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Manually verify that the device is not a partition and the caller has admin
privіleges at the beginning of the sr ioctl method and open code the
trivial check for sd as well.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210724072033.1284840-11-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
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Open code scsi_cmd_blk_ioctl() in its two callers.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210724072033.1284840-10-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
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Daniel Borkmann says:
====================
pull-request: bpf 2021-07-29
The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net* tree.
We've added 9 non-merge commits during the last 14 day(s) which contain
a total of 20 files changed, 446 insertions(+), 138 deletions(-).
The main changes are:
1) Fix UBSAN out-of-bounds splat for showing XDP link fdinfo, from Lorenz Bauer.
2) Fix insufficient Spectre v4 mitigation in BPF runtime, from Daniel Borkmann,
Piotr Krysiuk and Benedict Schlueter.
3) Batch of fixes for BPF sockmap found under stress testing, from John Fastabend.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Spectre v4 gadgets make use of memory disambiguation, which is a set of
techniques that execute memory access instructions, that is, loads and
stores, out of program order; Intel's optimization manual, section 2.4.4.5:
A load instruction micro-op may depend on a preceding store. Many
microarchitectures block loads until all preceding store addresses are
known. The memory disambiguator predicts which loads will not depend on
any previous stores. When the disambiguator predicts that a load does
not have such a dependency, the load takes its data from the L1 data
cache. Eventually, the prediction is verified. If an actual conflict is
detected, the load and all succeeding instructions are re-executed.
af86ca4e3088 ("bpf: Prevent memory disambiguation attack") tried to mitigate
this attack by sanitizing the memory locations through preemptive "fast"
(low latency) stores of zero prior to the actual "slow" (high latency) store
of a pointer value such that upon dependency misprediction the CPU then
speculatively executes the load of the pointer value and retrieves the zero
value instead of the attacker controlled scalar value previously stored at
that location, meaning, subsequent access in the speculative domain is then
redirected to the "zero page".
The sanitized preemptive store of zero prior to the actual "slow" store is
done through a simple ST instruction based on r10 (frame pointer) with
relative offset to the stack location that the verifier has been tracking
on the original used register for STX, which does not have to be r10. Thus,
there are no memory dependencies for this store, since it's only using r10
and immediate constant of zero; hence af86ca4e3088 /assumed/ a low latency
operation.
However, a recent attack demonstrated that this mitigation is not sufficient
since the preemptive store of zero could also be turned into a "slow" store
and is thus bypassed as well:
[...]
// r2 = oob address (e.g. scalar)
// r7 = pointer to map value
31: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r2
// r9 will remain "fast" register, r10 will become "slow" register below
32: (bf) r9 = r10
// JIT maps BPF reg to x86 reg:
// r9 -> r15 (callee saved)
// r10 -> rbp
// train store forward prediction to break dependency link between both r9
// and r10 by evicting them from the predictor's LRU table.
33: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +24576)
34: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29696) = r0
35: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +24580)
36: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29700) = r0
37: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +24584)
38: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29704) = r0
39: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +24588)
40: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29708) = r0
[...]
543: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +25596)
544: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +30716) = r0
// prepare call to bpf_ringbuf_output() helper. the latter will cause rbp
// to spill to stack memory while r13/r14/r15 (all callee saved regs) remain
// in hardware registers. rbp becomes slow due to push/pop latency. below is
// disasm of bpf_ringbuf_output() helper for better visual context:
//
// ffffffff8117ee20: 41 54 push r12
// ffffffff8117ee22: 55 push rbp
// ffffffff8117ee23: 53 push rbx
// ffffffff8117ee24: 48 f7 c1 fc ff ff ff test rcx,0xfffffffffffffffc
// ffffffff8117ee2b: 0f 85 af 00 00 00 jne ffffffff8117eee0 <-- jump taken
// [...]
// ffffffff8117eee0: 49 c7 c4 ea ff ff ff mov r12,0xffffffffffffffea
// ffffffff8117eee7: 5b pop rbx
// ffffffff8117eee8: 5d pop rbp
// ffffffff8117eee9: 4c 89 e0 mov rax,r12
// ffffffff8117eeec: 41 5c pop r12
// ffffffff8117eeee: c3 ret
545: (18) r1 = map[id:4]
547: (bf) r2 = r7
548: (b7) r3 = 0
549: (b7) r4 = 4
550: (85) call bpf_ringbuf_output#194288
// instruction 551 inserted by verifier \
551: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = 0 | /both/ are now slow stores here
// storing map value pointer r7 at fp-16 | since value of r10 is "slow".
552: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r7 /
// following "fast" read to the same memory location, but due to dependency
// misprediction it will speculatively execute before insn 551/552 completes.
553: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r9 -16)
// in speculative domain contains attacker controlled r2. in non-speculative
// domain this contains r7, and thus accesses r7 +0 below.
554: (71) r3 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0)
// leak r3
As can be seen, the current speculative store bypass mitigation which the
verifier inserts at line 551 is insufficient since /both/, the write of
the zero sanitation as well as the map value pointer are a high latency
instruction due to prior memory access via push/pop of r10 (rbp) in contrast
to the low latency read in line 553 as r9 (r15) which stays in hardware
registers. Thus, architecturally, fp-16 is r7, however, microarchitecturally,
fp-16 can still be r2.
Initial thoughts to address this issue was to track spilled pointer loads
from stack and enforce their load via LDX through r10 as well so that /both/
the preemptive store of zero /as well as/ the load use the /same/ register
such that a dependency is created between the store and load. However, this
option is not sufficient either since it can be bypassed as well under
speculation. An updated attack with pointer spill/fills now _all_ based on
r10 would look as follows:
[...]
// r2 = oob address (e.g. scalar)
// r7 = pointer to map value
[...]
// longer store forward prediction training sequence than before.
2062: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +25588)
2063: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +30708) = r0
2064: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +25592)
2065: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +30712) = r0
2066: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +25596)
2067: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +30716) = r0
// store the speculative load address (scalar) this time after the store
// forward prediction training.
2068: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r2
// preoccupy the CPU store port by running sequence of dummy stores.
2069: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29696) = r0
2070: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29700) = r0
2071: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29704) = r0
2072: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29708) = r0
2073: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29712) = r0
2074: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29716) = r0
2075: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29720) = r0
2076: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29724) = r0
2077: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29728) = r0
2078: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29732) = r0
2079: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29736) = r0
2080: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29740) = r0
2081: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29744) = r0
2082: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29748) = r0
2083: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29752) = r0
2084: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29756) = r0
2085: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29760) = r0
2086: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29764) = r0
2087: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29768) = r0
2088: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29772) = r0
2089: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29776) = r0
2090: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29780) = r0
2091: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29784) = r0
2092: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29788) = r0
2093: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29792) = r0
2094: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29796) = r0
2095: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29800) = r0
2096: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29804) = r0
2097: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29808) = r0
2098: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29812) = r0
// overwrite scalar with dummy pointer; same as before, also including the
// sanitation store with 0 from the current mitigation by the verifier.
2099: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = 0 | /both/ are now slow stores here
2100: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r7 | since store unit is still busy.
// load from stack intended to bypass stores.
2101: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16)
2102: (71) r3 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0)
// leak r3
[...]
Looking at the CPU microarchitecture, the scheduler might issue loads (such
as seen in line 2101) before stores (line 2099,2100) because the load execution
units become available while the store execution unit is still busy with the
sequence of dummy stores (line 2069-2098). And so the load may use the prior
stored scalar from r2 at address r10 -16 for speculation. The updated attack
may work less reliable on CPU microarchitectures where loads and stores share
execution resources.
This concludes that the sanitizing with zero stores from af86ca4e3088 ("bpf:
Prevent memory disambiguation attack") is insufficient. Moreover, the detection
of stack reuse from af86ca4e3088 where previously data (STACK_MISC) has been
written to a given stack slot where a pointer value is now to be stored does
not have sufficient coverage as precondition for the mitigation either; for
several reasons outlined as follows:
1) Stack content from prior program runs could still be preserved and is
therefore not "random", best example is to split a speculative store
bypass attack between tail calls, program A would prepare and store the
oob address at a given stack slot and then tail call into program B which
does the "slow" store of a pointer to the stack with subsequent "fast"
read. From program B PoV such stack slot type is STACK_INVALID, and
therefore also must be subject to mitigation.
2) The STACK_SPILL must not be coupled to register_is_const(&stack->spilled_ptr)
condition, for example, the previous content of that memory location could
also be a pointer to map or map value. Without the fix, a speculative
store bypass is not mitigated in such precondition and can then lead to
a type confusion in the speculative domain leaking kernel memory near
these pointer types.
While brainstorming on various alternative mitigation possibilities, we also
stumbled upon a retrospective from Chrome developers [0]:
[...] For variant 4, we implemented a mitigation to zero the unused memory
of the heap prior to allocation, which cost about 1% when done concurrently
and 4% for scavenging. Variant 4 defeats everything we could think of. We
explored more mitigations for variant 4 but the threat proved to be more
pervasive and dangerous than we anticipated. For example, stack slots used
by the register allocator in the optimizing compiler could be subject to
type confusion, leading to pointer crafting. Mitigating type confusion for
stack slots alone would have required a complete redesign of the backend of
the optimizing compiler, perhaps man years of work, without a guarantee of
completeness. [...]
From BPF side, the problem space is reduced, however, options are rather
limited. One idea that has been explored was to xor-obfuscate pointer spills
to the BPF stack:
[...]
// preoccupy the CPU store port by running sequence of dummy stores.
[...]
2106: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29796) = r0
2107: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29800) = r0
2108: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29804) = r0
2109: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29808) = r0
2110: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29812) = r0
// overwrite scalar with dummy pointer; xored with random 'secret' value
// of 943576462 before store ...
2111: (b4) w11 = 943576462
2112: (af) r11 ^= r7
2113: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r11
2114: (79) r11 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16)
2115: (b4) w2 = 943576462
2116: (af) r2 ^= r11
// ... and restored with the same 'secret' value with the help of AX reg.
2117: (71) r3 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0)
[...]
While the above would not prevent speculation, it would make data leakage
infeasible by directing it to random locations. In order to be effective
and prevent type confusion under speculation, such random secret would have
to be regenerated for each store. The additional complexity involved for a
tracking mechanism that prevents jumps such that restoring spilled pointers
would not get corrupted is not worth the gain for unprivileged. Hence, the
fix in here eventually opted for emitting a non-public BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC
instruction which the x86 JIT translates into a lfence opcode. Inserting the
latter in between the store and load instruction is one of the mitigations
options [1]. The x86 instruction manual notes:
[...] An LFENCE that follows an instruction that stores to memory might
complete before the data being stored have become globally visible. [...]
The latter meaning that the preceding store instruction finished execution
and the store is at minimum guaranteed to be in the CPU's store queue, but
it's not guaranteed to be in that CPU's L1 cache at that point (globally
visible). The latter would only be guaranteed via sfence. So the load which
is guaranteed to execute after the lfence for that local CPU would have to
rely on store-to-load forwarding. [2], in section 2.3 on store buffers says:
[...] For every store operation that is added to the ROB, an entry is
allocated in the store buffer. This entry requires both the virtual and
physical address of the target. Only if there is no free entry in the store
buffer, the frontend stalls until there is an empty slot available in the
store buffer again. Otherwise, the CPU can immediately continue adding
subsequent instructions to the ROB and execute them out of order. On Intel
CPUs, the store buffer has up to 56 entries. [...]
One small upside on the fix is that it lifts constraints from af86ca4e3088
where the sanitize_stack_off relative to r10 must be the same when coming
from different paths. The BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC gets emitted after a BPF_STX
or BPF_ST instruction. This happens either when we store a pointer or data
value to the BPF stack for the first time, or upon later pointer spills.
The former needs to be enforced since otherwise stale stack data could be
leaked under speculation as outlined earlier. For non-x86 JITs the BPF_ST |
BPF_NOSPEC mapping is currently optimized away, but others could emit a
speculation barrier as well if necessary. For real-world unprivileged
programs e.g. generated by LLVM, pointer spill/fill is only generated upon
register pressure and LLVM only tries to do that for pointers which are not
used often. The program main impact will be the initial BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC
sanitation for the STACK_INVALID case when the first write to a stack slot
occurs e.g. upon map lookup. In future we might refine ways to mitigate
the latter cost.
[0] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1902.05178.pdf
[1] https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2018/05/21/analysis-and-mitigation-of-speculative-store-bypass-cve-2018-3639/
[2] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1905.05725.pdf
Fixes: af86ca4e3088 ("bpf: Prevent memory disambiguation attack")
Fixes: f7cf25b2026d ("bpf: track spill/fill of constants")
Co-developed-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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In case of JITs, each of the JIT backends compiles the BPF nospec instruction
/either/ to a machine instruction which emits a speculation barrier /or/ to
/no/ machine instruction in case the underlying architecture is not affected
by Speculative Store Bypass or has different mitigations in place already.
This covers both x86 and (implicitly) arm64: In case of x86, we use 'lfence'
instruction for mitigation. In case of arm64, we rely on the firmware mitigation
as controlled via the ssbd kernel parameter. Whenever the mitigation is enabled,
it works for all of the kernel code with no need to provide any additional
instructions here (hence only comment in arm64 JIT). Other archs can follow
as needed. The BPF nospec instruction is specifically targeting Spectre v4
since i) we don't use a serialization barrier for the Spectre v1 case, and
ii) mitigation instructions for v1 and v4 might be different on some archs.
The BPF nospec is required for a future commit, where the BPF verifier does
annotate intermediate BPF programs with speculation barriers.
Co-developed-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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The load_rsc_table was removed since the
commit c1d35c1ab424 ("remoteproc: Rename "load_rsc_table" to "parse_fw"")
but got added back again by mistake in the below commit:
commit b1a17513a2d6 ("remoteproc: add vendor resources handling").
The patch fixed a small code indent issue which not worth
a separate patch.
Fixes: b1a17513a2d6 ("remoteproc: add vendor resources handling")
Signed-off-by: Dong Aisheng <aisheng.dong@nxp.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210706142156.952794-2-aisheng.dong@nxp.com
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org>
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The nubus core ignores the return value of the remove callback (in
nubus_device_remove()) and all implementers return 0 anyway.
So make it impossible for future drivers to return an unused error code
by changing the remove prototype to return void.
Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de>
Acked-by: Finn Thain <fthain@linux-m68k.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210727080840.3550927-3-u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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The upcoming paranoid L1D flush infrastructure allows to conditionally
(opt-in) flush L1D in switch_mm() as a defense against potential new side
channels or for paranoia reasons. As the flush makes only sense when a task
runs on a non-SMT enabled core, because SMT siblings share L1, the
switch_mm() logic will kill a task which is flagged for L1D flush when it
is running on a SMT thread.
Add a taskwork callback so switch_mm() can queue a SIG_KILL command which
is invoked when the task tries to return to user space.
Signed-off-by: Balbir Singh <sblbir@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210108121056.21940-1-sblbir@amazon.com
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If backlog handler is running during a tear down operation we may enqueue
data on the ingress msg queue while tear down is trying to free it.
sk_psock_backlog()
sk_psock_handle_skb()
skb_psock_skb_ingress()
sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue()
sk_psock_queue_msg(psock,msg)
spin_lock(ingress_lock)
sk_psock_zap_ingress()
_sk_psock_purge_ingerss_msg()
_sk_psock_purge_ingress_msg()
-- free ingress_msg list --
spin_unlock(ingress_lock)
spin_lock(ingress_lock)
list_add_tail(msg,ingress_msg) <- entry on list with no one
left to free it.
spin_unlock(ingress_lock)
To fix we only enqueue from backlog if the ENABLED bit is set. The tear
down logic clears the bit with ingress_lock set so we wont enqueue the
msg in the last step.
Fixes: 799aa7f98d53 ("skmsg: Avoid lock_sock() in sk_psock_backlog()")
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210727160500.1713554-4-john.fastabend@gmail.com
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The LPT stands for Lynxpoint PCH. However the driver is used on a few
Intel Atom SoCs. Rename it to reflect this in a way how another clock
driver, i.e. clk-pmc-atom, is called.
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210722193450.35321-1-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup
Pull cgroup fix from Tejun Heo:
"Fix leak of filesystem context root which is triggered by LTP.
Not too likely to be a problem in non-testing environments"
* 'for-5.14-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup:
cgroup1: fix leaked context root causing sporadic NULL deref in LTP
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All other user triggered operations are gone from ndo_ioctl, so move
the SIOCBOND family into a custom operation as well.
The .ndo_ioctl() helper is no longer called by the dev_ioctl.c code now,
but there are still a few definitions in obsolete wireless drivers as well
as the appletalk and ieee802154 layers to call SIOCSIFADDR/SIOCGIFADDR
helpers from inside the kernel.
Cc: Jay Vosburgh <j.vosburgh@gmail.com>
Cc: Veaceslav Falico <vfalico@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Working towards obsoleting the .ndo_do_ioctl operation entirely,
stop passing the SIOCBRADDIF/SIOCBRDELIF device ioctl commands
into this callback.
My first attempt was to add another ndo_siocbr() callback, but
as there is only a single driver that takes these commands and
there is already a hook mechanism to call directly into this
driver, extend this hook instead, and use it for both the
deviceless and the device specific ioctl commands.
Cc: Roopa Prabhu <roopa@nvidia.com>
Cc: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@nvidia.com>
Cc: bridge@lists.linux-foundation.org
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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In order to further reduce the scope of ndo_do_ioctl(), move
out the SIOCWANDEV handling into a new network device operation
function.
Adjust the prototype to only pass the if_settings sub-structure
in place of the ifreq, and remove the redundant 'cmd' argument
in the process.
Cc: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
Cc: "Jan \"Yenya\" Kasprzak" <kas@fi.muni.cz>
Cc: Kevin Curtis <kevin.curtis@farsite.co.uk>
Cc: Zhao Qiang <qiang.zhao@nxp.com>
Cc: Martin Schiller <ms@dev.tdt.de>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-x25@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Most users of ndo_do_ioctl are ethernet drivers that implement
the MII commands SIOCGMIIPHY/SIOCGMIIREG/SIOCSMIIREG, or hardware
timestamping with SIOCSHWTSTAMP/SIOCGHWTSTAMP.
Separate these from the few drivers that use ndo_do_ioctl to
implement SIOCBOND, SIOCBR and SIOCWANDEV commands.
This is a purely cosmetic change intended to help readers find
their way through the implementation.
Cc: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Cc: Jay Vosburgh <j.vosburgh@gmail.com>
Cc: Veaceslav Falico <vfalico@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
Cc: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Cc: Vivien Didelot <vivien.didelot@gmail.com>
Cc: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Cc: Vladimir Oltean <olteanv@gmail.com>
Cc: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The compat handlers for SIOCDEVPRIVATE are incorrect for any driver that
passes data as part of struct ifreq rather than as an ifr_data pointer, or
that passes data back this way, since the compat_ifr_data_ioctl() helper
overwrites the ifr_data pointer and does not copy anything back out.
Since all drivers using devprivate commands are now converted to the
new .ndo_siocdevprivate callback, fix this by adding the missing piece
and passing the pointer separately the whole way.
This further unifies the native and compat logic for socket ioctls,
as the new code now passes the correct pointer as well as the correct
data for both native and compat ioctls.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
hamradio uses a set of private ioctls that do seem to work
correctly in compat mode, as they only rely on the ifr_data
pointer.
Move them over to the ndo_siocdevprivate callback as a cleanup.
Cc: Thomas Sailer <t.sailer@alumni.ethz.ch>
Cc: Joerg Reuter <jreuter@yaina.de>
Cc: Jean-Paul Roubelat <jpr@f6fbb.org>
Cc: linux-hams@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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|
SIOCDEVPRIVATE ioctl commands are mainly used in really old
drivers, and they have a number of problems:
- They hide behind the normal .ndo_do_ioctl function that
is also used for other things in modern drivers, so it's
hard to spot a driver that actually uses one of these
- Since drivers use a number different calling conventions,
it is impossible to support compat mode for them in
a generic way.
- With all drivers using the same 16 commands codes, there
is no way to introspect the data being passed through
things like strace.
Add a new net_device_ops callback pointer, to address the
first two of these. Separating them from .ndo_do_ioctl
makes it easy to grep for drivers with a .ndo_siocdevprivate
callback, and the unwieldy name hopefully makes it easier
to spot in code review.
By passing the ifreq structure and the ifr_data pointer
separately, it is no longer necessary to overload these,
and the driver can use either one for a given command.
Cc: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mdf/linux-fpga into char-misc-next
Moritz writes:
FPGA Manager Changes for 5.15-rc1
FPGA Manager
- Navin's change removes a duplicate word in a comment
- Tom's change fixes a spelling mistake
- Mauro's change fixes up documentation
- Tom's second set adds wrappers to allow drivers not having to
implement empty functions by moving checks into fpga-mgr core code
- My changes address a bunch of warnings
DFL
- Martin's change adds a new PCI ID for Silicom N501x PAC cards
All patches have been reviewed on the mailing list, and have been in the
last linux-next releases (as part of my for-next branch).
I did get a complaint about one of the commit messages w/ a Fixes: tags
which has been addressed.
Signed-offy-by: Moritz Fischer <mdf@kernel.org>
* tag 'fpga-for-5.15-early' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mdf/linux-fpga:
fpga: fpga-mgr: wrap the write_sg() op
fpga: fpga-mgr: wrap the fpga_remove() op
fpga: fpga-mgr: wrap the state() op
fpga: fpga-mgr: wrap the status() op
fpga: fpga-mgr: wrap the write() op
fpga: fpga-mgr: make write_complete() op optional
fpga: fpga-mgr: wrap the write_init() op
fpga: zynqmp-fpga: Address warning about unused variable
fpga: xilinx-pr-decoupler: Address warning about unused variable
fpga: xiilnx-spi: Address warning about unused variable
fpga: altera-freeze-bridge: Address warning about unused variable
fpga: dfl: pci: add device IDs for Silicom N501x PAC cards
fpga: fpga-bridge: removed repeated word
fpga: fix spelling mistakes
docs: driver-api: fpga: avoid using UTF-8 chars
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Remove redundant prefix "cmd_" from name of members in struct kdbtab_t
for better readibility.
Suggested-by: Doug Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210712134620.276667-5-sumit.garg@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org>
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Commit e4f291b3f7bb ("kdb: Simplify kdb commands registration")
allowed registration of pre-allocated kdb commands with pointer to
struct kdbtab_t. Lets switch other users as well to register pre-
allocated kdb commands via:
- Changing prototype for kdb_register() to pass a pointer to struct
kdbtab_t instead.
- Embed kdbtab_t structure in kdb_macro_t rather than individual params.
With these changes kdb_register_flags() becomes redundant and hence
removed. Also, since we have switched all users to register
pre-allocated commands, "is_dynamic" flag in struct kdbtab_t becomes
redundant and hence removed as well.
Suggested-by: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210712134620.276667-3-sumit.garg@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org>
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The HNP work can be re-scheduled while it's still in-fly. This results in
re-initialization of the busy work, resetting the hrtimer's list node of
the work and crashing kernel with null dereference within kernel/timer
once work's timer is expired. It's very easy to trigger this problem by
re-plugging USB cable quickly. Initialize HNP work only once to fix this
trouble.
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000126)
...
PC is at __run_timers.part.0+0x150/0x228
LR is at __next_timer_interrupt+0x51/0x9c
...
(__run_timers.part.0) from [<c0187a2b>] (run_timer_softirq+0x2f/0x50)
(run_timer_softirq) from [<c01013ad>] (__do_softirq+0xd5/0x2f0)
(__do_softirq) from [<c012589b>] (irq_exit+0xab/0xb8)
(irq_exit) from [<c0170341>] (handle_domain_irq+0x45/0x60)
(handle_domain_irq) from [<c04c4a43>] (gic_handle_irq+0x6b/0x7c)
(gic_handle_irq) from [<c0100b65>] (__irq_svc+0x65/0xac)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Peter Chen <peter.chen@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Osipenko <digetx@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210717182134.30262-6-digetx@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Add helper to get "role-switch-default-mode", and convert it
to the corresponding enum usb_dr_mode
Signed-off-by: Chunfeng Yun <chunfeng.yun@mediatek.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1626340078-29111-6-git-send-email-chunfeng.yun@mediatek.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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This helps to remove conflict on idxd driver
Conflicts:
drivers/dma/idxd/sysfs.c
drivers/dma/idxd/bus.c
Greg says:
Bus: Make remove callback return void tag
Tag for other trees/branches to pull from in order to have a stable
place to build off of if they want to add new busses for 5.15.
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
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The console variable is used everywhere in some fun pointer path and
array indexes and for some reason isn't always declared as unsigned.
This plays havoc with some static analysis tools so mark the variable as
unsigned so we "know" we can not wrap the arrays backwards here.
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Reported-by: Jordy Zomer <jordy@pwning.systems>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210726134322.2274919-2-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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put_tty_driver() is an alias for tty_driver_kref_put(). There is no need
for two exported identical functions, therefore switch all users of
old put_tty_driver() to new tty_driver_kref_put() and remove the former
for good.
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Anton Ivanov <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Samuel Iglesias Gonsalvez <siglesias@igalia.com>
Cc: Jens Taprogge <jens.taprogge@taprogge.org>
Cc: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
Cc: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Cc: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: David Lin <dtwlin@gmail.com>
Cc: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Cc: Alex Elder <elder@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org>
Cc: Laurentiu Tudor <laurentiu.tudor@nxp.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Cc: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>
Cc: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>
Cc: Pengutronix Kernel Team <kernel@pengutronix.de>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <festevam@gmail.com>
Cc: NXP Linux Team <linux-imx@nxp.com>
Cc: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com>
Cc: Felipe Balbi <balbi@kernel.org>
Cc: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman@intel.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Cc: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.dentz@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alex Elder <elder@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Acked-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Acked-by: Samuel Iglesias Gonsálvez <siglesias@igalia.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210723074317.32690-8-jslaby@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Since commit f34d7a5b7010 (tty: The big operations rework) in 2008,
tty_set_operations() is a simple one-line assignment. There is no reason
for this to be an exported function, hence move it to a header and make
an inline from that.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210723074317.32690-7-jslaby@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Noone uses this deprecated function now. So we can remove it.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210723074317.32690-6-jslaby@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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tty_flip.h currently includes whole tty.h. In fact, it needs only
tty_buffer and tty_port definitions. Provided, we separated tty_buffer
and tty_port into separate headers in the previous patch, we can make
tty_flip.h to include only much lighter tty_buffer.h and tty_port.h.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210723103147.18250-9-jslaby@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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tty.h is long enough already. And I am slowly adding kernel-doc
documentation, so it grows to unmaintainable long mess. To avoid this,
split tty.h further into tty_port.h and move there tty_port-related
declarations and function prototypes (those implemented in tty_port.c).
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210723103147.18250-8-jslaby@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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tty.h is large enough currently. And I am slowly adding kernel-doc
documentation, so it grows to unmaintainable long mess. To avoid this,
split tty.h further into tty_buffer.h and move there tty_buffer-related
declarations and function prototypes.
Note that many of the tty_buffer.c function prototypes reside now in
tty_flip.h. But we cannot move struct tty_buffer & friends because:
* tty_insert_flip_char() in tty_flip.h needs both struct tty_port and
struct tty_buffer defined.
* struct tty_port in tty_port.h needs struct tty_buffer defined.
So if we moved struct tty_buffer to tty_flip.h too, tty_flip.h would
need tty_port.h and that would need tty_flip.h (to have tty_buffer)
again. Hence we introduce new header tty_buffer.h here to break this
circular dependency.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210723103147.18250-7-jslaby@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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It's the only remaining tty_buffer.c prototype residing in tty.h. Move
it along others to tty_flip.h.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210723103147.18250-6-jslaby@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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We use structs list_head and lockdep_map as non-pointers in tty_ldisc.h.
So better have headers defining them explicitly included so that the
structs are always defined. Not only implicitly via random include
chains.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210723103147.18250-5-jslaby@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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We already have tty_ldisc.h, so cleanup tty.h a bit by moving out
tty_ldisc-related function prototypes and a variable into tty_ldisc.h.
They are implemented in tty_ldisc.c anyway.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210723103147.18250-4-jslaby@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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We use kref in tty_driver.h, but do not include kref.h. It is currently
included by linux/cdev.h -> linux/kobject.h -> linux/kref.h chain, so
everything is in order only implicitly. So make this dependency
explicit.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210723103147.18250-3-jslaby@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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We already have tty_driver.h, so cleanup tty.h a bit by moving out
tty_driver-related function prototypes into tty_driver.h.
Note that tty.h already includes tty_driver.h.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210723103147.18250-2-jslaby@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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Remove the now unused generic_block_fiemap helper.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210720133341.405438-5-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
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The kernfs global lock restricts the ability to perform kernfs node
lookup operations in parallel during path walks.
Change the kernfs mutex to an rwsem so that, when opportunity arises,
node searches can be done in parallel with path walk lookups.
Reviewed-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/162642770946.63632.2218304587223241374.stgit@web.messagingengine.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Add a revision counter to kernfs directory nodes so it can be used
to detect if a directory node has changed during negative dentry
revalidation.
There's an assumption that sizeof(unsigned long) <= sizeof(pointer)
on all architectures and as far as I know that assumption holds.
So adding a revision counter to the struct kernfs_elem_dir variant of
the kernfs_node type union won't increase the size of the kernfs_node
struct. This is because struct kernfs_elem_dir is at least
sizeof(pointer) smaller than the largest union variant. It's tempting
to make the revision counter a u64 but that would increase the size of
kernfs_node on archs where sizeof(pointer) is smaller than the revision
counter.
Reviewed-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/162642769895.63632.8356662784964509867.stgit@web.messagingengine.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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We need the driver-core fixes in here as well.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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The main desire for having this feature in sja1105 is to support network
stack termination for traffic coming from a VLAN-aware bridge.
For sja1105, offloading the bridge data plane means sending packets
as-is, with the proper VLAN tag, to the chip. The chip will look up its
FDB and forward them to the correct destination port.
But we support bridge data plane offload even for VLAN-unaware bridges,
and the implementation there is different. In fact, VLAN-unaware
bridging is governed by tag_8021q, so it makes sense to have the
.bridge_fwd_offload_add() implementation fully within tag_8021q.
The key difference is that we only support 1 VLAN-aware bridge, but we
support multiple VLAN-unaware bridges. So we need to make sure that the
forwarding domain is not crossed by packets injected from the stack.
For this, we introduce the concept of a tag_8021q TX VLAN for bridge
forwarding offload. As opposed to the regular TX VLANs which contain
only 2 ports (the user port and the CPU port), a bridge data plane TX
VLAN is "multicast" (or "imprecise"): it contains all the ports that are
part of a certain bridge, and the hardware will select where the packet
goes within this "imprecise" forwarding domain.
Each VLAN-unaware bridge has its own "imprecise" TX VLAN, so we make use
of the unique "bridge_num" provided by DSA for the data plane offload.
We use the same 3 bits from the tag_8021q VLAN ID format to encode this
bridge number.
Note that these 3 bit positions have been used before for sub-VLANs in
best-effort VLAN filtering mode. The difference is that for best-effort,
the sub-VLANs were only valid on RX (and it was documented that the
sub-VLAN field needed to be transmitted as zero). Whereas for the bridge
data plane offload, these 3 bits are only valid on TX.
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Introduce a brother of br_vlan_get_info() which is protected by the RCU
mechanism, as opposed to br_vlan_get_info() which relies on taking the
write-side rtnl_mutex.
This is needed for drivers which need to find out whether a bridge port
has a VLAN configured or not. For example, certain DSA switches might
not offer complete source port identification to the CPU on RX, just the
VLAN in which the packet was received. Based on this VLAN, we cannot set
an accurate skb->dev ingress port, but at least we can configure one
that behaves the same as the correct one would (this is possible because
DSA sets skb->offload_fwd_mark = 1).
When we look at the bridge RX handler (br_handle_frame), we see that
what matters regarding skb->dev is the VLAN ID and the port STP state.
So we need to select an skb->dev that has the same bridge VLAN as the
packet we're receiving, and is in the LEARNING or FORWARDING STP state.
The latter is easy, but for the former, we should somehow keep a shadow
list of the bridge VLANs on each port, and a lookup table between VLAN
ID and the 'designated port for imprecise RX'. That is rather
complicated to keep in sync properly (the designated port per VLAN needs
to be updated on the addition and removal of a VLAN, as well as on the
join/leave events of the bridge on that port).
So, to avoid all that complexity, let's just iterate through our finite
number of ports and ask the bridge, for each packet: "do you have this
VLAN configured on this port?".
Cc: Roopa Prabhu <roopa@nvidia.com>
Cc: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@nvidia.com>
Cc: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/saeed/linux
mlx5-updates-2021-07-24
This series aims to reduce coupling in mlx5e, particularly between RX
resources (TIRs, RQTs) and numerous code units that use them.
This refactoring is required for upcoming features, ADQ and TX lag
hashing.
The issue with the current code is that TIRs and RQTs are unmanaged,
different places all over the driver create, destroy, track and
configure them, often in an uncoordinated way. The responsibilities of
different units become vague, leading to a lot of hidden dependencies
between numerous units and tight coupling between them, which is prone
to bugs and hard to maintain.
The result of this refactoring is:
1. Creating a manager for RX resources, that controls their lifecycle
and provides a clear API, which restricts the set of actions that other
units can do.
2. Using object-oriented approach for TIRs, RQTs and RX resource
manager (struct mlx5e_rx_res).
3. Fixing a few bugs and misbehaviors found during the refactoring.
4. Reducing the amount of dependencies, removing hidden dependencies,
making them one-directional and organizing the code in clear abstraction
layers.
5. Explicitly exposing the remaining weird dependencies.
6. Simplifying and organizing code that creates and modifies TIRs and
RQTs.
Saeed Mahameed says:
====================
mlx5 updates 2021-07-24
This series provides some refactoring to mlx5e RX resource management,
it is required for upcoming ADQ and TX lag hashing features.
The first two patches in this series :
net/mlx5e: Prohibit inner indir TIRs in IPoIB
net/mlx5e: Block LRO if firmware asks for tunneled LRO
Were supposed to go to net, but due to dependency and timing they were
included here.
I would appreciate it if you'd apply them to net and mark for -stable.
For more information please see tag log below.
Please pull and let me know if there is any problem.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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|
This commit does a cleanup in LRO configuration.
LRO is a parameter of an RQ, but its state is changed by modifying a TIR
related to the RQ.
The current status: LRO for tunneled packets is not supported in the
driver, inner TIRs may enable LRO on creation, but LRO status of inner
TIRs isn't changed in mlx5e_modify_tirs_lro(). This is inconsistent, but
as long as the firmware doesn't declare support for tunneled LRO, it
works, because the same RQs are shared between the inner and outer TIRs.
This commit does two fixes:
1. If the firmware has the tunneled LRO capability, LRO is blocked
altogether, because it's not possible to block it for inner TIRs only,
when the same RQs are shared between inner and outer TIRs, and the
driver won't be able to handle tunneled LRO traffic.
2. mlx5e_modify_tirs_lro() is patched to modify LRO state for all TIRs,
including inner ones, because all TIRs related to an RQ should agree on
their LRO state.
Fixes: 7b3722fa9ef6 ("net/mlx5e: Support RSS for GRE tunneled packets")
Signed-off-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maximmi@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com>
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All NMI contexts are handled the same as the safe context: store the
message and defer printing. There is no need to have special NMI
context tracking for this. Using in_nmi() is enough.
There are several parts of the kernel that are manually calling into
the printk NMI context tracking in order to cause general printk
deferred printing:
arch/arm/kernel/smp.c
arch/powerpc/kexec/crash.c
kernel/trace/trace.c
For arm/kernel/smp.c and powerpc/kexec/crash.c, provide a new
function pair printk_deferred_enter/exit that explicitly achieves the
same objective.
For ftrace, remove the printk context manipulation completely. It was
added in commit 03fc7f9c99c1 ("printk/nmi: Prevent deadlock when
accessing the main log buffer in NMI"). The purpose was to enforce
storing messages directly into the ring buffer even in NMI context.
It really should have only modified the behavior in NMI context.
There is no need for a special behavior any longer. All messages are
always stored directly now. The console deferring is handled
transparently in vprintk().
Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
[pmladek@suse.com: Remove special handling in ftrace.c completely.
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210715193359.25946-5-john.ogness@linutronix.de
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With @logbuf_lock removed, the high level printk functions for
storing messages are lockless. Messages can be stored from any
context, so there is no need for the NMI and safe buffers anymore.
Remove the NMI and safe buffers.
Although the safe buffers are removed, the NMI and safe context
tracking is still in place. In these contexts, store the message
immediately but still use irq_work to defer the console printing.
Since printk recursion tracking is in place, safe context tracking
for most of printk is not needed. Remove it. Only safe context
tracking relating to the console and console_owner locks is left
in place. This is because the console and console_owner locks are
needed for the actual printing.
Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210715193359.25946-4-john.ogness@linutronix.de
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We only ever now set strict mode enabled in iommu_set_dma_strict(), so
just remove the argument.
Signed-off-by: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1626088340-5838-7-git-send-email-john.garry@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
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We need the char-misc fixes from 5.14-rc3 into here as well.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Add a callback for IOMMU drivers to provide a path for the
IOMMU framework to call into an IOMMU driver, which can
call into the io-pgtable code, to map a physically contiguous
rnage of pages of the same size.
For IOMMU drivers that do not specify a map_pages() callback,
the existing logic of mapping memory one page block at a time
will be used.
Signed-off-by: Isaac J. Manjarres <isaacm@codeaurora.org>
Suggested-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Georgi Djakov <quic_c_gdjako@quicinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1623850736-389584-5-git-send-email-quic_c_gdjako@quicinc.com
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
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Mapping memory into io-pgtables follows the same semantics
that unmapping memory used to follow (i.e. a buffer will be
mapped one page block per call to the io-pgtable code). This
means that it can be optimized in the same way that unmapping
memory was, so add a map_pages() callback to the io-pgtable
ops structure, so that a range of pages of the same size
can be mapped within the same call.
Signed-off-by: Isaac J. Manjarres <isaacm@codeaurora.org>
Suggested-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Georgi Djakov <quic_c_gdjako@quicinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1623850736-389584-4-git-send-email-quic_c_gdjako@quicinc.com
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
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