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Adding the NAPI pointer to struct netdev_queue made it grow into another
cacheline, even though there was 44 bytes of padding available.
The struct was historically grouped as follows:
/* read-mostly stuff (align) */
/* ... random control path fields ... */
/* write-mostly stuff (align) */
/* ... 40 byte hole ... */
/* struct dql (align) */
It seems that people want to add control path fields after
the read only fields. struct dql looks pretty innocent
but it forces its own alignment and nothing indicates that
there is a lot of empty space above it.
Move dql above the xmit_lock. This shifts the empty space
to the end of the struct rather than in the middle of it.
Move two example fields there to set an example.
Hopefully people will now add new fields at the end of
the struct. A lot of the read-only stuff is also control
path-only, but if we move it all we'll have another hole
in the middle.
Before:
/* size: 384, cachelines: 6, members: 16 */
/* sum members: 284, holes: 3, sum holes: 100 */
After:
/* size: 320, cachelines: 5, members: 16 */
/* sum members: 284, holes: 1, sum holes: 8 */
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240820205119.1321322-1-kuba@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Verifier enforces that all iterator structs are named `bpf_iter_<name>`
and that whenever iterator is passed to a kfunc it's passed as a valid PTR ->
STRUCT chain (with potentially const modifiers in between).
We'll need this check for upcoming changes, so instead of duplicating
the logic, extract it into a helper function.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240808232230.2848712-2-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Fix htmldocs build warning introduced by 9b59a85a84dc ("workqueue: Don't
call va_start / va_end twice").
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
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As pointed out by Stephen Boyd it is possible that during initialization
of the pmic_glink child drivers, the protection-domain notifiers fires,
and the associated work is scheduled, before the client registration
returns and as a result the local "client" pointer has been initialized.
The outcome of this is a NULL pointer dereference as the "client"
pointer is blindly dereferenced.
Timeline provided by Stephen:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
ucsi->client = NULL;
devm_pmic_glink_register_client()
client->pdr_notify(client->priv, pg->client_state)
pmic_glink_ucsi_pdr_notify()
schedule_work(&ucsi->register_work)
<schedule away>
pmic_glink_ucsi_register()
ucsi_register()
pmic_glink_ucsi_read_version()
pmic_glink_ucsi_read()
pmic_glink_ucsi_read()
pmic_glink_send(ucsi->client)
<client is NULL BAD>
ucsi->client = client // Too late!
This code is identical across the altmode, battery manager and usci
child drivers.
Resolve this by splitting the allocation of the "client" object and the
registration thereof into two operations.
This only happens if the protection domain registry is populated at the
time of registration, which by the introduction of commit '1ebcde047c54
("soc: qcom: add pd-mapper implementation")' became much more likely.
Reported-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAMi1Hd2_a7TjA7J9ShrAbNOd_CoZ3D87twmO5t+nZxC9sX18tA@mail.gmail.com/
Reported-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZqiyLvP0gkBnuekL@hovoldconsulting.com/
Reported-by: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAE-0n52JgfCBWiFQyQWPji8cq_rCsviBpW-m72YitgNfdaEhQg@mail.gmail.com/
Fixes: 58ef4ece1e41 ("soc: qcom: pmic_glink: Introduce base PMIC GLINK driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Heikki Krogerus <heikki.krogerus@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Neil Armstrong <neil.armstrong@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Johan Hovold <johan+linaro@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Sebastian Reichel <sebastian.reichel@collabora.com>
Tested-by: Johan Hovold <johan+linaro@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <quic_bjorande@quicinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240820-pmic-glink-v6-11-races-v3-1-eec53c750a04@quicinc.com
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <andersson@kernel.org>
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In emergency situations (something has gone wrong but the
system continues to operate), usually important information
(such as a backtrace) is generated via printk(). This
information should be pushed out to the consoles ASAP.
Add per-CPU emergency nesting tracking because an emergency
can arise while in an emergency situation.
Add functions to mark the beginning and end of emergency
sections where the urgent messages are generated.
Perform direct console flushing at the emergency priority if
the current CPU is in an emergency state and it is safe to do
so.
Note that the emergency state is not system-wide. While one CPU
is in an emergency state, another CPU may attempt to print
console messages at normal priority.
Also note that printk() already attempts to flush consoles in
the caller context for normal priority. However, follow-up
changes will introduce printing kthreads, in which case the
normal priority printk() calls will offload to the kthreads.
Co-developed-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner (Intel) <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240820063001.36405-32-john.ogness@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
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If legacy and nbcon consoles are registered and the nbcon
consoles are allowed to flush (i.e. no boot consoles
registered), the legacy consoles will no longer perform
direct printing on the panic CPU until after the backtrace
has been stored. This will give the safe nbcon consoles a
chance to print the panic messages before allowing the
unsafe legacy consoles to print.
If no nbcon consoles are registered or they are not allowed
to flush because boot consoles are registered, there is no
change in behavior (i.e. legacy consoles will always attempt
to print from the printk() caller context).
Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240820063001.36405-30-john.ogness@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
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Add nbcon_atomic_flush_unsafe() to flush all nbcon consoles
using the write_atomic() callback and allowing unsafe hostile
takeovers. Call this at the end of panic() as a final attempt
to flush any pending messages.
Note that legacy consoles use unsafe methods for flushing
from the beginning of panic (see bust_spinlocks()). Therefore,
systems using both legacy and nbcon consoles may still fail to
see panic messages due to unsafe legacy console usage.
Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240820063001.36405-27-john.ogness@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
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Currently the port->lock wrappers uart_port_lock(),
uart_port_unlock() (and their variants) only lock/unlock
the spin_lock.
If the port is an nbcon console that has implemented the
write_atomic() callback, the wrappers must also acquire/release
the console context and mark the region as unsafe. This allows
general port->lock synchronization to be synchronized against
the nbcon write_atomic() callback.
Note that __uart_port_using_nbcon() relies on the port->lock
being held while a console is added and removed from the
console list (i.e. all uart nbcon drivers *must* take the
port->lock in their device_lock() callbacks).
Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240820063001.36405-15-john.ogness@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
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Provide functions nbcon_device_try_acquire() and
nbcon_device_release() which will try to acquire the nbcon
console ownership with NBCON_PRIO_NORMAL and mark it unsafe for
handover/takeover.
These functions are to be used together with the device-specific
locking when performing non-printing activities on the console
device. They will allow synchronization against the
atomic_write() callback which will be serialized, for higher
priority contexts, only by acquiring the console context
ownership.
Pitfalls:
The API requires to be called in a context with migration
disabled because it uses per-CPU variables internally.
The context is set unsafe for a takeover all the time. It
guarantees full serialization against any atomic_write() caller
except for the final flush in panic() which might try an unsafe
takeover.
Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240820063001.36405-14-john.ogness@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
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It was not clear when exactly console_srcu_read_flags() must be
used vs. directly reading @console->flags.
Refactor and clarify that console_srcu_read_flags() is only
needed if the console is registered or the caller is in a
context where the registration status of the console may change
(due to another context).
The function requires the caller holds @console_srcu, which will
ensure that the caller sees an appropriate @flags value for the
registered console and that exit/cleanup routines will not run
if the console is in the process of unregistration.
Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240820063001.36405-13-john.ogness@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
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Introduce uart_port_set_cons() as a wrapper to set @cons of a
uart_port. The wrapper sets @cons under the port lock in order
to prevent @cons from disappearing while another context is
holding the port lock. This is necessary for a follow-up
commit relating to the port lock wrappers, which rely on @cons
not changing between lock and unlock.
Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Théo Lebrun <theo.lebrun@bootlin.com> # EyeQ5, AMBA-PL011
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240820063001.36405-12-john.ogness@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
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It will be necessary at times for the uart nbcon console
drivers to acquire the port lock directly (without the
additional nbcon functionality of the port lock wrappers).
These are special cases such as the implementation of the
device_lock()/device_unlock() callbacks or for internal
port lock wrapper synchronization.
Provide low-level variants __uart_port_lock_irqsave() and
__uart_port_unlock_irqrestore() for this purpose.
Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240820063001.36405-11-john.ogness@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
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Console drivers typically must deal with access to the hardware
via user input/output (such as an interactive login shell) and
output of kernel messages via printk() calls. To provide the
necessary synchronization, usually some driver-specific locking
mechanism is used (for example, the port spinlock for uart
serial consoles).
Until now, usage of this driver-specific locking has been hidden
from the printk-subsystem and implemented within the various
console callbacks. However, nbcon consoles would need to use it
even in the generic code.
Add device_lock() and device_unlock() callback which will need
to get implemented by nbcon consoles.
The callbacks will use whatever synchronization mechanism the
driver is using for itself. The minimum requirement is to
prevent CPU migration. It would allow a context friendly
acquiring of nbcon console ownership in non-emergency and
non-panic context.
Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240820063001.36405-9-john.ogness@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
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The write_atomic() callback has special requirements and is
allowed to use special helper functions. Provide detailed
documentation of the callback so that a developer has a
chance of implementing it correctly.
Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240820063001.36405-8-john.ogness@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
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The return value of write_atomic() does not provide any useful
information. On the contrary, it makes things more complicated
for the caller to appropriately deal with the information.
Change write_atomic() to not have a return value. If the
message did not get printed due to loss of ownership, the
caller will notice this on its own. If ownership was not lost,
it will be assumed that the driver successfully printed the
message and the sequence number for that console will be
incremented.
Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240820063001.36405-7-john.ogness@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
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Add validation that printk_deferred_enter()/_exit() are called in
non-migration contexts.
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240820063001.36405-5-john.ogness@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
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Commit ae6ad75e5c3c ("dm: remove unused dm_get_rq_mapinfo()")
removed the implementation but leave declaration.
Signed-off-by: Yue Haibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
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Use F2FS_BYTES_TO_BLK(bytes) and F2FS_BLK_TO_BYTES(blk) for cleanup
Signed-off-by: Zhiguo Niu <zhiguo.niu@unisoc.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
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Calling va_start / va_end multiple times is undefined and causes
problems with certain compiler / platforms.
Change alloc_ordered_workqueue_lockdep_map to a macro and updated
__alloc_workqueue to take a va_list argument.
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@chromium.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
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To receive 863ccdbb918a ("sched: Allow sched_class::dequeue_task() to fail")
which makes sched_class.dequeue_task() return bool instead of void. This
leads to compile breakage and will be fixed by a follow-up patch.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
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This helps in easily initializing blocks of code (e.g. static calls and
keys).
UNROLL(N, MACRO, __VA_ARGS__) calls MACRO N times with the first
argument as the index of the iteration. This allows string pasting to
create unique tokens for variable names, function calls etc.
As an example:
#include <linux/unroll.h>
#define MACRO(N, a, b) \
int add_##N(int a, int b) \
{ \
return a + b + N; \
}
UNROLL(2, MACRO, x, y)
expands to:
int add_0(int x, int y)
{
return x + y + 0;
}
int add_1(int x, int y)
{
return x + y + 1;
}
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Nacked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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This patch enhances fsverity's capabilities to support both integrity and
authenticity protection by introducing the exposure of built-in
signatures through a new LSM hook. This functionality allows LSMs,
e.g. IPE, to enforce policies based on the authenticity and integrity of
files, specifically focusing on built-in fsverity signatures. It enables
a policy enforcement layer within LSMs for fsverity, offering granular
control over the usage of authenticity claims. For instance, a policy
could be established to only permit the execution of all files with
verified built-in fsverity signatures.
The introduction of a security_inode_setintegrity() hook call within
fsverity's workflow ensures that the verified built-in signature of a file
is exposed to LSMs. This enables LSMs to recognize and label fsverity files
that contain a verified built-in fsverity signature. This hook is invoked
subsequent to the fsverity_verify_signature() process, guaranteeing the
signature's verification against fsverity's keyring. This mechanism is
crucial for maintaining system security, as it operates in kernel space,
effectively thwarting attempts by malicious binaries to bypass user space
stack interactions.
The second to last commit in this patch set will add a link to the IPE
documentation in fsverity.rst.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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This patch introduces a new hook to save inode's integrity
data. For example, for fsverity enabled files, LSMs can use this hook to
save the existence of verified fsverity builtin signature into the inode's
security blob, and LSMs can make access decisions based on this data.
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: subject line tweak, removed changelog]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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dm-verity provides a strong guarantee of a block device's integrity. As
a generic way to check the integrity of a block device, it provides
those integrity guarantees to its higher layers, including the filesystem
level.
However, critical security metadata like the dm-verity roothash and its
signing information are not easily accessible to the LSMs.
To address this limitation, this patch introduces a mechanism to store
and manage these essential security details within a newly added LSM blob
in the block_device structure.
This addition allows LSMs to make access control decisions on the integrity
data stored within the block_device, enabling more flexible security
policies. For instance, LSMs can now revoke access to dm-verity devices
based on their roothashes, ensuring that only authorized and verified
content is accessible. Additionally, LSMs can enforce policies to only
allow files from dm-verity devices that have a valid digital signature to
execute, effectively blocking any unsigned files from execution, thus
enhancing security against unauthorized modifications.
The patch includes new hook calls, `security_bdev_setintegrity()`, in
dm-verity to expose the dm-verity roothash and the roothash signature to
LSMs via preresume() callback. By using the preresume() callback, it
ensures that the security metadata is consistently in sync with the
metadata of the dm-verity target in the current active mapping table.
The hook calls are depended on CONFIG_SECURITY.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
[PM: moved sig_size field as discussed]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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This patch introduces a new LSM blob to the block_device structure,
enabling the security subsystem to store security-sensitive data related
to block devices. Currently, for a device mapper's mapped device containing
a dm-verity target, critical security information such as the roothash and
its signing state are not readily accessible. Specifically, while the
dm-verity volume creation process passes the dm-verity roothash and its
signature from userspace to the kernel, the roothash is stored privately
within the dm-verity target, and its signature is discarded
post-verification. This makes it extremely hard for the security subsystem
to utilize these data.
With the addition of the LSM blob to the block_device structure, the
security subsystem can now retain and manage important security metadata
such as the roothash and the signing state of a dm-verity by storing them
inside the blob. Access decisions can then be based on these stored data.
The implementation follows the same approach used for security blobs in
other structures like struct file, struct inode, and struct superblock.
The initialization of the security blob occurs after the creation of the
struct block_device, performed by the security subsystem. Similarly, the
security blob is freed by the security subsystem before the struct
block_device is deallocated or freed.
This patch also introduces a new hook security_bdev_setintegrity() to save
block device's integrity data to the new LSM blob. For example, for
dm-verity, it can use this hook to expose its roothash and signing state
to LSMs, then LSMs can save these data into the LSM blob.
Please note that the new hook should be invoked every time the security
information is updated to keep these data current. For example, in
dm-verity, if the mapping table is reloaded and configured to use a
different dm-verity target with a new roothash and signing information,
the previously stored data in the LSM blob will become obsolete. It is
crucial to re-invoke the hook to refresh these data and ensure they are up
to date. This necessity arises from the design of device-mapper, where a
device-mapper device is first created, and then targets are subsequently
loaded into it. These targets can be modified multiple times during the
device's lifetime. Therefore, while the LSM blob is allocated during the
creation of the block device, its actual contents are not initialized at
this stage and can change substantially over time. This includes
alterations from data that the LSM 'trusts' to those it does not, making
it essential to handle these changes correctly. Failure to address this
dynamic aspect could potentially allow for bypassing LSM checks.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: merge fuzz, subject line tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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When deleting a directory in the security file system, the existing
securityfs_remove requires the directory to be empty, otherwise
it will do nothing. This leads to a potential risk that the security
file system might be in an unclean state when the intended deletion
did not happen.
This commit introduces a new function securityfs_recursive_remove
to recursively delete a directory without leaving an unclean state.
Co-developed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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This patch introduces a new hook to notify security system that the
content of initramfs has been unpacked into the rootfs.
Upon receiving this notification, the security system can activate
a policy to allow only files that originated from the initramfs to
execute or load into kernel during the early stages of booting.
This approach is crucial for minimizing the attack surface by
ensuring that only trusted files from the initramfs are operational
in the critical boot phase.
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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When soft interrupt actions are called, they are passed a pointer to the
struct softirq action which contains the action's function pointer.
This pointer isn't useful, as the action callback already knows what
function it is. And since each callback handles a specific soft interrupt,
the callback also knows which soft interrupt number is running.
No soft interrupt action callback actually uses this parameter, so remove
it from the function pointer signature. This clarifies that soft interrupt
actions are global routines and makes it slightly cheaper to call them.
Signed-off-by: Caleb Sander Mateos <csander@purestorage.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240815171549.3260003-1-csander@purestorage.com
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FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_{REQ,RESP} supported only x3-x7 to pass implementation
defined values as part of the message. This may not be sufficient sometimes
and also it would be good to use all the registers supported by SMCCC v1.2
(x0-x17) for such register based communication.
Also another limitation with the FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_{REQ,RESP} is the
ability to target a specific service within the partition based on it's
UUID.
In order to address both of the above limitation, FF-A v1.2 introduced
FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_{REQ,RESP}2 which has the ability to target the
message to a specific service based on its UUID within a partition as
well as utilise all the available registers(x4-x17 specifically) for
the communication.
This change adds support for FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_REQ2 and
FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_RESP2.
Message-Id: <20240820-ffa_v1-2-v2-5-18c0c5f3c65e@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
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Arm Firmware Framework for A-profile(FFA) v1.2 introduces register based
discovery mechanism and direct messaging extensions that enables to target
specific UUID within a partition.
Let us add all the newly supported FF-A function IDs in the spec.
Also update to the error values and associated handling.
Message-Id: <20240820-ffa_v1-2-v2-2-18c0c5f3c65e@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
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Reduce contention on the lock by replacing the global lock with one for
each map.
Signed-off-by: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Leach <mike.leach@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: James Clark <james.clark@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240722101202.26915-18-james.clark@linaro.org
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For Perf to be able to decode when per-sink trace IDs are used, emit the
sink that's being written to for each ETM.
Perf currently errors out if it sees a newer packet version so instead
of bumping it, add a new minor version field. This can be used to
signify new versions that have backwards compatible fields. Considering
this change is only for high core count machines, it doesn't make sense
to make a breaking change for everyone.
Signed-off-by: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com>
Tested-by: Leo Yan <leo.yan@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Leach <mike.leach@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: James Clark <james.clark@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240722101202.26915-17-james.clark@linaro.org
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Pending the release of IDs was a way of managing concurrent sysfs and
Perf sessions in a single global ID map. Perf may have finished while
sysfs hadn't, and Perf shouldn't release the IDs in use by sysfs and
vice versa.
Now that Perf uses its own exclusive ID maps, pending release doesn't
result in any different behavior than just releasing all IDs when the
last Perf session finishes. As part of the per-sink trace ID change, we
would have still had to make the pending mechanism work on a per-sink
basis, due to the overlapping ID allocations, so instead of making that
more complicated, just remove it.
Signed-off-by: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Leach <mike.leach@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: James Clark <james.clark@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240722101202.26915-16-james.clark@linaro.org
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This will allow sessions with more than CORESIGHT_TRACE_IDS_MAX ETMs
as long as there are fewer than that many ETMs connected to each sink.
Each sink owns its own trace ID map, and any Perf session connecting to
that sink will allocate from it, even if the sink is currently in use by
other users. This is similar to the existing behavior where the dynamic
trace IDs are constant as long as there is any concurrent Perf session
active. It's not completely optimal because slightly more IDs will be
used than necessary, but the optimal solution involves tracking the PIDs
of each session and allocating ID maps based on the session owner. This
is difficult to do with the combination of per-thread and per-cpu modes
and some scheduling issues. The complexity of this isn't likely to worth
it because even with multiple users they'd just see a difference in the
ordering of ID allocations rather than hitting any limits (unless the
hardware does have too many ETMs connected to one sink).
Signed-off-by: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Leach <mike.leach@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: James Clark <james.clark@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240722101202.26915-15-james.clark@linaro.org
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The global CPU ID mappings won't work for per-sink ID maps so move it to
the ID map struct. coresight_trace_id_release_all_pending() is hard
coded to operate on the default map, but once Perf sessions use their
own maps the pending release mechanism will be deleted. So it doesn't
need to be extended to accept a trace ID map argument at this point.
Signed-off-by: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Leach <mike.leach@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Leo Yan <leo.yan@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Clark <james.clark@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240722101202.26915-14-james.clark@linaro.org
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The trace ID maps will need to be created and stored by the core and
Perf code so move the definition up to the common header.
Reviewed-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Leach <mike.leach@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com>
Tested-by: Leo Yan <leo.yan@arm.com>
Tested-by: Ganapatrao Kulkarni <gankulkarni@os.amperecomputing.com>
Signed-off-by: James Clark <james.clark@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240722101202.26915-12-james.clark@linaro.org
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iounmap() on x86 occasionally fails to unmap because the provided valid
ioremap address is not below high_memory. It turned out that this
happens due to KASLR.
KASLR uses the full address space between PAGE_OFFSET and vaddr_end to
randomize the starting points of the direct map, vmalloc and vmemmap
regions. It thereby limits the size of the direct map by using the
installed memory size plus an extra configurable margin for hot-plug
memory. This limitation is done to gain more randomization space
because otherwise only the holes between the direct map, vmalloc,
vmemmap and vaddr_end would be usable for randomizing.
The limited direct map size is not exposed to the rest of the kernel, so
the memory hot-plug and resource management related code paths still
operate under the assumption that the available address space can be
determined with MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS.
request_free_mem_region() allocates from (1 << MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS) - 1
downwards. That means the first allocation happens past the end of the
direct map and if unlucky this address is in the vmalloc space, which
causes high_memory to become greater than VMALLOC_START and consequently
causes iounmap() to fail for valid ioremap addresses.
MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS cannot be changed for that because the randomization
does not align with address bit boundaries and there are other places
which actually require to know the maximum number of address bits. All
remaining usage sites of MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS have been analyzed and found
to be correct.
Cure this by exposing the end of the direct map via PHYSMEM_END and use
that for the memory hot-plug and resource management related places
instead of relying on MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS. In the KASLR case PHYSMEM_END
maps to a variable which is initialized by the KASLR initialization and
otherwise it is based on MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS as before.
To prevent future hickups add a check into add_pages() to catch callers
trying to add memory above PHYSMEM_END.
Fixes: 0483e1fa6e09 ("x86/mm: Implement ASLR for kernel memory regions")
Reported-by: Max Ramanouski <max8rr8@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Alistair Popple <apopple@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-By: Max Ramanouski <max8rr8@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Alistair Popple <apopple@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Alistair Popple <apopple@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/87ed6soy3z.ffs@tglx
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Add the devres-enabled version of dev_pm_domain_attach|detach_list.
If client drivers use devm_pm_domain_attach_list() to attach the PM domains,
devm_pm_domain_detach_list() will be invoked implicitly during remove phase.
Signed-off-by: Dikshita Agarwal <quic_dikshita@quicinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1724063350-11993-2-git-send-email-quic_dikshita@quicinc.com
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
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Add an skb helper function to copy a range of bytes from within
an existing skb_seq_state.
Signed-off-by: Christian Hopps <chopps@labn.net>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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The helper bpf_current_task_under_cgroup() currently is only allowed for
tracing programs, allow its usage also in the BPF_CGROUP_* program types.
Move the code from kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c to kernel/bpf/helpers.c,
so it compiles also without CONFIG_BPF_EVENTS.
This will be used in systemd-networkd to monitor the sysctl writes,
and filter it's own writes from others:
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/32212
Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <teknoraver@meta.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240819162805.78235-3-technoboy85@gmail.com
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Fix htmldocs build warning introduced by ec0a7d44b358 ("workqueue: Add
interface for user-defined workqueue lockdep map").
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
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Merge series from Bard Liao <yung-chuan.liao@linux.intel.com>:
Intel new platforms can have up to 5 SoundWire links.
This series does not apply to SoundWire tree due to recent changes in
machine driver. Can we go via ASoC tree with Vinod's Acked-by tag?
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The Spectre-v1 mitigations made "access_ok()" much more expensive, since
it has to serialize execution with the test for a valid user address.
All the normal user copy routines avoid this by just masking the user
address with a data-dependent mask instead, but the fast
"unsafe_user_read()" kind of patterms that were supposed to be a fast
case got slowed down.
This introduces a notion of using
src = masked_user_access_begin(src);
to do the user address sanity using a data-dependent mask instead of the
more traditional conditional
if (user_read_access_begin(src, len)) {
model.
This model only works for dense accesses that start at 'src' and on
architectures that have a guard region that is guaranteed to fault in
between the user space and the kernel space area.
With this, the user access doesn't need to be manually checked, because
a bad address is guaranteed to fault (by some architecture masking
trick: on x86-64 this involves just turning an invalid user address into
all ones, since we don't map the top of address space).
This only converts a couple of examples for now. Example x86-64 code
generation for loading two words from user space:
stac
mov %rax,%rcx
sar $0x3f,%rcx
or %rax,%rcx
mov (%rcx),%r13
mov 0x8(%rcx),%r14
clac
where all the error handling and -EFAULT is now purely handled out of
line by the exception path.
Of course, if the micro-architecture does badly at 'clac' and 'stac',
the above is still pitifully slow. But at least we did as well as we
could.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/printk/linux
Pull printk fix from Petr Mladek:
- Do not block printk on non-panic CPUs when they are dumping
backtraces
* tag 'printk-for-6.11-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/printk/linux:
printk/panic: Allow cpu backtraces to be written into ringbuffer during panic
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Function bdev_get_queue() must not return NULL, so drop the check in
bdev_write_zeroes_sectors().
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: John Garry <john.g.garry@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Nitesh Shetty <nj.shetty@samsung.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240815163228.216051-3-john.g.garry@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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In the function percpu_rwsem_release, the parameter `read`
is unused, so remove it.
Signed-off-by: Wang Long <w@laoqinren.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240802091901.2546797-1-w@laoqinren.net
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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When deactivating any type of superblock, it had to wait for the in-flight
wb switches to be completed. wb switches are executed in inode_switch_wbs_work_fn()
which needs to acquire the wb_switch_rwsem and races against sync_inodes_sb().
If there are too much dirty data in the superblock, the waiting time may increase
significantly.
For superblocks without cgroup writeback such as tmpfs, they have nothing to
do with the wb swithes, so the flushing can be avoided.
Signed-off-by: Haifeng Xu <haifeng.xu@shopee.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240726030525.180330-1-haifeng.xu@shopee.com
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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Intel platforms have enabled 4 links since the beginning, newer
platforms now have 5 links. Update the definition accordingly.
This patch will have no effect on older platforms where the number of
links was hard-coded. A follow-up patch will add a dynamic check that
the ACPI-reported information is aligned with hardware capabilities on
newer platforms.
Acked-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart <pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Péter Ujfalusi <peter.ujfalusi@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Bard Liao <yung-chuan.liao@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240819005548.5867-4-yung-chuan.liao@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
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In older platforms, the number of links was constant and hard-coded to
4. Newer platforms can have varying number of links, so we need to add
a probe-time check to make sure the ACPI-reported information with
_DSD properties is aligned with hardware capabilities reported in the
SoundWire LCAP register.
Acked-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart <pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Péter Ujfalusi <peter.ujfalusi@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Bard Liao <yung-chuan.liao@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240819005548.5867-3-yung-chuan.liao@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
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