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Writing to mounted devices is dangerous and can lead to filesystem
corruption as well as crashes. Furthermore syzbot comes with more and
more involved examples how to corrupt block device under a mounted
filesystem leading to kernel crashes and reports we can do nothing
about. Add tracking of writers to each block device and a kernel cmdline
argument which controls whether other writeable opens to block devices
open with BLK_OPEN_RESTRICT_WRITES flag are allowed. We will make
filesystems use this flag for used devices.
Note that this effectively only prevents modification of the particular
block device's page cache by other writers. The actual device content
can still be modified by other means - e.g. by issuing direct scsi
commands, by doing writes through devices lower in the storage stack
(e.g. in case loop devices, DM, or MD are involved) etc. But blocking
direct modifications of the block device page cache is enough to give
filesystems a chance to perform data validation when loading data from
the underlying storage and thus prevent kernel crashes.
Syzbot can use this cmdline argument option to avoid uninteresting
crashes. Also users whose userspace setup does not need writing to
mounted block devices can set this option for hardening.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/60788e5d-5c7c-1142-e554-c21d709acfd9@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231101174325.10596-3-jack@suse.cz
Reviewed-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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blkdev_get_by_*() and blkdev_put() functions are now unused. Remove
them.
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231101174325.10596-2-jack@suse.cz
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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Before [1] freezing a filesystems through the block layer only worked
for the main block device as the owning superblock of additional block
devices could not be found. Any filesystem that made use of multiple
block devices would only be freezable via it's main block device.
For example, consider xfs over device mapper with /dev/dm-0 as main
block device and /dev/dm-1 as external log device. Two freeze requests
before [1]:
(1) dmsetup suspend /dev/dm-0 on the main block device
bdev_freeze(dm-0)
-> dm-0->bd_fsfreeze_count++
-> freeze_super(xfs-sb)
The owning superblock is found and the filesystem gets frozen.
Returns 0.
(2) dmsetup suspend /dev/dm-1 on the log device
bdev_freeze(dm-1)
-> dm-1->bd_fsfreeze_count++
The owning superblock isn't found and only the block device freeze
count is incremented. Returns 0.
Two freeze requests after [1]:
(1') dmsetup suspend /dev/dm-0 on the main block device
bdev_freeze(dm-0)
-> dm-0->bd_fsfreeze_count++
-> freeze_super(xfs-sb)
The owning superblock is found and the filesystem gets frozen.
Returns 0.
(2') dmsetup suspend /dev/dm-1 on the log device
bdev_freeze(dm-0)
-> dm-0->bd_fsfreeze_count++
-> freeze_super(xfs-sb)
The owning superblock is found and the filesystem gets frozen.
Returns -EBUSY.
When (2') is called we initiate a freeze from another block device of
the same superblock. So we increment the bd_fsfreeze_count for that
additional block device. But we now also find the owning superblock for
additional block devices and call freeze_super() again which reports
-EBUSY.
This can be reproduced through xfstests via:
mkfs.xfs -f -m crc=1,reflink=1,rmapbt=1, -i sparse=1 -lsize=1g,logdev=/dev/nvme1n1p4 /dev/nvme1n1p3
mkfs.xfs -f -m crc=1,reflink=1,rmapbt=1, -i sparse=1 -lsize=1g,logdev=/dev/nvme1n1p6 /dev/nvme1n1p5
FSTYP=xfs
export TEST_DEV=/dev/nvme1n1p3
export TEST_DIR=/mnt/test
export TEST_LOGDEV=/dev/nvme1n1p4
export SCRATCH_DEV=/dev/nvme1n1p5
export SCRATCH_MNT=/mnt/scratch
export SCRATCH_LOGDEV=/dev/nvme1n1p6
export USE_EXTERNAL=yes
sudo ./check generic/311
Current semantics allow two concurrent freezers: one initiated from
userspace via FREEZE_HOLDER_USERSPACE and one initiated from the kernel
via FREEZE_HOLDER_KERNEL. If there are multiple concurrent freeze
requests from either FREEZE_HOLDER_USERSPACE or FREEZE_HOLDER_KERNEL
-EBUSY is returned.
We need to preserve these semantics because as they are uapi via
FIFREEZE and FITHAW ioctl()s. IOW, freezes don't nest for FIFREEZE and
FITHAW. Other kernels consumers rely on non-nesting freezes as well.
With freezes initiated from the block layer freezes need to nest if the
same superblock is frozen via multiple devices. So we need to start
counting the number of freeze requests.
If FREEZE_MAY_NEST is passed alongside FREEZE_HOLDER_KERNEL or
FREEZE_HOLDER_USERSPACE we allow the caller to nest freeze calls.
To accommodate the old semantics we split the freeze counter into two
counting kernel initiated and userspace initiated freezes separately. We
can then also stop recording FREEZE_HOLDER_* in struct sb_writers.
We also simplify freezing by making all concurrent freezers share a
single active superblock reference count instead of having separate
references for kernel and userspace. I don't see why we would need two
active reference counts. Neither FREEZE_HOLDER_KERNEL nor
FREEZE_HOLDER_USERSPACE can put the active reference as long as they are
concurrent freezers anwyay. That was already true before we allowed
nesting freezes.
Survives various fstests runs with different options including the
reproducer, online scrub, and online repair, fsfreze, and so on. Also
survives blktests.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-block/87bkccnwxc.fsf@debian-BULLSEYE-live-builder-AMD64
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231104-vfs-multi-device-freeze-v2-2-5b5b69626eac@kernel.org
Fixes: 288d8706abfc ("bdev: implement freeze and thaw holder operations") [1] # no backport needed
Tested-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanbabu@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reported-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanbabu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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Add a comment to @fs_holder_ops that @holder must point to a superblock.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231024-vfs-super-freeze-v2-10-599c19f4faac@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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Remove bd_fsfreeze_sb as it's now unused and can be removed. Also move
bd_fsfreeze_count down to not have it weirdly placed in the middle of
the holder fields.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231024-vfs-super-freeze-v2-7-599c19f4faac@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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This function is now unused so remove it. One less function that uses
the global superblock list.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231024-vfs-super-freeze-v2-6-599c19f4faac@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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The old method of implementing block device freeze and thaw operations
required us to rely on get_active_super() to walk the list of all
superblocks on the system to find any superblock that might use the
block device. This is wasteful and not very pleasant overall.
Now that we can finally go straight from block device to owning
superblock things become way simpler.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231024-vfs-super-freeze-v2-5-599c19f4faac@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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Add block device freeze and thaw holder operations. Follow-up patches
will implement block device freeze and thaw based on stuct
blk_holder_ops.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231024-vfs-super-freeze-v2-4-599c19f4faac@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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We have bdev_mark_dead() etc and we're going to move block device
freezing to holder ops in the next patch. Make the naming consistent:
* freeze_bdev() -> bdev_freeze()
* thaw_bdev() -> bdev_thaw()
Also document the return code.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231024-vfs-super-freeze-v2-2-599c19f4faac@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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When adding a mount to a namespace insert it into an rbtree rooted in the
mnt_namespace instead of a linear list.
The mnt.mnt_list is still used to set up the mount tree and for
propagation, but not after the mount has been added to a namespace. Hence
mnt_list can live in union with rb_node. Use MNT_ONRB mount flag to
validate that the mount is on the correct list.
This allows removing the cursor used for reading /proc/$PID/mountinfo. The
mnt_id_unique of the next mount can be used as an index into the seq file.
Tested by inserting 100k bind mounts, unsharing the mount namespace, and
unmounting. No performance regressions have been observed.
For the last mount in the 100k list the statmount() call was more than 100x
faster due to the mount ID lookup not having to do a linear search. This
patch makes the overhead of mount ID lookup non-observable in this range.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231025140205.3586473-3-mszeredi@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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Rename verifier internal flag BPF_F_TEST_SANITY_STRICT to more neutral
BPF_F_TEST_REG_INVARIANTS. This is a follow up to [0].
A few selftests and veristat need to be adjusted in the same patch as
well.
[0] https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/patch/20231112010609.848406-5-andrii@kernel.org/
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231117171404.225508-1-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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The macro SUMMARY_SIZE represents the size of the struct f2fs_summary,
instead of the size of the struct summary.
Signed-off-by: Yang Hubin <yanghb2019@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Qian Haolai <qianhl2023@lzu.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
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Adds kernel client API function tee_client_system_session() for a client
to request a system service entry in TEE context.
This feature is needed to prevent a system deadlock when several TEE
client applications invoke TEE, consuming all TEE thread contexts
available in the secure world. The deadlock can happen in the OP-TEE
driver for example if all these TEE threads issue an RPC call from TEE
to Linux OS to access an eMMC RPMB partition (TEE secure storage) which
device clock or regulator controller is accessed through an OP-TEE SCMI
services. In that case, Linux SCMI driver must reach OP-TEE SCMI service
without waiting until one of the consumed TEE threads is freed.
Reviewed-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Co-developed-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@foss.st.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
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With commit cf8e8658100d ("arch: Remove Itanium (IA-64) architecture"),
there is no need to keep the IA-64 definition of the KSYM_FUNC macro.
Clean up the IA-64 definition of the KSYM_FUNC macro.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
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Add a linkmode_fill() helper, which will allow us to convert phylink's
open coded bitmap_fill() operations.
Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Sometimes the users want to match the single value string property
against an array of predefined strings. Create a helper for them.
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230808162800.61651-3-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
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Cross-merge networking fixes after downstream PR.
No conflicts.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net
Pull networking fixes from Paolo Abeni:
"Including fixes from BPF and netfilter.
Current release - regressions:
- core: fix undefined behavior in netdev name allocation
- bpf: do not allocate percpu memory at init stage
- netfilter: nf_tables: split async and sync catchall in two
functions
- mptcp: fix possible NULL pointer dereference on close
Current release - new code bugs:
- eth: ice: dpll: fix initial lock status of dpll
Previous releases - regressions:
- bpf: fix precision backtracking instruction iteration
- af_unix: fix use-after-free in unix_stream_read_actor()
- tipc: fix kernel-infoleak due to uninitialized TLV value
- eth: bonding: stop the device in bond_setup_by_slave()
- eth: mlx5:
- fix double free of encap_header
- avoid referencing skb after free-ing in drop path
- eth: hns3: fix VF reset
- eth: mvneta: fix calls to page_pool_get_stats
Previous releases - always broken:
- core: set SOCK_RCU_FREE before inserting socket into hashtable
- bpf: fix control-flow graph checking in privileged mode
- eth: ppp: limit MRU to 64K
- eth: stmmac: avoid rx queue overrun
- eth: icssg-prueth: fix error cleanup on failing initialization
- eth: hns3: fix out-of-bounds access may occur when coalesce info is
read via debugfs
- eth: cortina: handle large frames
Misc:
- selftests: gso: support CONFIG_MAX_SKB_FRAGS up to 45"
* tag 'net-6.7-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net: (78 commits)
macvlan: Don't propagate promisc change to lower dev in passthru
net: sched: do not offload flows with a helper in act_ct
net/mlx5e: Check return value of snprintf writing to fw_version buffer for representors
net/mlx5e: Check return value of snprintf writing to fw_version buffer
net/mlx5e: Reduce the size of icosq_str
net/mlx5: Increase size of irq name buffer
net/mlx5e: Update doorbell for port timestamping CQ before the software counter
net/mlx5e: Track xmit submission to PTP WQ after populating metadata map
net/mlx5e: Avoid referencing skb after free-ing in drop path of mlx5e_sq_xmit_wqe
net/mlx5e: Don't modify the peer sent-to-vport rules for IPSec offload
net/mlx5e: Fix pedit endianness
net/mlx5e: fix double free of encap_header in update funcs
net/mlx5e: fix double free of encap_header
net/mlx5: Decouple PHC .adjtime and .adjphase implementations
net/mlx5: DR, Allow old devices to use multi destination FTE
net/mlx5: Free used cpus mask when an IRQ is released
Revert "net/mlx5: DR, Supporting inline WQE when possible"
bpf: Do not allocate percpu memory at init stage
net: Fix undefined behavior in netdev name allocation
dt-bindings: net: ethernet-controller: Fix formatting error
...
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Pull virtio fixes from Michael Tsirkin:
"Bugfixes all over the place"
* tag 'for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mst/vhost:
vhost-vdpa: fix use after free in vhost_vdpa_probe()
virtio_pci: Switch away from deprecated irq_set_affinity_hint
riscv, qemu_fw_cfg: Add support for RISC-V architecture
vdpa_sim_blk: allocate the buffer zeroed
virtio_pci: move structure to a header
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The SPI_MASTER_HALF_DUPLEX is the legacy name of a definition
for a half duplex flag. Since all others had been replaced with
the respective SPI_CONTROLLER prefix get rid of the last one
as well. There is no functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Acked-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org> # For MMC
Acked-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> # for input
Acked-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231113111249.3982461-1-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
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Introduce the new subtype of "CORESIGHT_DEV_SUBTYPE_SOURCE_TPDM"
for TPDM components in driver.
Signed-off-by: Tao Zhang <quic_taozha@quicinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1695882586-10306-4-git-send-email-quic_taozha@quicinc.com
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Fix a small typo in the kerneldoc comment of the INDIRECT_CALL_$NR
macro.
Signed-off-by: Tobias Klauser <tklauser@distanz.ch>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231114104202.4680-1-tklauser@distanz.ch
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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Alexei Starovoitov says:
====================
pull-request: bpf 2023-11-15
We've added 7 non-merge commits during the last 6 day(s) which contain
a total of 9 files changed, 200 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-).
The main changes are:
1) Do not allocate bpf specific percpu memory unconditionally, from Yonghong.
2) Fix precision backtracking instruction iteration, from Andrii.
3) Fix control flow graph checking, from Andrii.
4) Fix xskxceiver selftest build, from Anders.
* https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf:
bpf: Do not allocate percpu memory at init stage
selftests/bpf: add more test cases for check_cfg()
bpf: fix control-flow graph checking in privileged mode
selftests/bpf: add edge case backtracking logic test
bpf: fix precision backtracking instruction iteration
bpf: handle ldimm64 properly in check_cfg()
selftests: bpf: xskxceiver: ksft_print_msg: fix format type error
====================
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231115214949.48854-1-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Equivalent of kern_path_locked() taking dfd/userland name.
User introduced in the next commit.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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This driver uses delayed work to perform periodic battery state read out.
This delayed work is not stopped across suspend and resume cycle. The
read out can occur early in the resume cycle. In case of an I2C variant
of this hardware, that read out triggers I2C transfer. That I2C transfer
may happen while the I2C controller is still suspended, which produces a
WARNING in the kernel log.
Fix this by introducing trivial PM ops, which stop the delayed work before
the system enters suspend, and schedule the delayed work right after the
system resumes.
Signed-off-by: Marek Vasut <marex@denx.de>
Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231104154920.68585-1-marex@denx.de
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Reichel <sebastian.reichel@collabora.com>
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Add simple sanity checks that validate well-formed ranges (min <= max)
across u64, s64, u32, and s32 ranges. Also for cases when the value is
constant (either 64-bit or 32-bit), we validate that ranges and tnums
are in agreement.
These bounds checks are performed at the end of BPF_ALU/BPF_ALU64
operations, on conditional jumps, and for LDX instructions (where subreg
zero/sign extension is probably the most important to check). This
covers most of the interesting cases.
Also, we validate the sanity of the return register when manually
adjusting it for some special helpers.
By default, sanity violation will trigger a warning in verifier log and
resetting register bounds to "unbounded" ones. But to aid development
and debugging, BPF_F_TEST_SANITY_STRICT flag is added, which will
trigger hard failure of verification with -EFAULT on register bounds
violations. This allows selftests to catch such issues. veristat will
also gain a CLI option to enable this behavior.
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231112010609.848406-5-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Generalize bounds adjustment logic of reg_set_min_max() to handle not
just register vs constant case, but in general any register vs any
register cases. For most of the operations it's trivial extension based
on range vs range comparison logic, we just need to properly pick
min/max of a range to compare against min/max of the other range.
For BPF_JSET we keep the original capabilities, just make sure JSET is
integrated in the common framework. This is manifested in the
internal-only BPF_JSET + BPF_X "opcode" to allow for simpler and more
uniform rev_opcode() handling. See the code for details. This allows to
reuse the same code exactly both for TRUE and FALSE branches without
explicitly handling both conditions with custom code.
Note also that now we don't need a special handling of BPF_JEQ/BPF_JNE
case none of the registers are constants. This is now just a normal
generic case handled by reg_set_min_max().
To make tnum handling cleaner, tnum_with_subreg() helper is added, as
that's a common operator when dealing with 32-bit subregister bounds.
This keeps the overall logic much less noisy when it comes to tnums.
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231112010609.848406-2-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Some mlx5 devices do not support the default advertised maximum frequency
adjustment value for the PTP hardware clock that is set by the driver.
These devices need to be queried when initializing the clock functionality
in order to get the maximum supported frequency adjustment value. This
value can be greater than the minimum supported frequency adjustment across
mlx5 devices (50 million ppb).
Signed-off-by: Rahul Rameshbabu <rrameshbabu@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com>
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Kirill Shutemov reported significant percpu memory consumption increase after
booting in 288-cpu VM ([1]) due to commit 41a5db8d8161 ("bpf: Add support for
non-fix-size percpu mem allocation"). The percpu memory consumption is
increased from 111MB to 969MB. The number is from /proc/meminfo.
I tried to reproduce the issue with my local VM which at most supports upto
255 cpus. With 252 cpus, without the above commit, the percpu memory
consumption immediately after boot is 57MB while with the above commit the
percpu memory consumption is 231MB.
This is not good since so far percpu memory from bpf memory allocator is not
widely used yet. Let us change pre-allocation in init stage to on-demand
allocation when verifier detects there is a need of percpu memory for bpf
program. With this change, percpu memory consumption after boot can be reduced
signicantly.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20231109154934.4saimljtqx625l3v@box.shutemov.name/
Fixes: 41a5db8d8161 ("bpf: Add support for non-fix-size percpu mem allocation")
Reported-and-tested-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Acked-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231111013928.948838-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Let's kickstart the v6.8 release cycle.
Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <mripard@kernel.org>
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Avoid conflicts, base on fixes.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
|
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Adds:
- DEFINE_GUARD_COND() / DEFINE_LOCK_GUARD_1_COND() to extend existing
guards with conditional lock primitives, eg. mutex_trylock(),
mutex_lock_interruptible().
nb. both primitives allow NULL 'locks', which cause the lock to
fail (obviously).
- extends scoped_guard() to not take the body when the the
conditional guard 'fails'. eg.
scoped_guard (mutex_intr, &task->signal_cred_guard_mutex) {
...
}
will only execute the body when the mutex is held.
- provides scoped_cond_guard(name, fail, args...); which extends
scoped_guard() to do fail when the lock-acquire fails.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20231102110706.460851167%40infradead.org
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Low priority tasks (e.g., SCHED_OTHER) can suffer starvation if tasks
with higher priority (e.g., SCHED_FIFO) monopolize CPU(s).
RT Throttling has been introduced a while ago as a (mostly debug)
countermeasure one can utilize to reserve some CPU time for low priority
tasks (usually background type of work, e.g. workqueues, timers, etc.).
It however has its own problems (see documentation) and the undesired
effect of unconditionally throttling FIFO tasks even when no lower
priority activity needs to run (there are mechanisms to fix this issue
as well, but, again, with their own problems).
Introduce deadline servers to service low priority tasks needs under
starvation conditions. Deadline servers are built extending SCHED_DEADLINE
implementation to allow 2-level scheduling (a sched_deadline entity
becomes a container for lower priority scheduling entities).
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4968601859d920335cf85822eb573a5f179f04b8.1699095159.git.bristot@kernel.org
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All classes use sched_entity::exec_start to track runtime and have
copies of the exact same code around to compute runtime.
Collapse all that.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/54d148a144f26d9559698c4dd82d8859038a7380.1699095159.git.bristot@kernel.org
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Sort the task timeline by virtual deadline and keep the min_vruntime
in the augmented tree, so we can avoid doubling the worst case cost
and make full use of the cached leftmost node to enable O(1) fastpath
picking in next patch.
Signed-off-by: Abel Wu <wuyun.abel@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20231115033647.80785-3-wuyun.abel@bytedance.com
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Since commit fc137c0ddab2 ("sched/numa: enhance vma scanning logic")
NUMA Balancing allows updating PTEs to trap NUMA hinting faults if the
task had previously accessed VMA. However unconditional scan of VMAs are
allowed during initial phase of VMA creation until process's
mm numa_scan_seq reaches 2 even though current task had not accessed VMA.
Rationale:
- Without initial scan subsequent PTE update may never happen.
- Give fair opportunity to all the VMAs to be scanned and subsequently
understand the access pattern of all the VMAs.
But it has a corner case where, if a VMA is created after some time,
process's mm numa_scan_seq could be already greater than 2.
For e.g., values of mm numa_scan_seq when VMAs are created by running
mmtest autonuma benchmark briefly looks like:
start_seq=0 : 459
start_seq=2 : 138
start_seq=3 : 144
start_seq=4 : 8
start_seq=8 : 1
start_seq=9 : 1
This results in no unconditional PTE updates for those VMAs created after
some time.
Fix:
- Note down the initial value of mm numa_scan_seq in per VMA start_seq.
- Allow unconditional scan till start_seq + 2.
Result:
SUT: AMD EPYC Milan with 2 NUMA nodes 256 cpus.
base kernel: upstream 6.6-rc6 with Mels patches [1] applied.
kernbench
========== base patched %gain
Amean elsp-128 165.09 ( 0.00%) 164.78 * 0.19%*
Duration User 41404.28 41375.08
Duration System 9862.22 9768.48
Duration Elapsed 519.87 518.72
Ops NUMA PTE updates 1041416.00 831536.00
Ops NUMA hint faults 263296.00 220966.00
Ops NUMA pages migrated 258021.00 212769.00
Ops AutoNUMA cost 1328.67 1114.69
autonumabench
NUMA01_THREADLOCAL
==================
Amean elsp-NUMA01_THREADLOCAL 81.79 (0.00%) 67.74 * 17.18%*
Duration User 54832.73 47379.67
Duration System 75.00 185.75
Duration Elapsed 576.72 476.09
Ops NUMA PTE updates 394429.00 11121044.00
Ops NUMA hint faults 1001.00 8906404.00
Ops NUMA pages migrated 288.00 2998694.00
Ops AutoNUMA cost 7.77 44666.84
Signed-off-by: Raghavendra K T <raghavendra.kt@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2ea7cbce80ac7c62e90cbfb9653a7972f902439f.1697816692.git.raghavendra.kt@amd.com
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull hardening fixes from Kees Cook:
- stackleak: add declarations for global functions (Arnd Bergmann)
- gcc-plugins: randstruct: Only warn about true flexible arrays (Kees
Cook)
- gcc-plugins: latent_entropy: Fix description typo (Konstantin Runov)
* tag 'hardening-v6.7-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
gcc-plugins: latent_entropy: Fix typo (args -> argc) in plugin description
gcc-plugins: randstruct: Only warn about true flexible arrays
stackleak: add declarations for global functions
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Audit of the refcounting turned up that perf_pmu_migrate_context()
fails to migrate the ctx refcount.
Fixes: bd2756811766 ("perf: Rewrite core context handling")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230612093539.085862001@infradead.org
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
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Widely used variable names can be used by macro users, potentially
leading to name collisions.
Suffix locals used inside the macros with an underscore, to reduce the
collision potential.
Suggested-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Michał Winiarski <michal.winiarski@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20231024110710.3039807-1-michal.winiarski@intel.com
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Introduce several new KVM uAPIs to ultimately create a guest-first memory
subsystem within KVM, a.k.a. guest_memfd. Guest-first memory allows KVM
to provide features, enhancements, and optimizations that are kludgly
or outright impossible to implement in a generic memory subsystem.
The core KVM ioctl() for guest_memfd is KVM_CREATE_GUEST_MEMFD, which
similar to the generic memfd_create(), creates an anonymous file and
returns a file descriptor that refers to it. Again like "regular"
memfd files, guest_memfd files live in RAM, have volatile storage,
and are automatically released when the last reference is dropped.
The key differences between memfd files (and every other memory subystem)
is that guest_memfd files are bound to their owning virtual machine,
cannot be mapped, read, or written by userspace, and cannot be resized.
guest_memfd files do however support PUNCH_HOLE, which can be used to
convert a guest memory area between the shared and guest-private states.
A second KVM ioctl(), KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES, allows userspace to
specify attributes for a given page of guest memory. In the long term,
it will likely be extended to allow userspace to specify per-gfn RWX
protections, including allowing memory to be writable in the guest
without it also being writable in host userspace.
The immediate and driving use case for guest_memfd are Confidential
(CoCo) VMs, specifically AMD's SEV-SNP, Intel's TDX, and KVM's own pKVM.
For such use cases, being able to map memory into KVM guests without
requiring said memory to be mapped into the host is a hard requirement.
While SEV+ and TDX prevent untrusted software from reading guest private
data by encrypting guest memory, pKVM provides confidentiality and
integrity *without* relying on memory encryption. In addition, with
SEV-SNP and especially TDX, accessing guest private memory can be fatal
to the host, i.e. KVM must be prevent host userspace from accessing
guest memory irrespective of hardware behavior.
Long term, guest_memfd may be useful for use cases beyond CoCo VMs,
for example hardening userspace against unintentional accesses to guest
memory. As mentioned earlier, KVM's ABI uses userspace VMA protections to
define the allow guest protection (with an exception granted to mapping
guest memory executable), and similarly KVM currently requires the guest
mapping size to be a strict subset of the host userspace mapping size.
Decoupling the mappings sizes would allow userspace to precisely map
only what is needed and with the required permissions, without impacting
guest performance.
A guest-first memory subsystem also provides clearer line of sight to
things like a dedicated memory pool (for slice-of-hardware VMs) and
elimination of "struct page" (for offload setups where userspace _never_
needs to DMA from or into guest memory).
guest_memfd is the result of 3+ years of development and exploration;
taking on memory management responsibilities in KVM was not the first,
second, or even third choice for supporting CoCo VMs. But after many
failed attempts to avoid KVM-specific backing memory, and looking at
where things ended up, it is quite clear that of all approaches tried,
guest_memfd is the simplest, most robust, and most extensible, and the
right thing to do for KVM and the kernel at-large.
The "development cycle" for this version is going to be very short;
ideally, next week I will merge it as is in kvm/next, taking this through
the KVM tree for 6.8 immediately after the end of the merge window.
The series is still based on 6.6 (plus KVM changes for 6.7) so it
will require a small fixup for changes to get_file_rcu() introduced in
6.7 by commit 0ede61d8589c ("file: convert to SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU").
The fixup will be done as part of the merge commit, and most of the text
above will become the commit message for the merge.
Pending post-merge work includes:
- hugepage support
- looking into using the restrictedmem framework for guest memory
- introducing a testing mechanism to poison memory, possibly using
the same memory attributes introduced here
- SNP and TDX support
There are two non-KVM patches buried in the middle of this series:
fs: Rename anon_inode_getfile_secure() and anon_inode_getfd_secure()
mm: Add AS_UNMOVABLE to mark mapping as completely unmovable
The first is small and mostly suggested-by Christian Brauner; the second
a bit less so but it was written by an mm person (Vlastimil Babka).
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Let x86 track the number of address spaces on a per-VM basis so that KVM
can disallow SMM memslots for confidential VMs. Confidentials VMs are
fundamentally incompatible with emulating SMM, which as the name suggests
requires being able to read and write guest memory and register state.
Disallowing SMM will simplify support for guest private memory, as KVM
will not need to worry about tracking memory attributes for multiple
address spaces (SMM is the only "non-default" address space across all
architectures).
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Tested-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Message-Id: <20231027182217.3615211-23-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Drop __KVM_VCPU_MULTIPLE_ADDRESS_SPACE and instead check the value of
KVM_ADDRESS_SPACE_NUM.
No functional change intended.
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Tested-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Message-Id: <20231027182217.3615211-22-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Add support for resolving page faults on guest private memory for VMs
that differentiate between "shared" and "private" memory. For such VMs,
KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD memslots can include both fd-based private memory and
hva-based shared memory, and KVM needs to map in the "correct" variant,
i.e. KVM needs to map the gfn shared/private as appropriate based on the
current state of the gfn's KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PRIVATE flag.
For AMD's SEV-SNP and Intel's TDX, the guest effectively gets to request
shared vs. private via a bit in the guest page tables, i.e. what the guest
wants may conflict with the current memory attributes. To support such
"implicit" conversion requests, exit to user with KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT
to forward the request to userspace. Add a new flag for memory faults,
KVM_MEMORY_EXIT_FLAG_PRIVATE, to communicate whether the guest wants to
map memory as shared vs. private.
Like KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PRIVATE, use bit 3 for flagging private memory
so that KVM can use bits 0-2 for capturing RWX behavior if/when userspace
needs such information, e.g. a likely user of KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT is to
exit on missing mappings when handling guest page fault VM-Exits. In
that case, userspace will want to know RWX information in order to
correctly/precisely resolve the fault.
Note, private memory *must* be backed by guest_memfd, i.e. shared mappings
always come from the host userspace page tables, and private mappings
always come from a guest_memfd instance.
Co-developed-by: Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Tested-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Message-Id: <20231027182217.3615211-21-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Introduce an ioctl(), KVM_CREATE_GUEST_MEMFD, to allow creating file-based
memory that is tied to a specific KVM virtual machine and whose primary
purpose is to serve guest memory.
A guest-first memory subsystem allows for optimizations and enhancements
that are kludgy or outright infeasible to implement/support in a generic
memory subsystem. With guest_memfd, guest protections and mapping sizes
are fully decoupled from host userspace mappings. E.g. KVM currently
doesn't support mapping memory as writable in the guest without it also
being writable in host userspace, as KVM's ABI uses VMA protections to
define the allow guest protection. Userspace can fudge this by
establishing two mappings, a writable mapping for the guest and readable
one for itself, but that’s suboptimal on multiple fronts.
Similarly, KVM currently requires the guest mapping size to be a strict
subset of the host userspace mapping size, e.g. KVM doesn’t support
creating a 1GiB guest mapping unless userspace also has a 1GiB guest
mapping. Decoupling the mappings sizes would allow userspace to precisely
map only what is needed without impacting guest performance, e.g. to
harden against unintentional accesses to guest memory.
Decoupling guest and userspace mappings may also allow for a cleaner
alternative to high-granularity mappings for HugeTLB, which has reached a
bit of an impasse and is unlikely to ever be merged.
A guest-first memory subsystem also provides clearer line of sight to
things like a dedicated memory pool (for slice-of-hardware VMs) and
elimination of "struct page" (for offload setups where userspace _never_
needs to mmap() guest memory).
More immediately, being able to map memory into KVM guests without mapping
said memory into the host is critical for Confidential VMs (CoCo VMs), the
initial use case for guest_memfd. While AMD's SEV and Intel's TDX prevent
untrusted software from reading guest private data by encrypting guest
memory with a key that isn't usable by the untrusted host, projects such
as Protected KVM (pKVM) provide confidentiality and integrity *without*
relying on memory encryption. And with SEV-SNP and TDX, accessing guest
private memory can be fatal to the host, i.e. KVM must be prevent host
userspace from accessing guest memory irrespective of hardware behavior.
Attempt #1 to support CoCo VMs was to add a VMA flag to mark memory as
being mappable only by KVM (or a similarly enlightened kernel subsystem).
That approach was abandoned largely due to it needing to play games with
PROT_NONE to prevent userspace from accessing guest memory.
Attempt #2 to was to usurp PG_hwpoison to prevent the host from mapping
guest private memory into userspace, but that approach failed to meet
several requirements for software-based CoCo VMs, e.g. pKVM, as the kernel
wouldn't easily be able to enforce a 1:1 page:guest association, let alone
a 1:1 pfn:gfn mapping. And using PG_hwpoison does not work for memory
that isn't backed by 'struct page', e.g. if devices gain support for
exposing encrypted memory regions to guests.
Attempt #3 was to extend the memfd() syscall and wrap shmem to provide
dedicated file-based guest memory. That approach made it as far as v10
before feedback from Hugh Dickins and Christian Brauner (and others) led
to it demise.
Hugh's objection was that piggybacking shmem made no sense for KVM's use
case as KVM didn't actually *want* the features provided by shmem. I.e.
KVM was using memfd() and shmem to avoid having to manage memory directly,
not because memfd() and shmem were the optimal solution, e.g. things like
read/write/mmap in shmem were dead weight.
Christian pointed out flaws with implementing a partial overlay (wrapping
only _some_ of shmem), e.g. poking at inode_operations or super_operations
would show shmem stuff, but address_space_operations and file_operations
would show KVM's overlay. Paraphrashing heavily, Christian suggested KVM
stop being lazy and create a proper API.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20201020061859.18385-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20210416154106.23721-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20210824005248.200037-1-seanjc@google.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20211111141352.26311-1-chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221202061347.1070246-1-chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ff5c5b97-acdf-9745-ebe5-c6609dd6322e@google.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230418-anfallen-irdisch-6993a61be10b@brauner
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZEM5Zq8oo+xnApW9@google.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20230306191944.GA15773@monkey
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/ZII1p8ZHlHaQ3dDl@casper.infradead.org
Cc: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Cc: Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@google.com>
Cc: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: Maciej Szmigiero <mail@maciej.szmigiero.name>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: Wang <wei.w.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Liam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Cc: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20231027182217.3615211-17-seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Tested-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
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The call to the inode_init_security_anon() LSM hook is not the sole
reason to use anon_inode_getfile_secure() or anon_inode_getfd_secure().
For example, the functions also allow one to create a file with non-zero
size, without needing a full-blown filesystem. In this case, you don't
need a "secure" version, just unique inodes; the current name of the
functions is confusing and does not explain well the difference with
the more "standard" anon_inode_getfile() and anon_inode_getfd().
Of course, there is another side of the coin; neither io_uring nor
userfaultfd strictly speaking need distinct inodes, and it is not
that clear anymore that anon_inode_create_get{file,fd}() allow the LSM
to intercept and block the inode's creation. If one was so inclined,
anon_inode_getfile_secure() and anon_inode_getfd_secure() could be kept,
using the shared inode or a new one depending on CONFIG_SECURITY.
However, this is probably overkill, and potentially a cause of bugs in
different configurations. Therefore, just add a comment to io_uring
and userfaultfd explaining the choice of the function.
While at it, remove the export for what is now anon_inode_create_getfd().
There is no in-tree module that uses it, and the old name is gone anyway.
If anybody actually needs the symbol, they can ask or they can just use
anon_inode_create_getfile(), which will be exported very soon for use
in KVM.
Suggested-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
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smatch reports:
drivers/firmware/arm_ffa/bus.c:108:17: warning:
symbol 'ffa_bus_type' was not declared. Should it be static?
ffa_bus_type is exported to be useful in the FF-A driver. So this
warning is not correct. However, declaring the ffa_bus_type structure
in the header like many other bus_types do already removes this warning.
So let us just do the same and get rid of the warning.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231024105715.2369638-1-sudeep.holla@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
|
|
The quotes symbol in
"EEE "link partner ability 1
should be at the end of the register name
"EEE link partner ability 1"
Signed-off-by: Marek Behún <kabel@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
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Add an "unmovable" flag for mappings that cannot be migrated under any
circumstance. KVM will use the flag for its upcoming GUEST_MEMFD support,
which will not support compaction/migration, at least not in the
foreseeable future.
Test AS_UNMOVABLE under folio lock as already done for the async
compaction/dirty folio case, as the mapping can be removed by truncation
while compaction is running. To avoid having to lock every folio with a
mapping, assume/require that unmovable mappings are also unevictable, and
have mapping_set_unmovable() also set AS_UNEVICTABLE.
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Co-developed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20231027182217.3615211-15-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
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In confidential computing usages, whether a page is private or shared is
necessary information for KVM to perform operations like page fault
handling, page zapping etc. There are other potential use cases for
per-page memory attributes, e.g. to make memory read-only (or no-exec,
or exec-only, etc.) without having to modify memslots.
Introduce the KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES ioctl, advertised by
KVM_CAP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES, to allow userspace to set the per-page memory
attributes to a guest memory range.
Use an xarray to store the per-page attributes internally, with a naive,
not fully optimized implementation, i.e. prioritize correctness over
performance for the initial implementation.
Use bit 3 for the PRIVATE attribute so that KVM can use bits 0-2 for RWX
attributes/protections in the future, e.g. to give userspace fine-grained
control over read, write, and execute protections for guest memory.
Provide arch hooks for handling attribute changes before and after common
code sets the new attributes, e.g. x86 will use the "pre" hook to zap all
relevant mappings, and the "post" hook to track whether or not hugepages
can be used to map the range.
To simplify the implementation wrap the entire sequence with
kvm_mmu_invalidate_{begin,end}() even though the operation isn't strictly
guaranteed to be an invalidation. For the initial use case, x86 *will*
always invalidate memory, and preventing arch code from creating new
mappings while the attributes are in flux makes it much easier to reason
about the correctness of consuming attributes.
It's possible that future usages may not require an invalidation, e.g.
if KVM ends up supporting RWX protections and userspace grants _more_
protections, but again opt for simplicity and punt optimizations to
if/when they are needed.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/Y2WB48kD0J4VGynX@google.com
Cc: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Cc: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Signed-off-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20231027182217.3615211-14-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Add a new KVM exit type to allow userspace to handle memory faults that
KVM cannot resolve, but that userspace *may* be able to handle (without
terminating the guest).
KVM will initially use KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT to report implicit
conversions between private and shared memory. With guest private memory,
there will be two kind of memory conversions:
- explicit conversion: happens when the guest explicitly calls into KVM
to map a range (as private or shared)
- implicit conversion: happens when the guest attempts to access a gfn
that is configured in the "wrong" state (private vs. shared)
On x86 (first architecture to support guest private memory), explicit
conversions will be reported via KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL+KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE,
but reporting KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL for implicit conversions is undesriable
as there is (obviously) no hypercall, and there is no guarantee that the
guest actually intends to convert between private and shared, i.e. what
KVM thinks is an implicit conversion "request" could actually be the
result of a guest code bug.
KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT will be used to report memory faults that appear to
be implicit conversions.
Note! To allow for future possibilities where KVM reports
KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT and fills run->memory_fault on _any_ unresolved
fault, KVM returns "-EFAULT" (-1 with errno == EFAULT from userspace's
perspective), not '0'! Due to historical baggage within KVM, exiting to
userspace with '0' from deep callstacks, e.g. in emulation paths, is
infeasible as doing so would require a near-complete overhaul of KVM,
whereas KVM already propagates -errno return codes to userspace even when
the -errno originated in a low level helper.
Report the gpa+size instead of a single gfn even though the initial usage
is expected to always report single pages. It's entirely possible, likely
even, that KVM will someday support sub-page granularity faults, e.g.
Intel's sub-page protection feature allows for additional protections at
128-byte granularity.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230908222905.1321305-5-amoorthy@google.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZQ3AmLO2SYv3DszH@google.com
Cc: Anish Moorthy <amoorthy@google.com>
Cc: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20231027182217.3615211-10-seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Tested-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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