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Generalize bounds adjustment logic of reg_set_min_max() to handle not
just register vs constant case, but in general any register vs any
register cases. For most of the operations it's trivial extension based
on range vs range comparison logic, we just need to properly pick
min/max of a range to compare against min/max of the other range.
For BPF_JSET we keep the original capabilities, just make sure JSET is
integrated in the common framework. This is manifested in the
internal-only BPF_JSET + BPF_X "opcode" to allow for simpler and more
uniform rev_opcode() handling. See the code for details. This allows to
reuse the same code exactly both for TRUE and FALSE branches without
explicitly handling both conditions with custom code.
Note also that now we don't need a special handling of BPF_JEQ/BPF_JNE
case none of the registers are constants. This is now just a normal
generic case handled by reg_set_min_max().
To make tnum handling cleaner, tnum_with_subreg() helper is added, as
that's a common operator when dealing with 32-bit subregister bounds.
This keeps the overall logic much less noisy when it comes to tnums.
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231112010609.848406-2-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Some mlx5 devices do not support the default advertised maximum frequency
adjustment value for the PTP hardware clock that is set by the driver.
These devices need to be queried when initializing the clock functionality
in order to get the maximum supported frequency adjustment value. This
value can be greater than the minimum supported frequency adjustment across
mlx5 devices (50 million ppb).
Signed-off-by: Rahul Rameshbabu <rrameshbabu@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com>
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Kirill Shutemov reported significant percpu memory consumption increase after
booting in 288-cpu VM ([1]) due to commit 41a5db8d8161 ("bpf: Add support for
non-fix-size percpu mem allocation"). The percpu memory consumption is
increased from 111MB to 969MB. The number is from /proc/meminfo.
I tried to reproduce the issue with my local VM which at most supports upto
255 cpus. With 252 cpus, without the above commit, the percpu memory
consumption immediately after boot is 57MB while with the above commit the
percpu memory consumption is 231MB.
This is not good since so far percpu memory from bpf memory allocator is not
widely used yet. Let us change pre-allocation in init stage to on-demand
allocation when verifier detects there is a need of percpu memory for bpf
program. With this change, percpu memory consumption after boot can be reduced
signicantly.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20231109154934.4saimljtqx625l3v@box.shutemov.name/
Fixes: 41a5db8d8161 ("bpf: Add support for non-fix-size percpu mem allocation")
Reported-and-tested-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Acked-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231111013928.948838-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Let's kickstart the v6.8 release cycle.
Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <mripard@kernel.org>
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Avoid conflicts, base on fixes.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
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Adds:
- DEFINE_GUARD_COND() / DEFINE_LOCK_GUARD_1_COND() to extend existing
guards with conditional lock primitives, eg. mutex_trylock(),
mutex_lock_interruptible().
nb. both primitives allow NULL 'locks', which cause the lock to
fail (obviously).
- extends scoped_guard() to not take the body when the the
conditional guard 'fails'. eg.
scoped_guard (mutex_intr, &task->signal_cred_guard_mutex) {
...
}
will only execute the body when the mutex is held.
- provides scoped_cond_guard(name, fail, args...); which extends
scoped_guard() to do fail when the lock-acquire fails.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20231102110706.460851167%40infradead.org
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Low priority tasks (e.g., SCHED_OTHER) can suffer starvation if tasks
with higher priority (e.g., SCHED_FIFO) monopolize CPU(s).
RT Throttling has been introduced a while ago as a (mostly debug)
countermeasure one can utilize to reserve some CPU time for low priority
tasks (usually background type of work, e.g. workqueues, timers, etc.).
It however has its own problems (see documentation) and the undesired
effect of unconditionally throttling FIFO tasks even when no lower
priority activity needs to run (there are mechanisms to fix this issue
as well, but, again, with their own problems).
Introduce deadline servers to service low priority tasks needs under
starvation conditions. Deadline servers are built extending SCHED_DEADLINE
implementation to allow 2-level scheduling (a sched_deadline entity
becomes a container for lower priority scheduling entities).
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4968601859d920335cf85822eb573a5f179f04b8.1699095159.git.bristot@kernel.org
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All classes use sched_entity::exec_start to track runtime and have
copies of the exact same code around to compute runtime.
Collapse all that.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/54d148a144f26d9559698c4dd82d8859038a7380.1699095159.git.bristot@kernel.org
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Sort the task timeline by virtual deadline and keep the min_vruntime
in the augmented tree, so we can avoid doubling the worst case cost
and make full use of the cached leftmost node to enable O(1) fastpath
picking in next patch.
Signed-off-by: Abel Wu <wuyun.abel@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20231115033647.80785-3-wuyun.abel@bytedance.com
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Since commit fc137c0ddab2 ("sched/numa: enhance vma scanning logic")
NUMA Balancing allows updating PTEs to trap NUMA hinting faults if the
task had previously accessed VMA. However unconditional scan of VMAs are
allowed during initial phase of VMA creation until process's
mm numa_scan_seq reaches 2 even though current task had not accessed VMA.
Rationale:
- Without initial scan subsequent PTE update may never happen.
- Give fair opportunity to all the VMAs to be scanned and subsequently
understand the access pattern of all the VMAs.
But it has a corner case where, if a VMA is created after some time,
process's mm numa_scan_seq could be already greater than 2.
For e.g., values of mm numa_scan_seq when VMAs are created by running
mmtest autonuma benchmark briefly looks like:
start_seq=0 : 459
start_seq=2 : 138
start_seq=3 : 144
start_seq=4 : 8
start_seq=8 : 1
start_seq=9 : 1
This results in no unconditional PTE updates for those VMAs created after
some time.
Fix:
- Note down the initial value of mm numa_scan_seq in per VMA start_seq.
- Allow unconditional scan till start_seq + 2.
Result:
SUT: AMD EPYC Milan with 2 NUMA nodes 256 cpus.
base kernel: upstream 6.6-rc6 with Mels patches [1] applied.
kernbench
========== base patched %gain
Amean elsp-128 165.09 ( 0.00%) 164.78 * 0.19%*
Duration User 41404.28 41375.08
Duration System 9862.22 9768.48
Duration Elapsed 519.87 518.72
Ops NUMA PTE updates 1041416.00 831536.00
Ops NUMA hint faults 263296.00 220966.00
Ops NUMA pages migrated 258021.00 212769.00
Ops AutoNUMA cost 1328.67 1114.69
autonumabench
NUMA01_THREADLOCAL
==================
Amean elsp-NUMA01_THREADLOCAL 81.79 (0.00%) 67.74 * 17.18%*
Duration User 54832.73 47379.67
Duration System 75.00 185.75
Duration Elapsed 576.72 476.09
Ops NUMA PTE updates 394429.00 11121044.00
Ops NUMA hint faults 1001.00 8906404.00
Ops NUMA pages migrated 288.00 2998694.00
Ops AutoNUMA cost 7.77 44666.84
Signed-off-by: Raghavendra K T <raghavendra.kt@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2ea7cbce80ac7c62e90cbfb9653a7972f902439f.1697816692.git.raghavendra.kt@amd.com
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull hardening fixes from Kees Cook:
- stackleak: add declarations for global functions (Arnd Bergmann)
- gcc-plugins: randstruct: Only warn about true flexible arrays (Kees
Cook)
- gcc-plugins: latent_entropy: Fix description typo (Konstantin Runov)
* tag 'hardening-v6.7-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
gcc-plugins: latent_entropy: Fix typo (args -> argc) in plugin description
gcc-plugins: randstruct: Only warn about true flexible arrays
stackleak: add declarations for global functions
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Audit of the refcounting turned up that perf_pmu_migrate_context()
fails to migrate the ctx refcount.
Fixes: bd2756811766 ("perf: Rewrite core context handling")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230612093539.085862001@infradead.org
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
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Widely used variable names can be used by macro users, potentially
leading to name collisions.
Suffix locals used inside the macros with an underscore, to reduce the
collision potential.
Suggested-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Michał Winiarski <michal.winiarski@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20231024110710.3039807-1-michal.winiarski@intel.com
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Introduce several new KVM uAPIs to ultimately create a guest-first memory
subsystem within KVM, a.k.a. guest_memfd. Guest-first memory allows KVM
to provide features, enhancements, and optimizations that are kludgly
or outright impossible to implement in a generic memory subsystem.
The core KVM ioctl() for guest_memfd is KVM_CREATE_GUEST_MEMFD, which
similar to the generic memfd_create(), creates an anonymous file and
returns a file descriptor that refers to it. Again like "regular"
memfd files, guest_memfd files live in RAM, have volatile storage,
and are automatically released when the last reference is dropped.
The key differences between memfd files (and every other memory subystem)
is that guest_memfd files are bound to their owning virtual machine,
cannot be mapped, read, or written by userspace, and cannot be resized.
guest_memfd files do however support PUNCH_HOLE, which can be used to
convert a guest memory area between the shared and guest-private states.
A second KVM ioctl(), KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES, allows userspace to
specify attributes for a given page of guest memory. In the long term,
it will likely be extended to allow userspace to specify per-gfn RWX
protections, including allowing memory to be writable in the guest
without it also being writable in host userspace.
The immediate and driving use case for guest_memfd are Confidential
(CoCo) VMs, specifically AMD's SEV-SNP, Intel's TDX, and KVM's own pKVM.
For such use cases, being able to map memory into KVM guests without
requiring said memory to be mapped into the host is a hard requirement.
While SEV+ and TDX prevent untrusted software from reading guest private
data by encrypting guest memory, pKVM provides confidentiality and
integrity *without* relying on memory encryption. In addition, with
SEV-SNP and especially TDX, accessing guest private memory can be fatal
to the host, i.e. KVM must be prevent host userspace from accessing
guest memory irrespective of hardware behavior.
Long term, guest_memfd may be useful for use cases beyond CoCo VMs,
for example hardening userspace against unintentional accesses to guest
memory. As mentioned earlier, KVM's ABI uses userspace VMA protections to
define the allow guest protection (with an exception granted to mapping
guest memory executable), and similarly KVM currently requires the guest
mapping size to be a strict subset of the host userspace mapping size.
Decoupling the mappings sizes would allow userspace to precisely map
only what is needed and with the required permissions, without impacting
guest performance.
A guest-first memory subsystem also provides clearer line of sight to
things like a dedicated memory pool (for slice-of-hardware VMs) and
elimination of "struct page" (for offload setups where userspace _never_
needs to DMA from or into guest memory).
guest_memfd is the result of 3+ years of development and exploration;
taking on memory management responsibilities in KVM was not the first,
second, or even third choice for supporting CoCo VMs. But after many
failed attempts to avoid KVM-specific backing memory, and looking at
where things ended up, it is quite clear that of all approaches tried,
guest_memfd is the simplest, most robust, and most extensible, and the
right thing to do for KVM and the kernel at-large.
The "development cycle" for this version is going to be very short;
ideally, next week I will merge it as is in kvm/next, taking this through
the KVM tree for 6.8 immediately after the end of the merge window.
The series is still based on 6.6 (plus KVM changes for 6.7) so it
will require a small fixup for changes to get_file_rcu() introduced in
6.7 by commit 0ede61d8589c ("file: convert to SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU").
The fixup will be done as part of the merge commit, and most of the text
above will become the commit message for the merge.
Pending post-merge work includes:
- hugepage support
- looking into using the restrictedmem framework for guest memory
- introducing a testing mechanism to poison memory, possibly using
the same memory attributes introduced here
- SNP and TDX support
There are two non-KVM patches buried in the middle of this series:
fs: Rename anon_inode_getfile_secure() and anon_inode_getfd_secure()
mm: Add AS_UNMOVABLE to mark mapping as completely unmovable
The first is small and mostly suggested-by Christian Brauner; the second
a bit less so but it was written by an mm person (Vlastimil Babka).
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Let x86 track the number of address spaces on a per-VM basis so that KVM
can disallow SMM memslots for confidential VMs. Confidentials VMs are
fundamentally incompatible with emulating SMM, which as the name suggests
requires being able to read and write guest memory and register state.
Disallowing SMM will simplify support for guest private memory, as KVM
will not need to worry about tracking memory attributes for multiple
address spaces (SMM is the only "non-default" address space across all
architectures).
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Tested-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Message-Id: <20231027182217.3615211-23-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Drop __KVM_VCPU_MULTIPLE_ADDRESS_SPACE and instead check the value of
KVM_ADDRESS_SPACE_NUM.
No functional change intended.
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Tested-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Message-Id: <20231027182217.3615211-22-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Add support for resolving page faults on guest private memory for VMs
that differentiate between "shared" and "private" memory. For such VMs,
KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD memslots can include both fd-based private memory and
hva-based shared memory, and KVM needs to map in the "correct" variant,
i.e. KVM needs to map the gfn shared/private as appropriate based on the
current state of the gfn's KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PRIVATE flag.
For AMD's SEV-SNP and Intel's TDX, the guest effectively gets to request
shared vs. private via a bit in the guest page tables, i.e. what the guest
wants may conflict with the current memory attributes. To support such
"implicit" conversion requests, exit to user with KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT
to forward the request to userspace. Add a new flag for memory faults,
KVM_MEMORY_EXIT_FLAG_PRIVATE, to communicate whether the guest wants to
map memory as shared vs. private.
Like KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PRIVATE, use bit 3 for flagging private memory
so that KVM can use bits 0-2 for capturing RWX behavior if/when userspace
needs such information, e.g. a likely user of KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT is to
exit on missing mappings when handling guest page fault VM-Exits. In
that case, userspace will want to know RWX information in order to
correctly/precisely resolve the fault.
Note, private memory *must* be backed by guest_memfd, i.e. shared mappings
always come from the host userspace page tables, and private mappings
always come from a guest_memfd instance.
Co-developed-by: Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Tested-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Message-Id: <20231027182217.3615211-21-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Introduce an ioctl(), KVM_CREATE_GUEST_MEMFD, to allow creating file-based
memory that is tied to a specific KVM virtual machine and whose primary
purpose is to serve guest memory.
A guest-first memory subsystem allows for optimizations and enhancements
that are kludgy or outright infeasible to implement/support in a generic
memory subsystem. With guest_memfd, guest protections and mapping sizes
are fully decoupled from host userspace mappings. E.g. KVM currently
doesn't support mapping memory as writable in the guest without it also
being writable in host userspace, as KVM's ABI uses VMA protections to
define the allow guest protection. Userspace can fudge this by
establishing two mappings, a writable mapping for the guest and readable
one for itself, but that’s suboptimal on multiple fronts.
Similarly, KVM currently requires the guest mapping size to be a strict
subset of the host userspace mapping size, e.g. KVM doesn’t support
creating a 1GiB guest mapping unless userspace also has a 1GiB guest
mapping. Decoupling the mappings sizes would allow userspace to precisely
map only what is needed without impacting guest performance, e.g. to
harden against unintentional accesses to guest memory.
Decoupling guest and userspace mappings may also allow for a cleaner
alternative to high-granularity mappings for HugeTLB, which has reached a
bit of an impasse and is unlikely to ever be merged.
A guest-first memory subsystem also provides clearer line of sight to
things like a dedicated memory pool (for slice-of-hardware VMs) and
elimination of "struct page" (for offload setups where userspace _never_
needs to mmap() guest memory).
More immediately, being able to map memory into KVM guests without mapping
said memory into the host is critical for Confidential VMs (CoCo VMs), the
initial use case for guest_memfd. While AMD's SEV and Intel's TDX prevent
untrusted software from reading guest private data by encrypting guest
memory with a key that isn't usable by the untrusted host, projects such
as Protected KVM (pKVM) provide confidentiality and integrity *without*
relying on memory encryption. And with SEV-SNP and TDX, accessing guest
private memory can be fatal to the host, i.e. KVM must be prevent host
userspace from accessing guest memory irrespective of hardware behavior.
Attempt #1 to support CoCo VMs was to add a VMA flag to mark memory as
being mappable only by KVM (or a similarly enlightened kernel subsystem).
That approach was abandoned largely due to it needing to play games with
PROT_NONE to prevent userspace from accessing guest memory.
Attempt #2 to was to usurp PG_hwpoison to prevent the host from mapping
guest private memory into userspace, but that approach failed to meet
several requirements for software-based CoCo VMs, e.g. pKVM, as the kernel
wouldn't easily be able to enforce a 1:1 page:guest association, let alone
a 1:1 pfn:gfn mapping. And using PG_hwpoison does not work for memory
that isn't backed by 'struct page', e.g. if devices gain support for
exposing encrypted memory regions to guests.
Attempt #3 was to extend the memfd() syscall and wrap shmem to provide
dedicated file-based guest memory. That approach made it as far as v10
before feedback from Hugh Dickins and Christian Brauner (and others) led
to it demise.
Hugh's objection was that piggybacking shmem made no sense for KVM's use
case as KVM didn't actually *want* the features provided by shmem. I.e.
KVM was using memfd() and shmem to avoid having to manage memory directly,
not because memfd() and shmem were the optimal solution, e.g. things like
read/write/mmap in shmem were dead weight.
Christian pointed out flaws with implementing a partial overlay (wrapping
only _some_ of shmem), e.g. poking at inode_operations or super_operations
would show shmem stuff, but address_space_operations and file_operations
would show KVM's overlay. Paraphrashing heavily, Christian suggested KVM
stop being lazy and create a proper API.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20201020061859.18385-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20210416154106.23721-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20210824005248.200037-1-seanjc@google.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20211111141352.26311-1-chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221202061347.1070246-1-chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ff5c5b97-acdf-9745-ebe5-c6609dd6322e@google.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230418-anfallen-irdisch-6993a61be10b@brauner
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZEM5Zq8oo+xnApW9@google.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20230306191944.GA15773@monkey
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/ZII1p8ZHlHaQ3dDl@casper.infradead.org
Cc: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Cc: Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@google.com>
Cc: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: Maciej Szmigiero <mail@maciej.szmigiero.name>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: Wang <wei.w.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Liam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Cc: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20231027182217.3615211-17-seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Tested-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The call to the inode_init_security_anon() LSM hook is not the sole
reason to use anon_inode_getfile_secure() or anon_inode_getfd_secure().
For example, the functions also allow one to create a file with non-zero
size, without needing a full-blown filesystem. In this case, you don't
need a "secure" version, just unique inodes; the current name of the
functions is confusing and does not explain well the difference with
the more "standard" anon_inode_getfile() and anon_inode_getfd().
Of course, there is another side of the coin; neither io_uring nor
userfaultfd strictly speaking need distinct inodes, and it is not
that clear anymore that anon_inode_create_get{file,fd}() allow the LSM
to intercept and block the inode's creation. If one was so inclined,
anon_inode_getfile_secure() and anon_inode_getfd_secure() could be kept,
using the shared inode or a new one depending on CONFIG_SECURITY.
However, this is probably overkill, and potentially a cause of bugs in
different configurations. Therefore, just add a comment to io_uring
and userfaultfd explaining the choice of the function.
While at it, remove the export for what is now anon_inode_create_getfd().
There is no in-tree module that uses it, and the old name is gone anyway.
If anybody actually needs the symbol, they can ask or they can just use
anon_inode_create_getfile(), which will be exported very soon for use
in KVM.
Suggested-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
smatch reports:
drivers/firmware/arm_ffa/bus.c:108:17: warning:
symbol 'ffa_bus_type' was not declared. Should it be static?
ffa_bus_type is exported to be useful in the FF-A driver. So this
warning is not correct. However, declaring the ffa_bus_type structure
in the header like many other bus_types do already removes this warning.
So let us just do the same and get rid of the warning.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231024105715.2369638-1-sudeep.holla@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
|
|
The quotes symbol in
"EEE "link partner ability 1
should be at the end of the register name
"EEE link partner ability 1"
Signed-off-by: Marek Behún <kabel@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Add an "unmovable" flag for mappings that cannot be migrated under any
circumstance. KVM will use the flag for its upcoming GUEST_MEMFD support,
which will not support compaction/migration, at least not in the
foreseeable future.
Test AS_UNMOVABLE under folio lock as already done for the async
compaction/dirty folio case, as the mapping can be removed by truncation
while compaction is running. To avoid having to lock every folio with a
mapping, assume/require that unmovable mappings are also unevictable, and
have mapping_set_unmovable() also set AS_UNEVICTABLE.
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Co-developed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20231027182217.3615211-15-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
In confidential computing usages, whether a page is private or shared is
necessary information for KVM to perform operations like page fault
handling, page zapping etc. There are other potential use cases for
per-page memory attributes, e.g. to make memory read-only (or no-exec,
or exec-only, etc.) without having to modify memslots.
Introduce the KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES ioctl, advertised by
KVM_CAP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES, to allow userspace to set the per-page memory
attributes to a guest memory range.
Use an xarray to store the per-page attributes internally, with a naive,
not fully optimized implementation, i.e. prioritize correctness over
performance for the initial implementation.
Use bit 3 for the PRIVATE attribute so that KVM can use bits 0-2 for RWX
attributes/protections in the future, e.g. to give userspace fine-grained
control over read, write, and execute protections for guest memory.
Provide arch hooks for handling attribute changes before and after common
code sets the new attributes, e.g. x86 will use the "pre" hook to zap all
relevant mappings, and the "post" hook to track whether or not hugepages
can be used to map the range.
To simplify the implementation wrap the entire sequence with
kvm_mmu_invalidate_{begin,end}() even though the operation isn't strictly
guaranteed to be an invalidation. For the initial use case, x86 *will*
always invalidate memory, and preventing arch code from creating new
mappings while the attributes are in flux makes it much easier to reason
about the correctness of consuming attributes.
It's possible that future usages may not require an invalidation, e.g.
if KVM ends up supporting RWX protections and userspace grants _more_
protections, but again opt for simplicity and punt optimizations to
if/when they are needed.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/Y2WB48kD0J4VGynX@google.com
Cc: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Cc: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Signed-off-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20231027182217.3615211-14-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Add a new KVM exit type to allow userspace to handle memory faults that
KVM cannot resolve, but that userspace *may* be able to handle (without
terminating the guest).
KVM will initially use KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT to report implicit
conversions between private and shared memory. With guest private memory,
there will be two kind of memory conversions:
- explicit conversion: happens when the guest explicitly calls into KVM
to map a range (as private or shared)
- implicit conversion: happens when the guest attempts to access a gfn
that is configured in the "wrong" state (private vs. shared)
On x86 (first architecture to support guest private memory), explicit
conversions will be reported via KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL+KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE,
but reporting KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL for implicit conversions is undesriable
as there is (obviously) no hypercall, and there is no guarantee that the
guest actually intends to convert between private and shared, i.e. what
KVM thinks is an implicit conversion "request" could actually be the
result of a guest code bug.
KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT will be used to report memory faults that appear to
be implicit conversions.
Note! To allow for future possibilities where KVM reports
KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT and fills run->memory_fault on _any_ unresolved
fault, KVM returns "-EFAULT" (-1 with errno == EFAULT from userspace's
perspective), not '0'! Due to historical baggage within KVM, exiting to
userspace with '0' from deep callstacks, e.g. in emulation paths, is
infeasible as doing so would require a near-complete overhaul of KVM,
whereas KVM already propagates -errno return codes to userspace even when
the -errno originated in a low level helper.
Report the gpa+size instead of a single gfn even though the initial usage
is expected to always report single pages. It's entirely possible, likely
even, that KVM will someday support sub-page granularity faults, e.g.
Intel's sub-page protection feature allows for additional protections at
128-byte granularity.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230908222905.1321305-5-amoorthy@google.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZQ3AmLO2SYv3DszH@google.com
Cc: Anish Moorthy <amoorthy@google.com>
Cc: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20231027182217.3615211-10-seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Tested-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Introduce a "version 2" of KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION so that additional
information can be supplied without setting userspace up to fail. The
padding in the new kvm_userspace_memory_region2 structure will be used to
pass a file descriptor in addition to the userspace_addr, i.e. allow
userspace to point at a file descriptor and map memory into a guest that
is NOT mapped into host userspace.
Alternatively, KVM could simply add "struct kvm_userspace_memory_region2"
without a new ioctl(), but as Paolo pointed out, adding a new ioctl()
makes detection of bad flags a bit more robust, e.g. if the new fd field
is guarded only by a flag and not a new ioctl(), then a userspace bug
(setting a "bad" flag) would generate out-of-bounds access instead of an
-EINVAL error.
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Tested-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Message-Id: <20231027182217.3615211-9-seanjc@google.com>
Acked-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Convert KVM_ARCH_WANT_MMU_NOTIFIER into a Kconfig and select it where
appropriate to effectively maintain existing behavior. Using a proper
Kconfig will simplify building more functionality on top of KVM's
mmu_notifier infrastructure.
Add a forward declaration of kvm_gfn_range to kvm_types.h so that
including arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_ppc.h's with CONFIG_KVM=n doesn't
generate warnings due to kvm_gfn_range being undeclared. PPC defines
hooks for PR vs. HV without guarding them via #ifdeffery, e.g.
bool (*unmap_gfn_range)(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_gfn_range *range);
bool (*age_gfn)(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_gfn_range *range);
bool (*test_age_gfn)(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_gfn_range *range);
bool (*set_spte_gfn)(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_gfn_range *range);
Alternatively, PPC could forward declare kvm_gfn_range, but there's no
good reason not to define it in common KVM.
Acked-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Tested-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Message-Id: <20231027182217.3615211-8-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Currently in mmu_notifier invalidate path, hva range is recorded and then
checked against by mmu_invalidate_retry_hva() in the page fault handling
path. However, for the soon-to-be-introduced private memory, a page fault
may not have a hva associated, checking gfn(gpa) makes more sense.
For existing hva based shared memory, gfn is expected to also work. The
only downside is when aliasing multiple gfns to a single hva, the
current algorithm of checking multiple ranges could result in a much
larger range being rejected. Such aliasing should be uncommon, so the
impact is expected small.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Tested-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
[sean: convert vmx_set_apic_access_page_addr() to gfn-based API]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@linux.intel.com>
Message-Id: <20231027182217.3615211-4-seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
While we have a lsm_fill_user_ctx() helper function designed to make
life easier for LSMs which return lsm_ctx structs to userspace, we
didn't include all of the buffer length safety checks and buffer
padding adjustments in the helper. This led to code duplication
across the different LSMs and the possibility for mistakes across the
different LSM subsystems. In order to reduce code duplication and
decrease the chances of silly mistakes, we're consolidating all of
this code into the lsm_fill_user_ctx() helper.
The buffer padding is also modified from a fixed 8-byte alignment to
an alignment that matches the word length of the machine
(BITS_PER_LONG / 8).
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Add lsm_name_to_attr(), which translates a text string to a
LSM_ATTR value if one is available.
Add lsm_fill_user_ctx(), which fills a struct lsm_ctx, including
the trailing attribute value.
Both are used in module specific components of LSM system calls.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Create a system call to report the list of Linux Security Modules
that are active on the system. The list is provided as an array
of LSM ID numbers.
The calling application can use this list determine what LSM
specific actions it might take. That might include choosing an
output format, determining required privilege or bypassing
security module specific behavior.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Create a system call lsm_get_self_attr() to provide the security
module maintained attributes of the current process.
Create a system call lsm_set_self_attr() to set a security
module maintained attribute of the current process.
Historically these attributes have been exposed to user space via
entries in procfs under /proc/self/attr.
The attribute value is provided in a lsm_ctx structure. The structure
identifies the size of the attribute, and the attribute value. The format
of the attribute value is defined by the security module. A flags field
is included for LSM specific information. It is currently unused and must
be 0. The total size of the data, including the lsm_ctx structure and any
padding, is maintained as well.
struct lsm_ctx {
__u64 id;
__u64 flags;
__u64 len;
__u64 ctx_len;
__u8 ctx[];
};
Two new LSM hooks are used to interface with the LSMs.
security_getselfattr() collects the lsm_ctx values from the
LSMs that support the hook, accounting for space requirements.
security_setselfattr() identifies which LSM the attribute is
intended for and passes it along.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Use the LSM ID number instead of the LSM name to identify which
security module's attibute data should be shown in /proc/self/attr.
The security_[gs]etprocattr() functions have been changed to expect
the LSM ID. The change from a string comparison to an integer comparison
in these functions will provide a minor performance improvement.
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Mickael Salaun <mic@digikod.net>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
As LSMs are registered add their lsm_id pointers to a table.
This will be used later for attribute reporting.
Determine the number of possible security modules based on
their respective CONFIG options. This allows the number to be
known at build time. This allows data structures and tables
to use the constant.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Mickael Salaun <mic@digikod.net>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Create a struct lsm_id to contain identifying information about Linux
Security Modules (LSMs). At inception this contains the name of the
module and an identifier associated with the security module. Change
the security_add_hooks() interface to use this structure. Change the
individual modules to maintain their own struct lsm_id and pass it to
security_add_hooks().
The values are for LSM identifiers are defined in a new UAPI
header file linux/lsm.h. Each existing LSM has been updated to
include it's LSMID in the lsm_id.
The LSM ID values are sequential, with the oldest module
LSM_ID_CAPABILITY being the lowest value and the existing modules
numbered in the order they were included in the main line kernel.
This is an arbitrary convention for assigning the values, but
none better presents itself. The value 0 is defined as being invalid.
The values 1-99 are reserved for any special case uses which may
arise in the future. This may include attributes of the LSM
infrastructure itself, possibly related to namespacing or network
attribute management. A special range is identified for such attributes
to help reduce confusion for developers unfamiliar with LSMs.
LSM attribute values are defined for the attributes presented by
modules that are available today. As with the LSM IDs, The value 0
is defined as being invalid. The values 1-99 are reserved for any
special case uses which may arise in the future.
Cc: linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Mickael Salaun <mic@digikod.net>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Nacked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
[PM: forward ported beyond v6.6 due merge window changes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Add 'uv_survival_time' field to regulation_constraints for specifying
survival time post critical under-voltage event. Update the regulator
notifier call chain and Device Tree property parsing to use this new
field, allowing a configurable timeout before emergency shutdown.
Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231026144824.4065145-6-o.rempel@pengutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
|
|
Handle under-voltage events for crucial regulators to maintain system
stability and avoid issues during power drops.
Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231026144824.4065145-3-o.rempel@pengutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
|
|
When cgroup_rstat_updated() isn't being called concurrently with
cgroup_rstat_flush_locked(), its run time is pretty short. When
both are called concurrently, the cgroup_rstat_updated() run time
can spike to a pretty high value due to high cpu_lock hold time in
cgroup_rstat_flush_locked(). This can be problematic if the task calling
cgroup_rstat_updated() is a realtime task running on an isolated CPU
with a strict latency requirement. The cgroup_rstat_updated() call can
happen when there is a page fault even though the task is running in
user space most of the time.
The percpu cpu_lock is used to protect the update tree -
updated_next and updated_children. This protection is only needed when
cgroup_rstat_cpu_pop_updated() is being called. The subsequent flushing
operation which can take a much longer time does not need that protection
as it is already protected by cgroup_rstat_lock.
To reduce the cpu_lock hold time, we need to perform all the
cgroup_rstat_cpu_pop_updated() calls up front with the lock
released afterward before doing any flushing. This patch adds a new
cgroup_rstat_updated_list() function to return a singly linked list of
cgroups to be flushed.
Some instrumentation code are added to measure the cpu_lock hold time
right after lock acquisition to after releasing the lock. Parallel
kernel build on a 2-socket x86-64 server is used as the benchmarking
tool for measuring the lock hold time.
The maximum cpu_lock hold time before and after the patch are 100us and
29us respectively. So the worst case time is reduced to about 30% of
the original. However, there may be some OS or hardware noises like NMI
or SMI in the test system that can worsen the worst case value. Those
noises are usually tuned out in a real production environment to get
a better result.
OTOH, the lock hold time frequency distribution should give a better
idea of the performance benefit of the patch. Below were the frequency
distribution before and after the patch:
Hold time Before patch After patch
--------- ------------ -----------
0-01 us 804,139 13,738,708
01-05 us 9,772,767 1,177,194
05-10 us 4,595,028 4,984
10-15 us 303,481 3,562
15-20 us 78,971 1,314
20-25 us 24,583 18
25-30 us 6,908 12
30-40 us 8,015
40-50 us 2,192
50-60 us 316
60-70 us 43
70-80 us 7
80-90 us 2
>90 us 3
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosryahmed@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
|
|
wq_unbound_cpumask
When the "isolcpus" boot command line option is used to add a set
of isolated CPUs, those CPUs will be excluded automatically from
wq_unbound_cpumask to avoid running work functions from unbound
workqueues.
Recently cpuset has been extended to allow the creation of partitions
of isolated CPUs dynamically. To make it closer to the "isolcpus"
in functionality, the CPUs in those isolated cpuset partitions should be
excluded from wq_unbound_cpumask as well. This can be done currently by
explicitly writing to the workqueue's cpumask sysfs file after creating
the isolated partitions. However, this process can be error prone.
Ideally, the cpuset code should be allowed to request the workqueue code
to exclude those isolated CPUs from wq_unbound_cpumask so that this
operation can be done automatically and the isolated CPUs will be returned
back to wq_unbound_cpumask after the destructions of the isolated
cpuset partitions.
This patch adds a new workqueue_unbound_exclude_cpumask() function to
enable that. This new function will exclude the specified isolated
CPUs from wq_unbound_cpumask. To be able to restore those isolated
CPUs back after the destruction of isolated cpuset partitions, a new
wq_requested_unbound_cpumask is added to store the user provided unbound
cpumask either from the boot command line options or from writing to
the cpumask sysfs file. This new cpumask provides the basis for CPU
exclusion.
To enable users to understand how the wq_unbound_cpumask is being
modified internally, this patch also exposes the newly introduced
wq_requested_unbound_cpumask as well as a wq_isolated_cpumask to
store the cpumask to be excluded from wq_unbound_cpumask as read-only
sysfs files.
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
|
|
2b8272ff4a70 ("cpu/hotplug: Prevent self deadlock on CPU hot-unplug")
solved the straight forward CPU hotplug deadlock vs. the scheduler
bandwidth timer. Yu discovered a more involved variant where a task which
has a bandwidth timer started on the outgoing CPU holds a lock and then
gets throttled. If the lock required by one of the CPU hotplug callbacks
the hotplug operation deadlocks because the unthrottling timer event is not
handled on the dying CPU and can only be recovered once the control CPU
reaches the hotplug state which pulls the pending hrtimers from the dead
CPU.
Solve this by pushing the hrtimers away from the dying CPU in the dying
callbacks. Nothing can queue a hrtimer on the dying CPU at that point because
all other CPUs spin in stop_machine() with interrupts disabled and once the
operation is finished the CPU is marked offline.
Reported-by: Yu Liao <liaoyu15@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Liu Tie <liutie4@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87a5rphara.ffs@tglx
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-trace
Pull probes fixes from Masami Hiramatsu:
- Documentation update: Add a note about argument and return value
fetching is the best effort because it depends on the type.
- objpool: Fix to make internal global variables static in
test_objpool.c.
- kprobes: Unify kprobes_exceptions_nofify() prototypes. There are the
same prototypes in asm/kprobes.h for some architectures, but some of
them are missing the prototype and it causes a warning. So move the
prototype into linux/kprobes.h.
- tracing: Fix to check the tracepoint event and return event at
parsing stage. The tracepoint event doesn't support %return but if
$retval exists, it will be converted to %return silently. This finds
that case and rejects it.
- tracing: Fix the order of the descriptions about the parameters of
__kprobe_event_gen_cmd_start() to be consistent with the argument
list of the function.
* tag 'probes-fixes-v6.7-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-trace:
tracing/kprobes: Fix the order of argument descriptions
tracing: fprobe-event: Fix to check tracepoint event and return
kprobes: unify kprobes_exceptions_nofify() prototypes
lib: test_objpool: make global variables static
Documentation: tracing: Add a note about argument and retval access
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/broonie/spi
Pull spi fixes from Mark Brown:
"A couple of fixes that came in during the merge window: one Kconfig
dependency fix and another fix for a long standing issue where a sync
transfer races with system suspend"
* tag 'spi-fix-v6.7-merge-window' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/broonie/spi:
spi: Fix null dereference on suspend
spi: spi-zynq-qspi: add spi-mem to driver kconfig dependencies
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Pull MMC fixes from Ulf Hansson:
"MMC core:
- Fix broken cache-flush support for Micron eMMCs
- Revert 'mmc: core: Capture correct oemid-bits for eMMC cards'
MMC host:
- sdhci_am654: Fix TAP value parsing for legacy speed mode
- sdhci-pci-gli: Fix support for ASPM mode for GL9755/GL9750
- vub300: Fix an error path in probe"
* tag 'mmc-v6.7-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ulfh/mmc:
mmc: sdhci-pci-gli: GL9750: Mask the replay timer timeout of AER
mmc: sdhci-pci-gli: GL9755: Mask the replay timer timeout of AER
Revert "mmc: core: Capture correct oemid-bits for eMMC cards"
mmc: vub300: fix an error code
mmc: Add quirk MMC_QUIRK_BROKEN_CACHE_FLUSH for Micron eMMC Q2J54A
mmc: sdhci_am654: fix start loop index for TAP value parsing
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/thierry.reding/linux-pwm
Pull pwm fixes from Thierry Reding:
"This contains two very small fixes that I failed to include in the
main pull request"
* tag 'pwm/for-6.7-rc1-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/thierry.reding/linux-pwm:
pwm: Fix double shift bug
pwm: samsung: Fix a bit test in pwm_samsung_resume()
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Pull block fixes from Jens Axboe:
- NVMe pull request via Keith:
- nvme keyring config compile fixes (Hannes and Arnd)
- fabrics keep alive fixes (Hannes)
- tcp authentication fixes (Mark)
- io_uring_cmd error handling fix (Anuj)
- stale firmware attribute fix (Daniel)
- tcp memory leak (Christophe)
- crypto library usage simplification (Eric)
- nbd use-after-free fix. May need a followup, but at least it's better
than what it was before (Li)
- Rate limit write on read-only device warnings (Yu)
* tag 'block-6.7-2023-11-10' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux:
nvme: keyring: fix conditional compilation
nvme: common: make keyring and auth separate modules
blk-core: use pr_warn_ratelimited() in bio_check_ro()
nbd: fix uaf in nbd_open
nvme: start keep-alive after admin queue setup
nvme-loop: always quiesce and cancel commands before destroying admin q
nvme-tcp: avoid open-coding nvme_tcp_teardown_admin_queue()
nvme-auth: always set valid seq_num in dhchap reply
nvme-auth: add flag for bi-directional auth
nvme-auth: auth success1 msg always includes resp
nvme: fix error-handling for io_uring nvme-passthrough
nvme: update firmware version after commit
nvme-tcp: Fix a memory leak
nvme-auth: use crypto_shash_tfm_digest()
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git://git.infradead.org/users/hch/dma-mapping
Pull dma-mapping fixes from Christoph Hellwig:
- don't leave pages decrypted for DMA in encrypted memory setups linger
around on failure (Petr Tesarik)
- fix an out of bounds access in the new dynamic swiotlb code (Petr
Tesarik)
- fix dma_addressing_limited for systems with weird physical memory
layouts (Jia He)
* tag 'dma-mapping-6.7-2023-11-10' of git://git.infradead.org/users/hch/dma-mapping:
swiotlb: fix out-of-bounds TLB allocations with CONFIG_SWIOTLB_DYNAMIC
dma-mapping: fix dma_addressing_limited() if dma_range_map can't cover all system RAM
dma-mapping: move dma_addressing_limited() out of line
swiotlb: do not free decrypted pages if dynamic
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore:
"We've got two small patches to correct the default return
value of two LSM hooks: security_vm_enough_memory_mm() and
security_inode_getsecctx()"
* tag 'lsm-pr-20231109' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
lsm: fix default return value for inode_getsecctx
lsm: fix default return value for vm_enough_memory
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Pull ceph updates from Ilya Dryomov:
- support for idmapped mounts in CephFS (Christian Brauner, Alexander
Mikhalitsyn).
The series was originally developed by Christian and later picked up
and brought over the finish line by Alexander, who also contributed
an enabler on the MDS side (separate owner_{u,g}id fields on the
wire).
The required exports for mnt_idmap_{get,put}() in VFS have been acked
by Christian and received no objection from Christoph.
- a churny change in CephFS logging to include cluster and client
identifiers in log and debug messages (Xiubo Li).
This would help in scenarios with dozens of CephFS mounts on the same
node which are getting increasingly common, especially in the
Kubernetes world.
* tag 'ceph-for-6.7-rc1' of https://github.com/ceph/ceph-client:
ceph: allow idmapped mounts
ceph: allow idmapped atomic_open inode op
ceph: allow idmapped set_acl inode op
ceph: allow idmapped setattr inode op
ceph: pass idmap to __ceph_setattr
ceph: allow idmapped permission inode op
ceph: allow idmapped getattr inode op
ceph: pass an idmapping to mknod/symlink/mkdir
ceph: add enable_unsafe_idmap module parameter
ceph: handle idmapped mounts in create_request_message()
ceph: stash idmapping in mdsc request
fs: export mnt_idmap_get/mnt_idmap_put
libceph, ceph: move mdsmap.h to fs/ceph
ceph: print cluster fsid and client global_id in all debug logs
ceph: rename _to_client() to _to_fs_client()
ceph: pass the mdsc to several helpers
libceph: add doutc and *_client debug macros support
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Pull MIPS updates from Thomas Bogendoerfer:
- removed AR7 platform support
- cleanups and fixes
* tag 'mips_6.7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mips/linux:
MIPS: AR7: remove platform
watchdog: ar7_wdt: remove driver to prepare for platform removal
vlynq: remove bus driver
mtd: parsers: ar7: remove support
serial: 8250: remove AR7 support
arch: mips: remove ReiserFS from defconfig
MIPS: lantiq: Remove unnecessary include of <linux/of_irq.h>
MIPS: lantiq: Fix pcibios_plat_dev_init() "no previous prototype" warning
MIPS: KVM: Fix a build warning about variable set but not used
MIPS: Remove dead code in relocate_new_kernel
mips: dts: ralink: mt7621: rename to GnuBee GB-PC1 and GnuBee GB-PC2
mips: dts: ralink: mt7621: define each reset as an item
mips: dts: ingenic: Remove unneeded probe-type properties
MIPS: loongson32: Remove dma.h and nand.h
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https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup into bpf-next
Merge cgroup prerequisite patches.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231029061438.4215-1-laoar.shao@gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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The kernel supports a minimum GCC version of 5.1.0 for building. However,
the "__diag_ignore_all" directive only suppresses the
"-Wmissing-prototypes" warning for GCC versions >= 8.0.0. As a result, when
building the kernel with older GCC versions, warnings may be triggered. The
example below illustrates the warnings reported by the kernel test robot
using GCC 7.5.0:
compiler: gcc-7 (Ubuntu 7.5.0-6ubuntu2) 7.5.0
All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>):
kernel/bpf/helpers.c:1893:19: warning: no previous prototype for 'bpf_obj_new_impl' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
__bpf_kfunc void *bpf_obj_new_impl(u64 local_type_id__k, void *meta__ign)
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
kernel/bpf/helpers.c:1907:19: warning: no previous prototype for 'bpf_percpu_obj_new_impl' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
__bpf_kfunc void *bpf_percpu_obj_new_impl(u64 local_type_id__k, void *meta__ign)
[...]
To address this, we should also suppress the "-Wmissing-prototypes" warning
for older GCC versions. "#pragma GCC diagnostic push" is supported as
of GCC 4.6, and both "-Wmissing-prototypes" and "-Wmissing-declarations"
are supported for all the GCC versions that we currently support.
Therefore, it is reasonable to suppress these warnings for all supported
GCC versions.
With this adjustment, it's important to note that after implementing
"__diag_ignore_all", it will effectively suppress warnings for all the
supported GCC versions.
In the future, if you wish to suppress warnings that are only supported on
higher GCC versions, it is advisable to explicitly use "__diag_ignore" to
specify the GCC version you are targeting.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202311031651.A7crZEur-lkp@intel.com/
Suggested-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Cc: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231106031802.4188-1-laoar.shao@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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