Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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When booting with retbleed=auto, if the kernel wasn't built with
CONFIG_CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK, the mitigation falls back to IBPB. Make
sure a warning is printed in that case. The IBPB fallback check is done
twice, but it really only needs to be done once.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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jmp2ret mitigates the easy-to-attack case at relatively low overhead.
It mitigates the long speculation windows after a mispredicted RET, but
it does not mitigate the short speculation window from arbitrary
instruction boundaries.
On Zen2, there is a chicken bit which needs setting, which mitigates
"arbitrary instruction boundaries" down to just "basic block boundaries".
But there is no fix for the short speculation window on basic block
boundaries, other than to flush the entire BTB to evict all attacker
predictions.
On the spectrum of "fast & blurry" -> "safe", there is (on top of STIBP
or no-SMT):
1) Nothing System wide open
2) jmp2ret May stop a script kiddy
3) jmp2ret+chickenbit Raises the bar rather further
4) IBPB Only thing which can count as "safe".
Tentative numbers put IBPB-on-entry at a 2.5x hit on Zen2, and a 10x hit
on Zen1 according to lmbench.
[ bp: Fixup feature bit comments, document option, 32-bit build fix. ]
Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Ensure the Xen entry also passes through UNTRAIN_RET.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Native SYS{CALL,ENTER} entry points are called
entry_SYS{CALL,ENTER}_{64,compat}, make sure the Xen versions are
named consistently.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Update retpoline validation with the new CONFIG_RETPOLINE requirement of
not having bare naked RET instructions.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Having IBRS enabled while the SMT sibling is idle unnecessarily slows
down the running sibling. OTOH, disabling IBRS around idle takes two
MSR writes, which will increase the idle latency.
Therefore, only disable IBRS around deeper idle states. Shallow idle
states are bounded by the tick in duration, since NOHZ is not allowed
for them by virtue of their short target residency.
Only do this for mwait-driven idle, since that keeps interrupts disabled
across idle, which makes disabling IBRS vs IRQ-entry a non-issue.
Note: C6 is a random threshold, most importantly C1 probably shouldn't
disable IBRS, benchmarking needed.
Suggested-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Skylake suffers from RSB underflow speculation issues; report this
vulnerability and it's mitigation (spectre_v2=ibrs).
[jpoimboe: cleanups, eibrs]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation()
retbleed will depend on spectre_v2, while spectre_v2_user depends on
retbleed. Break this cycle.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Extend spectre_v2= boot option with Kernel IBRS.
[jpoimboe: no STIBP with IBRS]
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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When changing SPEC_CTRL for user control, the WRMSR can be delayed
until return-to-user when KERNEL_IBRS has been enabled.
This avoids an MSR write during context switch.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Implement Kernel IBRS - currently the only known option to mitigate RSB
underflow speculation issues on Skylake hardware.
Note: since IBRS_ENTER requires fuller context established than
UNTRAIN_RET, it must be placed after it. However, since UNTRAIN_RET
itself implies a RET, it must come after IBRS_ENTER. This means
IBRS_ENTER needs to also move UNTRAIN_RET.
Note 2: KERNEL_IBRS is sub-optimal for XenPV.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Due to TIF_SSBD and TIF_SPEC_IB the actual IA32_SPEC_CTRL value can
differ from x86_spec_ctrl_base. As such, keep a per-CPU value
reflecting the current task's MSR content.
[jpoimboe: rename]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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For untrained return thunks to be fully effective, STIBP must be enabled
or SMT disabled.
Co-developed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Add the "retbleed=<value>" boot parameter to select a mitigation for
RETBleed. Possible values are "off", "auto" and "unret"
(JMP2RET mitigation). The default value is "auto".
Currently, "retbleed=auto" will select the unret mitigation on
AMD and Hygon and no mitigation on Intel (JMP2RET is not effective on
Intel).
[peterz: rebase; add hygon]
[jpoimboe: cleanups]
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Report that AMD x86 CPUs are vulnerable to the RETBleed (Arbitrary
Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions) attack.
[peterz: add hygon]
[kim: invert parity; fam15h]
Co-developed-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Note: needs to be in a section distinct from Retpolines such that the
Retpoline RET substitution cannot possibly use immediate jumps.
ORC unwinding for zen_untrain_ret() and __x86_return_thunk() is a
little tricky but works due to the fact that zen_untrain_ret() doesn't
have any stack ops and as such will emit a single ORC entry at the
start (+0x3f).
Meanwhile, unwinding an IP, including the __x86_return_thunk() one
(+0x40) will search for the largest ORC entry smaller or equal to the
IP, these will find the one ORC entry (+0x3f) and all works.
[ Alexandre: SVM part. ]
[ bp: Build fix, massages. ]
Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Commit
ee774dac0da1 ("x86/entry: Move PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS out of error_entry()")
manages to introduce a CALL/RET pair that is before SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3,
which means it is before RETBleed can be mitigated.
Revert to an earlier version of the commit in Fixes. Down side is that
this will bloat .text size somewhat. The alternative is fully reverting
it.
The purpose of this patch was to allow migrating error_entry() to C,
including the whole of kPTI. Much care needs to be taken moving that
forward to not re-introduce this problem of early RETs.
Fixes: ee774dac0da1 ("x86/entry: Move PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS out of error_entry()")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Use the return thunk in asm code. If the thunk isn't needed, it will
get patched into a RET instruction during boot by apply_returns().
Since alternatives can't handle relocations outside of the first
instruction, putting a 'jmp __x86_return_thunk' in one is not valid,
therefore carve out the memmove ERMS path into a separate label and jump
to it.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Specifically, it's because __enc_copy() encrypts the kernel after
being relocated outside the kernel in sme_encrypt_execute(), and the
RET macro's jmp offset isn't amended prior to execution.
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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This is userspace code and doesn't play by the normal kernel rules.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Prepare the SETcc fastop stuff for when RET can be larger still.
The tricky bit here is that the expressions should not only be
constant C expressions, but also absolute GAS expressions. This means
no ?: and 'true' is ~0.
Also ensure em_setcc() has the same alignment as the actual FOP_SETCC()
ops, this ensures there cannot be an alignment hole between em_setcc()
and the first op.
Additionally, add a .skip directive to the FOP_SETCC() macro to fill
any remaining space with INT3 traps; however the primary purpose of
this directive is to generate AS warnings when the remaining space
goes negative. Which is a very good indication the alignment magic
went side-ways.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Use the return thunk in eBPF generated code, if needed.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Use the return thunk in ftrace trampolines, if needed.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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In addition to teaching static_call about the new way to spell 'RET',
there is an added complication in that static_call() is allowed to
rewrite text before it is known which particular spelling is required.
In order to deal with this; have a static_call specific fixup in the
apply_return() 'alternative' patching routine that will rewrite the
static_call trampoline to match the definite sequence.
This in turn creates the problem of uniquely identifying static call
trampolines. Currently trampolines are 8 bytes, the first 5 being the
jmp.d32/ret sequence and the final 3 a byte sequence that spells out
'SCT'.
This sequence is used in __static_call_validate() to ensure it is
patching a trampoline and not a random other jmp.d32. That is,
false-positives shouldn't be plenty, but aren't a big concern.
OTOH the new __static_call_fixup() must not have false-positives, and
'SCT' decodes to the somewhat weird but semi plausible sequence:
push %rbx
rex.XB push %r12
Additionally, there are SLS concerns with immediate jumps. Combined it
seems like a good moment to change the signature to a single 3 byte
trap instruction that is unique to this usage and will not ever get
generated by accident.
As such, change the signature to: '0x0f, 0xb9, 0xcc', which decodes
to:
ud1 %esp, %ecx
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Introduce X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK for those afflicted with needing this.
[ bp: Do only INT3 padding - simpler. ]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Utilize -mfunction-return=thunk-extern when available to have the
compiler replace RET instructions with direct JMPs to the symbol
__x86_return_thunk. This does not affect assembler (.S) sources, only C
sources.
-mfunction-return=thunk-extern has been available since gcc 7.3 and
clang 15.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Put the actual retpoline thunk as the original code so that it can
become more complicated. Specifically, it allows RET to be a JMP,
which can't be .altinstr_replacement since that doesn't do relocations
(except for the very first instruction).
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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On it's own not much of a cleanup but it prepares for more/similar
code.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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In order to extend the RETPOLINE features to 4, move them to word 11
where there is still room. This mostly keeps DISABLE_RETPOLINE
simple.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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The recent mmio_stale_data fixes broke the noinstr constraints:
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: vmx_vcpu_enter_exit+0x15b: call to wrmsrl.constprop.0() leaves .noinstr.text section
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: vmx_vcpu_enter_exit+0x1bf: call to kvm_arch_has_assigned_device() leaves .noinstr.text section
make it all happy again.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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BIT3 and BIT0 are reserved bits, should not touch.
Fixes: aec8ad34f7f2 ("arm64: dts: imx8mp: Add Engicam i.Core MX8M Plus EDIMM2.2 Starter Kit")
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Rasmus Villemoes <rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>
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BIT3 and BIT0 are reserved bits, should not touch.
Fixes: 88f7f6bcca37 ("arm64: dts: freescale: Add support for phyBOARD-Pollux-i.MX8MP")
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Rasmus Villemoes <rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>
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BIT3 and BIT0 are reserved bits, should not touch.
Fixes: 6f96852619d5 ("arm64: dts: freescale: Add support EQOS MAC on phyBOARD-Pollux-i.MX8MP")
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Rasmus Villemoes <rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>
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BIT3 and BIT0 are reserved bits, should not touch.
Fixes: 846f752866bd ("arm64: dts: imx8mp-phyboard-pollux-rdk: Change debug UART")
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Rasmus Villemoes <rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>
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According to RM bit layout, BIT3 and BIT0 are reserved.
8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
PE HYS PUE ODE FSEL X DSE X
Should not set reserved bit.
Fixes: 7899eb6cb15d ("arm64: dts: imx: Add i.MX8M Plus Gateworks gw7400 dts support")
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Rasmus Villemoes <rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>
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According to RM bit layout, BIT3 and BIT0 are reserved.
8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
PE HYS PUE ODE FSEL X DSE X
Although function is not broken, we should not set reserved bit.
Fixes: 5e4a67ff7f69 ("arm64: dts: imx8mp-evk: Add i2c3 support")
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Rasmus Villemoes <rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>
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According to RM bit layout, BIT3 and BIT0 are reserved.
8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
PE HYS PUE ODE FSEL X DSE X
Although function is not broken, we should not set reserved bit.
Fixes: 5497bc2a2bff ("arm64: dts: imx8mp-evk: Add PMIC device")
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Rasmus Villemoes <rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>
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According to RM bit layout, BIT3 and BIT0 are reserved.
8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
PE HYS PUE ODE FSEL X DSE X
Although function is not broken, we should not set reserved bit.
Fixes: 8134822db08d ("arm64: dts: imx8mp-evk: add support for I2C5")
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Rasmus Villemoes <rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>
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According to RM bit layout, BIT3 and BIT0 are reserved.
8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
PE HYS PUE ODE FSEL X DSE X
Not set reserved bit.
Fixes: 9e847693c6f3 ("arm64: dts: freescale: Add i.MX8MP EVK board support")
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Rasmus Villemoes <rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>
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According to RM bit layout, BIT3 and BIT0 are reserved.
8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
PE HYS PUE ODE FSEL X DSE X
Although function is not broken, we should not set reserved bit.
Fixes: dc6d5dc89bad ("arm64: dts: imx8mp-evk: enable EQOS ethernet")
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Rasmus Villemoes <rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>
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0x19 is not a valid setting. According to RM bit layout, BIT3 and BIT0
are reserved.
8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
PE HYS PUE ODE FSEL X DSE X
Not set reserved bit.
Fixes: 43da4f92a611 ("arm64: dts: imx8mp-evk: enable usb1 as host mode")
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Rasmus Villemoes <rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>
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0x19 is not a valid setting. According to RM bit layout,
BIT3 and BIT0 are reserved.
8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
PE HYS PUE ODE FSEL X DSE X
Correct setting with PE PUE set, DSE set to 0.
Fixes: 50d336b12f34 ("arm64: dts: imx8mp-evk: Add GPIO LED support")
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Rasmus Villemoes <rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>
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According to the IOMUXC_SW_PAD_CTL_PAD_UART2_RXD/TXD register define in
imx8mp RM, bit0 and bit3 are reserved, and the uart2 rx/tx pin should
enable the pull up, so need to set bit8 to 1. The original pinctl value
0x49 is incorrect and needs to be changed to 0x140, same as uart1 and
uart3.
Fixes: 9e847693c6f3 ("arm64: dts: freescale: Add i.MX8MP EVK board support")
Reviewed-by: Haibo Chen <haibo.chen@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Sherry Sun <sherry.sun@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Rasmus Villemoes <rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>
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According to RM bit layout, BIT3 and BIT0 are reserved.
8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
PE HYS PUE ODE FSEL X DSE X
Not set reserved bit.
Fixes: 9e847693c6f3 ("arm64: dts: freescale: Add i.MX8MP EVK board support")
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Rasmus Villemoes <rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>
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Currently, when booting Linux on a imx28-evk board there is
no display activity.
Enable CONFIG_FB which is nowadays required for CONFIG_DRM_PANEL_LVDS,
CONFIG_DRM_PANEL_SIMPLE, CONFIG_DRM_PANEL_SEIKO_43WVF1G,
CONFIG_FB_MODE_HELPERS, CONFIG_BACKLIGHT_PWM, CONFIG_BACKLIGHT_GPIO,
CONFIG_FRAMEBUFFER_CONSOLE, CONFIG_LOGO, CONFIG_FONTS, CONFIG_FONT_8x8
and CONFIG_FONT_8x16.
Based on commit c54467482ffd ("ARM: imx_v6_v7_defconfig: enable fb").
Fixes: f611b1e7624c ("drm: Avoid circular dependencies for CONFIG_FB")
Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam <festevam@denx.de>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>
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The deprecated DIV clk is previously part of the ISP composite clk, but
there is still one child clk(IMX8MP_CLK_MEDIA_ISP_ROOT) sourcing from
IMX8MP_CLK_MEDIA_ISP( previously IMX8MP_CLK_MEDIA_ISP_DIV)
So IMX8MP_CLK_MEDIA_ISP_ROOT should be used, not IMX8MP_CLK_MEDIA_ISP_DIV.
Fixes: 9d89189d5227 ("arm64: dts: imx8mp: Add MEDIAMIX power domains")
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
Tested-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/soc/soc
Pull ARM SoC fixes from Arnd Bergmann:
"A number of fixes have accumulated, but they are largely for harmless
issues:
- Several OF node leak fixes
- A fix to the Exynos7885 UART clock description
- DTS fixes to prevent boot failures on TI AM64 and J721s2
- Bus probe error handling fixes for Baikal-T1
- A fixup to the way STM32 SoCs use separate dts files for different
firmware stacks
- Multiple code fixes for Arm SCMI firmware, all dealing with
robustness of the implementation
- Multiple NXP i.MX devicetree fixes, addressing incorrect data in DT
nodes
- Three updates to the MAINTAINERS file, including Florian Fainelli
taking over BCM283x/BCM2711 (Raspberry Pi) from Nicolas Saenz
Julienne"
* tag 'soc-fixes-5.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/soc/soc: (29 commits)
ARM: dts: aspeed: nuvia: rename vendor nuvia to qcom
arm: mach-spear: Add missing of_node_put() in time.c
ARM: cns3xxx: Fix refcount leak in cns3xxx_init
MAINTAINERS: Update email address
arm64: dts: ti: k3-am64-main: Remove support for HS400 speed mode
arm64: dts: ti: k3-j721s2: Fix overlapping GICD memory region
ARM: dts: bcm2711-rpi-400: Fix GPIO line names
bus: bt1-axi: Don't print error on -EPROBE_DEFER
bus: bt1-apb: Don't print error on -EPROBE_DEFER
ARM: Fix refcount leak in axxia_boot_secondary
ARM: dts: stm32: move SCMI related nodes in a dedicated file for stm32mp15
soc: imx: imx8m-blk-ctrl: fix display clock for LCDIF2 power domain
ARM: dts: imx6qdl-colibri: Fix capacitive touch reset polarity
ARM: dts: imx6qdl: correct PU regulator ramp delay
firmware: arm_scmi: Fix incorrect error propagation in scmi_voltage_descriptors_get
firmware: arm_scmi: Avoid using extended string-buffers sizes if not necessary
firmware: arm_scmi: Fix SENSOR_AXIS_NAME_GET behaviour when unsupported
ARM: dts: imx7: Move hsic_phy power domain to HSIC PHY node
soc: bcm: brcmstb: pm: pm-arm: Fix refcount leak in brcmstb_pm_probe
MAINTAINERS: Update BCM2711/BCM2835 maintainer
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/deller/parisc-linux
Pull parisc architecture fixes from Helge Deller:
- enable ARCH_HAS_STRICT_MODULE_RWX to prevent a boot crash on c8000
machines
- flush all mappings of a shared anonymous page on PA8800/8900 machines
via flushing the whole data cache. This may slow down such machines
but makes sure that the cache is consistent
- Fix duplicate definition build error regarding fb_is_primary_device()
* tag 'for-5.19/parisc-3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/deller/parisc-linux:
parisc: Enable ARCH_HAS_STRICT_MODULE_RWX
parisc: Fix flush_anon_page on PA8800/PA8900
parisc: align '*' in comment in math-emu code
parisc/stifb: Fix fb_is_primary_device() only available with CONFIG_FB_STI
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Pull xtensa fixes from Max Filippov:
- fix OF reference leaks in xtensa arch code
- replace '.bss' with '.section .bss' to fix entry.S build with old
assembler
* tag 'xtensa-20220626' of https://github.com/jcmvbkbc/linux-xtensa:
xtensa: change '.bss' to '.section .bss'
xtensa: xtfpga: Fix refcount leak bug in setup
xtensa: Fix refcount leak bug in time.c
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux
Pull powerpc fixes from Michael Ellerman:
- A fix for a CMA change that broke booting guests with > 2G RAM on
Power8 hosts.
- Fix the RTAS call filter to allow a special case that applications
rely on.
- A change to our execve path, to make the execve syscall exit
tracepoint work.
- Three fixes to wire up our various RNGs earlier in boot so they're
available for use in the initial seeding in random_init().
- A build fix for when KASAN is enabled along with
STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL.
Thanks to Andrew Donnellan, Aneesh Kumar K.V, Christophe Leroy, Jason
Donenfeld, Nathan Lynch, Naveen N. Rao, Sathvika Vasireddy, Sumit
Dubey2, Tyrel Datwyler, and Zi Yan.
* tag 'powerpc-5.19-3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux:
powerpc/powernv: wire up rng during setup_arch
powerpc/prom_init: Fix build failure with GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL and KASAN
powerpc/rtas: Allow ibm,platform-dump RTAS call with null buffer address
powerpc: Enable execve syscall exit tracepoint
powerpc/pseries: wire up rng during setup_arch()
powerpc/microwatt: wire up rng during setup_arch()
powerpc/mm: Move CMA reservations after initmem_init()
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