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The new io_uring_register(2) IOURING_REGISTER_RESTRICTIONS opcode
permanently installs a feature allowlist on an io_ring_ctx.
The io_ring_ctx can then be passed to untrusted code with the
knowledge that only operations present in the allowlist can be
executed.
The allowlist approach ensures that new features added to io_uring
do not accidentally become available when an existing application
is launched on a newer kernel version.
Currently is it possible to restrict sqe opcodes, sqe flags, and
register opcodes.
IOURING_REGISTER_RESTRICTIONS can only be made once. Afterwards
it is not possible to change restrictions anymore.
This prevents untrusted code from removing restrictions.
Suggested-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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If we don't get and assign the namespace for the async work, then certain
paths just don't work properly (like /dev/stdin, /proc/mounts, etc).
Anything that references the current namespace of the given task should
be assigned for async work on behalf of that task.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.5+
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Grab actual references to the files_struct. To avoid circular references
issues due to this, we add a per-task note that keeps track of what
io_uring contexts a task has used. When the tasks execs or exits its
assigned files, we cancel requests based on this tracking.
With that, we can grab proper references to the files table, and no
longer need to rely on stashing away ring_fd and ring_file to check
if the ring_fd may have been closed.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.5+
Reviewed-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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This allows us to selectively flush out pending overflows, depending on
the task and/or files_struct being passed in.
No intended functional changes in this patch.
Reviewed-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Return whether we found and canceled requests or not. This is in
preparation for using this information, no functional changes in this
patch.
Reviewed-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Sometimes we assign a weak reference to it, sometimes we grab a
reference to it. Clean this up and make it unconditional, and drop the
flag related to tracking this state.
Reviewed-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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We can grab a reference to the task instead of stashing away the task
files_struct. This is doable without creating a circular reference
between the ring fd and the task itself.
Reviewed-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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No functional changes in this patch, prep patch for grabbing references
to the files_struct.
Reviewed-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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We currently cancel these when the ring exits, and we cancel all of
them. This is in preparation for killing only the ones associated
with a given task.
Reviewed-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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* io_uring-5.9:
io_uring: fix async buffered reads when readahead is disabled
io_uring: fix potential ABBA deadlock in ->show_fdinfo()
io_uring: always delete double poll wait entry on match
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We use a device's allocation state tree to track ranges in a device used
for allocated chunks, and we set ranges in this tree when allocating a new
chunk. However after a device replace operation, we were not setting the
allocated ranges in the new device's allocation state tree, so that tree
is empty after a device replace.
This means that a fitrim operation after a device replace will trim the
device ranges that have allocated chunks and extents, as we trim every
range for which there is not a range marked in the device's allocation
state tree. It is also important during chunk allocation, since the
device's allocation state is used to determine if a range is already
allocated when allocating a new chunk.
This is trivial to reproduce and the following script triggers the bug:
$ cat reproducer.sh
#!/bin/bash
DEV1="/dev/sdg"
DEV2="/dev/sdh"
DEV3="/dev/sdi"
wipefs -a $DEV1 $DEV2 $DEV3 &> /dev/null
# Create a raid1 test fs on 2 devices.
mkfs.btrfs -f -m raid1 -d raid1 $DEV1 $DEV2 > /dev/null
mount $DEV1 /mnt/btrfs
xfs_io -f -c "pwrite -S 0xab 0 10M" /mnt/btrfs/foo
echo "Starting to replace $DEV1 with $DEV3"
btrfs replace start -B $DEV1 $DEV3 /mnt/btrfs
echo
echo "Running fstrim"
fstrim /mnt/btrfs
echo
echo "Unmounting filesystem"
umount /mnt/btrfs
echo "Mounting filesystem in degraded mode using $DEV3 only"
wipefs -a $DEV1 $DEV2 &> /dev/null
mount -o degraded $DEV3 /mnt/btrfs
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
dmesg | tail
echo
echo "Failed to mount in degraded mode"
exit 1
fi
echo
echo "File foo data (expected all bytes = 0xab):"
od -A d -t x1 /mnt/btrfs/foo
umount /mnt/btrfs
When running the reproducer:
$ ./replace-test.sh
wrote 10485760/10485760 bytes at offset 0
10 MiB, 2560 ops; 0.0901 sec (110.877 MiB/sec and 28384.5216 ops/sec)
Starting to replace /dev/sdg with /dev/sdi
Running fstrim
Unmounting filesystem
Mounting filesystem in degraded mode using /dev/sdi only
mount: /mnt/btrfs: wrong fs type, bad option, bad superblock on /dev/sdi, missing codepage or helper program, or other error.
[19581.748641] BTRFS info (device sdg): dev_replace from /dev/sdg (devid 1) to /dev/sdi started
[19581.803842] BTRFS info (device sdg): dev_replace from /dev/sdg (devid 1) to /dev/sdi finished
[19582.208293] BTRFS info (device sdi): allowing degraded mounts
[19582.208298] BTRFS info (device sdi): disk space caching is enabled
[19582.208301] BTRFS info (device sdi): has skinny extents
[19582.212853] BTRFS warning (device sdi): devid 2 uuid 1f731f47-e1bb-4f00-bfbb-9e5a0cb4ba9f is missing
[19582.213904] btree_readpage_end_io_hook: 25839 callbacks suppressed
[19582.213907] BTRFS error (device sdi): bad tree block start, want 30490624 have 0
[19582.214780] BTRFS warning (device sdi): failed to read root (objectid=7): -5
[19582.231576] BTRFS error (device sdi): open_ctree failed
Failed to mount in degraded mode
So fix by setting all allocated ranges in the replace target device when
the replace operation is finishing, when we are holding the chunk mutex
and we can not race with new chunk allocations.
A test case for fstests follows soon.
Fixes: 1c11b63eff2a67 ("btrfs: replace pending/pinned chunks lists with io tree")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.2+
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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When closing and freeing the source device we could end up doing our
final blkdev_put() on the bdev, which will grab the bd_mutex. As such
we want to be holding as few locks as possible, so move this call
outside of the dev_replace->lock_finishing_cancel_unmount lock. Since
we're modifying the fs_devices we need to make sure we're holding the
uuid_mutex here, so take that as well.
There's a report from syzbot probably hitting one of the cases where
the bd_mutex and device_list_mutex are taken in the wrong order, however
it's not with device replace, like this patch fixes. As there's no
reproducer available so far, we can't verify the fix.
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/000000000000fc04d105afcf86d7@google.com/
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=84a0634dc5d21d488419
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
5.9.0-rc5-syzkaller #0 Not tainted
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syz-executor.0/6878 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff88804c17d780 (&bdev->bd_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: blkdev_put+0x30/0x520 fs/block_dev.c:1804
but task is already holding lock:
ffff8880908cfce0 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: close_fs_devices.part.0+0x2e/0x800 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1159
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #4 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:956 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x134/0x10e0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1103
btrfs_finish_chunk_alloc+0x281/0xf90 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:5255
btrfs_create_pending_block_groups+0x2f3/0x700 fs/btrfs/block-group.c:2109
__btrfs_end_transaction+0xf5/0x690 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:916
find_free_extent_update_loop fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:3807 [inline]
find_free_extent+0x23b7/0x2e60 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:4127
btrfs_reserve_extent+0x166/0x460 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:4206
cow_file_range+0x3de/0x9b0 fs/btrfs/inode.c:1063
btrfs_run_delalloc_range+0x2cf/0x1410 fs/btrfs/inode.c:1838
writepage_delalloc+0x150/0x460 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:3439
__extent_writepage+0x441/0xd00 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:3653
extent_write_cache_pages.constprop.0+0x69d/0x1040 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:4249
extent_writepages+0xcd/0x2b0 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:4370
do_writepages+0xec/0x290 mm/page-writeback.c:2352
__writeback_single_inode+0x125/0x1400 fs/fs-writeback.c:1461
writeback_sb_inodes+0x53d/0xf40 fs/fs-writeback.c:1721
wb_writeback+0x2ad/0xd40 fs/fs-writeback.c:1894
wb_do_writeback fs/fs-writeback.c:2039 [inline]
wb_workfn+0x2dc/0x13e0 fs/fs-writeback.c:2080
process_one_work+0x94c/0x1670 kernel/workqueue.c:2269
worker_thread+0x64c/0x1120 kernel/workqueue.c:2415
kthread+0x3b5/0x4a0 kernel/kthread.c:292
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:294
-> #3 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}:
percpu_down_read include/linux/percpu-rwsem.h:51 [inline]
__sb_start_write+0x234/0x470 fs/super.c:1672
sb_start_intwrite include/linux/fs.h:1690 [inline]
start_transaction+0xbe7/0x1170 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:624
find_free_extent_update_loop fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:3789 [inline]
find_free_extent+0x25e1/0x2e60 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:4127
btrfs_reserve_extent+0x166/0x460 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:4206
cow_file_range+0x3de/0x9b0 fs/btrfs/inode.c:1063
btrfs_run_delalloc_range+0x2cf/0x1410 fs/btrfs/inode.c:1838
writepage_delalloc+0x150/0x460 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:3439
__extent_writepage+0x441/0xd00 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:3653
extent_write_cache_pages.constprop.0+0x69d/0x1040 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:4249
extent_writepages+0xcd/0x2b0 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:4370
do_writepages+0xec/0x290 mm/page-writeback.c:2352
__writeback_single_inode+0x125/0x1400 fs/fs-writeback.c:1461
writeback_sb_inodes+0x53d/0xf40 fs/fs-writeback.c:1721
wb_writeback+0x2ad/0xd40 fs/fs-writeback.c:1894
wb_do_writeback fs/fs-writeback.c:2039 [inline]
wb_workfn+0x2dc/0x13e0 fs/fs-writeback.c:2080
process_one_work+0x94c/0x1670 kernel/workqueue.c:2269
worker_thread+0x64c/0x1120 kernel/workqueue.c:2415
kthread+0x3b5/0x4a0 kernel/kthread.c:292
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:294
-> #2 ((work_completion)(&(&wb->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
__flush_work+0x60e/0xac0 kernel/workqueue.c:3041
wb_shutdown+0x180/0x220 mm/backing-dev.c:355
bdi_unregister+0x174/0x590 mm/backing-dev.c:872
del_gendisk+0x820/0xa10 block/genhd.c:933
loop_remove drivers/block/loop.c:2192 [inline]
loop_control_ioctl drivers/block/loop.c:2291 [inline]
loop_control_ioctl+0x3b1/0x480 drivers/block/loop.c:2257
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:48 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:753 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:739 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x193/0x200 fs/ioctl.c:739
do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
-> #1 (loop_ctl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:956 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x134/0x10e0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1103
lo_open+0x19/0xd0 drivers/block/loop.c:1893
__blkdev_get+0x759/0x1aa0 fs/block_dev.c:1507
blkdev_get fs/block_dev.c:1639 [inline]
blkdev_open+0x227/0x300 fs/block_dev.c:1753
do_dentry_open+0x4b9/0x11b0 fs/open.c:817
do_open fs/namei.c:3251 [inline]
path_openat+0x1b9a/0x2730 fs/namei.c:3368
do_filp_open+0x17e/0x3c0 fs/namei.c:3395
do_sys_openat2+0x16d/0x420 fs/open.c:1168
do_sys_open fs/open.c:1184 [inline]
__do_sys_open fs/open.c:1192 [inline]
__se_sys_open fs/open.c:1188 [inline]
__x64_sys_open+0x119/0x1c0 fs/open.c:1188
do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
-> #0 (&bdev->bd_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2496 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2601 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3218 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x2a96/0x5780 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4426
lock_acquire+0x1f3/0xae0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5006
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:956 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x134/0x10e0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1103
blkdev_put+0x30/0x520 fs/block_dev.c:1804
btrfs_close_bdev fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1117 [inline]
btrfs_close_bdev fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1107 [inline]
btrfs_close_one_device fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1133 [inline]
close_fs_devices.part.0+0x1a4/0x800 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1161
close_fs_devices fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1193 [inline]
btrfs_close_devices+0x95/0x1f0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1179
close_ctree+0x688/0x6cb fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:4149
generic_shutdown_super+0x144/0x370 fs/super.c:464
kill_anon_super+0x36/0x60 fs/super.c:1108
btrfs_kill_super+0x38/0x50 fs/btrfs/super.c:2265
deactivate_locked_super+0x94/0x160 fs/super.c:335
deactivate_super+0xad/0xd0 fs/super.c:366
cleanup_mnt+0x3a3/0x530 fs/namespace.c:1118
task_work_run+0xdd/0x190 kernel/task_work.c:141
tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:188 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:163 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1e1/0x200 kernel/entry/common.c:190
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x7e/0x2e0 kernel/entry/common.c:265
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of:
&bdev->bd_mutex --> sb_internal#2 --> &fs_devs->device_list_mutex
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&fs_devs->device_list_mutex);
lock(sb_internal#2);
lock(&fs_devs->device_list_mutex);
lock(&bdev->bd_mutex);
*** DEADLOCK ***
3 locks held by syz-executor.0/6878:
#0: ffff88809070c0e0 (&type->s_umount_key#70){++++}-{3:3}, at: deactivate_super+0xa5/0xd0 fs/super.c:365
#1: ffffffff8a5b37a8 (uuid_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_close_devices+0x23/0x1f0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1178
#2: ffff8880908cfce0 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: close_fs_devices.part.0+0x2e/0x800 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1159
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 6878 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.9.0-rc5-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x198/0x1fd lib/dump_stack.c:118
check_noncircular+0x324/0x3e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1827
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2496 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2601 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3218 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x2a96/0x5780 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4426
lock_acquire+0x1f3/0xae0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5006
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:956 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x134/0x10e0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1103
blkdev_put+0x30/0x520 fs/block_dev.c:1804
btrfs_close_bdev fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1117 [inline]
btrfs_close_bdev fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1107 [inline]
btrfs_close_one_device fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1133 [inline]
close_fs_devices.part.0+0x1a4/0x800 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1161
close_fs_devices fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1193 [inline]
btrfs_close_devices+0x95/0x1f0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1179
close_ctree+0x688/0x6cb fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:4149
generic_shutdown_super+0x144/0x370 fs/super.c:464
kill_anon_super+0x36/0x60 fs/super.c:1108
btrfs_kill_super+0x38/0x50 fs/btrfs/super.c:2265
deactivate_locked_super+0x94/0x160 fs/super.c:335
deactivate_super+0xad/0xd0 fs/super.c:366
cleanup_mnt+0x3a3/0x530 fs/namespace.c:1118
task_work_run+0xdd/0x190 kernel/task_work.c:141
tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:188 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:163 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1e1/0x200 kernel/entry/common.c:190
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x7e/0x2e0 kernel/entry/common.c:265
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x460027
RSP: 002b:00007fff59216328 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a6
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000076035 RCX: 0000000000460027
RDX: 0000000000403188 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: 00007fff592163d0
RBP: 0000000000000333 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000000000000000b
R10: 0000000000000005 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fff59217460
R13: 0000000002df2a60 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007fff59217460
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
[ add syzbot reference ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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autofs got broken in some configurations by commit 13c164b1a186
("autofs: switch to kernel_write") because there is now an extra LSM
permission check done by security_file_permission() in rw_verify_area().
autofs is one if the few places that really does want the much more
limited __kernel_write(), because the write is an internal kernel one
that shouldn't do any user permission checks (it also doesn't need the
file_start_write/file_end_write logic, since it's just a pipe).
There are a couple of other cases like that - accounting, core dumping,
and splice - but autofs stands out because it can be built as a module.
As a result, we need to export this internal __kernel_write() function
again.
We really don't want any other module to use this, but we don't have a
"EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_AUTOFS_ONLY()". But we can mark it GPL-only to at
least approximate that "internal use only" for licensing.
While in this area, make autofs pass in NULL for the file position
pointer, since it's always a pipe, and we now use a NULL file pointer
for streaming file descriptors (see file_ppos() and commit 438ab720c675:
"vfs: pass ppos=NULL to .read()/.write() of FMODE_STREAM files")
This effectively reverts commits 9db977522449 ("fs: unexport
__kernel_write") and 13c164b1a186 ("autofs: switch to kernel_write").
Fixes: 13c164b1a186 ("autofs: switch to kernel_write")
Reported-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Acked-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This patch reworks the current receive handling of dlm. As I tried to
change the send handling to fix reorder issues I took a look into the
receive handling and simplified it, it works as the following:
Each connection has a preallocated receive buffer with a minimum length of
4096. On receive, the upper layer protocol will process all dlm message
until there is not enough data anymore. If there exists "leftover" data at
the end of the receive buffer because the dlm message wasn't fully received
it will be copied to the begin of the preallocated receive buffer. Next
receive more data will be appended to the previous "leftover" data and
processing will begin again.
This will remove a lot of code of the current mechanism. Inside the
processing functionality we will ensure with a memmove() that the dlm
message should be memory aligned. To have a dlm message always started
at the beginning of the buffer will reduce some amount of memmove()
calls because src and dest pointers are the same.
The cluster attribute "buffer_size" becomes a new meaning, it's now the
size of application layer receive buffer size. If this is changed during
runtime the receive buffer will be reallocated. It's important that the
receive buffer size has at minimum the size of the maximum possible dlm
message size otherwise the received message cannot be placed inside
the receive buffer size.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Aring <aahringo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Teigland <teigland@redhat.com>
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I observed that the upper layer will not send messages above this value.
As conclusion the application receive buffer should not below that
value, otherwise we are not capable to deliver the dlm message to the
upper layer. This patch forbids to set the receive buffer below the
maximum possible dlm message size.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Aring <aahringo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Teigland <teigland@redhat.com>
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This patch adds a callback to CLUSTER_ATTR macro to allow individual
callbacks for attributes which might have a more complex attribute range
checking just than non zero.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Aring <aahringo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Teigland <teigland@redhat.com>
|
|
This patch fixes to set per nodeid mark configuration for accepted
sockets as well. Before this patch only the listen socket mark value was
used for all accepted connections. This patch will ensure that the
cluster mark attribute value will be always used for all sockets, if a
per nodeid mark value is specified dlm will use this value for the
specific node.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Aring <aahringo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Teigland <teigland@redhat.com>
|
|
During my experiments to make dlm robust against tcpkill application I
was able to run sometimes in a circular lock dependency warning between
clusters_root.subsys.su_mutex and con->sock_mutex. We don't need to
held the sock_mutex when getting the mark value which held the
clusters_root.subsys.su_mutex. This patch moves the specific handling
just before the sock_mutex will be held.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Aring <aahringo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Teigland <teigland@redhat.com>
|
|
The async buffered reads feature is not working when readahead is
turned off. There are two things to concern:
- when doing retry in io_read, not only the IOCB_WAITQ flag but also
the IOCB_NOWAIT flag is still set, which makes it goes to would_block
phase in generic_file_buffered_read() and then return -EAGAIN. After
that, the io-wq thread work is queued, and later doing the async
reads in the old way.
- even if we remove IOCB_NOWAIT when doing retry, the feature is still
not running properly, since in generic_file_buffered_read() it goes to
lock_page_killable() after calling mapping->a_ops->readpage() to do
IO, and thus causing process to sleep.
Fixes: 1a0a7853b901 ("mm: support async buffered reads in generic_file_buffered_read()")
Fixes: 3b2a4439e0ae ("io_uring: get rid of kiocb_wait_page_queue_init()")
Signed-off-by: Hao Xu <haoxu@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
Dentries that represent no-key names must have a dentry_operations that
includes fscrypt_d_revalidate(). Currently, this is handled by
fscrypt_prepare_lookup() installing fscrypt_d_ops.
However, ceph support for encryption
(https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200914191707.380444-1-jlayton@kernel.org)
can't use fscrypt_d_ops, since ceph already has its own
dentry_operations.
Similarly, ext4 and f2fs support for directories that are both encrypted
and casefolded
(https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200923010151.69506-1-drosen@google.com)
can't use fscrypt_d_ops either, since casefolding requires some dentry
operations too.
To satisfy both users, we need to move the responsibility of installing
the dentry_operations to filesystems.
In preparation for this, export fscrypt_d_revalidate() and give it a
!CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION stub.
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200924054721.187797-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
|
|
Pull NFS client bugfixes from Trond Myklebust:
"Highlights include:
- NFSv4.2: copy_file_range needs to invalidate caches on success
- NFSv4.2: Fix security label length not being reset
- pNFS/flexfiles: Ensure we initialise the mirror bsizes correctly
on read
- pNFS/flexfiles: Fix signed/unsigned type issues with mirror
indices"
* tag 'nfs-for-5.9-3' of git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/trondmy/linux-nfs:
pNFS/flexfiles: Be consistent about mirror index types
pNFS/flexfiles: Ensure we initialise the mirror bsizes correctly on read
NFSv4.2: fix client's attribute cache management for copy_file_range
nfs: Fix security label length not being reset
|
|
syzbot reports a potential lock deadlock between the normal IO path and
->show_fdinfo():
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
5.9.0-rc6-syzkaller #0 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syz-executor.2/19710 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff888098ddc450 (sb_writers#4){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: io_write+0x6b5/0xb30 fs/io_uring.c:3296
but task is already holding lock:
ffff8880a11b8428 (&ctx->uring_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __do_sys_io_uring_enter+0xe9a/0x1bd0 fs/io_uring.c:8348
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #2 (&ctx->uring_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:956 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x134/0x10e0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1103
__io_uring_show_fdinfo fs/io_uring.c:8417 [inline]
io_uring_show_fdinfo+0x194/0xc70 fs/io_uring.c:8460
seq_show+0x4a8/0x700 fs/proc/fd.c:65
seq_read+0x432/0x1070 fs/seq_file.c:208
do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:734 [inline]
do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:721 [inline]
do_iter_read+0x48e/0x6e0 fs/read_write.c:955
vfs_readv+0xe5/0x150 fs/read_write.c:1073
kernel_readv fs/splice.c:355 [inline]
default_file_splice_read.constprop.0+0x4e6/0x9e0 fs/splice.c:412
do_splice_to+0x137/0x170 fs/splice.c:871
splice_direct_to_actor+0x307/0x980 fs/splice.c:950
do_splice_direct+0x1b3/0x280 fs/splice.c:1059
do_sendfile+0x55f/0xd40 fs/read_write.c:1540
__do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1601 [inline]
__se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1587 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendfile64+0x1cc/0x210 fs/read_write.c:1587
do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
-> #1 (&p->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:956 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x134/0x10e0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1103
seq_read+0x61/0x1070 fs/seq_file.c:155
pde_read fs/proc/inode.c:306 [inline]
proc_reg_read+0x221/0x300 fs/proc/inode.c:318
do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:734 [inline]
do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:721 [inline]
do_iter_read+0x48e/0x6e0 fs/read_write.c:955
vfs_readv+0xe5/0x150 fs/read_write.c:1073
kernel_readv fs/splice.c:355 [inline]
default_file_splice_read.constprop.0+0x4e6/0x9e0 fs/splice.c:412
do_splice_to+0x137/0x170 fs/splice.c:871
splice_direct_to_actor+0x307/0x980 fs/splice.c:950
do_splice_direct+0x1b3/0x280 fs/splice.c:1059
do_sendfile+0x55f/0xd40 fs/read_write.c:1540
__do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1601 [inline]
__se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1587 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendfile64+0x1cc/0x210 fs/read_write.c:1587
do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
-> #0 (sb_writers#4){.+.+}-{0:0}:
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2496 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2601 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3218 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x2a96/0x5780 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4441
lock_acquire+0x1f3/0xaf0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5029
percpu_down_read include/linux/percpu-rwsem.h:51 [inline]
__sb_start_write+0x228/0x450 fs/super.c:1672
io_write+0x6b5/0xb30 fs/io_uring.c:3296
io_issue_sqe+0x18f/0x5c50 fs/io_uring.c:5719
__io_queue_sqe+0x280/0x1160 fs/io_uring.c:6175
io_queue_sqe+0x692/0xfa0 fs/io_uring.c:6254
io_submit_sqe fs/io_uring.c:6324 [inline]
io_submit_sqes+0x1761/0x2400 fs/io_uring.c:6521
__do_sys_io_uring_enter+0xeac/0x1bd0 fs/io_uring.c:8349
do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of:
sb_writers#4 --> &p->lock --> &ctx->uring_lock
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&ctx->uring_lock);
lock(&p->lock);
lock(&ctx->uring_lock);
lock(sb_writers#4);
*** DEADLOCK ***
1 lock held by syz-executor.2/19710:
#0: ffff8880a11b8428 (&ctx->uring_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __do_sys_io_uring_enter+0xe9a/0x1bd0 fs/io_uring.c:8348
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 19710 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 5.9.0-rc6-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x198/0x1fd lib/dump_stack.c:118
check_noncircular+0x324/0x3e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1827
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2496 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2601 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3218 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x2a96/0x5780 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4441
lock_acquire+0x1f3/0xaf0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5029
percpu_down_read include/linux/percpu-rwsem.h:51 [inline]
__sb_start_write+0x228/0x450 fs/super.c:1672
io_write+0x6b5/0xb30 fs/io_uring.c:3296
io_issue_sqe+0x18f/0x5c50 fs/io_uring.c:5719
__io_queue_sqe+0x280/0x1160 fs/io_uring.c:6175
io_queue_sqe+0x692/0xfa0 fs/io_uring.c:6254
io_submit_sqe fs/io_uring.c:6324 [inline]
io_submit_sqes+0x1761/0x2400 fs/io_uring.c:6521
__do_sys_io_uring_enter+0xeac/0x1bd0 fs/io_uring.c:8349
do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x45e179
Code: 3d b2 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 0b b2 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007f1194e74c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000001aa
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000000082c0 RCX: 000000000045e179
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 000000000118cf98 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000118cf4c
R13: 00007ffd1aa5756f R14: 00007f1194e759c0 R15: 000000000118cf4c
Fix this by just not diving into details if we fail to trylock the
io_uring mutex. We know the ctx isn't going away during this operation,
but we cannot safely iterate buffers/files/personalities if we don't
hold the io_uring mutex.
Reported-by: syzbot+2f8fa4e860edc3066aba@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
syzbot reports a crash with tty polling, which is using the double poll
handling:
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000009: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000048-0x000000000000004f]
CPU: 0 PID: 6874 Comm: syz-executor749 Not tainted 5.9.0-rc6-next-20200924-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:io_poll_get_single fs/io_uring.c:4778 [inline]
RIP: 0010:io_poll_double_wake+0x51/0x510 fs/io_uring.c:4845
Code: fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 9e 03 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 49 8b 5d 08 48 8d 7b 48 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 06 0f 8e 63 03 00 00 0f b6 6b 48 bf 06 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc90001c1fb70 EFLAGS: 00010006
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000004
RDX: 0000000000000009 RSI: ffffffff81d9b3ad RDI: 0000000000000048
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffff8880a3cac798 R09: ffffc90001c1fc60
R10: fffff52000383f73 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000004
R13: ffff8880a3cac798 R14: ffff8880a3cac7a0 R15: 0000000000000004
FS: 0000000001f98880(0000) GS:ffff8880ae400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f18886916c0 CR3: 0000000094c5a000 CR4: 00000000001506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
__wake_up_common+0x147/0x650 kernel/sched/wait.c:93
__wake_up_common_lock+0xd0/0x130 kernel/sched/wait.c:123
tty_ldisc_hangup+0x1cf/0x680 drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:735
__tty_hangup.part.0+0x403/0x870 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:625
__tty_hangup drivers/tty/tty_io.c:575 [inline]
tty_vhangup+0x1d/0x30 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:698
pty_close+0x3f5/0x550 drivers/tty/pty.c:79
tty_release+0x455/0xf60 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1679
__fput+0x285/0x920 fs/file_table.c:281
task_work_run+0xdd/0x190 kernel/task_work.c:141
tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:188 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:165 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1e2/0x1f0 kernel/entry/common.c:192
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x7a/0x2c0 kernel/entry/common.c:267
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x401210
which is due to a failure in removing the double poll wait entry if we
hit a wakeup match. This can cause multiple invocations of the wakeup,
which isn't safe.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.8
Reported-by: syzbot+81b3883093f772addf6d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
Pull io_uring fixes from Jens Axboe:
"Two fixes for regressions in this cycle, and one that goes to 5.8
stable:
- fix leak of getname() retrieved filename
- remove plug->nowait assignment, fixing a regression with btrfs
- fix for async buffered retry"
* tag 'io_uring-5.9-2020-09-25' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block:
io_uring: ensure async buffered read-retry is setup properly
io_uring: don't unconditionally set plug->nowait = true
io_uring: ensure open/openat2 name is cleaned on cancelation
|
|
A previous commit for fixing up short reads botched the async retry
path, so we ended up going to worker threads more often than we should.
Fix this up, so retries work the way they originally were intended to.
Fixes: 227c0c9673d8 ("io_uring: internally retry short reads")
Reported-by: Hao_Xu <haoxu@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
Without this patch efivarfs_alloc_dentry creates dentries with slashes in
their name if the respective EFI variable has slashes in its name. This in
turn causes EIO on getdents64, which prevents a complete directory listing
of /sys/firmware/efi/efivars/.
This patch replaces the invalid shlashes with exclamation marks like
kobject_set_name_vargs does for /sys/firmware/efi/vars/ to have consistently
named dentries under /sys/firmware/efi/vars/ and /sys/firmware/efi/efivars/.
Signed-off-by: Michael Schaller <misch@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200925074502.150448-1-misch@google.com
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
|
|
This lets the compiler inline it into import_iovec() generating
much better code.
Signed-off-by: David Laight <david.laight@aculab.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
This causes all the bios to be submitted with REQ_NOWAIT, which can be
problematic on either btrfs or on file systems that otherwise use a mix
of block devices where only some of them support it.
For now, just remove the setting of plug->nowait = true.
Reported-by: Dan Melnic <dmm@fb.com>
Reported-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Fixes: b63534c41e20 ("io_uring: re-issue block requests that failed because of resources")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
We need to move the closing of the src_device out of all the device
replace locking, but we definitely want to zero out the superblock
before we commit the last time to make sure the device is properly
removed. Handle this by pushing btrfs_scratch_superblocks into
btrfs_dev_replace_finishing, and then later on we'll move the src_device
closing and freeing stuff where we need it to be.
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
|
|
Add a littler helper to make the somewhat arcane bd_contains checks a
little more obvious.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
If we cancel these requests, we'll leak the memory associated with the
filename. Add them to the table of ops that need cleaning, if
REQ_F_NEED_CLEANUP is set.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e62753e4e292 ("io_uring: call statx directly")
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
or get freed, for that matter, if it's a long (separately stored)
name.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
Replace the two negative flags that are always used together with a
single positive flag that indicates the writeback capability instead
of two related non-capabilities. Also remove the pointless wrappers
to just check the flag.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
Replace BDI_CAP_NO_ACCT_WB with a positive BDI_CAP_WRITEBACK_ACCT to
make the checks more obvious. Also remove the pointless
bdi_cap_account_writeback wrapper that just obsfucates the check.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
The BDI_CAP_STABLE_WRITES is one of the few bits of information in the
backing_dev_info shared between the block drivers and the writeback code.
To help untangling the dependency replace it with a queue flag and a
superblock flag derived from it. This also helps with the case of e.g.
a file system requiring stable writes due to its own checksumming, but
not forcing it on other users of the block device like the swap code.
One downside is that we an't support the stable_pages_required bdi
attribute in sysfs anymore. It is replaced with a queue attribute which
also is writable for easier testing.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
Just checking SB_I_CGROUPWB for cgroup writeback support is enough.
Either the file system allocates its own bdi (e.g. btrfs), in which case
it is known to support cgroup writeback, or the bdi comes from the block
layer, which always supports cgroup writeback.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
Set up a readahead size by default, as very few users have a good
reason to change it. This means code, ecryptfs, and orangefs now
set up the values while they were previously missing it, while ubifs,
mtd and vboxsf manually set it to 0 to avoid readahead.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Acked-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> [btrfs]
Acked-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> [ubifs, mtd]
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
The last user of SB_I_MULTIROOT is disappeared with commit f2aedb713c28
("NFS: Add fs_context support.")
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
Originally we used the term "encrypted name" or "ciphertext name" to
mean the encoded filename that is shown when an encrypted directory is
listed without its key. But these terms are ambiguous since they also
mean the filename stored on-disk. "Encrypted name" is especially
ambiguous since it could also be understood to mean "this filename is
encrypted on-disk", similar to "encrypted file".
So we've started calling these encoded names "no-key names" instead.
Therefore, rename DCACHE_ENCRYPTED_NAME to DCACHE_NOKEY_NAME to avoid
confusion about what this flag means.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200924042624.98439-3-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
|
|
Currently we're using the term "ciphertext name" ambiguously because it
can mean either the actual ciphertext filename, or the encoded filename
that is shown when an encrypted directory is listed without its key.
The latter we're now usually calling the "no-key name"; and while it's
derived from the ciphertext name, it's not the same thing.
To avoid this ambiguity, rename fscrypt_name::is_ciphertext_name to
fscrypt_name::is_nokey_name, and update comments that say "ciphertext
name" (or "encrypted name") to say "no-key name" instead when warranted.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200924042624.98439-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux
Pull btrfs fixes from David Sterba:
"syzkaller started to hit us with reports, here's a fix for one type
(stack overflow when printing checksums on read error).
The other patch is a fix for sysfs object, we have a test for that and
it leads to a crash."
* tag 'for-5.9-rc6-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux:
btrfs: fix put of uninitialized kobject after seed device delete
btrfs: fix overflow when copying corrupt csums for a message
|
|
There are no users outside the core block code left now.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
Just check the dev_t to help simplifying the code.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Use blkdev_get_by_dev instead of igrab (aka open coded bdgrab) +
blkdev_get.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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We can only scan for partitions on the whole disk, so move the flag
from struct block_device to struct gendisk.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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compat_sys_mount is identical to the regular sys_mount now, so remove it
and use the native version everywhere.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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There is no reason the generic fs code should bother with NFS specific
binary mount data - lift the conversion into nfs4_parse_monolithic
instead.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Remove a level of indentation for the version 1 mount data parsing, and
simplify the NULL data case a little bit as well.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Pull vfs fixes from Al Viro:
"No common topic, just assorted fixes"
* 'fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
fuse: fix the ->direct_IO() treatment of iov_iter
fs: fix cast in fsparam_u32hex() macro
vboxsf: Fix the check for the old binary mount-arguments struct
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Pull io_uring fixes from Jens Axboe:
"A few fixes - most of them regression fixes from this cycle, but also
a few stable heading fixes, and a build fix for the included demo tool
since some systems now actually have gettid() available"
* tag 'io_uring-5.9-2020-09-22' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block:
io_uring: fix openat/openat2 unified prep handling
io_uring: mark statx/files_update/epoll_ctl as non-SQPOLL
tools/io_uring: fix compile breakage
io_uring: don't use retry based buffered reads for non-async bdev
io_uring: don't re-setup vecs/iter in io_resumit_prep() is already there
io_uring: don't run task work on an exiting task
io_uring: drop 'ctx' ref on task work cancelation
io_uring: grab any needed state during defer prep
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