header from uapi/linux/fcntl.h, to avoid problems that glibc has with importing that header. /* Testing. */ In a follow-up patch there are over 200 selftests which ensure that this syscall has the correct semantics and will correctly handle several attack scenarios. In addition, I've written a userspace library[4] which provides convenient wrappers around openat2(RESOLVE_IN_ROOT) (this is necessary because no other syscalls support RESOLVE_IN_ROOT, and thus lots of care must be taken when using RESOLVE_IN_ROOT'd file descriptors with other syscalls). During the development of this patch, I've run numerous verification tests using libpathrs (showing that the API is reasonably usable by userspace). /* Future Work. */ Additional RESOLVE_ flags have been suggested during the review period. These can be easily implemented separately (such as blocking auto-mount during resolution). Furthermore, there are some other proposed changes to the openat(2) interface (the most obvious example is magic-link hardening[5]) which would be a good opportunity to add a way for userspace to restrict how O_PATH file descriptors can be re-opened. Another possible avenue of future work would be some kind of CHECK_FIELDS[6] flag which causes the kernel to indicate to userspace which openat2(2) flags and fields are supported by the current kernel (to avoid userspace having to go through several guesses to figure it out). [1]: https://lwn.net/Articles/588444/ [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+55aFyyxJL1LyXZeBsf2ypriraj5ut1XkNDsunRBqgVjZU_6Q@mail.gmail.com [3]: commit 629e014bb834 ("fs: completely ignore unknown open flags") [4]: https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=17523 [5]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190930183316.10190-2-cyphar@cyphar.com/ [6]: https://youtu.be/ggD-eb3yPVs Suggested-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-01-17x86/resctrl: Check monitoring static key in the MBM overflow handlerXiaochen Shen
Currently, there are three static keys in the resctrl file system: rdt_mon_enable_key and rdt_alloc_enable_key indicate if the monitoring feature and the allocation feature are enabled, respectively. The rdt_enable_key is enabled when either the monitoring feature or the allocation feature is enabled. If no monitoring feature is present (either hardware doesn't support a monitoring feature or the feature is disabled by the kernel command line option "rdt="), rdt_enable_key is still enabled but rdt_mon_enable_key is disabled. MBM is a monitoring feature. The MBM overflow handler intends to check if the monitoring feature is not enabled for fast return. So check the rdt_mon_enable_key in it instead of the rdt_enable_key as former is the more accurate check. [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Fixes: e33026831bdb ("x86/intel_rdt/mbm: Handle counter overflow") Signed-off-by: Xiaochen Shen <xiaochen.shen@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1576094705-13660-1-git-send-email-xiaochen.shen@intel.com
2020-01-17x86/speculation/swapgs: Exclude Zhaoxin CPUs from SWAPGS vulnerabilityTony W Wang-oc
New Zhaoxin family 7 CPUs are not affected by the SWAPGS vulnerability. So mark these CPUs in the cpu vulnerability whitelist accordingly. Signed-off-by: Tony W Wang-oc <TonyWWang-oc@zhaoxin.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1579227872-26972-3-git-send-email-TonyWWang-oc@zhaoxin.com
2020-01-17x86/speculation/spectre_v2: Exclude Zhaoxin CPUs from SPECTRE_V2Tony W Wang-oc
New Zhaoxin family 7 CPUs are not affected by SPECTRE_V2. So define a separate cpu_vuln_whitelist bit NO_SPECTRE_V2 and add these CPUs to the cpu vulnerability whitelist. Signed-off-by: Tony W Wang-oc <TonyWWang-oc@zhaoxin.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1579227872-26972-2-git-send-email-TonyWWang-oc@zhaoxin.com
2020-01-17x86/cpu: Update cached HLE state on write to TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEARPawan Gupta
/proc/cpuinfo currently reports Hardware Lock Elision (HLE) feature to be present on boot cpu even if it was disabled during the bootup. This is because cpuinfo_x86->x86_capability HLE bit is not updated after TSX state is changed via the new MSR IA32_TSX_CTRL. Update the cached HLE bit also since it is expected to change after an update to CPUID_CLEAR bit in MSR IA32_TSX_CTRL. Fixes: 95c5824f75f3 ("x86/cpu: Add a "tsx=" cmdline option with TSX disabled by default") Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2529b99546294c893dfa1c89e2b3e46da3369a59.1578685425.git.pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com
2020-01-17x86/hyper-v: Add "polling" bit to hv_synic_sintWei Liu
That bit is documented in TLFS 5.0c as follows: Setting the polling bit will have the effect of unmasking an interrupt source, except that an actual interrupt is not generated. Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191222233404.1629-1-wei.liu@kernel.org
2020-01-17x86/apic/uv: Avoid unused variable warningArnd Bergmann
When CONFIG_PROC_FS is disabled, the compiler warns about an unused variable: arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_uv_x.c: In function 'uv_setup_proc_files': arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_uv_x.c:1546:8: error: unused variable 'name' [-Werror=unused-variable] char *name = hubless ? "hubless" : "hubbed"; Simplify the code so this variable is no longer needed. Fixes: 8785968bce1c ("x86/platform/uv: Add UV Hubbed/Hubless Proc FS Files") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191212140419.315264-1-arnd@arndb.de
2020-01-17perf/x86/intel/uncore: Remove PCIe3 unit for SNRKan Liang
The PCIe Root Port driver for CPU Complex PCIe Root Ports are not loaded on SNR. The device ID for SNR PCIe3 unit is used by both uncore driver and the PCIe Root Port driver. If uncore driver is loaded, the PCIe Root Port driver never be probed. Remove the PCIe3 unit for SNR for now. The support for PCIe3 unit will be added later separately. Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200116200210.18937-2-kan.liang@linux.intel.com
2020-01-17perf/x86/intel/uncore: Fix missing marker for snr_uncore_imc_freerunning_eventsKan Liang
An Oops during the boot is found on some SNR machines. It turns out this is because the snr_uncore_imc_freerunning_events[] array was missing an end-marker. Fixes: ee49532b38dd ("perf/x86/intel/uncore: Add IMC uncore support for Snow Ridge") Reported-by: Like Xu <like.xu@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Tested-by: Like Xu <like.xu@linux.intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200116200210.18937-1-kan.liang@linux.intel.com
2020-01-17perf/x86/intel/uncore: Add PCI ID of IMC for Xeon E3 V5 FamilyKan Liang
The IMC uncore support is missed for E3-1585 v5 CPU. Intel Xeon E3 V5 Family has Sky Lake CPU. Add the PCI ID of IMC for Intel Xeon E3 V5 Family. Reported-by: Rosales-fernandez, Carlos <carlos.rosales-fernandez@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Tested-by: Rosales-fernandez, Carlos <carlos.rosales-fernandez@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1578687311-158748-1-git-send-email-kan.liang@linux.intel.com
2020-01-17perf/x86/amd: Add support for Large Increment per Cycle EventsKim Phillips
Description of hardware operation --------------------------------- The core AMD PMU has a 4-bit wide per-cycle increment for each performance monitor counter. That works for most events, but now with AMD Family 17h and above processors, some events can occur more than 15 times in a cycle. Those events are called "Large Increment per Cycle" events. In order to count these events, two adjacent h/w PMCs get their count signals merged to form 8 bits per cycle total. In addition, the PERF_CTR count registers are merged to be able to count up to 64 bits. Normally, events like instructions retired, get programmed on a single counter like so: PERF_CTL0 (MSR 0xc0010200) 0x000000000053ff0c # event 0x0c, umask 0xff PERF_CTR0 (MSR 0xc0010201) 0x0000800000000001 # r/w 48-bit count The next counter at MSRs 0xc0010202-3 remains unused, or can be used independently to count something else. When counting Large Increment per Cycle events, such as FLOPs, however, we now have to reserve the next counter and program the PERF_CTL (config) register with the Merge event (0xFFF), like so: PERF_CTL0 (msr 0xc0010200) 0x000000000053ff03 # FLOPs event, umask 0xff PERF_CTR0 (msr 0xc0010201) 0x0000800000000001 # rd 64-bit cnt, wr lo 48b PERF_CTL1 (msr 0xc0010202) 0x0000000f004000ff # Merge event, enable bit PERF_CTR1 (msr 0xc0010203) 0x0000000000000000 # wr hi 16-bits count The count is widened from the normal 48-bits to 64 bits by having the second counter carry the higher 16 bits of the count in its lower 16 bits of its counter register. The odd counter, e.g., PERF_CTL1, is programmed with the enabled Merge event before the even counter, PERF_CTL0. The Large Increment feature is available starting with Family 17h. For more details, search any Family 17h PPR for the "Large Increment per Cycle Events" section, e.g., section 2.1.15.3 on p. 173 in this version: https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/56176_ppr_Family_17h_Model_71h_B0_pub_Rev_3.06.zip Description of software operation --------------------------------- The following steps are taken in order to support reserving and enabling the extra counter for Large Increment per Cycle events: 1. In the main x86 scheduler, we reduce the number of available counters by the number of Large Increment per Cycle events being scheduled, tracked by a new cpuc variable 'n_pair' and a new amd_put_event_constraints_f17h(). This improves the counter scheduler success rate. 2. In perf_assign_events(), if a counter is assigned to a Large Increment event, we increment the current counter variable, so the counter used for the Merge event is removed from assignment consideration by upcoming event assignments. 3. In find_counter(), if a counter has been found for the Large Increment event, we set the next counter as used, to prevent other events from using it. 4. We perform steps 2 & 3 also in the x86 scheduler fastpath, i.e., we add Merge event accounting to the existing used_mask logic. 5. Finally, we add on the programming of Merge event to the neighbouring PMC counters in the counter enable/disable{_all} code paths. Currently, software does not support a single PMU with mixed 48- and 64-bit counting, so Large increment event counts are limited to 48 bits. In set_period, we zero-out the upper 16 bits of the count, so the hardware doesn't copy them to the even counter's higher bits. Simple invocation example showing counting 8 FLOPs per 256-bit/%ymm vaddps instruction executed in a loop 100 million times: perf stat -e cpu/fp_ret_sse_avx_ops.all/,cpu/instructions/ <workload> Performance counter stats for '<workload>': 800,000,000 cpu/fp_ret_sse_avx_ops.all/u 300,042,101 cpu/instructions/u Prior to this patch, the reported SSE/AVX FLOPs retired count would be wrong. [peterz: lots of renames and edits to the code] Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
2020-01-17perf/x86/amd: Constrain Large Increment per Cycle eventsKim Phillips
AMD Family 17h processors and above gain support for Large Increment per Cycle events. Unfortunately there is no CPUID or equivalent bit that indicates whether the feature exists or not, so we continue to determine eligibility based on a CPU family number comparison. For Large Increment per Cycle events, we add a f17h-and-compatibles get_event_constraints_f17h() that returns an even counter bitmask: Large Increment per Cycle events can only be placed on PMCs 0, 2, and 4 out of the currently available 0-5. The only currently public event that requires this feature to report valid counts is PMCx003 "Retired SSE/AVX Operations". Note that the CPU family logic in amd_core_pmu_init() is changed so as to be able to selectively add initialization for features available in ranges of backward-compatible CPU families. This Large Increment per Cycle feature is expected to be retained in future families. A side-effect of assigning a new get_constraints function for f17h disables calling the old (prior to f15h) amd_get_event_constraints implementation left enabled by commit e40ed1542dd7 ("perf/x86: Add perf support for AMD family-17h processors"), which is no longer necessary since those North Bridge event codes are obsoleted. Also fix a spelling mistake whilst in the area (calulating -> calculating). Fixes: e40ed1542dd7 ("perf/x86: Add perf support for AMD family-17h processors") Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191114183720.19887-2-kim.phillips@amd.com
2020-01-17perf/x86/intel/rapl: Add Comet Lake supportHarry Pan
Comet Lake supports the same RAPL counters like Kaby Lake and Skylake. After this, on CML machine the energy counters appear in perf list. Signed-off-by: Harry Pan <harry.pan@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191227171944.1.Id6f3ab98474d7d1dba5b95390b24e0a67368d364@changeid
2020-01-16x86/CPU/AMD: Ensure clearing of SME/SEV features is maintainedTom Lendacky
If the SME and SEV features are present via CPUID, but memory encryption support is not enabled (MSR 0xC001_0010[23]), the feature flags are cleared using clear_cpu_cap(). However, if get_cpu_cap() is later called, these feature flags will be reset back to present, which is not desired. Change from using clear_cpu_cap() to setup_clear_cpu_cap() so that the clearing of the flags is maintained. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.16.x- Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/226de90a703c3c0be5a49565047905ac4e94e8f3.1579125915.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
2020-01-16x86/amd_nb: Add Family 19h PCI IDsYazen Ghannam
Add the new PCI Device 18h IDs for AMD Family 19h systems. Note that Family 19h systems will not have a new PCI root device ID. Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200110015651.14887-4-Yazen.Ghannam@amd.com
2020-01-16x86/MCE/AMD, EDAC/mce_amd: Add new Load Store unit McaTypeYazen Ghannam
Add support for a new version of the Load Store unit bank type as indicated by its McaType value, which will be present in future SMCA systems. Add the new (HWID, MCATYPE) tuple. Reuse the same name, since this is logically the same to the user. Also, add the new error descriptions to edac_mce_amd. Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200110015651.14887-2-Yazen.Ghannam@amd.com
2020-01-16crypto: x86/poly1305 - wire up faster implementations for kernelJason A. Donenfeld
These x86_64 vectorized implementations support AVX, AVX-2, and AVX512F. The AVX-512F implementation is disabled on Skylake, due to throttling, but it is quite fast on >= Cannonlake. On the left is cycle counts on a Core i7 6700HQ using the AVX-2 codepath, comparing this implementation ("new") to the implementation in the current crypto api ("old"). On the right are benchmarks on a Xeon Gold 5120 using the AVX-512 codepath. The new implementation is faster on all benchmarks. AVX-2 AVX-512 --------- ----------- size old new size old new ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 0 70 68 0 74 70 16 92 90 16 96 92 32 134 104 32 136 106 48 172 120 48 184 124 64 218 136 64 218 138 80 254 158 80 260 160 96 298 174 96 300 176 112 342 192 112 342 194 128 388 212 128 384 212 144 428 228 144 420 226 160 466 246 160 464 248 176 510 264 176 504 264 192 550 282 192 544 282 208 594 302 208 582 300 224 628 316 224 624 318 240 676 334 240 662 338 256 716 354 256 708 358 272 764 374 272 748 372 288 802 352 288 788 358 304 420 366 304 422 370 320 428 360 320 432 364 336 484 378 336 486 380 352 426 384 352 434 390 368 478 400 368 480 408 384 488 394 384 490 398 400 542 408 400 542 412 416 486 416 416 492 426 432 534 430 432 538 436 448 544 422 448 546 432 464 600 438 464 600 448 480 540 448 480 548 456 496 594 464 496 594 476 512 602 456 512 606 470 528 656 476 528 656 480 544 600 480 544 606 498 560 650 494 560 652 512 576 664 490 576 662 508 592 714 508 592 716 522 608 656 514 608 664 538 624 708 532 624 710 552 640 716 524 640 720 516 656 770 536 656 772 526 672 716 548 672 722 544 688 770 562 688 768 556 704 774 552 704 778 556 720 826 568 720 832 568 736 768 574 736 780 584 752 822 592 752 826 600 768 830 584 768 836 560 784 884 602 784 888 572 800 828 610 800 838 588 816 884 628 816 884 604 832 888 618 832 894 598 848 942 632 848 946 612 864 884 644 864 896 628 880 936 660 880 942 644 896 948 652 896 952 608 912 1000 664 912 1004 616 928 942 676 928 954 634 944 994 690 944 1000 646 960 1002 680 960 1008 646 976 1054 694 976 1062 658 992 1002 706 992 1012 674 1008 1052 720 1008 1058 690 This commit wires in the prior implementation from Andy, and makes the following changes to be suitable for kernel land. - Some cosmetic and structural changes, like renaming labels to .Lname, constants, and other Linux conventions, as well as making the code easy for us to maintain moving forward. - CPU feature checking is done in C by the glue code. - We avoid jumping into the middle of functions, to appease objtool, and instead parameterize shared code. - We maintain frame pointers so that stack traces make sense. - We remove the dependency on the perl xlate code, which transforms the output into things that assemblers we don't care about use. Importantly, none of our changes affect the arithmetic or core code, but just involve the differing environment of kernel space. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Samuel Neves <sneves@dei.uc.pt> Co-developed-by: Samuel Neves <sneves@dei.uc.pt> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-01-16crypto: x86/poly1305 - import unmodified cryptogams implementationJason A. Donenfeld
These x86_64 vectorized implementations come from Andy Polyakov's CRYPTOGAMS implementation, and are included here in raw form without modification, so that subsequent commits that fix these up for the kernel can see how it has changed. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-01-16crypto: poly1305 - add new 32 and 64-bit generic versionsJason A. Donenfeld
These two C implementations from Zinc -- a 32x32 one and a 64x64 one, depending on the platform -- come from Andrew Moon's public domain poly1305-donna portable code, modified for usage in the kernel. The precomputation in the 32-bit version and the use of 64x64 multiplies in the 64-bit version make these perform better than the code it replaces. Moon's code is also very widespread and has received many eyeballs of scrutiny. There's a bit of interference between the x86 implementation, which relies on internal details of the old scalar implementation. In the next commit, the x86 implementation will be replaced with a faster one that doesn't rely on this, so none of this matters much. But for now, to keep this passing the tests, we inline the bits of the old implementation that the x86 implementation relied on. Also, since we now support a slightly larger key space, via the union, some offsets had to be fixed up. Nonce calculation was folded in with the emit function, to take advantage of 64x64 arithmetic. However, Adiantum appeared to rely on no nonce handling in emit, so this path was conditionalized. We also introduced a new struct, poly1305_core_key, to represent the precise amount of space that particular implementation uses. Testing with kbench9000, depending on the CPU, the update function for the 32x32 version has been improved by 4%-7%, and for the 64x64 by 19%-30%. The 32x32 gains are small, but I think there's great value in having a parallel implementation to the 64x64 one so that the two can be compared side-by-side as nice stand-alone units. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-01-15x86/cpu: Print "VMX disabled" error message iff KVM is enabledSean Christopherson
Don't print an error message about VMX being disabled by BIOS if KVM, the sole user of VMX, is disabled. E.g. if KVM is disabled and the MSR is unlocked, the kernel will intentionally disable VMX when locking feature control and then complain that "BIOS" disabled VMX. Fixes: ef4d3bf19855 ("x86/cpu: Clear VMX feature flag if VMX is not fully enabled") Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200114202545.20296-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com
2020-01-15x86/mce/therm_throt: Do not access uninitialized therm_workChuansheng Liu
It is relatively easy to trigger the following boot splat on an Ice Lake client platform. The call stack is like: kernel BUG at kernel/timer/timer.c:1152! Call Trace: __queue_delayed_work queue_delayed_work_on therm_throt_process intel_thermal_interrupt ... The reason is that a CPU's thermal interrupt is enabled prior to executing its hotplug onlining callback which will initialize the throttling workqueues. Such a race can lead to therm_throt_process() accessing an uninitialized therm_work, leading to the above BUG at a very early bootup stage. Therefore, unmask the thermal interrupt vector only after having setup the workqueues completely. [ bp: Heavily massage commit message and correct comment formatting. ] Fixes: f6656208f04e ("x86/mce/therm_throt: Optimize notifications of thermal throttle") Signed-off-by: Chuansheng Liu <chuansheng.liu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200107004116.59353-1-chuansheng.liu@intel.com
2020-01-14arch/x86/setup: Drop dummy_con initializationArvind Sankar
con_init in tty/vt.c will now set conswitchp to dummy_con if it's unset. Drop it from arch setup code. Signed-off-by: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191218214506.49252-24-nivedita@alum.mit.edu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-01-14x86/vdso: Zap vvar pages when switching to a time namespaceDmitry Safonov
The VVAR page layout depends on whether a task belongs to the root or non-root time namespace. Whenever a task changes its namespace, the VVAR page tables are cleared and then they will be re-faulted with a corresponding layout. Co-developed-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191112012724.250792-27-dima@arista.com
2020-01-14x86/vdso: On timens page fault prefault also VVAR pageDmitry Safonov
As timens page has offsets to data on VVAR page VVAR is going to be accessed shortly. Set it up with timens in one page fault as optimization. Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Co-developed-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191112012724.250792-26-dima@arista.com
2020-01-14x86/vdso: Handle faults on timens pageDmitry Safonov
If a task belongs to a time namespace then the VVAR page which contains the system wide VDSO data is replaced with a namespace specific page which has the same layout as the VVAR page. Co-developed-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191112012724.250792-25-dima@arista.com
2020-01-14x86/vdso: Add time napespace pageDmitry Safonov
To support time namespaces in the VDSO with a minimal impact on regular non time namespace affected tasks, the namespace handling needs to be hidden in a slow path. The most obvious place is vdso_seq_begin(). If a task belongs to a time namespace then the VVAR page which contains the system wide VDSO data is replaced with a namespace specific page which has the same layout as the VVAR page. That page has vdso_data->seq set to 1 to enforce the slow path and vdso_data->clock_mode set to VCLOCK_TIMENS to enforce the time namespace handling path. The extra check in the case that vdso_data->seq is odd, e.g. a concurrent update of the VDSO data is in progress, is not really affecting regular tasks which are not part of a time namespace as the task is spin waiting for the update to finish and vdso_data->seq to become even again. If a time namespace task hits that code path, it invokes the corresponding time getter function which retrieves the real VVAR page, reads host time and then adds the offset for the requested clock which is stored in the special VVAR page. Allocate the time namespace page among VVAR pages and place vdso_data on it. Provide __arch_get_timens_vdso_data() helper for VDSO code to get the code-relative position of VVARs on that special page. Co-developed-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191112012724.250792-23-dima@arista.com
2020-01-14x86/vdso: Provide vdso_data offset on vvar_pageDmitry Safonov
VDSO support for time namespaces needs to set up a page with the same layout as VVAR. That timens page will be placed on position of VVAR page inside namespace. That page has vdso_data->seq set to 1 to enforce the slow path and vdso_data->clock_mode set to VCLOCK_TIMENS to enforce the time namespace handling path. To prepare the time namespace page the kernel needs to know the vdso_data offset. Provide arch_get_vdso_data() helper for locating vdso_data on VVAR page. Co-developed-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191112012724.250792-22-dima@arista.com
2020-01-14x86/vdso: Restrict splitting VVAR VMADmitry Safonov
Forbid splitting VVAR VMA resulting in a stricter ABI and reducing the amount of corner-cases to consider while working further on VDSO time namespace support. As the offset from timens to VVAR page is computed compile-time, the pages in VVAR should stay together and not being partically mremap()'ed. Co-developed-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191112012724.250792-20-dima@arista.com
2020-01-14x86/vdso: Remove unused VDSO_HAS_32BIT_FALLBACKVincenzo Frascino
VDSO_HAS_32BIT_FALLBACK has been removed from the core since the architectures that support the generic vDSO library have been converted to support the 32 bit fallbacks. Remove unused VDSO_HAS_32BIT_FALLBACK from x86 vdso. Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190830135902.20861-9-vincenzo.frascino@arm.com
2020-01-13arch: wire up pidfd_getfd syscallSargun Dhillon
This wires up the pidfd_getfd syscall for all architectures. Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200107175927.4558-4-sargun@sargun.me Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2020-01-13KVM: VMX: Allow KVM_INTEL when building for Centaur and/or Zhaoxin CPUsSean Christopherson
Change the dependency for KVM_INTEL, i.e. KVM w/ VMX, from Intel CPUs to any CPU that supports the IA32_FEAT_CTL MSR and thus VMX functionality. This effectively allows building KVM_INTEL for Centaur and Zhaoxin CPUs. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191221044513.21680-20-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com
2020-01-13perf/x86: Provide stubs of KVM helpers for non-Intel CPUsSean Christopherson
Provide stubs for perf_guest_get_msrs() and intel_pt_handle_vmx() when building without support for Intel CPUs, i.e. CPU_SUP_INTEL=n. Lack of stubs is not currently a problem as the only user, KVM_INTEL, takes a dependency on CPU_SUP_INTEL=y. Provide the stubs for all CPUs so that KVM_INTEL can be built for any CPU with compatible hardware support, e.g. Centuar and Zhaoxin CPUs. Note, the existing stub for perf_guest_get_msrs() is essentially dead code as KVM selects CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS, i.e. the only user guarantees the full implementation is built. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191221044513.21680-19-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com
2020-01-13KVM: VMX: Use VMX_FEATURE_* flags to define VMCS control bitsSean Christopherson
Define the VMCS execution control flags (consumed by KVM) using their associated VMX_FEATURE_* to provide a strong hint that new VMX features are expected to be added to VMX_FEATURE and considered for reporting via /proc/cpuinfo. No functional change intended. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191221044513.21680-18-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com
2020-01-13KVM: VMX: Check for full VMX support when verifying CPU compatibilitySean Christopherson
Explicitly check the current CPU's IA32_FEAT_CTL and VMX feature flags when verifying compatibility across physical CPUs. This effectively adds a check on IA32_FEAT_CTL to ensure that VMX is fully enabled on all CPUs. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191221044513.21680-17-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com