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In case of tas2781, tas2563_dvc_table will be unused,
so mark it as __maybe_unused.
Signed-off-by: Shenghao Ding <shenghao-ding@ti.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240822063205.662-1-shenghao-ding@ti.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
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This patch provides a new feature (i.e., "tunsrc") for the tunnel (i.e.,
"encap") mode of ioam6. Just like seg6 already does, except it is
attached to a route. The "tunsrc" is optional: when not provided (by
default), the automatic resolution is applied. Using "tunsrc" when
possible has a benefit: performance. See the comparison:
- before (= "encap" mode): https://ibb.co/bNCzvf7
- after (= "encap" mode with "tunsrc"): https://ibb.co/PT8L6yq
Signed-off-by: Justin Iurman <justin.iurman@uliege.be>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/misc/kernel into drm-next
drm-misc-next for v6.12:
Core Changes:
ci:
- Update dependencies
docs:
- Cleanups
edid:
- Improve debug logging
- Clean up interface
fbdev emulation:
- Remove old fbdev hooks
- Update documentation
panic:
- Cleanups
Driver Changes:
amdgpu:
- Remove usage of old fbdev hooks
- Use backlight constants
ast:
- Fix timeout loop for DP link training
hisilicon:
- hibmc: Cleanups
mipi-dsi:
- Improve error handling
- startek-kd070fhfid015: Use new error handling
nouveau:
- Remove usage of old fbdev hooks
panel:
- Use backlight constants
radeon:
- Use backlight constants
rockchip:
- Improve DP sink-capability reporting
- Cleanups
- dw_hdmi: Support 4k@60Hz; Cleanups
- vop: Support RGB display on Rockchip RK3066; Support 4096px width
tilcdc:
- Use backlight constants
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
From: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20240816084109.GA229316@localhost.localdomain
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Directly call into dma-iommu just like we have been doing for dma-direct
for a while. This avoids the indirect call overhead for IOMMU ops and
removes the need to have DMA ops entirely for many common configurations.
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Acked-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
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The hardware DMA limit might not be power of 2. When RAM range starts
above 0, say 4GB, DMA limit of 30 bits should end at 5GB. A single high
bit can not encode this limit.
Use a plain address for the DMA zone limit instead.
Since the DMA zone can now potentially span beyond 4GB physical limit of
DMA32, make sure to use DMA zone for GFP_DMA32 allocations in that case.
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Co-developed-by: Baruch Siach <baruch@tkos.co.il>
Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach <baruch@tkos.co.il>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Petr Tesarik <ptesarik@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
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Adding the NAPI pointer to struct netdev_queue made it grow into another
cacheline, even though there was 44 bytes of padding available.
The struct was historically grouped as follows:
/* read-mostly stuff (align) */
/* ... random control path fields ... */
/* write-mostly stuff (align) */
/* ... 40 byte hole ... */
/* struct dql (align) */
It seems that people want to add control path fields after
the read only fields. struct dql looks pretty innocent
but it forces its own alignment and nothing indicates that
there is a lot of empty space above it.
Move dql above the xmit_lock. This shifts the empty space
to the end of the struct rather than in the middle of it.
Move two example fields there to set an example.
Hopefully people will now add new fields at the end of
the struct. A lot of the read-only stuff is also control
path-only, but if we move it all we'll have another hole
in the middle.
Before:
/* size: 384, cachelines: 6, members: 16 */
/* sum members: 284, holes: 3, sum holes: 100 */
After:
/* size: 320, cachelines: 5, members: 16 */
/* sum members: 284, holes: 1, sum holes: 8 */
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240820205119.1321322-1-kuba@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Add Tile4 type ccs modifiers to indicate presence of compression on Xe2.
Here is defined I915_FORMAT_MOD_4_TILED_LNL_CCS which is meant for
integrated graphics with igpu related limitations
Here is also defined I915_FORMAT_MOD_4_TILED_BMG_CCS which is meant
for discrete graphics with dgpu related limitations
Signed-off-by: Juha-Pekka Heikkila <juhapekka.heikkila@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@intel.com>
Acked-by: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20240816115229.531671-3-juhapekka.heikkila@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
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Fix htmldocs build warning introduced by 9b59a85a84dc ("workqueue: Don't
call va_start / va_end twice").
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
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As pointed out by Stephen Boyd it is possible that during initialization
of the pmic_glink child drivers, the protection-domain notifiers fires,
and the associated work is scheduled, before the client registration
returns and as a result the local "client" pointer has been initialized.
The outcome of this is a NULL pointer dereference as the "client"
pointer is blindly dereferenced.
Timeline provided by Stephen:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
ucsi->client = NULL;
devm_pmic_glink_register_client()
client->pdr_notify(client->priv, pg->client_state)
pmic_glink_ucsi_pdr_notify()
schedule_work(&ucsi->register_work)
<schedule away>
pmic_glink_ucsi_register()
ucsi_register()
pmic_glink_ucsi_read_version()
pmic_glink_ucsi_read()
pmic_glink_ucsi_read()
pmic_glink_send(ucsi->client)
<client is NULL BAD>
ucsi->client = client // Too late!
This code is identical across the altmode, battery manager and usci
child drivers.
Resolve this by splitting the allocation of the "client" object and the
registration thereof into two operations.
This only happens if the protection domain registry is populated at the
time of registration, which by the introduction of commit '1ebcde047c54
("soc: qcom: add pd-mapper implementation")' became much more likely.
Reported-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAMi1Hd2_a7TjA7J9ShrAbNOd_CoZ3D87twmO5t+nZxC9sX18tA@mail.gmail.com/
Reported-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZqiyLvP0gkBnuekL@hovoldconsulting.com/
Reported-by: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAE-0n52JgfCBWiFQyQWPji8cq_rCsviBpW-m72YitgNfdaEhQg@mail.gmail.com/
Fixes: 58ef4ece1e41 ("soc: qcom: pmic_glink: Introduce base PMIC GLINK driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Heikki Krogerus <heikki.krogerus@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Neil Armstrong <neil.armstrong@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Johan Hovold <johan+linaro@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Sebastian Reichel <sebastian.reichel@collabora.com>
Tested-by: Johan Hovold <johan+linaro@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <quic_bjorande@quicinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240820-pmic-glink-v6-11-races-v3-1-eec53c750a04@quicinc.com
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <andersson@kernel.org>
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In emergency situations (something has gone wrong but the
system continues to operate), usually important information
(such as a backtrace) is generated via printk(). This
information should be pushed out to the consoles ASAP.
Add per-CPU emergency nesting tracking because an emergency
can arise while in an emergency situation.
Add functions to mark the beginning and end of emergency
sections where the urgent messages are generated.
Perform direct console flushing at the emergency priority if
the current CPU is in an emergency state and it is safe to do
so.
Note that the emergency state is not system-wide. While one CPU
is in an emergency state, another CPU may attempt to print
console messages at normal priority.
Also note that printk() already attempts to flush consoles in
the caller context for normal priority. However, follow-up
changes will introduce printing kthreads, in which case the
normal priority printk() calls will offload to the kthreads.
Co-developed-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner (Intel) <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240820063001.36405-32-john.ogness@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
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If legacy and nbcon consoles are registered and the nbcon
consoles are allowed to flush (i.e. no boot consoles
registered), the legacy consoles will no longer perform
direct printing on the panic CPU until after the backtrace
has been stored. This will give the safe nbcon consoles a
chance to print the panic messages before allowing the
unsafe legacy consoles to print.
If no nbcon consoles are registered or they are not allowed
to flush because boot consoles are registered, there is no
change in behavior (i.e. legacy consoles will always attempt
to print from the printk() caller context).
Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240820063001.36405-30-john.ogness@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
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Add nbcon_atomic_flush_unsafe() to flush all nbcon consoles
using the write_atomic() callback and allowing unsafe hostile
takeovers. Call this at the end of panic() as a final attempt
to flush any pending messages.
Note that legacy consoles use unsafe methods for flushing
from the beginning of panic (see bust_spinlocks()). Therefore,
systems using both legacy and nbcon consoles may still fail to
see panic messages due to unsafe legacy console usage.
Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240820063001.36405-27-john.ogness@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
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Currently the port->lock wrappers uart_port_lock(),
uart_port_unlock() (and their variants) only lock/unlock
the spin_lock.
If the port is an nbcon console that has implemented the
write_atomic() callback, the wrappers must also acquire/release
the console context and mark the region as unsafe. This allows
general port->lock synchronization to be synchronized against
the nbcon write_atomic() callback.
Note that __uart_port_using_nbcon() relies on the port->lock
being held while a console is added and removed from the
console list (i.e. all uart nbcon drivers *must* take the
port->lock in their device_lock() callbacks).
Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240820063001.36405-15-john.ogness@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
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Provide functions nbcon_device_try_acquire() and
nbcon_device_release() which will try to acquire the nbcon
console ownership with NBCON_PRIO_NORMAL and mark it unsafe for
handover/takeover.
These functions are to be used together with the device-specific
locking when performing non-printing activities on the console
device. They will allow synchronization against the
atomic_write() callback which will be serialized, for higher
priority contexts, only by acquiring the console context
ownership.
Pitfalls:
The API requires to be called in a context with migration
disabled because it uses per-CPU variables internally.
The context is set unsafe for a takeover all the time. It
guarantees full serialization against any atomic_write() caller
except for the final flush in panic() which might try an unsafe
takeover.
Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240820063001.36405-14-john.ogness@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
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It was not clear when exactly console_srcu_read_flags() must be
used vs. directly reading @console->flags.
Refactor and clarify that console_srcu_read_flags() is only
needed if the console is registered or the caller is in a
context where the registration status of the console may change
(due to another context).
The function requires the caller holds @console_srcu, which will
ensure that the caller sees an appropriate @flags value for the
registered console and that exit/cleanup routines will not run
if the console is in the process of unregistration.
Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240820063001.36405-13-john.ogness@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
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Introduce uart_port_set_cons() as a wrapper to set @cons of a
uart_port. The wrapper sets @cons under the port lock in order
to prevent @cons from disappearing while another context is
holding the port lock. This is necessary for a follow-up
commit relating to the port lock wrappers, which rely on @cons
not changing between lock and unlock.
Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Théo Lebrun <theo.lebrun@bootlin.com> # EyeQ5, AMBA-PL011
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240820063001.36405-12-john.ogness@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
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It will be necessary at times for the uart nbcon console
drivers to acquire the port lock directly (without the
additional nbcon functionality of the port lock wrappers).
These are special cases such as the implementation of the
device_lock()/device_unlock() callbacks or for internal
port lock wrapper synchronization.
Provide low-level variants __uart_port_lock_irqsave() and
__uart_port_unlock_irqrestore() for this purpose.
Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240820063001.36405-11-john.ogness@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
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Console drivers typically must deal with access to the hardware
via user input/output (such as an interactive login shell) and
output of kernel messages via printk() calls. To provide the
necessary synchronization, usually some driver-specific locking
mechanism is used (for example, the port spinlock for uart
serial consoles).
Until now, usage of this driver-specific locking has been hidden
from the printk-subsystem and implemented within the various
console callbacks. However, nbcon consoles would need to use it
even in the generic code.
Add device_lock() and device_unlock() callback which will need
to get implemented by nbcon consoles.
The callbacks will use whatever synchronization mechanism the
driver is using for itself. The minimum requirement is to
prevent CPU migration. It would allow a context friendly
acquiring of nbcon console ownership in non-emergency and
non-panic context.
Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240820063001.36405-9-john.ogness@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
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The write_atomic() callback has special requirements and is
allowed to use special helper functions. Provide detailed
documentation of the callback so that a developer has a
chance of implementing it correctly.
Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240820063001.36405-8-john.ogness@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
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The return value of write_atomic() does not provide any useful
information. On the contrary, it makes things more complicated
for the caller to appropriately deal with the information.
Change write_atomic() to not have a return value. If the
message did not get printed due to loss of ownership, the
caller will notice this on its own. If ownership was not lost,
it will be assumed that the driver successfully printed the
message and the sequence number for that console will be
incremented.
Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240820063001.36405-7-john.ogness@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
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Add validation that printk_deferred_enter()/_exit() are called in
non-migration contexts.
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240820063001.36405-5-john.ogness@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
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When metadata_dst struct is allocated (using metadata_dst_alloc()), it
reserves room for options at the end of the struct.
Change the memcpy() to unsafe_memcpy() as it is guaranteed that enough
room (md_size bytes) was allocated and the field-spanning write is
intentional.
This resolves the following warning:
------------[ cut here ]------------
memcpy: detected field-spanning write (size 104) of single field "&new_md->u.tun_info" at include/net/dst_metadata.h:166 (size 96)
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 391470 at include/net/dst_metadata.h:166 tun_dst_unclone+0x114/0x138 [geneve]
Modules linked in: act_tunnel_key geneve ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel act_vlan act_mirred act_skbedit cls_matchall nfnetlink_cttimeout act_gact cls_flower sch_ingress sbsa_gwdt ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler xfrm_interface xfrm6_tunnel tunnel6 tunnel4 xfrm_user xfrm_algo nvme_fabrics overlay optee openvswitch nsh nf_conncount ib_srp scsi_transport_srp rpcrdma rdma_ucm ib_iser rdma_cm ib_umad iw_cm libiscsi ib_ipoib scsi_transport_iscsi ib_cm uio_pdrv_genirq uio mlxbf_pmc pwr_mlxbf mlxbf_bootctl bluefield_edac nft_chain_nat binfmt_misc xt_MASQUERADE nf_nat xt_tcpmss xt_NFLOG nfnetlink_log xt_recent xt_hashlimit xt_state xt_conntrack nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_mark xt_comment ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 nft_compat nf_tables nfnetlink sch_fq_codel dm_multipath fuse efi_pstore ip_tables btrfs blake2b_generic raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx xor xor_neon raid6_pq raid1 raid0 nvme nvme_core mlx5_ib ib_uverbs ib_core ipv6 crc_ccitt mlx5_core crct10dif_ce mlxfw
psample i2c_mlxbf gpio_mlxbf2 mlxbf_gige mlxbf_tmfifo
CPU: 2 PID: 391470 Comm: handler6 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc1 #1
Hardware name: https://www.mellanox.com BlueField SoC/BlueField SoC, BIOS 4.5.0.12993 Dec 6 2023
pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : tun_dst_unclone+0x114/0x138 [geneve]
lr : tun_dst_unclone+0x114/0x138 [geneve]
sp : ffffffc0804533f0
x29: ffffffc0804533f0 x28: 000000000000024e x27: 0000000000000000
x26: ffffffdcfc0e8e40 x25: ffffff8086fa6600 x24: ffffff8096a0c000
x23: 0000000000000068 x22: 0000000000000008 x21: ffffff8092ad7000
x20: ffffff8081e17900 x19: ffffff8092ad7900 x18: 00000000fffffffd
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffffdcfa018488 x15: 695f6e75742e753e
x14: 2d646d5f77656e26 x13: 6d5f77656e262220 x12: 646c65696620656c
x11: ffffffdcfbe33ae8 x10: ffffffdcfbe1baa8 x9 : ffffffdcfa0a4c10
x8 : 0000000000017fe8 x7 : c0000000ffffefff x6 : 0000000000000001
x5 : ffffff83fdeeb010 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000027
x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffffff80913f6780
Call trace:
tun_dst_unclone+0x114/0x138 [geneve]
geneve_xmit+0x214/0x10e0 [geneve]
dev_hard_start_xmit+0xc0/0x220
__dev_queue_xmit+0xa14/0xd38
dev_queue_xmit+0x14/0x28 [openvswitch]
ovs_vport_send+0x98/0x1c8 [openvswitch]
do_output+0x80/0x1a0 [openvswitch]
do_execute_actions+0x172c/0x1958 [openvswitch]
ovs_execute_actions+0x64/0x1a8 [openvswitch]
ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0x258/0x2d8 [openvswitch]
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xc8/0x138
genl_rcv_msg+0x1ec/0x280
netlink_rcv_skb+0x64/0x150
genl_rcv+0x40/0x60
netlink_unicast+0x2e4/0x348
netlink_sendmsg+0x1b0/0x400
__sock_sendmsg+0x64/0xc0
____sys_sendmsg+0x284/0x308
___sys_sendmsg+0x88/0xf0
__sys_sendmsg+0x70/0xd8
__arm64_sys_sendmsg+0x2c/0x40
invoke_syscall+0x50/0x128
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x48/0xf0
do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38
el0_svc+0x38/0x100
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xc0/0xc8
el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Reviewed-by: Cosmin Ratiu <cratiu@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Gal Pressman <gal@nvidia.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240818114351.3612692-1-gal@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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mipi_dsi_dcs_set_tear_scanline_multi can heavily benefit from being
converted to a multi style function as it is often called in the context of
similar functions.
Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Tejas Vipin <tejasvipin76@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20240818060816.848784-2-tejasvipin76@gmail.com
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Calling va_start / va_end multiple times is undefined and causes
problems with certain compiler / platforms.
Change alloc_ordered_workqueue_lockdep_map to a macro and updated
__alloc_workqueue to take a va_list argument.
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@chromium.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
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This helps in easily initializing blocks of code (e.g. static calls and
keys).
UNROLL(N, MACRO, __VA_ARGS__) calls MACRO N times with the first
argument as the index of the iteration. This allows string pasting to
create unique tokens for variable names, function calls etc.
As an example:
#include <linux/unroll.h>
#define MACRO(N, a, b) \
int add_##N(int a, int b) \
{ \
return a + b + N; \
}
UNROLL(2, MACRO, x, y)
expands to:
int add_0(int x, int y)
{
return x + y + 0;
}
int add_1(int x, int y)
{
return x + y + 1;
}
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Nacked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
This patch enhances fsverity's capabilities to support both integrity and
authenticity protection by introducing the exposure of built-in
signatures through a new LSM hook. This functionality allows LSMs,
e.g. IPE, to enforce policies based on the authenticity and integrity of
files, specifically focusing on built-in fsverity signatures. It enables
a policy enforcement layer within LSMs for fsverity, offering granular
control over the usage of authenticity claims. For instance, a policy
could be established to only permit the execution of all files with
verified built-in fsverity signatures.
The introduction of a security_inode_setintegrity() hook call within
fsverity's workflow ensures that the verified built-in signature of a file
is exposed to LSMs. This enables LSMs to recognize and label fsverity files
that contain a verified built-in fsverity signature. This hook is invoked
subsequent to the fsverity_verify_signature() process, guaranteeing the
signature's verification against fsverity's keyring. This mechanism is
crucial for maintaining system security, as it operates in kernel space,
effectively thwarting attempts by malicious binaries to bypass user space
stack interactions.
The second to last commit in this patch set will add a link to the IPE
documentation in fsverity.rst.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
This patch introduces a new hook to save inode's integrity
data. For example, for fsverity enabled files, LSMs can use this hook to
save the existence of verified fsverity builtin signature into the inode's
security blob, and LSMs can make access decisions based on this data.
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: subject line tweak, removed changelog]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
dm-verity provides a strong guarantee of a block device's integrity. As
a generic way to check the integrity of a block device, it provides
those integrity guarantees to its higher layers, including the filesystem
level.
However, critical security metadata like the dm-verity roothash and its
signing information are not easily accessible to the LSMs.
To address this limitation, this patch introduces a mechanism to store
and manage these essential security details within a newly added LSM blob
in the block_device structure.
This addition allows LSMs to make access control decisions on the integrity
data stored within the block_device, enabling more flexible security
policies. For instance, LSMs can now revoke access to dm-verity devices
based on their roothashes, ensuring that only authorized and verified
content is accessible. Additionally, LSMs can enforce policies to only
allow files from dm-verity devices that have a valid digital signature to
execute, effectively blocking any unsigned files from execution, thus
enhancing security against unauthorized modifications.
The patch includes new hook calls, `security_bdev_setintegrity()`, in
dm-verity to expose the dm-verity roothash and the roothash signature to
LSMs via preresume() callback. By using the preresume() callback, it
ensures that the security metadata is consistently in sync with the
metadata of the dm-verity target in the current active mapping table.
The hook calls are depended on CONFIG_SECURITY.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
[PM: moved sig_size field as discussed]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
This patch introduces a new LSM blob to the block_device structure,
enabling the security subsystem to store security-sensitive data related
to block devices. Currently, for a device mapper's mapped device containing
a dm-verity target, critical security information such as the roothash and
its signing state are not readily accessible. Specifically, while the
dm-verity volume creation process passes the dm-verity roothash and its
signature from userspace to the kernel, the roothash is stored privately
within the dm-verity target, and its signature is discarded
post-verification. This makes it extremely hard for the security subsystem
to utilize these data.
With the addition of the LSM blob to the block_device structure, the
security subsystem can now retain and manage important security metadata
such as the roothash and the signing state of a dm-verity by storing them
inside the blob. Access decisions can then be based on these stored data.
The implementation follows the same approach used for security blobs in
other structures like struct file, struct inode, and struct superblock.
The initialization of the security blob occurs after the creation of the
struct block_device, performed by the security subsystem. Similarly, the
security blob is freed by the security subsystem before the struct
block_device is deallocated or freed.
This patch also introduces a new hook security_bdev_setintegrity() to save
block device's integrity data to the new LSM blob. For example, for
dm-verity, it can use this hook to expose its roothash and signing state
to LSMs, then LSMs can save these data into the LSM blob.
Please note that the new hook should be invoked every time the security
information is updated to keep these data current. For example, in
dm-verity, if the mapping table is reloaded and configured to use a
different dm-verity target with a new roothash and signing information,
the previously stored data in the LSM blob will become obsolete. It is
crucial to re-invoke the hook to refresh these data and ensure they are up
to date. This necessity arises from the design of device-mapper, where a
device-mapper device is first created, and then targets are subsequently
loaded into it. These targets can be modified multiple times during the
device's lifetime. Therefore, while the LSM blob is allocated during the
creation of the block device, its actual contents are not initialized at
this stage and can change substantially over time. This includes
alterations from data that the LSM 'trusts' to those it does not, making
it essential to handle these changes correctly. Failure to address this
dynamic aspect could potentially allow for bypassing LSM checks.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: merge fuzz, subject line tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Users of IPE require a way to identify when and why an operation fails,
allowing them to both respond to violations of policy and be notified
of potentially malicious actions on their systems with respect to IPE
itself.
This patch introduces 3 new audit events.
AUDIT_IPE_ACCESS(1420) indicates the result of an IPE policy evaluation
of a resource.
AUDIT_IPE_CONFIG_CHANGE(1421) indicates the current active IPE policy
has been changed to another loaded policy.
AUDIT_IPE_POLICY_LOAD(1422) indicates a new IPE policy has been loaded
into the kernel.
This patch also adds support for success auditing, allowing users to
identify why an allow decision was made for a resource. However, it is
recommended to use this option with caution, as it is quite noisy.
Here are some examples of the new audit record types:
AUDIT_IPE_ACCESS(1420):
audit: AUDIT1420 ipe_op=EXECUTE ipe_hook=BPRM_CHECK enforcing=1
pid=297 comm="sh" path="/root/vol/bin/hello" dev="tmpfs"
ino=3897 rule="op=EXECUTE boot_verified=TRUE action=ALLOW"
audit: AUDIT1420 ipe_op=EXECUTE ipe_hook=BPRM_CHECK enforcing=1
pid=299 comm="sh" path="/mnt/ipe/bin/hello" dev="dm-0"
ino=2 rule="DEFAULT action=DENY"
audit: AUDIT1420 ipe_op=EXECUTE ipe_hook=BPRM_CHECK enforcing=1
pid=300 path="/tmp/tmpdp2h1lub/deny/bin/hello" dev="tmpfs"
ino=131 rule="DEFAULT action=DENY"
The above three records were generated when the active IPE policy only
allows binaries from the initramfs to run. The three identical `hello`
binary were placed at different locations, only the first hello from
the rootfs(initramfs) was allowed.
Field ipe_op followed by the IPE operation name associated with the log.
Field ipe_hook followed by the name of the LSM hook that triggered the IPE
event.
Field enforcing followed by the enforcement state of IPE. (it will be
introduced in the next commit)
Field pid followed by the pid of the process that triggered the IPE
event.
Field comm followed by the command line program name of the process that
triggered the IPE event.
Field path followed by the file's path name.
Field dev followed by the device name as found in /dev where the file is
from.
Note that for device mappers it will use the name `dm-X` instead of
the name in /dev/mapper.
For a file in a temp file system, which is not from a device, it will use
`tmpfs` for the field.
The implementation of this part is following another existing use case
LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE in security/lsm_audit.c
Field ino followed by the file's inode number.
Field rule followed by the IPE rule made the access decision. The whole
rule must be audited because the decision is based on the combination of
all property conditions in the rule.
Along with the syscall audit event, user can know why a blocked
happened. For example:
audit: AUDIT1420 ipe_op=EXECUTE ipe_hook=BPRM_CHECK enforcing=1
pid=2138 comm="bash" path="/mnt/ipe/bin/hello" dev="dm-0"
ino=2 rule="DEFAULT action=DENY"
audit[1956]: SYSCALL arch=c000003e syscall=59
success=no exit=-13 a0=556790138df0 a1=556790135390 a2=5567901338b0
a3=ab2a41a67f4f1f4e items=1 ppid=147 pid=1956 auid=4294967295 uid=0
gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0
ses=4294967295 comm="bash" exe="/usr/bin/bash" key=(null)
The above two records showed bash used execve to run "hello" and got
blocked by IPE. Note that the IPE records are always prior to a SYSCALL
record.
AUDIT_IPE_CONFIG_CHANGE(1421):
audit: AUDIT1421
old_active_pol_name="Allow_All" old_active_pol_version=0.0.0
old_policy_digest=sha256:E3B0C44298FC1C149AFBF4C8996FB92427AE41E4649
new_active_pol_name="boot_verified" new_active_pol_version=0.0.0
new_policy_digest=sha256:820EEA5B40CA42B51F68962354BA083122A20BB846F
auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 lsm=ipe res=1
The above record showed the current IPE active policy switch from
`Allow_All` to `boot_verified` along with the version and the hash
digest of the two policies. Note IPE can only have one policy active
at a time, all access decision evaluation is based on the current active
policy.
The normal procedure to deploy a policy is loading the policy to deploy
into the kernel first, then switch the active policy to it.
AUDIT_IPE_POLICY_LOAD(1422):
audit: AUDIT1422 policy_name="boot_verified" policy_version=0.0.0
policy_digest=sha256:820EEA5B40CA42B51F68962354BA083122A20BB846F2676
auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 lsm=ipe res=1
The above record showed a new policy has been loaded into the kernel
with the policy name, policy version and policy hash.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
When deleting a directory in the security file system, the existing
securityfs_remove requires the directory to be empty, otherwise
it will do nothing. This leads to a potential risk that the security
file system might be in an unclean state when the intended deletion
did not happen.
This commit introduces a new function securityfs_recursive_remove
to recursively delete a directory without leaving an unclean state.
Co-developed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
This patch introduces a new hook to notify security system that the
content of initramfs has been unpacked into the rootfs.
Upon receiving this notification, the security system can activate
a policy to allow only files that originated from the initramfs to
execute or load into kernel during the early stages of booting.
This approach is crucial for minimizing the attack surface by
ensuring that only trusted files from the initramfs are operational
in the critical boot phase.
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
When soft interrupt actions are called, they are passed a pointer to the
struct softirq action which contains the action's function pointer.
This pointer isn't useful, as the action callback already knows what
function it is. And since each callback handles a specific soft interrupt,
the callback also knows which soft interrupt number is running.
No soft interrupt action callback actually uses this parameter, so remove
it from the function pointer signature. This clarifies that soft interrupt
actions are global routines and makes it slightly cheaper to call them.
Signed-off-by: Caleb Sander Mateos <csander@purestorage.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240815171549.3260003-1-csander@purestorage.com
|
|
FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_{REQ,RESP} supported only x3-x7 to pass implementation
defined values as part of the message. This may not be sufficient sometimes
and also it would be good to use all the registers supported by SMCCC v1.2
(x0-x17) for such register based communication.
Also another limitation with the FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_{REQ,RESP} is the
ability to target a specific service within the partition based on it's
UUID.
In order to address both of the above limitation, FF-A v1.2 introduced
FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_{REQ,RESP}2 which has the ability to target the
message to a specific service based on its UUID within a partition as
well as utilise all the available registers(x4-x17 specifically) for
the communication.
This change adds support for FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_REQ2 and
FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_RESP2.
Message-Id: <20240820-ffa_v1-2-v2-5-18c0c5f3c65e@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
|
|
Arm Firmware Framework for A-profile(FFA) v1.2 introduces register based
discovery mechanism and direct messaging extensions that enables to target
specific UUID within a partition.
Let us add all the newly supported FF-A function IDs in the spec.
Also update to the error values and associated handling.
Message-Id: <20240820-ffa_v1-2-v2-2-18c0c5f3c65e@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
|
|
The TOS field in the IPv4 flow information structure ('flowi4_tos') is
matched by the kernel against the TOS selector in IPv4 rules and routes.
The field is initialized differently by different call sites. Some treat
it as DSCP (RFC 2474) and initialize all six DSCP bits, some treat it as
RFC 1349 TOS and initialize it using RT_TOS() and some treat it as RFC
791 TOS and initialize it using IPTOS_RT_MASK.
What is common to all these call sites is that they all initialize the
lower three DSCP bits, which fits the TOS definition in the initial IPv4
specification (RFC 791).
Therefore, the kernel only allows configuring IPv4 FIB rules that match
on the lower three DSCP bits which are always guaranteed to be
initialized by all call sites:
# ip -4 rule add tos 0x1c table 100
# ip -4 rule add tos 0x3c table 100
Error: Invalid tos.
While this works, it is unlikely to be very useful. RFC 791 that
initially defined the TOS and IP precedence fields was updated by RFC
2474 over twenty five years ago where these fields were replaced by a
single six bits DSCP field.
Extending FIB rules to match on DSCP can be done by adding a new DSCP
selector while maintaining the existing semantics of the TOS selector
for applications that rely on that.
A prerequisite for allowing FIB rules to match on DSCP is to adjust all
the call sites to initialize the high order DSCP bits and remove their
masking along the path to the core where the field is matched on.
However, making this change alone will result in a behavior change. For
example, a forwarded IPv4 packet with a DS field of 0xfc will no longer
match a FIB rule that was configured with 'tos 0x1c'.
This behavior change can be avoided by masking the upper three DSCP bits
in 'flowi4_tos' before comparing it against the TOS selectors in FIB
rules and routes.
Implement the above by adding a new function that checks whether a given
DSCP value matches the one specified in the IPv4 flow information
structure and invoke it from the three places that currently match on
'flowi4_tos'.
Use RT_TOS() for the masking of 'flowi4_tos' instead of IPTOS_RT_MASK
since the latter is not uAPI and we should be able to remove it at some
point.
Include <linux/ip.h> in <linux/in_route.h> since the former defines
IPTOS_TOS_MASK which is used in the definition of RT_TOS() in
<linux/in_route.h>.
No regressions in FIB tests:
# ./fib_tests.sh
[...]
Tests passed: 218
Tests failed: 0
And FIB rule tests:
# ./fib_rule_tests.sh
[...]
Tests passed: 116
Tests failed: 0
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
|
|
iounmap() on x86 occasionally fails to unmap because the provided valid
ioremap address is not below high_memory. It turned out that this
happens due to KASLR.
KASLR uses the full address space between PAGE_OFFSET and vaddr_end to
randomize the starting points of the direct map, vmalloc and vmemmap
regions. It thereby limits the size of the direct map by using the
installed memory size plus an extra configurable margin for hot-plug
memory. This limitation is done to gain more randomization space
because otherwise only the holes between the direct map, vmalloc,
vmemmap and vaddr_end would be usable for randomizing.
The limited direct map size is not exposed to the rest of the kernel, so
the memory hot-plug and resource management related code paths still
operate under the assumption that the available address space can be
determined with MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS.
request_free_mem_region() allocates from (1 << MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS) - 1
downwards. That means the first allocation happens past the end of the
direct map and if unlucky this address is in the vmalloc space, which
causes high_memory to become greater than VMALLOC_START and consequently
causes iounmap() to fail for valid ioremap addresses.
MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS cannot be changed for that because the randomization
does not align with address bit boundaries and there are other places
which actually require to know the maximum number of address bits. All
remaining usage sites of MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS have been analyzed and found
to be correct.
Cure this by exposing the end of the direct map via PHYSMEM_END and use
that for the memory hot-plug and resource management related places
instead of relying on MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS. In the KASLR case PHYSMEM_END
maps to a variable which is initialized by the KASLR initialization and
otherwise it is based on MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS as before.
To prevent future hickups add a check into add_pages() to catch callers
trying to add memory above PHYSMEM_END.
Fixes: 0483e1fa6e09 ("x86/mm: Implement ASLR for kernel memory regions")
Reported-by: Max Ramanouski <max8rr8@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Alistair Popple <apopple@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-By: Max Ramanouski <max8rr8@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Alistair Popple <apopple@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Alistair Popple <apopple@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/87ed6soy3z.ffs@tglx
|
|
Reject rules where a load occurs from a register that has not seen a store
early in the same rule.
commit 4c905f6740a3 ("netfilter: nf_tables: initialize registers in
nft_do_chain()")
had to add a unconditional memset to the nftables register space to avoid
leaking stack information to userspace.
This memset shows up in benchmarks. After this change, this commit can
be reverted again.
Note that this breaks userspace compatibility, because theoretically
you can do
rule 1: reg2 := meta load iif, reg2 == 1 jump ...
rule 2: reg2 == 2 jump ... // read access with no store in this rule
... after this change this is rejected.
Neither nftables nor iptables-nft generate such rules, each rule is
always standalone.
This resuts in a small increase of nft_ctx structure by sizeof(long).
To cope with hypothetical rulesets like the example above one could emit
on-demand "reg[x] = 0" store when generating the datapath blob in
nf_tables_commit_chain_prepare().
A patch that does this is linked to below.
For now, lets disable this. In nf_tables, a rule is the smallest
unit that can be replaced from userspace, i.e. a hypothetical ruleset
that relies on earlier initialisations of registers can't be changed
at will as register usage would need to be coordinated.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netfilter-devel/20240627135330.17039-4-fw@strlen.de/
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
|
|
Mechanical transformation, no logical changes intended.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
|
|
The buffer size histograms in smc_stats, namely rx/tx_rmbsize, record
the sizes of ringbufs for all connections that have ever appeared in
the net namespace. They are incremental and we cannot know the actual
ringbufs usage from these. So here introduces statistics for current
ringbufs usage of existing smc connections in the net namespace into
smc_stats, it will be incremented when new connection uses a ringbuf
and decremented when the ringbuf is unused.
Signed-off-by: Wen Gu <guwen@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
|
|
Currently we have the statistics on sndbuf/RMB sizes of all connections
that have ever been on the link group, namely smc_stats_memsize. However
these statistics are incremental and since the ringbufs of link group
are allowed to be reused, we cannot know the actual allocated buffers
through these. So here introduces the statistic on actual allocated
ringbufs of the link group, it will be incremented when a new ringbuf is
added into buf_list and decremented when it is deleted from buf_list.
Signed-off-by: Wen Gu <guwen@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
|
|
Add the devres-enabled version of dev_pm_domain_attach|detach_list.
If client drivers use devm_pm_domain_attach_list() to attach the PM domains,
devm_pm_domain_detach_list() will be invoked implicitly during remove phase.
Signed-off-by: Dikshita Agarwal <quic_dikshita@quicinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1724063350-11993-2-git-send-email-quic_dikshita@quicinc.com
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
|
|
Merge the immutable branch dt into next, to allow the DT bindings to be
tested together with changes that are targeted for v6.12.
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
|
|
Define power domain IDs as described in the TRM and add compatible for
rockchip,rk3576-power-controller
Signed-off-by: Finley Xiao <finley.xiao@rock-chips.com>
Co-Developed-by: Detlev Casanova <detlev.casanova@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Detlev Casanova <detlev.casanova@collabora.com>
Acked-by: Conor Dooley <conor.dooley@microchip.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240814222824.3170-2-detlev.casanova@collabora.com
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
|
|
Add an skb helper function to copy a range of bytes from within
an existing skb_seq_state.
Signed-off-by: Christian Hopps <chopps@labn.net>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
|
|
Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) is an LSM that provides an
complimentary approach to Mandatory Access Control than existing LSMs
today.
Existing LSMs have centered around the concept of access to a resource
should be controlled by the current user's credentials. IPE's approach,
is that access to a resource should be controlled by the system's trust
of a current resource.
The basis of this approach is defining a global policy to specify which
resource can be trusted.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
syzkaller reported UAF in kcm_release(). [0]
The scenario is
1. Thread A builds a skb with MSG_MORE and sets kcm->seq_skb.
2. Thread A resumes building skb from kcm->seq_skb but is blocked
by sk_stream_wait_memory()
3. Thread B calls sendmsg() concurrently, finishes building kcm->seq_skb
and puts the skb to the write queue
4. Thread A faces an error and finally frees skb that is already in the
write queue
5. kcm_release() does double-free the skb in the write queue
When a thread is building a MSG_MORE skb, another thread must not touch it.
Let's add a per-sk mutex and serialise kcm_sendmsg().
[0]:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __skb_unlink include/linux/skbuff.h:2366 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __skb_dequeue include/linux/skbuff.h:2385 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __skb_queue_purge_reason include/linux/skbuff.h:3175 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __skb_queue_purge include/linux/skbuff.h:3181 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in kcm_release+0x170/0x4c8 net/kcm/kcmsock.c:1691
Read of size 8 at addr ffff0000ced0fc80 by task syz-executor329/6167
CPU: 1 PID: 6167 Comm: syz-executor329 Tainted: G B 6.8.0-rc5-syzkaller-g9abbc24128bc #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/25/2024
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x1b8/0x1e4 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:291
show_stack+0x2c/0x3c arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:298
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xd0/0x124 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
print_report+0x178/0x518 mm/kasan/report.c:488
kasan_report+0xd8/0x138 mm/kasan/report.c:601
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x20/0x2c mm/kasan/report_generic.c:381
__skb_unlink include/linux/skbuff.h:2366 [inline]
__skb_dequeue include/linux/skbuff.h:2385 [inline]
__skb_queue_purge_reason include/linux/skbuff.h:3175 [inline]
__skb_queue_purge include/linux/skbuff.h:3181 [inline]
kcm_release+0x170/0x4c8 net/kcm/kcmsock.c:1691
__sock_release net/socket.c:659 [inline]
sock_close+0xa4/0x1e8 net/socket.c:1421
__fput+0x30c/0x738 fs/file_table.c:376
____fput+0x20/0x30 fs/file_table.c:404
task_work_run+0x230/0x2e0 kernel/task_work.c:180
exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:38 [inline]
do_exit+0x618/0x1f64 kernel/exit.c:871
do_group_exit+0x194/0x22c kernel/exit.c:1020
get_signal+0x1500/0x15ec kernel/signal.c:2893
do_signal+0x23c/0x3b44 arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c:1249
do_notify_resume+0x74/0x1f4 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:148
exit_to_user_mode_prepare arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:169 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:178 [inline]
el0_svc+0xac/0x168 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:713
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:730
el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:598
Allocated by task 6166:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x40/0x78 mm/kasan/common.c:68
kasan_save_alloc_info+0x70/0x84 mm/kasan/generic.c:626
unpoison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:314 [inline]
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x74/0x8c mm/kasan/common.c:340
kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:201 [inline]
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3813 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3860 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x204/0x4c0 mm/slub.c:3903
__alloc_skb+0x19c/0x3d8 net/core/skbuff.c:641
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1296 [inline]
kcm_sendmsg+0x1d3c/0x2124 net/kcm/kcmsock.c:783
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0x220/0x2c0 net/socket.c:768
splice_to_socket+0x7cc/0xd58 fs/splice.c:889
do_splice_from fs/splice.c:941 [inline]
direct_splice_actor+0xec/0x1d8 fs/splice.c:1164
splice_direct_to_actor+0x438/0xa0c fs/splice.c:1108
do_splice_direct_actor fs/splice.c:1207 [inline]
do_splice_direct+0x1e4/0x304 fs/splice.c:1233
do_sendfile+0x460/0xb3c fs/read_write.c:1295
__do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1362 [inline]
__se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1348 [inline]
__arm64_sys_sendfile64+0x160/0x3b4 fs/read_write.c:1348
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:37 [inline]
invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2b8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:51
el0_svc_common+0x130/0x23c arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:136
do_el0_svc+0x48/0x58 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:155
el0_svc+0x54/0x168 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:712
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:730
el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:598
Freed by task 6167:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x40/0x78 mm/kasan/common.c:68
kasan_save_free_info+0x5c/0x74 mm/kasan/generic.c:640
poison_slab_object+0x124/0x18c mm/kasan/common.c:241
__kasan_slab_free+0x3c/0x78 mm/kasan/common.c:257
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:184 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2121 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:4299 [inline]
kmem_cache_free+0x15c/0x3d4 mm/slub.c:4363
kfree_skbmem+0x10c/0x19c
__kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:1109 [inline]
kfree_skb_reason+0x240/0x6f4 net/core/skbuff.c:1144
kfree_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1244 [inline]
kcm_release+0x104/0x4c8 net/kcm/kcmsock.c:1685
__sock_release net/socket.c:659 [inline]
sock_close+0xa4/0x1e8 net/socket.c:1421
__fput+0x30c/0x738 fs/file_table.c:376
____fput+0x20/0x30 fs/file_table.c:404
task_work_run+0x230/0x2e0 kernel/task_work.c:180
exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:38 [inline]
do_exit+0x618/0x1f64 kernel/exit.c:871
do_group_exit+0x194/0x22c kernel/exit.c:1020
get_signal+0x1500/0x15ec kernel/signal.c:2893
do_signal+0x23c/0x3b44 arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c:1249
do_notify_resume+0x74/0x1f4 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:148
exit_to_user_mode_prepare arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:169 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:178 [inline]
el0_svc+0xac/0x168 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:713
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:730
el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:598
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff0000ced0fc80
which belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 240
The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
freed 240-byte region [ffff0000ced0fc80, ffff0000ced0fd70)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:00000000d35f4ae4 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x10ed0f
flags: 0x5ffc00000000800(slab|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
page_type: 0xffffffff()
raw: 05ffc00000000800 ffff0000c1cbf640 fffffdffc3423100 dead000000000004
raw: 0000000000000000 00000000000c000c 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff0000ced0fb80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff0000ced0fc00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff0000ced0fc80: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff0000ced0fd00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc
ffff0000ced0fd80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
Fixes: ab7ac4eb9832 ("kcm: Kernel Connection Multiplexor module")
Reported-by: syzbot+b72d86aa5df17ce74c60@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=b72d86aa5df17ce74c60
Tested-by: syzbot+b72d86aa5df17ce74c60@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240815220437.69511-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Fix htmldocs build warning introduced by ec0a7d44b358 ("workqueue: Add
interface for user-defined workqueue lockdep map").
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
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Merge series from Bard Liao <yung-chuan.liao@linux.intel.com>:
Intel new platforms can have up to 5 SoundWire links.
This series does not apply to SoundWire tree due to recent changes in
machine driver. Can we go via ASoC tree with Vinod's Acked-by tag?
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Merge series from Cezary Rojewski <cezary.rojewski@intel.com>:
A spiritual successor to haswell/baytrail removal series [1].
The avs-driver found in sound/soc/intel/avs is a direct replacement to
the existing skylake-driver. It covers all features supported by it and
more and aligns with the recommended flows and requirements based on
Windows driver equivalent.
The skylake-driver related UAPI has been removed with "ASoC: Drop
soc-topology ABI v4 support" [2].
For the official kernel tree the deprecation begun with v6.0. Most
skylake-drivers users moved to avs- or SOF-driver when AudioDSP
capabilities are available on the platform or to snd-hda-intel
(sound/pci/hda) when such capabilities are not.
For the supported trees the deprecation begun with v5.4 with v5.15 being
the first where the skylake-driver is disabled entirely.
All machine board drivers that consume this DSP driver have their
replacements present within sound/soc/intel/avs/boards/ directory.
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/alsa-devel/20201006064907.16277-1-cezary.rojewski@intel.com/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/alsa-devel/20240403091629.647267-1-cezary.rojewski@intel.com/
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