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Let's use a macro to get the total number of sections.
Reviewed-by: Namjae Jeon <namjae.jeon@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk.kim@samsung.com>
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A macro should not use duplicate parameter names.
Reviewed-by: Namjae Jeon <namjae.jeon@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk.kim@samsung.com>
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Pull nfsd bugfix from J Bruce Fields:
"An xdr decoding error--thanks, Toralf Förster, and Trinity!"
* 'for-3.9' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux:
nfsd4: reject "negative" acl lengths
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/wq into for-3.10/core
Tejun writes:
-----
This is the pull request for the earlier patchset[1] with the same
name. It's only three patches (the first one was committed to
workqueue tree) but the merge strategy is a bit involved due to the
dependencies.
* Because the conversion needs features from wq/for-3.10,
block/for-3.10/core is based on rc3, and wq/for-3.10 has conflicts
with rc3, I pulled mainline (rc5) into wq/for-3.10 to prevent those
workqueue conflicts from flaring up in block tree.
* Resolving the issue that Jan and Dave raised about debugging
requires arch-wide changes. The patchset is being worked on[2] but
it'll have to go through -mm after these changes show up in -next,
and not included in this pull request.
The three commits are located in the following git branch.
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/wq.git writeback-workqueue
Pulling it into block/for-3.10/core produces a conflict in
drivers/md/raid5.c between the following two commits.
e3620a3ad5 ("MD RAID5: Avoid accessing gendisk or queue structs when not available")
2f6db2a707 ("raid5: use bio_reset()")
The conflict is trivial - one removes an "if ()" conditional while the
other removes "rbi->bi_next = NULL" right above it. We just need to
remove both. The merged branch is available at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/wq.git block-test-merge
so that you can use it for verification. The test merge commit has
proper merge description.
While these changes are a bit of pain to route, they make code simpler
and even have, while minute, measureable performance gain[3] even on a
workload which isn't particularly favorable to showing the benefits of
this conversion.
----
Fixed up the conflict.
Conflicts:
drivers/md/raid5.c
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Writeback implements its own worker pool - each bdi can be associated
with a worker thread which is created and destroyed dynamically. The
worker thread for the default bdi is always present and serves as the
"forker" thread which forks off worker threads for other bdis.
there's no reason for writeback to implement its own worker pool when
using unbound workqueue instead is much simpler and more efficient.
This patch replaces custom worker pool implementation in writeback
with an unbound workqueue.
The conversion isn't too complicated but the followings are worth
mentioning.
* bdi_writeback->last_active, task and wakeup_timer are removed.
delayed_work ->dwork is added instead. Explicit timer handling is
no longer necessary. Everything works by either queueing / modding
/ flushing / canceling the delayed_work item.
* bdi_writeback_thread() becomes bdi_writeback_workfn() which runs off
bdi_writeback->dwork. On each execution, it processes
bdi->work_list and reschedules itself if there are more things to
do.
The function also handles low-mem condition, which used to be
handled by the forker thread. If the function is running off a
rescuer thread, it only writes out limited number of pages so that
the rescuer can serve other bdis too. This preserves the flusher
creation failure behavior of the forker thread.
* INIT_LIST_HEAD(&bdi->bdi_list) is used to tell
bdi_writeback_workfn() about on-going bdi unregistration so that it
always drains work_list even if it's running off the rescuer. Note
that the original code was broken in this regard. Under memory
pressure, a bdi could finish unregistration with non-empty
work_list.
* The default bdi is no longer special. It now is treated the same as
any other bdi and bdi_cap_flush_forker() is removed.
* BDI_pending is no longer used. Removed.
* Some tracepoints become non-applicable. The following TPs are
removed - writeback_nothread, writeback_wake_thread,
writeback_wake_forker_thread, writeback_thread_start,
writeback_thread_stop.
Everything, including devices coming and going away and rescuer
operation under simulated memory pressure, seems to work fine in my
test setup.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
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I had the following problem reported a while back. If you mount the
same filesystem twice using NFSv4 with different contexts, then the
second context= option is ignored. For instance:
# mount server:/export /mnt/test1
# mount server:/export /mnt/test2 -o context=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0
# ls -dZ /mnt/test1
drwxrwxrwt. root root system_u:object_r:nfs_t:s0 /mnt/test1
# ls -dZ /mnt/test2
drwxrwxrwt. root root system_u:object_r:nfs_t:s0 /mnt/test2
When we call into SELinux to set the context of a "cloned" superblock,
it will currently just bail out when it notices that we're reusing an
existing superblock. Since the existing superblock is already set up and
presumably in use, we can't go overwriting its context with the one from
the "original" sb. Because of this, the second context= option in this
case cannot take effect.
This patch fixes this by turning security_sb_clone_mnt_opts into an int
return operation. When it finds that the "new" superblock that it has
been handed is already set up, it checks to see whether the contexts on
the old superblock match it. If it does, then it will just return
success, otherwise it'll return -EBUSY and emit a printk to tell the
admin why the second mount failed.
Note that this patch may cause casualties. The NFSv4 code relies on
being able to walk down to an export from the pseudoroot. If you mount
filesystems that are nested within one another with different contexts,
then this patch will make those mounts fail in new and "exciting" ways.
For instance, suppose that /export is a separate filesystem on the
server:
# mount server:/ /mnt/test1
# mount salusa:/export /mnt/test2 -o context=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0
mount.nfs: an incorrect mount option was specified
...with the printk in the ring buffer. Because we *might* eventually
walk down to /mnt/test1/export, the mount is denied due to this patch.
The second mount needs the pseudoroot superblock, but that's already
present with the wrong context.
OTOH, if we mount these in the reverse order, then both mounts work,
because the pseudoroot superblock created when mounting /export is
discarded once that mount is done. If we then however try to walk into
that directory, the automount fails for the similar reasons:
# cd /mnt/test1/scratch/
-bash: cd: /mnt/test1/scratch: Device or resource busy
The story I've gotten from the SELinux folks that I've talked to is that
this is desirable behavior. In SELinux-land, mounting the same data
under different contexts is wrong -- there can be only one.
Cc: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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struct block_device lifecycle is defined by its inode (see fs/block_dev.c) -
block_device allocated first time we access /dev/loopXX and deallocated on
bdev_destroy_inode. When we create the device "losetup /dev/loopXX afile"
we want that block_device stay alive until we destroy the loop device
with "losetup -d".
But because we do not hold /dev/loopXX inode its counter goes 0, and
inode/bdev can be destroyed at any moment. Usually it happens at memory
pressure or when user drops inode cache (like in the test below). When later in
loop_clr_fd() we want to use bdev we have use-after-free error with following
stack:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000280
bd_set_size+0x10/0xa0
loop_clr_fd+0x1f8/0x420 [loop]
lo_ioctl+0x200/0x7e0 [loop]
lo_compat_ioctl+0x47/0xe0 [loop]
compat_blkdev_ioctl+0x341/0x1290
do_filp_open+0x42/0xa0
compat_sys_ioctl+0xc1/0xf20
do_sys_open+0x16e/0x1d0
sysenter_dispatch+0x7/0x1a
To prevent use-after-free we need to grab the device in loop_set_fd()
and put it later in loop_clr_fd().
The issue is reprodusible on current Linus head and v3.3. Here is the test:
dd if=/dev/zero of=loop.file bs=1M count=1
while [ true ]; do
losetup /dev/loop0 loop.file
echo 2 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
losetup -d /dev/loop0
done
[ Doing bdgrab/bput in loop_set_fd/loop_clr_fd is safe, because every
time we call loop_set_fd() we check that loop_device->lo_state is
Lo_unbound and set it to Lo_bound If somebody will try to set_fd again
it will get EBUSY. And if we try to loop_clr_fd() on unbound loop
device we'll get ENXIO.
loop_set_fd/loop_clr_fd (and any other loop ioctl) is called under
loop_device->lo_ctl_mutex. ]
Signed-off-by: Anatol Pomozov <anatol.pomozov@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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We want the fixes in here.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Use kmemdup instead of kzalloc and memcpy.
Signed-off-by: Alexandru Gheorghiu <gheorghiuandru@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <namjae.jeon@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk.kim@samsung.com>
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Currently our client uses AUTH_UNIX for state management on Kerberos
NFS mounts in some cases. For example, if the first mount of a
server specifies "sec=sys," the SETCLIENTID operation is performed
with AUTH_UNIX. Subsequent mounts using stronger security flavors
can not change the flavor used for lease establishment. This might
be less security than an administrator was expecting.
Dave Noveck's migration issues draft recommends the use of an
integrity-protecting security flavor for the SETCLIENTID operation.
Let's ignore the mount's sec= setting and use krb5i as the default
security flavor for SETCLIENTID.
If our client can't establish a GSS context (eg. because it doesn't
have a keytab or the server doesn't support Kerberos) we fall back
to using AUTH_NULL. For an operation that requires a
machine credential (which never represents a particular user)
AUTH_NULL is as secure as AUTH_UNIX.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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Most NFSv4 servers implement AUTH_UNIX, and administrators will
prefer this over AUTH_NULL. It is harmless for our client to try
this flavor in addition to the flavors mandated by RFC 3530/5661.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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If the Linux NFS client receives an NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC error while
trying to look up an NFS server's root file handle, it retries the
lookup operation with various security flavors to see what flavor
the NFS server will accept for pseudo-fs access.
The list of flavors the client uses during retry consists only of
flavors that are currently registered in the kernel RPC client.
This list may not include any GSS pseudoflavors if auth_rpcgss.ko
has not yet been loaded.
Let's instead use a static list of security flavors that the NFS
standard requires the server to implement (RFC 3530bis, section
3.2.1). The RPC client should now be able to load support for
these dynamically; if not, they are skipped.
Recovery behavior here is prescribed by RFC 3530bis, section
15.33.5:
> For LOOKUPP, PUTROOTFH and PUTPUBFH, the client will be unable to
> use the SECINFO operation since SECINFO requires a current
> filehandle and none exist for these two [sic] operations. Therefore,
> the client must iterate through the security triples available at
> the client and reattempt the PUTROOTFH or PUTPUBFH operation. In
> the unfortunate event none of the MANDATORY security triples are
> supported by the client and server, the client SHOULD try using
> others that support integrity. Failing that, the client can try
> using AUTH_NONE, but because such forms lack integrity checks,
> this puts the client at risk.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Cc: Bryan Schumaker <bjschuma@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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Currently, the compound operation the Linux NFS client sends to the
server to confirm a client ID looks like this:
{ SETCLIENTID_CONFIRM; PUTROOTFH; GETATTR(lease_time) }
Once the lease is confirmed, it makes sense to know how long before
the client will have to renew it. And, performing these operations
in the same compound saves a round trip.
Unfortunately, this arrangement assumes that the security flavor
used for establishing a client ID can also be used to access the
server's pseudo-fs.
If the server requires a different security flavor to access its
pseudo-fs than it allowed for the client's SETCLIENTID operation,
the PUTROOTFH in this compound fails with NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC. Even
though the SETCLIENTID_CONFIRM succeeded, our client's trunking
detection logic interprets the failure of the compound as a failure
by the server to confirm the client ID.
As part of server trunking detection, the client then begins another
SETCLIENTID pass with the same nfs4_client_id. This fails with
NFS4ERR_CLID_INUSE because the first SETCLIENTID/SETCLIENTID_CONFIRM
already succeeded in confirming that client ID -- it was the
PUTROOTFH operation that caused the SETCLIENTID_CONFIRM compound to
fail.
To address this issue, separate the "establish client ID" step from
the "accessing the server's pseudo-fs root" step. The first access
of the server's pseudo-fs may require retrying the PUTROOTFH
operation with different security flavors. This access is done in
nfs4_proc_get_rootfh().
That leaves the matter of how to retrieve the server's lease time.
nfs4_proc_fsinfo() already retrieves the lease time value, though
none of its callers do anything with the retrieved value (nor do
they mark the lease as "renewed").
Note that NFSv4.1 state recovery invokes nfs4_proc_get_lease_time()
using the lease management security flavor. This may cause some
heartburn if that security flavor isn't the same as the security
flavor the server requires for accessing the pseudo-fs.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Cc: Bryan Schumaker <bjschuma@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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The long lines with no vertical white space make this function
difficult for humans to read. Add a proper documenting comment
while we're here.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Cc: Bryan Schumaker <bjschuma@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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When rpc.gssd is not running, any NFS operation that needs to use a
GSS security flavor of course does not work.
If looking up a server's root file handle results in an
NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC, nfs4_find_root_sec() is called to try a bunch of
security flavors until one works or all reasonable flavors have
been tried. When rpc.gssd isn't running, this loop seems to fail
immediately after rpcauth_create() craps out on the first GSS
flavor.
When the rpcauth_create() call in nfs4_lookup_root_sec() fails
because rpc.gssd is not available, nfs4_lookup_root_sec()
unconditionally returns -EIO. This prevents nfs4_find_root_sec()
from retrying any other flavors; it drops out of its loop and fails
immediately.
Having nfs4_lookup_root_sec() return -EACCES instead allows
nfs4_find_root_sec() to try all flavors in its list.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Cc: Bryan Schumaker <bjschuma@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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Clean up. This matches a similar API for the client side, and
keeps ULP fingers out the of the GSS mech switch.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Acked-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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A SECINFO reply may contain flavors whose kernel module is not
yet loaded by the client's kernel. A new RPC client API, called
rpcauth_get_pseudoflavor(), is introduced to do proper checking
for support of a security flavor.
When this API is invoked, the RPC client now tries to load the
module for each flavor first before performing the "is this
supported?" check. This means if a module is available on the
client, but has not been loaded yet, it will be loaded and
registered automatically when the SECINFO reply is processed.
The new API can take a full GSS tuple (OID, QoP, and service).
Previously only the OID and service were considered.
nfs_find_best_sec() is updated to verify all flavors requested in a
SECINFO reply, including AUTH_NULL and AUTH_UNIX. Previously these
two flavors were simply assumed to be supported without consulting
the RPC client.
Note that the replaced version of nfs_find_best_sec() can return
RPC_AUTH_MAXFLAVOR if the server returns a recognized OID but an
unsupported "service" value. nfs_find_best_sec() now returns
RPC_AUTH_UNIX in this case.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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The NFSv4 SECINFO procedure returns a list of security flavors. Any
GSS flavor also has a GSS tuple containing an OID, a quality-of-
protection value, and a service value, which specifies a particular
GSS pseudoflavor.
For simplicity and efficiency, I'd like to return each GSS tuple
from the NFSv4 SECINFO XDR decoder and pass it straight into the RPC
client.
Define a data structure that is visible to both the NFS client and
the RPC client. Take structure and field names from the relevant
standards to avoid confusion.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mason/linux-btrfs
Pull btrfs fixes from Chris Mason:
"We've had a busy two weeks of bug fixing. The biggest patches in here
are some long standing early-enospc problems (Josef) and a very old
race where compression and mmap combine forces to lose writes (me).
I'm fairly sure the mmap bug goes all the way back to the introduction
of the compression code, which is proof that fsx doesn't trigger every
possible mmap corner after all.
I'm sure you'll notice one of these is from this morning, it's a small
and isolated use-after-free fix in our scrub error reporting. I
double checked it here."
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mason/linux-btrfs:
Btrfs: don't drop path when printing out tree errors in scrub
Btrfs: fix wrong return value of btrfs_lookup_csum()
Btrfs: fix wrong reservation of csums
Btrfs: fix double free in the btrfs_qgroup_account_ref()
Btrfs: limit the global reserve to 512mb
Btrfs: hold the ordered operations mutex when waiting on ordered extents
Btrfs: fix space accounting for unlink and rename
Btrfs: fix space leak when we fail to reserve metadata space
Btrfs: fix EIO from btrfs send in is_extent_unchanged for punched holes
Btrfs: fix race between mmap writes and compression
Btrfs: fix memory leak in btrfs_create_tree()
Btrfs: fix locking on ROOT_REPLACE operations in tree mod log
Btrfs: fix missing qgroup reservation before fallocating
Btrfs: handle a bogus chunk tree nicely
Btrfs: update to use fs_state bit
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After commit 21d8a15a (lookup_one_len: don't accept . and ..) reiserfs
started failing to delete xattrs from inode. This was due to a buggy
test for '.' and '..' in fill_with_dentries() which resulted in passing
'.' and '..' entries to lookup_one_len() in some cases. That returned
error and so we failed to iterate over all xattrs of and inode.
Fix the test in fill_with_dentries() along the lines of the one in
lookup_one_len().
Reported-by: Pawel Zawora <pzawora@gmail.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
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A user reported a panic where we were panicing somewhere in
tree_backref_for_extent from scrub_print_warning. He only captured the trace
but looking at scrub_print_warning we drop the path right before we mess with
the extent buffer to print out a bunch of stuff, which isn't right. So fix this
by dropping the path after we use the eb if we need to. Thanks,
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fusionio.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core
Pull sysfs fixes from Greg Kroah-Hartman:
"Here are two fixes for sysfs that resolve issues that have been found
by the Trinity fuzz tool, causing oopses in sysfs. They both have
been in linux-next for a while to ensure that they do not cause any
other problems."
* tag 'driver-core-3.9-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core:
sysfs: handle failure path correctly for readdir()
sysfs: fix race between readdir and lseek
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull userns fixes from Eric W Biederman:
"The bulk of the changes are fixing the worst consequences of the user
namespace design oversight in not considering what happens when one
namespace starts off as a clone of another namespace, as happens with
the mount namespace.
The rest of the changes are just plain bug fixes.
Many thanks to Andy Lutomirski for pointing out many of these issues."
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
userns: Restrict when proc and sysfs can be mounted
ipc: Restrict mounting the mqueue filesystem
vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces
vfs: Add a mount flag to lock read only bind mounts
userns: Don't allow creation if the user is chrooted
yama: Better permission check for ptraceme
pid: Handle the exit of a multi-threaded init.
scm: Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN over the current pidns to spoof pids.
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If the server sends us a pathname with more components than the client
limit of NFS4_PATHNAME_MAXCOMPONENTS, more server entries than the client
limit of NFS4_FS_LOCATION_MAXSERVERS, or sends a total number of
fs_locations entries than the client limit of NFS4_FS_LOCATIONS_MAXENTRIES
then we will currently Oops because the limit checks are done _after_ we've
decoded the data into the arrays.
Reported-by: fanchaoting<fanchaoting@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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If the open_context for the file is not yet fully initialised,
then open recovery cannot succeed, and since nfs4_state_find_open_context
returns an ENOENT, we end up treating the file as being irrecoverable.
What we really want to do, is just defer the recovery until later.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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If we don't find the expected csum item, but find a csum item which is
adjacent to the specified extent, we should return -EFBIG, or we should
return -ENOENT. But btrfs_lookup_csum() return -EFBIG even the csum item
is not adjacent to the specified extent. Fix it.
Signed-off-by: Miao Xie <miaox@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fusionio.com>
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We reserve the space for csums only when we write data into a file, in
the other cases, such as tree log, log replay, we don't do reservation,
so we can use the reservation of the transaction handle just for the former.
And for the latter, we should use the tree's own reservation. But the
function - btrfs_csum_file_blocks() didn't differentiate between these
two types of the cases, fix it.
Signed-off-by: Miao Xie <miaox@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fusionio.com>
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The function btrfs_find_all_roots is responsible to allocate
memory for 'roots' and free it if errors happen,so the caller should not
free it again since the work has been done.
Besides,'tmp' is allocated after the function btrfs_find_all_roots,
so we can return directly if btrfs_find_all_roots() fails.
Signed-off-by: Wang Shilong <wangsl-fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Miao Xie <miaox@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Schmidt <list.btrfs@jan-o-sch.net>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fusionio.com>
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A user reported a problem where he was getting early ENOSPC with hundreds of
gigs of free data space and 6 gigs of free metadata space. This is because the
global block reserve was taking up the entire free metadata space. This is
ridiculous, we have infrastructure in place to throttle if we start using too
much of the global reserve, so instead of letting it get this huge just limit it
to 512mb so that users can still get work done. This allowed the user to
complete his rsync without issues. Thanks
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-and-tested-by: Stefan Priebe <s.priebe@profihost.ag>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fusionio.com>
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We need to hold the ordered_operations mutex while waiting on ordered extents
since we splice and run the ordered extents list. We need to make sure anybody
else who wants to wait on ordered extents does actually wait for them to be
completed. This will keep us from bailing out of flushing in case somebody is
already waiting on ordered extents to complete. Thanks,
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fusionio.com>
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We are way over-reserving for unlink and rename. Rename is just some random
huge number and unlink accounts for tree log operations that don't actually
happen during unlink, not to mention the tree log doesn't take from the trans
block rsv anyway so it's completely useless. Thanks,
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fusionio.com>
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Dave reported a warning when running xfstest 275. We have been leaking delalloc
metadata space when our reservations fail. This is because we were improperly
calculating how much space to free for our checksum reservations. The problem
is we would sometimes free up space that had already been freed in another
thread and we would end up with negative usage for the delalloc space. This
patch fixes the problem by calculating how much space the other threads would
have already freed, and then calculate how much space we need to free had we not
done the reservation at all, and then freeing any excess space. This makes
xfstests 275 no longer have leaked space. Thanks
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fusionio.com>
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When you take a snapshot, punch a hole where there has been data, then take
another snapshot and try to send an incremental stream, btrfs send would
give you EIO. That is because is_extent_unchanged had no support for holes
being punched. With this patch, instead of returning EIO we just return
0 (== the extent is not unchanged) and we're good.
Signed-off-by: Jan Schmidt <list.btrfs@jan-o-sch.net>
Cc: Alexander Block <ablock84@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fusionio.com>
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With unlink is an asynchronous operation in the sillyrename case, it
expects nfs4_async_handle_error() to map the error correctly.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
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In the case where an inode has a very stale transaction id (tid) in
i_datasync_tid or i_sync_tid, it's possible that after a very large
(2**31) number of transactions, that the tid number space might wrap,
causing tid_geq()'s calculations to fail.
Commit d9b0193 "jbd: fix fsync() tid wraparound bug" attempted to fix
this problem, but it only avoided kjournald spinning forever by fixing
the logic in jbd_log_start_commit().
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
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Commit 06ae43f34bcc ("Don't bother with redoing rw_verify_area() from
default_file_splice_from()") lost the checks to test existence of the
write/aio_write methods. My apologies ;-/
Eventually, we want that in fs/splice.c side of things (no point
repeating it for every buffer, after all), but for now this is the
obvious minimal fix.
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Only allow unprivileged mounts of proc and sysfs if they are already
mounted when the user namespace is created.
proc and sysfs are interesting because they have content that is
per namespace, and so fresh mounts are needed when new namespaces
are created while at the same time proc and sysfs have content that
is shared between every instance.
Respect the policy of who may see the shared content of proc and sysfs
by only allowing new mounts if there was an existing mount at the time
the user namespace was created.
In practice there are only two interesting cases: proc and sysfs are
mounted at their usual places, proc and sysfs are not mounted at all
(some form of mount namespace jail).
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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As a matter of policy MNT_READONLY should not be changable if the
original mounter had more privileges than creator of the mount
namespace.
Add the flag CL_UNPRIVILEGED to note when we are copying a mount from
a mount namespace that requires more privileges to a mount namespace
that requires fewer privileges.
When the CL_UNPRIVILEGED flag is set cause clone_mnt to set MNT_NO_REMOUNT
if any of the mnt flags that should never be changed are set.
This protects both mount propagation and the initial creation of a less
privileged mount namespace.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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When a read-only bind mount is copied from mount namespace in a higher
privileged user namespace to a mount namespace in a lesser privileged
user namespace, it should not be possible to remove the the read-only
restriction.
Add a MNT_LOCK_READONLY mount flag to indicate that a mount must
remain read-only.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Guarantee that the policy of which files may be access that is
established by setting the root directory will not be violated
by user namespaces by verifying that the root directory points
to the root of the mount namespace at the time of user namespace
creation.
Changing the root is a privileged operation, and as a matter of policy
it serves to limit unprivileged processes to files below the current
root directory.
For reasons of simplicity and comprehensibility the privilege to
change the root directory is gated solely on the CAP_SYS_CHROOT
capability in the user namespace. Therefore when creating a user
namespace we must ensure that the policy of which files may be access
can not be violated by changing the root directory.
Anyone who runs a processes in a chroot and would like to use user
namespace can setup the same view of filesystems with a mount
namespace instead. With this result that this is not a practical
limitation for using user namespaces.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull vfs fixes from Al Viro:
"stable fodder; assorted deadlock fixes"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
vt: synchronize_rcu() under spinlock is not nice...
Nest rename_lock inside vfsmount_lock
Don't bother with redoing rw_verify_area() from default_file_splice_from()
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When we recover fsync'ed data after power-off-recovery, we should guarantee
that any parent inode number should be correct for each direct inode blocks.
So, let's make the following rules.
- The fsync should do checkpoint to all the inodes that were experienced hard
links.
- So, the only normal files can be recovered by roll-forward.
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk.kim@samsung.com>
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In the checkpoint flow, the f2fs investigates the total nat cache entries.
Previously, if an entry has NULL_ADDR, f2fs drops the entry and adds the
obsolete nid to the free nid list.
However, this free nid will be reused sooner, resulting in its nat entry miss.
In order to avoid this, we don't need to drop the nat cache entry at this moment.
Reviewed-by: Namjae Jeon <namjae.jeon@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk.kim@samsung.com>
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This patch removes data_version check flow during the fsync call.
The original purpose for the use of data_version was to avoid writng inode
pages redundantly by the fsync calls repeatedly.
However, when user can modify file meta and then call fsync, we should not
skip fsync procedure.
So, let's remove this condition check and hope that user triggers in right
manner.
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk.kim@samsung.com>
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We should handle errors during the recovery flow correctly.
For example, if we get -ENOMEM, we should report a mount failure instead of
conducting the remained mount procedure.
Reviewed-by: Namjae Jeon <namjae.jeon@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk.kim@samsung.com>
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... lest we get livelocks between path_is_under() and d_path() and friends.
The thing is, wrt fairness lglocks are more similar to rwsems than to rwlocks;
it is possible to have thread B spin on attempt to take lock shared while thread
A is already holding it shared, if B is on lower-numbered CPU than A and there's
a thread C spinning on attempt to take the same lock exclusive.
As the result, we need consistent ordering between vfsmount_lock (lglock) and
rename_lock (seq_lock), even though everything that takes both is going to take
vfsmount_lock only shared.
Spotted-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Pull NFS client bugfixes from Trond Myklebust:
- Fix an NFSv4 idmapper regression
- Fix an Oops in the pNFS blocks client
- Fix up various issues with pNFS layoutcommit
- Ensure correct read ordering of variables in
rpc_wake_up_task_queue_locked
* tag 'nfs-for-3.9-3' of git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/trondmy/linux-nfs:
SUNRPC: Add barriers to ensure read ordering in rpc_wake_up_task_queue_locked
NFSv4.1: Add a helper pnfs_commit_and_return_layout
NFSv4.1: Always clear the NFS_INO_LAYOUTCOMMIT in layoutreturn
NFSv4.1: Fix a race in pNFS layoutcommit
pnfs-block: removing DM device maybe cause oops when call dev_remove
NFSv4: Fix the string length returned by the idmapper
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Since we only enforce an upper bound, not a lower bound, a "negative"
length can get through here.
The symptom seen was a warning when we attempt to a kmalloc with an
excessive size.
Reported-by: Toralf Förster <toralf.foerster@gmx.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
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Btrfs uses page_mkwrite to ensure stable pages during
crc calculations and mmap workloads. We call clear_page_dirty_for_io
before we do any crcs, and this forces any application with the file
mapped to wait for the crc to finish before it is allowed to change
the file.
With compression on, the clear_page_dirty_for_io step is happening after
we've compressed the pages. This means the applications might be
changing the pages while we are compressing them, and some of those
modifications might not hit the disk.
This commit adds the clear_page_dirty_for_io before compression starts
and makes sure to redirty the page if we have to fallback to
uncompressed IO as well.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Alexandre Oliva <oliva@gnu.org>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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It seems that sysfs has an interesting way of doing the same thing.
This removes the cpu_relax unfortunately, but if it's really needed,
it would be better to add this to include/linux/atomic.h to benefit
all atomic ops users.
Signed-off-by: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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