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The function belongs to the family of locking functions, so move it
there. The 'noinline' keyword is dropped as it's now an exported
function that does not need it.
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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The function btrfs_assert_tree_locked is used outside of the locking
code so it is exported, however we can make it static inine as it's
fairly trivial.
This is the only locking assertion used in release builds, inlining
improves the text size by 174 bytes and reduces stack consumption in the
callers.
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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I've noticed that none of the btrfs_assert_*lock* debugging helpers is
inlined, despite they're short and mostly a value update. Making them
inline shaves 67 from the text size, reduces stack consumption and
perhaps also slightly improves the performance due to avoiding
unnecessary calls.
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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Commit ac0c7cf8be00 ("btrfs: fix crash when tracepoint arguments are
freed by wq callbacks") added a void pointer, wtag, which is passed into
trace_btrfs_all_work_done() instead of the freed work item. This is
silly for a few reasons:
1. The freed work item still has the same address.
2. work is still in scope after it's freed, so assigning wtag doesn't
stop anyone from using it.
3. The tracepoint has always taken a void * argument, so assigning wtag
doesn't actually make things any more type-safe. (Note that the
original bug in commit bc074524e123 ("btrfs: prefix fsid to all trace
events") was that the void * was implicitly casted when it was passed
to btrfs_work_owner() in the trace point itself).
Instead, let's add some clearer warnings as comments.
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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Commit 9e0af2376434 ("Btrfs: fix task hang under heavy compressed
write") worked around the issue that a recycled work item could get a
false dependency on the original work item due to how the workqueue code
guarantees non-reentrancy. It did so by giving different work functions
to different types of work.
However, the fixes in the previous few patches are more complete, as
they prevent a work item from being recycled at all (except for a tiny
window that the kernel workqueue code handles for us). This obsoletes
the previous fix, so we don't need the unique helpers for correctness.
The only other reason to keep them would be so they show up in stack
traces, but they always seem to be optimized to a tail call, so they
don't show up anyways. So, let's just get rid of the extra indirection.
While we're here, rename normal_work_helper() to the more informative
btrfs_work_helper().
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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Currently, scrub_missing_raid56_worker() puts and potentially frees
sblock (which embeds the work item) and then submits a bio through
scrub_wr_submit(). This is another potential instance of the bug in
"btrfs: don't prematurely free work in run_ordered_work()". Fix it by
dropping the reference after we submit the bio.
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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Currently, reada_start_machine_worker() frees the reada_machine_work and
then calls __reada_start_machine() to do readahead. This is another
potential instance of the bug in "btrfs: don't prematurely free work in
run_ordered_work()".
There _might_ already be a deadlock here: reada_start_machine_worker()
can depend on itself through stacked filesystems (__read_start_machine()
-> reada_start_machine_dev() -> reada_tree_block_flagged() ->
read_extent_buffer_pages() -> submit_one_bio() ->
btree_submit_bio_hook() -> btrfs_map_bio() -> submit_stripe_bio() ->
submit_bio() onto a loop device can trigger readahead on the lower
filesystem).
Either way, let's fix it by freeing the work at the end.
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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Currently, end_workqueue_fn() frees the end_io_wq entry (which embeds
the work item) and then calls bio_endio(). This is another potential
instance of the bug in "btrfs: don't prematurely free work in
run_ordered_work()".
In particular, the endio call may depend on other work items. For
example, btrfs_end_dio_bio() can call btrfs_subio_endio_read() ->
__btrfs_correct_data_nocsum() -> dio_read_error() ->
submit_dio_repair_bio(), which submits a bio that is also completed
through a end_workqueue_fn() work item. However,
__btrfs_correct_data_nocsum() waits for the newly submitted bio to
complete, thus it depends on another work item.
This example currently usually works because we use different workqueue
helper functions for BTRFS_WQ_ENDIO_DATA and BTRFS_WQ_ENDIO_DIO_REPAIR.
However, it may deadlock with stacked filesystems and is fragile
overall. The proper fix is to free the work item at the very end of the
work function, so let's do that.
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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We hit the following very strange deadlock on a system with Btrfs on a
loop device backed by another Btrfs filesystem:
1. The top (loop device) filesystem queues an async_cow work item from
cow_file_range_async(). We'll call this work X.
2. Worker thread A starts work X (normal_work_helper()).
3. Worker thread A executes the ordered work for the top filesystem
(run_ordered_work()).
4. Worker thread A finishes the ordered work for work X and frees X
(work->ordered_free()).
5. Worker thread A executes another ordered work and gets blocked on I/O
to the bottom filesystem (still in run_ordered_work()).
6. Meanwhile, the bottom filesystem allocates and queues an async_cow
work item which happens to be the recently-freed X.
7. The workqueue code sees that X is already being executed by worker
thread A, so it schedules X to be executed _after_ worker thread A
finishes (see the find_worker_executing_work() call in
process_one_work()).
Now, the top filesystem is waiting for I/O on the bottom filesystem, but
the bottom filesystem is waiting for the top filesystem to finish, so we
deadlock.
This happens because we are breaking the workqueue assumption that a
work item cannot be recycled while it still depends on other work. Fix
it by waiting to free the work item until we are done with all of the
related ordered work.
P.S.:
One might ask why the workqueue code doesn't try to detect a recycled
work item. It actually does try by checking whether the work item has
the same work function (find_worker_executing_work()), but in our case
the function is the same. This is the only key that the workqueue code
has available to compare, short of adding an additional, layer-violating
"custom key". Considering that we're the only ones that have ever hit
this, we should just play by the rules.
Unfortunately, we haven't been able to create a minimal reproducer other
than our full container setup using a compress-force=zstd filesystem on
top of another compress-force=zstd filesystem.
Suggested-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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Commit fc97fab0ea59 ("btrfs: Replace fs_info->qgroup_rescan_worker
workqueue with btrfs_workqueue.") converted qgroup_rescan_work to be
initialized with btrfs_init_work(), but it left behind an unnecessary
memset(). Get rid of the memset().
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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This needs to be cleaned up in the future, but for now it belongs to the
extent-io-tree stuff since it uses the internal tree search code.
Needed to export get_state_failrec and set_state_failrec as well since
we're not going to move the actual IO part of the failrec stuff out at
this point.
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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This utilizes internal stuff to the extent_io_tree, so we need to export
it before we move it.
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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extent_io.c/h are huge, encompassing a bunch of different things. The
extent_io_tree code can live on its own, so separate this out.
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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We are moving extent_io_tree into it's on file, so separate out the
extent_state init stuff from extent_io_tree_init().
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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We check both extent buffer and extent state leaks in the same function,
separate these two functions out so we can move them around.
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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The following comment shows up in btrfs_search_slot() with out much
sense:
/*
* setup the path here so we can release it under lock
* contention with the cow code
*/
if (cow) {
/* code touching path->lock[] is far away from here */
}
This comment hasn't been cleaned up after the relevant code has been
removed.
The original code is introduced in commit 65b51a009e29
("btrfs_search_slot: reduce lock contention by cowing in two stages"):
+
+ /*
+ * setup the path here so we can release it under lock
+ * contention with the cow code
+ */
+ p->nodes[level] = b;
+ if (!p->skip_locking)
+ p->locks[level] = 1;
+
But in current code, we have different timing for modifying path lock,
so just remove the comment.
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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Similar to btrfs_search_slot() done in previous patch, make a shortcut
for the level 0 case and allow to reduce indentation for the remaining
case.
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[ update changelog ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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In btrfs_search_slot(), we something like:
if (level != 0) {
/* Do search inside tree nodes*/
} else {
/* Do search inside tree leaves */
goto done;
}
This caused extra indent for tree node search code. Change it to
something like:
if (level == 0) {
/* Do search inside tree leaves */
goto done'
}
/* Do search inside tree nodes */
So we have more space to maneuver our code, this is especially useful as
the tree nodes search code is more complex than the leaves search code.
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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For INODE_REF we will check:
- Objectid (ino) against previous key
To detect missing INODE_ITEM.
- No overflow/padding in the data payload
Much like DIR_ITEM, but with less members to check.
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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For the following items, key->objectid is inode number:
- DIR_ITEM
- DIR_INDEX
- XATTR_ITEM
- EXTENT_DATA
- INODE_REF
So in the subvolume tree, such items must have its previous item share the
same objectid, e.g.:
(257 INODE_ITEM 0)
(257 DIR_INDEX xxx)
(257 DIR_ITEM xxx)
(258 INODE_ITEM 0)
(258 INODE_REF 0)
(258 XATTR_ITEM 0)
(258 EXTENT_DATA 0)
But if we have the following sequence, then there is definitely
something wrong, normally some INODE_ITEM is missing, like:
(257 INODE_ITEM 0)
(257 DIR_INDEX xxx)
(257 DIR_ITEM xxx)
(258 XATTR_ITEM 0) <<< objecitd suddenly changed to 258
(258 EXTENT_DATA 0)
So just by checking the previous key for above inode based key types, we
can detect a missing inode item.
For INODE_REF key type, the check will be added along with INODE_REF
checker.
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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It's not used ouside of transaction.c
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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A recent patch to btrfs showed that there was at least 1 case where a
nested transaction was committed. Nested transaction in this case means
a code which has a transaction handle calls some function which in turn
obtains a copy of the same transaction handle. In such cases the correct
thing to do is for the lower callee to call btrfs_end_transaction which
contains appropriate checks so as to not commit the transaction which
will result in stale trans handler for the caller.
To catch such cases add an assert in btrfs_commit_transaction ensuring
btrfs_trans_handle::use_count is always 1.
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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This is similar to 942491c9e6d6 ("xfs: fix AIM7 regression"). Apparently
our current rwsem code doesn't like doing the trylock, then lock for
real scheme. This causes extra contention on the lock and can be
measured eg. by AIM7 benchmark. So change our read/write methods to
just do the trylock for the RWF_NOWAIT case.
Fixes: edf064e7c6fe ("btrfs: nowait aio support")
Signed-off-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[ update changelog ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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Pull block fixes from Jens Axboe:
"A few fixes that should make it into this release. This contains:
- io_uring:
- The timeout command assumes sequence == 0 means that we want
one completion, but this kind of overloading is unfortunate as
it prevents users from doing a pure time based wait. Since
this operation was introduced in this cycle, let's correct it
now, while we can. (me)
- One-liner to fix an issue with dependent links and fixed
buffer reads. The actual IO completed fine, but the link got
severed since we stored the wrong expected value. (me)
- Add TIMEOUT to list of opcodes that don't need a file. (Pavel)
- rsxx missing workqueue destry calls. Old bug. (Chuhong)
- Fix blk-iocost active list check (Jiufei)
- Fix impossible-to-hit overflow merge condition, that still hit some
folks very rarely (Junichi)
- Fix bfq hang issue from 5.3. This didn't get marked for stable, but
will go into stable post this merge (Paolo)"
* tag 'for-linus-20191115' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block:
rsxx: add missed destroy_workqueue calls in remove
iocost: check active_list of all the ancestors in iocg_activate()
block, bfq: deschedule empty bfq_queues not referred by any process
io_uring: ensure registered buffer import returns the IO length
io_uring: Fix getting file for timeout
block: check bi_size overflow before merge
io_uring: make timeout sequence == 0 mean no sequence
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Pull ceph fixes from Ilya Dryomov:
"Two fixes for the buffered reads and O_DIRECT writes serialization
patch that went into -rc1 and a fixup for a bogus warning on older gcc
versions"
* tag 'ceph-for-5.4-rc8' of git://github.com/ceph/ceph-client:
rbd: silence bogus uninitialized warning in rbd_object_map_update_finish()
ceph: increment/decrement dio counter on async requests
ceph: take the inode lock before acquiring cap refs
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When a lookup is done, the afs filesystem will perform a bulk status-fetch
operation on the requested vnode (file) plus the next 49 other vnodes from
the directory list (in AFS, directory contents are downloaded as blobs and
parsed locally). When the results are received, it will speculatively
populate the inode cache from the extra data.
However, if the lookup races with another lookup on the same directory, but
for a different file - one that's in the 49 extra fetches, then if the bulk
status-fetch operation finishes first, it will try and update the inode
from the other lookup.
If this other inode is still in the throes of being created, however, this
will cause an assertion failure in afs_apply_status():
BUG_ON(test_bit(AFS_VNODE_UNSET, &vnode->flags));
on or about fs/afs/inode.c:175 because it expects data to be there already
that it can compare to.
Fix this by skipping the update if the inode is being created as the
creator will presumably set up the inode with the same information.
Fixes: 39db9815da48 ("afs: Fix application of the results of a inline bulk status fetch")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Pull misc vfs fixes from Al Viro:
"Assorted fixes all over the place; some of that is -stable fodder,
some regressions from the last window"
* 'fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
ecryptfs_lookup_interpose(): lower_dentry->d_parent is not stable either
ecryptfs_lookup_interpose(): lower_dentry->d_inode is not stable
ecryptfs: fix unlink and rmdir in face of underlying fs modifications
audit_get_nd(): don't unlock parent too early
exportfs_decode_fh(): negative pinned may become positive without the parent locked
cgroup: don't put ERR_PTR() into fc->root
autofs: fix a leak in autofs_expire_indirect()
aio: Fix io_pgetevents() struct __compat_aio_sigset layout
fs/namespace.c: fix use-after-free of mount in mnt_warn_timestamp_expiry()
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Ceph can in some cases issue an async DIO request, in which case we can
end up calling ceph_end_io_direct before the I/O is actually complete.
That may allow buffered operations to proceed while DIO requests are
still in flight.
Fix this by incrementing the i_dio_count when issuing an async DIO
request, and decrement it when tearing down the aio_req.
Fixes: 321fe13c9398 ("ceph: add buffered/direct exclusionary locking for reads and writes")
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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Most of the time, we (or the vfs layer) takes the inode_lock and then
acquires caps, but ceph_read_iter does the opposite, and that can lead
to a deadlock.
When there are multiple clients treading over the same data, we can end
up in a situation where a reader takes caps and then tries to acquire
the inode_lock. Another task holds the inode_lock and issues a request
to the MDS which needs to revoke the caps, but that can't happen until
the inode_lock is unwedged.
Fix this by having ceph_read_iter take the inode_lock earlier, before
attempting to acquire caps.
Fixes: 321fe13c9398 ("ceph: add buffered/direct exclusionary locking for reads and writes")
Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/36348
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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A test case was reported where two linked reads with registered buffers
failed the second link always. This is because we set the expected value
of a request in req->result, and if we don't get this result, then we
fail the dependent links. For some reason the registered buffer import
returned -ERROR/0, while the normal import returns -ERROR/length. This
broke linked commands with registered buffers.
Fix this by making io_import_fixed() correctly return the mapped length.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.3
Reported-by: 李通洲 <carter.li@eoitek.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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For timeout requests io_uring tries to grab a file with specified fd,
which is usually stdin/fd=0.
Update io_op_needs_file()
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux
Pull btrfs fix from David Sterba:
"A fix for an older bug that has started to show up during testing
(because of an updated test for rename exchange).
It's an in-memory corruption caused by local variable leaking out of
the function scope"
* tag 'for-5.4-rc7-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux:
Btrfs: fix log context list corruption after rename exchange operation
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Currently we make sequence == 0 be the same as sequence == 1, but that's
not super useful if the intent is really to have a timeout that's just
a pure timeout.
If the user passes in sqe->off == 0, then don't apply any sequence logic
to the request, let it purely be driven by the timeout specified.
Reported-by: 李通洲 <carter.li@eoitek.com>
Reviewed-by: 李通洲 <carter.li@eoitek.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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During rename exchange we might have successfully log the new name in the
source root's log tree, in which case we leave our log context (allocated
on stack) in the root's list of log contextes. However we might fail to
log the new name in the destination root, in which case we fallback to
a transaction commit later and never sync the log of the source root,
which causes the source root log context to remain in the list of log
contextes. This later causes invalid memory accesses because the context
was allocated on stack and after rename exchange finishes the stack gets
reused and overwritten for other purposes.
The kernel's linked list corruption detector (CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST=y) can
detect this and report something like the following:
[ 691.489929] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 691.489947] list_add corruption. prev->next should be next (ffff88819c944530), but was ffff8881c23f7be4. (prev=ffff8881c23f7a38).
[ 691.489967] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 28933 at lib/list_debug.c:28 __list_add_valid+0x95/0xe0
(...)
[ 691.489998] CPU: 2 PID: 28933 Comm: fsstress Not tainted 5.4.0-rc6-btrfs-next-62 #1
[ 691.490001] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-0-ga698c8995f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 691.490003] RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid+0x95/0xe0
(...)
[ 691.490007] RSP: 0018:ffff8881f0b3faf8 EFLAGS: 00010282
[ 691.490010] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88819c944530 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 691.490011] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffffffa2c497e0
[ 691.490013] RBP: ffff8881f0b3fe68 R08: ffffed103eaa4115 R09: ffffed103eaa4114
[ 691.490015] R10: ffff88819c944000 R11: ffffed103eaa4115 R12: 7fffffffffffffff
[ 691.490016] R13: ffff8881b4035610 R14: ffff8881e7b84728 R15: 1ffff1103e167f7b
[ 691.490019] FS: 00007f4b25ea2e80(0000) GS:ffff8881f5500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 691.490021] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 691.490022] CR2: 00007fffbb2d4eec CR3: 00000001f2a4a004 CR4: 00000000003606e0
[ 691.490025] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 691.490027] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 691.490029] Call Trace:
[ 691.490058] btrfs_log_inode_parent+0x667/0x2730 [btrfs]
[ 691.490083] ? join_transaction+0x24a/0xce0 [btrfs]
[ 691.490107] ? btrfs_end_log_trans+0x80/0x80 [btrfs]
[ 691.490111] ? dget_parent+0xb8/0x460
[ 691.490116] ? lock_downgrade+0x6b0/0x6b0
[ 691.490121] ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x90/0x90
[ 691.490127] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x142/0x220
[ 691.490151] btrfs_log_dentry_safe+0x65/0x90 [btrfs]
[ 691.490172] btrfs_sync_file+0x9f1/0xc00 [btrfs]
[ 691.490195] ? btrfs_file_write_iter+0x1800/0x1800 [btrfs]
[ 691.490198] ? rcu_read_lock_any_held.part.11+0x20/0x20
[ 691.490204] ? __do_sys_newstat+0x88/0xd0
[ 691.490207] ? cp_new_stat+0x5d0/0x5d0
[ 691.490218] ? do_fsync+0x38/0x60
[ 691.490220] do_fsync+0x38/0x60
[ 691.490224] __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x32/0x40
[ 691.490228] do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x540
[ 691.490233] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[ 691.490235] RIP: 0033:0x7f4b253ad5f0
(...)
[ 691.490239] RSP: 002b:00007fffbb2d6078 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004b
[ 691.490242] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f4b253ad5f0
[ 691.490244] RDX: 00007fffbb2d5fe0 RSI: 00007fffbb2d5fe0 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 691.490245] RBP: 000000000000000d R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00007fffbb2d608c
[ 691.490247] R10: 00000000000002e8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000000001f4
[ 691.490248] R13: 0000000051eb851f R14: 00007fffbb2d6120 R15: 00005635a498bda0
This started happening recently when running some test cases from fstests
like btrfs/004 for example, because support for rename exchange was added
last week to fsstress from fstests.
So fix this by deleting the log context for the source root from the list
if we have logged the new name in the source root.
Reported-by: Su Yue <Damenly_Su@gmx.com>
Fixes: d4682ba03ef618 ("Btrfs: sync log after logging new name")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Tested-by: Su Yue <Damenly_Su@gmx.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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Pull configfs regression fix from Christoph Hellwig:
"Fix a regression from this merge window in the configfs symlink
handling (Honggang Li)"
* tag 'configfs-for-5.4-2' of git://git.infradead.org/users/hch/configfs:
configfs: calculate the depth of parent item
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Pull cifs fix from Steve French:
"Small fix for an smb3 reconnect bug (also marked for stable)"
* tag '5.4-rc7-smb3-fix' of git://git.samba.org/sfrench/cifs-2.6:
SMB3: Fix persistent handles reconnect
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We need to get the underlying dentry of parent; sure, absent the races
it is the parent of underlying dentry, but there's nothing to prevent
losing a timeslice to preemtion in the middle of evaluation of
lower_dentry->d_parent->d_inode, having another process move lower_dentry
around and have its (ex)parent not pinned anymore and freed on memory
pressure. Then we regain CPU and try to fetch ->d_inode from memory
that is freed by that point.
dentry->d_parent *is* stable here - it's an argument of ->lookup() and
we are guaranteed that it won't be moved anywhere until we feed it
to d_add/d_splice_alias. So we safely go that way to get to its
underlying dentry.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # since 2009 or so
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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lower_dentry can't go from positive to negative (we have it pinned),
but it *can* go from negative to positive. So fetching ->d_inode
into a local variable, doing a blocking allocation, checking that
now ->d_inode is non-NULL and feeding the value we'd fetched
earlier to a function that won't accept NULL is not a good idea.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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A problem similar to the one caught in commit 74dd7c97ea2a ("ecryptfs_rename():
verify that lower dentries are still OK after lock_rename()") exists for
unlink/rmdir as well.
Instead of playing with dget_parent() of underlying dentry of victim
and hoping it's the same as underlying dentry of our directory,
do the following:
* find the underlying dentry of victim
* find the underlying directory of victim's parent (stable
since the victim is ecryptfs dentry and inode of its parent is
held exclusive by the caller).
* lock the inode of dentry underlying the victim's parent
* check that underlying dentry of victim is still hashed and
has the right parent - it can be moved, but it can't be moved to/from
the directory we are holding exclusive. So while ->d_parent itself
might not be stable, the result of comparison is.
If the check passes, everything is fine - underlying directory is locked,
underlying victim is still a child of that directory and we can go ahead
and feed them to vfs_unlink(). As in the current mainline we need to
pin the underlying dentry of victim, so that it wouldn't go negative under
us, but that's the only temporary reference that needs to be grabbed there.
Underlying dentry of parent won't go away (it's pinned by the parent,
which is held by caller), so there's no need to grab it.
The same problem (with the same solution) exists for rmdir. Moreover,
rename gets simpler and more robust with the same "don't bother with
dget_parent()" approach.
Fixes: 74dd7c97ea2 "ecryptfs_rename(): verify that lower dentries are still OK after lock_rename()"
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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locked
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux
Pull btrfs fixes from David Sterba:
"A few regressions and fixes for stable.
Regressions:
- fix a race leading to metadata space leak after task received a
signal
- un-deprecate 2 ioctls, marked as deprecated by mistake
Fixes:
- fix limit check for number of devices during chunk allocation
- fix a race due to double evaluation of i_size_read inside max()
macro, can cause a crash
- remove wrong device id check in tree-checker"
* tag 'for-5.4-rc6-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux:
btrfs: un-deprecate ioctls START_SYNC and WAIT_SYNC
btrfs: save i_size to avoid double evaluation of i_size_read in compress_file_range
Btrfs: fix race leading to metadata space leak after task received signal
btrfs: tree-checker: Fix wrong check on max devid
btrfs: Consider system chunk array size for new SYSTEM chunks
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Pull block fixes from Jens Axboe:
- Two NVMe device removal crash fixes, and a compat fixup for for an
ioctl that was introduced in this release (Anton, Charles, Max - via
Keith)
- Missing error path mutex unlock for drbd (Dan)
- cgroup writeback fixup on dead memcg (Tejun)
- blkcg online stats print fix (Tejun)
* tag 'for-linus-2019-11-08' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block:
cgroup,writeback: don't switch wbs immediately on dead wbs if the memcg is dead
block: drbd: remove a stray unlock in __drbd_send_protocol()
blkcg: make blkcg_print_stat() print stats only for online blkgs
nvme: change nvme_passthru_cmd64 to explicitly mark rsvd
nvme-multipath: fix crash in nvme_mpath_clear_ctrl_paths
nvme-rdma: fix a segmentation fault during module unload
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cgroup writeback tries to refresh the associated wb immediately if the
current wb is dead. This is to avoid keeping issuing IOs on the stale
wb after memcg - blkcg association has changed (ie. when blkcg got
disabled / enabled higher up in the hierarchy).
Unfortunately, the logic gets triggered spuriously on inodes which are
associated with dead cgroups. When the logic is triggered on dead
cgroups, the attempt fails only after doing quite a bit of work
allocating and initializing a new wb.
While c3aab9a0bd91 ("mm/filemap.c: don't initiate writeback if mapping
has no dirty pages") alleviated the issue significantly as it now only
triggers when the inode has dirty pages. However, the condition can
still be triggered before the inode is switched to a different cgroup
and the logic simply doesn't make sense.
Skip the immediate switching if the associated memcg is dying.
This is a simplified version of the following two patches:
* https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20190513183053.GA73423@dennisz-mbp/
* http://lkml.kernel.org/r/156355839560.2063.5265687291430814589.stgit@buzz
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Fixes: e8a7abf5a5bd ("writeback: disassociate inodes from dying bdi_writebacks")
Acked-by: Dennis Zhou <dennis@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Pull ceph fixes from Ilya Dryomov:
"Some late-breaking dentry handling fixes from Al and Jeff, a patch to
further restrict copy_file_range() to avoid potential data corruption
from Luis and a fix for !CONFIG_CEPH_FSCACHE kernels.
Everything but the fscache fix is marked for stable"
* tag 'ceph-for-5.4-rc7' of git://github.com/ceph/ceph-client:
ceph: return -EINVAL if given fsc mount option on kernel w/o support
ceph: don't allow copy_file_range when stripe_count != 1
ceph: don't try to handle hashed dentries in non-O_CREAT atomic_open
ceph: add missing check in d_revalidate snapdir handling
ceph: fix RCU case handling in ceph_d_revalidate()
ceph: fix use-after-free in __ceph_remove_cap()
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If someone requests fscache on the mount, and the kernel doesn't
support it, it should fail the mount.
[ Drop ceph prefix -- it's provided by pr_err. ]
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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When the client hits a network reconnect, it re-opens every open
file with a create context to reconnect a persistent handle. All
create context types should be 8-bytes aligned but the padding
was missed for that one. As a result, some servers don't allow
us to reconnect handles and return an error. The problem occurs
when the problematic context is not at the end of the create
request packet. Fix this by adding a proper padding at the end
of the reconnect persistent handle context.
Cc: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.19.x
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
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When create symbolic link, create_link should calculate the depth
of the parent item. However, both the first and second parameters
of configfs_get_target_path had been set to the target. Broken
symbolic link created.
$ targetcli ls /
o- / ............................................................. [...]
o- backstores .................................................. [...]
| o- block ...................................... [Storage Objects: 0]
| o- fileio ..................................... [Storage Objects: 2]
| | o- vdev0 .......... [/dev/ramdisk1 (16.0MiB) write-thru activated]
| | | o- alua ....................................... [ALUA Groups: 1]
| | | o- default_tg_pt_gp ........... [ALUA state: Active/optimized]
| | o- vdev1 .......... [/dev/ramdisk2 (16.0MiB) write-thru activated]
| | o- alua ....................................... [ALUA Groups: 1]
| | o- default_tg_pt_gp ........... [ALUA state: Active/optimized]
| o- pscsi ...................................... [Storage Objects: 0]
| o- ramdisk .................................... [Storage Objects: 0]
o- iscsi ................................................ [Targets: 0]
o- loopback ............................................. [Targets: 0]
o- srpt ................................................. [Targets: 2]
| o- ib.e89a8f91cb3200000000000000000000 ............... [no-gen-acls]
| | o- acls ................................................ [ACLs: 2]
| | | o- ib.e89a8f91cb3200000000000000000000 ........ [Mapped LUNs: 2]
| | | | o- mapped_lun0 ............................. [BROKEN LUN LINK]
| | | | o- mapped_lun1 ............................. [BROKEN LUN LINK]
| | | o- ib.e89a8f91cb3300000000000000000000 ........ [Mapped LUNs: 2]
| | | o- mapped_lun0 ............................. [BROKEN LUN LINK]
| | | o- mapped_lun1 ............................. [BROKEN LUN LINK]
| | o- luns ................................................ [LUNs: 2]
| | o- lun0 ...... [fileio/vdev0 (/dev/ramdisk1) (default_tg_pt_gp)]
| | o- lun1 ...... [fileio/vdev1 (/dev/ramdisk2) (default_tg_pt_gp)]
| o- ib.e89a8f91cb3300000000000000000000 ............... [no-gen-acls]
| o- acls ................................................ [ACLs: 0]
| o- luns ................................................ [LUNs: 0]
o- vhost ................................................ [Targets: 0]
Fixes: e9c03af21cc7 ("configfs: calculate the symlink target only once")
Signed-off-by: Honggang Li <honli@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
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When the extent tree is modified, it should be protected by inode
cluster lock and ip_alloc_sem.
The extent tree is accessed and modified in the
ocfs2_prepare_inode_for_write, but isn't protected by ip_alloc_sem.
The following is a case. The function ocfs2_fiemap is accessing the
extent tree, which is modified at the same time.
kernel BUG at fs/ocfs2/extent_map.c:475!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: tun ocfs2 ocfs2_nodemanager configfs ocfs2_stackglue [...]
CPU: 16 PID: 14047 Comm: o2info Not tainted 4.1.12-124.23.1.el6uek.x86_64 #2
Hardware name: Oracle Corporation ORACLE SERVER X7-2L/ASM, MB MECH, X7-2L, BIOS 42040600 10/19/2018
task: ffff88019487e200 ti: ffff88003daa4000 task.ti: ffff88003daa4000
RIP: ocfs2_get_clusters_nocache.isra.11+0x390/0x550 [ocfs2]
Call Trace:
ocfs2_fiemap+0x1e3/0x430 [ocfs2]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x155/0x510
SyS_ioctl+0x81/0xa0
system_call_fastpath+0x18/0xd8
Code: 18 48 c7 c6 60 7f 65 a0 31 c0 bb e2 ff ff ff 48 8b 4a 40 48 8b 7a 28 48 c7 c2 78 2d 66 a0 e8 38 4f 05 00 e9 28 fe ff ff 0f 1f 00 <0f> 0b 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 bb 86 ff ff ff e9 13 fe ff ff 66 0f 1f
RIP ocfs2_get_clusters_nocache.isra.11+0x390/0x550 [ocfs2]
---[ end trace c8aa0c8180e869dc ]---
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Kernel Offset: disabled
This issue can be reproduced every week in a production environment.
This issue is related to the usage mode. If others use ocfs2 in this
mode, the kernel will panic frequently.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding style fixes]
[Fix new warning due to unused function by removing said function - Linus ]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1568772175-2906-2-git-send-email-sunny.s.zhang@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Shuning Zhang <sunny.s.zhang@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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copy_file_range tries to use the OSD 'copy-from' operation, which simply
performs a full object copy. Unfortunately, the implementation of this
system call assumes that stripe_count is always set to 1 and doesn't take
into account that the data may be striped across an object set. If the
file layout has stripe_count different from 1, then the destination file
data will be corrupted.
For example:
Consider a 8 MiB file with 4 MiB object size, stripe_count of 2 and
stripe_size of 2 MiB; the first half of the file will be filled with 'A's
and the second half will be filled with 'B's:
0 4M 8M Obj1 Obj2
+------+------+ +----+ +----+
file: | AAAA | BBBB | | AA | | AA |
+------+------+ |----| |----|
| BB | | BB |
+----+ +----+
If we copy_file_range this file into a new file (which needs to have the
same file layout!), then it will start by copying the object starting at
file offset 0 (Obj1). And then it will copy the object starting at file
offset 4M -- which is Obj1 again.
Unfortunately, the solution for this is to not allow remote object copies
to be performed when the file layout stripe_count is not 1 and simply
fallback to the default (VFS) copy_file_range implementation.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <lhenriques@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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If ceph_atomic_open is handed a !d_in_lookup dentry, then that means
that it already passed d_revalidate so we *know* that it's negative (or
at least was very recently). Just return -ENOENT in that case.
This also addresses a subtle bug in dentry handling. Non-O_CREAT opens
call atomic_open with the parent's i_rwsem shared, but calling
d_splice_alias on a hashed dentry requires the exclusive lock.
If ceph_atomic_open receives a hashed, negative dentry on a non-O_CREAT
open, and another client were to race in and create the file before we
issue our OPEN, ceph_fill_trace could end up calling d_splice_alias on
the dentry with the new inode with insufficient locks.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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