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Add an empty drivers/net/mctp/, for future interface drivers.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Kerr <jk@codeconstruct.com.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This change introduces the user-visible MCTP header, containing the
protocol-specific addressing definitions.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Kerr <jk@codeconstruct.com.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Simple packet header format as defined by DMTF DSP0236.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Kerr <jk@codeconstruct.com.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Add basic Kconfig, an initial (empty) af_mctp source object, and
{AF,PF}_MCTP definitions, and the required definitions for a new
protocol type.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Kerr <jk@codeconstruct.com.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The struct nfc_dev is not modified by nfc_get_drvdata() and
nfc_device_name() so it can be made a const.
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This change leverages the infrastructure introduced by the previous
patches to allow soft devices passing to the GRO engine owned skbs
without impacting the fast-path.
It's up to the GRO caller ensuring the slow_gro bit validity before
invoking the GRO engine. The new helper skb_prepare_for_gro() is
introduced for that goal.
On slow_gro, skbs are aggregated only with equal sk.
Additionally, skb truesize on GRO recycle and free is correctly
updated so that sk wmem is not changed by the GRO processing.
rfc-> v1:
- fixed bad truesize on dev_gro_receive NAPI_FREE
- use the existing state bit
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Similar to the previous patch, but covering the dst field:
the slow_gro flag is additionally set when a dst is attached
to the skb
RFC -> v1:
- use the existing flag instead of adding a new one
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The new flag tracks if any state field is set, so that
GRO requires 'unusual'/slow prepare steps.
Set such flag when a ct entry is attached to the skb,
and never clear it.
The new bit uses an existing hole into the sk_buff struct
RFC -> v1:
- use a single state bit, never clear it
- avoid moving the _nfct field
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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We make the following changes to the documentation of drm leases to
make it easier to reason about their usage. In particular, we clarify
the lifetime and locking rules of lease fields in drm_master:
1. Make it clear that &drm_device.mode_config.idr_mutex protects the
lease idr and list structures for drm_master. The lessor field itself
doesn't need to be protected as it doesn't change after it's set in
drm_lease_create.
2. Add descriptions for the lifetime of lessors and leases.
3. Add an overview DOC: section in drm-uapi.rst that defines the
terminology for drm leasing, and explains how leases work and why
they're used.
Signed-off-by: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi <desmondcheongzx@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20210728102739.441543-1-desmondcheongzx@gmail.com
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We can now switch over to using cpu_pm instead of custom calls and make
the context save and restore functions static.
Let's also move the save and restore functions to avoid adding forward
declarations for them. And get rid of the static data pointer while at it.
Cc: Roger Quadros <rogerq@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210727101034.32148-2-tony@atomide.com
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com>
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We need to check up->dirmask to avoid shift-out-of-bounce bug,
since up->dirmask comes from userspace.
Also, added XFRM_USERPOLICY_DIRMASK_MAX constant to uapi to inform
user-space that up->dirmask has maximum possible value
Fixes: 2d151d39073a ("xfrm: Add possibility to set the default to block if we have no policy")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+9cd5837a045bbee5b810@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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Document all fields of struct fscrypt_operations so that it's more clear
what filesystems that use (or plan to use) fs/crypto/ need to implement.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210729043728.18480-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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Just call scsi_ioctl() in sg as that has the same effect.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210724072033.1284840-25-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
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Merge the ioctl handling in block/scsi_ioctl.c into its only caller in
drivers/scsi/scsi_ioctl.c.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210724072033.1284840-19-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
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Remove the separate command filter structure and just use a switch
statement (which also cought two duplicate commands), return a bool and
give the function a sensible name.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210724072033.1284840-18-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
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Merge scsi_req_init() into its only caller.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210724072033.1284840-16-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
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Move the SCSI-specific bsg code in the SCSI midlayer instead of in the
common bsg code. This just keeps the common bsg code block/ and also
allows building it as a module.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210724072033.1284840-15-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
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Return the max_sectors value in bytes. Lifted from scsi_ioctl.c.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210724072033.1284840-13-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
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Ensure SCSI ULD only has to call a single ioctl helper. This also adds a
bunch of missing ioctls to the ch driver, and removes the need for a
duplicate implementation of SCSI_IOCTL_SEND_COMMAND command.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210724072033.1284840-12-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
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Manually verify that the device is not a partition and the caller has admin
privіleges at the beginning of the sr ioctl method and open code the
trivial check for sd as well.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210724072033.1284840-11-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
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Open code scsi_cmd_blk_ioctl() in its two callers.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210724072033.1284840-10-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
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Just handle the compat case in scsi_ioctl() using in_compat_syscall().
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210724072033.1284840-7-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
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Daniel Borkmann says:
====================
pull-request: bpf 2021-07-29
The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net* tree.
We've added 9 non-merge commits during the last 14 day(s) which contain
a total of 20 files changed, 446 insertions(+), 138 deletions(-).
The main changes are:
1) Fix UBSAN out-of-bounds splat for showing XDP link fdinfo, from Lorenz Bauer.
2) Fix insufficient Spectre v4 mitigation in BPF runtime, from Daniel Borkmann,
Piotr Krysiuk and Benedict Schlueter.
3) Batch of fixes for BPF sockmap found under stress testing, from John Fastabend.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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syzbot is hitting might_sleep() warning at hci_sock_dev_event()
due to calling lock_sock() with rw spinlock held [1].
It seems that history of this locking problem is a trial and error.
Commit b40df5743ee8aed8 ("[PATCH] bluetooth: fix socket locking in
hci_sock_dev_event()") in 2.6.21-rc4 changed bh_lock_sock() to lock_sock()
as an attempt to fix lockdep warning.
Then, commit 4ce61d1c7a8ef4c1 ("[BLUETOOTH]: Fix locking in
hci_sock_dev_event().") in 2.6.22-rc2 changed lock_sock() to
local_bh_disable() + bh_lock_sock_nested() as an attempt to fix
sleep in atomic context warning.
Then, commit 4b5dd696f81b210c ("Bluetooth: Remove local_bh_disable() from
hci_sock.c") in 3.3-rc1 removed local_bh_disable().
Then, commit e305509e678b3a4a ("Bluetooth: use correct lock to prevent UAF
of hdev object") in 5.13-rc5 again changed bh_lock_sock_nested() to
lock_sock() as an attempt to fix CVE-2021-3573.
This difficulty comes from current implementation that
hci_sock_dev_event(HCI_DEV_UNREG) is responsible for dropping all
references from sockets because hci_unregister_dev() immediately reclaims
resources as soon as returning from hci_sock_dev_event(HCI_DEV_UNREG).
But the history suggests that hci_sock_dev_event(HCI_DEV_UNREG) was not
doing what it should do.
Therefore, instead of trying to detach sockets from device, let's accept
not detaching sockets from device at hci_sock_dev_event(HCI_DEV_UNREG),
by moving actual cleanup of resources from hci_unregister_dev() to
hci_release_dev() which is called by bt_host_release when all references
to this unregistered device (which is a kobject) are gone.
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=a5df189917e79d5e59c9 [1]
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+a5df189917e79d5e59c9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Tested-by: syzbot <syzbot+a5df189917e79d5e59c9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Fixes: e305509e678b3a4a ("Bluetooth: use correct lock to prevent UAF of hdev object")
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
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Spectre v4 gadgets make use of memory disambiguation, which is a set of
techniques that execute memory access instructions, that is, loads and
stores, out of program order; Intel's optimization manual, section 2.4.4.5:
A load instruction micro-op may depend on a preceding store. Many
microarchitectures block loads until all preceding store addresses are
known. The memory disambiguator predicts which loads will not depend on
any previous stores. When the disambiguator predicts that a load does
not have such a dependency, the load takes its data from the L1 data
cache. Eventually, the prediction is verified. If an actual conflict is
detected, the load and all succeeding instructions are re-executed.
af86ca4e3088 ("bpf: Prevent memory disambiguation attack") tried to mitigate
this attack by sanitizing the memory locations through preemptive "fast"
(low latency) stores of zero prior to the actual "slow" (high latency) store
of a pointer value such that upon dependency misprediction the CPU then
speculatively executes the load of the pointer value and retrieves the zero
value instead of the attacker controlled scalar value previously stored at
that location, meaning, subsequent access in the speculative domain is then
redirected to the "zero page".
The sanitized preemptive store of zero prior to the actual "slow" store is
done through a simple ST instruction based on r10 (frame pointer) with
relative offset to the stack location that the verifier has been tracking
on the original used register for STX, which does not have to be r10. Thus,
there are no memory dependencies for this store, since it's only using r10
and immediate constant of zero; hence af86ca4e3088 /assumed/ a low latency
operation.
However, a recent attack demonstrated that this mitigation is not sufficient
since the preemptive store of zero could also be turned into a "slow" store
and is thus bypassed as well:
[...]
// r2 = oob address (e.g. scalar)
// r7 = pointer to map value
31: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r2
// r9 will remain "fast" register, r10 will become "slow" register below
32: (bf) r9 = r10
// JIT maps BPF reg to x86 reg:
// r9 -> r15 (callee saved)
// r10 -> rbp
// train store forward prediction to break dependency link between both r9
// and r10 by evicting them from the predictor's LRU table.
33: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +24576)
34: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29696) = r0
35: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +24580)
36: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29700) = r0
37: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +24584)
38: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29704) = r0
39: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +24588)
40: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29708) = r0
[...]
543: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +25596)
544: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +30716) = r0
// prepare call to bpf_ringbuf_output() helper. the latter will cause rbp
// to spill to stack memory while r13/r14/r15 (all callee saved regs) remain
// in hardware registers. rbp becomes slow due to push/pop latency. below is
// disasm of bpf_ringbuf_output() helper for better visual context:
//
// ffffffff8117ee20: 41 54 push r12
// ffffffff8117ee22: 55 push rbp
// ffffffff8117ee23: 53 push rbx
// ffffffff8117ee24: 48 f7 c1 fc ff ff ff test rcx,0xfffffffffffffffc
// ffffffff8117ee2b: 0f 85 af 00 00 00 jne ffffffff8117eee0 <-- jump taken
// [...]
// ffffffff8117eee0: 49 c7 c4 ea ff ff ff mov r12,0xffffffffffffffea
// ffffffff8117eee7: 5b pop rbx
// ffffffff8117eee8: 5d pop rbp
// ffffffff8117eee9: 4c 89 e0 mov rax,r12
// ffffffff8117eeec: 41 5c pop r12
// ffffffff8117eeee: c3 ret
545: (18) r1 = map[id:4]
547: (bf) r2 = r7
548: (b7) r3 = 0
549: (b7) r4 = 4
550: (85) call bpf_ringbuf_output#194288
// instruction 551 inserted by verifier \
551: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = 0 | /both/ are now slow stores here
// storing map value pointer r7 at fp-16 | since value of r10 is "slow".
552: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r7 /
// following "fast" read to the same memory location, but due to dependency
// misprediction it will speculatively execute before insn 551/552 completes.
553: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r9 -16)
// in speculative domain contains attacker controlled r2. in non-speculative
// domain this contains r7, and thus accesses r7 +0 below.
554: (71) r3 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0)
// leak r3
As can be seen, the current speculative store bypass mitigation which the
verifier inserts at line 551 is insufficient since /both/, the write of
the zero sanitation as well as the map value pointer are a high latency
instruction due to prior memory access via push/pop of r10 (rbp) in contrast
to the low latency read in line 553 as r9 (r15) which stays in hardware
registers. Thus, architecturally, fp-16 is r7, however, microarchitecturally,
fp-16 can still be r2.
Initial thoughts to address this issue was to track spilled pointer loads
from stack and enforce their load via LDX through r10 as well so that /both/
the preemptive store of zero /as well as/ the load use the /same/ register
such that a dependency is created between the store and load. However, this
option is not sufficient either since it can be bypassed as well under
speculation. An updated attack with pointer spill/fills now _all_ based on
r10 would look as follows:
[...]
// r2 = oob address (e.g. scalar)
// r7 = pointer to map value
[...]
// longer store forward prediction training sequence than before.
2062: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +25588)
2063: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +30708) = r0
2064: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +25592)
2065: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +30712) = r0
2066: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +25596)
2067: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +30716) = r0
// store the speculative load address (scalar) this time after the store
// forward prediction training.
2068: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r2
// preoccupy the CPU store port by running sequence of dummy stores.
2069: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29696) = r0
2070: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29700) = r0
2071: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29704) = r0
2072: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29708) = r0
2073: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29712) = r0
2074: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29716) = r0
2075: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29720) = r0
2076: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29724) = r0
2077: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29728) = r0
2078: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29732) = r0
2079: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29736) = r0
2080: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29740) = r0
2081: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29744) = r0
2082: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29748) = r0
2083: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29752) = r0
2084: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29756) = r0
2085: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29760) = r0
2086: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29764) = r0
2087: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29768) = r0
2088: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29772) = r0
2089: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29776) = r0
2090: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29780) = r0
2091: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29784) = r0
2092: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29788) = r0
2093: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29792) = r0
2094: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29796) = r0
2095: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29800) = r0
2096: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29804) = r0
2097: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29808) = r0
2098: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29812) = r0
// overwrite scalar with dummy pointer; same as before, also including the
// sanitation store with 0 from the current mitigation by the verifier.
2099: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = 0 | /both/ are now slow stores here
2100: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r7 | since store unit is still busy.
// load from stack intended to bypass stores.
2101: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16)
2102: (71) r3 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0)
// leak r3
[...]
Looking at the CPU microarchitecture, the scheduler might issue loads (such
as seen in line 2101) before stores (line 2099,2100) because the load execution
units become available while the store execution unit is still busy with the
sequence of dummy stores (line 2069-2098). And so the load may use the prior
stored scalar from r2 at address r10 -16 for speculation. The updated attack
may work less reliable on CPU microarchitectures where loads and stores share
execution resources.
This concludes that the sanitizing with zero stores from af86ca4e3088 ("bpf:
Prevent memory disambiguation attack") is insufficient. Moreover, the detection
of stack reuse from af86ca4e3088 where previously data (STACK_MISC) has been
written to a given stack slot where a pointer value is now to be stored does
not have sufficient coverage as precondition for the mitigation either; for
several reasons outlined as follows:
1) Stack content from prior program runs could still be preserved and is
therefore not "random", best example is to split a speculative store
bypass attack between tail calls, program A would prepare and store the
oob address at a given stack slot and then tail call into program B which
does the "slow" store of a pointer to the stack with subsequent "fast"
read. From program B PoV such stack slot type is STACK_INVALID, and
therefore also must be subject to mitigation.
2) The STACK_SPILL must not be coupled to register_is_const(&stack->spilled_ptr)
condition, for example, the previous content of that memory location could
also be a pointer to map or map value. Without the fix, a speculative
store bypass is not mitigated in such precondition and can then lead to
a type confusion in the speculative domain leaking kernel memory near
these pointer types.
While brainstorming on various alternative mitigation possibilities, we also
stumbled upon a retrospective from Chrome developers [0]:
[...] For variant 4, we implemented a mitigation to zero the unused memory
of the heap prior to allocation, which cost about 1% when done concurrently
and 4% for scavenging. Variant 4 defeats everything we could think of. We
explored more mitigations for variant 4 but the threat proved to be more
pervasive and dangerous than we anticipated. For example, stack slots used
by the register allocator in the optimizing compiler could be subject to
type confusion, leading to pointer crafting. Mitigating type confusion for
stack slots alone would have required a complete redesign of the backend of
the optimizing compiler, perhaps man years of work, without a guarantee of
completeness. [...]
From BPF side, the problem space is reduced, however, options are rather
limited. One idea that has been explored was to xor-obfuscate pointer spills
to the BPF stack:
[...]
// preoccupy the CPU store port by running sequence of dummy stores.
[...]
2106: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29796) = r0
2107: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29800) = r0
2108: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29804) = r0
2109: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29808) = r0
2110: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29812) = r0
// overwrite scalar with dummy pointer; xored with random 'secret' value
// of 943576462 before store ...
2111: (b4) w11 = 943576462
2112: (af) r11 ^= r7
2113: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r11
2114: (79) r11 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16)
2115: (b4) w2 = 943576462
2116: (af) r2 ^= r11
// ... and restored with the same 'secret' value with the help of AX reg.
2117: (71) r3 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0)
[...]
While the above would not prevent speculation, it would make data leakage
infeasible by directing it to random locations. In order to be effective
and prevent type confusion under speculation, such random secret would have
to be regenerated for each store. The additional complexity involved for a
tracking mechanism that prevents jumps such that restoring spilled pointers
would not get corrupted is not worth the gain for unprivileged. Hence, the
fix in here eventually opted for emitting a non-public BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC
instruction which the x86 JIT translates into a lfence opcode. Inserting the
latter in between the store and load instruction is one of the mitigations
options [1]. The x86 instruction manual notes:
[...] An LFENCE that follows an instruction that stores to memory might
complete before the data being stored have become globally visible. [...]
The latter meaning that the preceding store instruction finished execution
and the store is at minimum guaranteed to be in the CPU's store queue, but
it's not guaranteed to be in that CPU's L1 cache at that point (globally
visible). The latter would only be guaranteed via sfence. So the load which
is guaranteed to execute after the lfence for that local CPU would have to
rely on store-to-load forwarding. [2], in section 2.3 on store buffers says:
[...] For every store operation that is added to the ROB, an entry is
allocated in the store buffer. This entry requires both the virtual and
physical address of the target. Only if there is no free entry in the store
buffer, the frontend stalls until there is an empty slot available in the
store buffer again. Otherwise, the CPU can immediately continue adding
subsequent instructions to the ROB and execute them out of order. On Intel
CPUs, the store buffer has up to 56 entries. [...]
One small upside on the fix is that it lifts constraints from af86ca4e3088
where the sanitize_stack_off relative to r10 must be the same when coming
from different paths. The BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC gets emitted after a BPF_STX
or BPF_ST instruction. This happens either when we store a pointer or data
value to the BPF stack for the first time, or upon later pointer spills.
The former needs to be enforced since otherwise stale stack data could be
leaked under speculation as outlined earlier. For non-x86 JITs the BPF_ST |
BPF_NOSPEC mapping is currently optimized away, but others could emit a
speculation barrier as well if necessary. For real-world unprivileged
programs e.g. generated by LLVM, pointer spill/fill is only generated upon
register pressure and LLVM only tries to do that for pointers which are not
used often. The program main impact will be the initial BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC
sanitation for the STACK_INVALID case when the first write to a stack slot
occurs e.g. upon map lookup. In future we might refine ways to mitigate
the latter cost.
[0] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1902.05178.pdf
[1] https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2018/05/21/analysis-and-mitigation-of-speculative-store-bypass-cve-2018-3639/
[2] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1905.05725.pdf
Fixes: af86ca4e3088 ("bpf: Prevent memory disambiguation attack")
Fixes: f7cf25b2026d ("bpf: track spill/fill of constants")
Co-developed-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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In case of JITs, each of the JIT backends compiles the BPF nospec instruction
/either/ to a machine instruction which emits a speculation barrier /or/ to
/no/ machine instruction in case the underlying architecture is not affected
by Speculative Store Bypass or has different mitigations in place already.
This covers both x86 and (implicitly) arm64: In case of x86, we use 'lfence'
instruction for mitigation. In case of arm64, we rely on the firmware mitigation
as controlled via the ssbd kernel parameter. Whenever the mitigation is enabled,
it works for all of the kernel code with no need to provide any additional
instructions here (hence only comment in arm64 JIT). Other archs can follow
as needed. The BPF nospec instruction is specifically targeting Spectre v4
since i) we don't use a serialization barrier for the Spectre v1 case, and
ii) mitigation instructions for v1 and v4 might be different on some archs.
The BPF nospec is required for a future commit, where the BPF verifier does
annotate intermediate BPF programs with speculation barriers.
Co-developed-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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The load_rsc_table was removed since the
commit c1d35c1ab424 ("remoteproc: Rename "load_rsc_table" to "parse_fw"")
but got added back again by mistake in the below commit:
commit b1a17513a2d6 ("remoteproc: add vendor resources handling").
The patch fixed a small code indent issue which not worth
a separate patch.
Fixes: b1a17513a2d6 ("remoteproc: add vendor resources handling")
Signed-off-by: Dong Aisheng <aisheng.dong@nxp.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210706142156.952794-2-aisheng.dong@nxp.com
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org>
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Allow the user program to specify both ASYNC and SYNC TCF modes by
repurposing the existing constants as bitfields. This will allow the
kernel to select one of the modes on behalf of the user program. With
this patch the kernel will always select async mode, but a subsequent
patch will make this configurable.
Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Icc5923c85a8ea284588cc399ae74fd19ec291230
Signed-off-by: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210727205300.2554659-3-pcc@google.com
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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This file was given GPL-2.0 license. But LGPL-2.1 makes more sense
as it needs to be used by libraries outside of the kernel source tree.
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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The drm/scheduler provides additional prioritization on top of that
provided by however many number of ringbuffers (each with their own
priority level) is supported on a given generation. Expose the
additional levels of priority to userspace and map the userspace
priority back to ring (first level of priority) and schedular priority
(additional priority levels within the ring).
Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210728010632.2633470-13-robdclark@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@chromium.org>
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The nubus core ignores the return value of the remove callback (in
nubus_device_remove()) and all implementers return 0 anyway.
So make it impossible for future drivers to return an unused error code
by changing the remove prototype to return void.
Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de>
Acked-by: Finn Thain <fthain@linux-m68k.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210727080840.3550927-3-u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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On all platforms except i.MX and Rockchip, the dw-hdmi DT bindings
require a video output port connected to an HDMI sink (most likely an
HDMI connector, in rare cases another bridges converting HDMI to another
protocol). For those platforms, retrieve the next bridge and attach it
from the dw-hdmi bridge attach handler.
Signed-off-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart+renesas@ideasonboard.com>
Reviewed-by: Neil Armstrong <narmstrong@baylibre.com>
Tested-by: Kieran Bingham <kieran.bingham@ideasonboard.com> # On V3U
Reviewed-by: Kieran Bingham <kieran.bingham+renesas@ideasonboard.com>
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Enabling device and wq returns standard errno and that does not provide
enough details to indicate what exactly failed. The hardware command status
is only 8bits. Expand the command status to 32bits and use the upper 16
bits to define software errors to provide more details on the exact
failure. Bit 31 will be used to indicate the error is software set as the
driver is using some of the spec defined hardware error as well.
Cc: Ramesh Thomas <ramesh.thomas@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/162681373579.1968485.5891788397526827892.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
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Currently, when doing rate limiting using the tc-police(8) action, the
easiest way is to simply drop the packets which exceed or conform the
configured bandwidth limit. Add a new option to tc-skbmod(8), so that
users may use the ECN [1] extension to explicitly inform the receiver
about the congestion instead of dropping packets "on the floor".
The 2 least significant bits of the Traffic Class field in IPv4 and IPv6
headers are used to represent different ECN states [2]:
0b00: "Non ECN-Capable Transport", Non-ECT
0b10: "ECN Capable Transport", ECT(0)
0b01: "ECN Capable Transport", ECT(1)
0b11: "Congestion Encountered", CE
As an example:
$ tc filter add dev eth0 parent 1: protocol ip prio 10 \
matchall action skbmod ecn
Doing the above marks all ECT(0) and ECT(1) packets as CE. It does NOT
affect Non-ECT or non-IP packets. In the tc-police scenario mentioned
above, users may pipe a tc-police action and a tc-skbmod "ecn" action
together to achieve ECN-based rate limiting.
For TCP connections, upon receiving a CE packet, the receiver will respond
with an ECE packet, asking the sender to reduce their congestion window.
However ECN also works with other L4 protocols e.g. DCCP and SCTP [2], and
our implementation does not touch or care about L4 headers.
The updated tc-skbmod SYNOPSIS looks like the following:
tc ... action skbmod { set SETTABLE | swap SWAPPABLE | ecn } ...
Only one of "set", "swap" or "ecn" shall be used in a single tc-skbmod
command. Trying to use more than one of them at a time is considered
undefined behavior; pipe multiple tc-skbmod commands together instead.
"set" and "swap" only affect Ethernet packets, while "ecn" only affects
IPv{4,6} packets.
It is also worth mentioning that, in theory, the same effect could be
achieved by piping a "police" action and a "bpf" action using the
bpf_skb_ecn_set_ce() helper, but this requires eBPF programming from the
user, thus impractical.
Depends on patch "net/sched: act_skbmod: Skip non-Ethernet packets".
[1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3168
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Explicit_Congestion_Notification
Reviewed-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye <peilin.ye@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Use the existing PR_GET/SET_SPECULATION_CTRL API to expose the L1D flush
capability. For L1D flushing PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE and
PR_SPEC_DISABLE_NOEXEC are not supported.
Enabling L1D flush does not check if the task is running on an SMT enabled
core, rather a check is done at runtime (at the time of flush), if the task
runs on a SMT sibling then the task is sent a SIGBUS which is executed
before the task returns to user space or to a guest.
This is better than the other alternatives of:
a. Ensuring strict affinity of the task (hard to enforce without further
changes in the scheduler)
b. Silently skipping flush for tasks that move to SMT enabled cores.
Hook up the core prctl and implement the x86 specific parts which in turn
makes it functional.
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Balbir Singh <sblbir@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210108121056.21940-5-sblbir@amazon.com
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The upcoming paranoid L1D flush infrastructure allows to conditionally
(opt-in) flush L1D in switch_mm() as a defense against potential new side
channels or for paranoia reasons. As the flush makes only sense when a task
runs on a non-SMT enabled core, because SMT siblings share L1, the
switch_mm() logic will kill a task which is flagged for L1D flush when it
is running on a SMT thread.
Add a taskwork callback so switch_mm() can queue a SIG_KILL command which
is invoked when the task tries to return to user space.
Signed-off-by: Balbir Singh <sblbir@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210108121056.21940-1-sblbir@amazon.com
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Both registered flag and devlink pointer are set at the same time
and indicate the same thing - devlink/devlink_port are ready. Instead
of checking ->registered use devlink pointer as an indication.
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Now that no one is using it, remove it.
Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210728010632.2633470-5-robdclark@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@chromium.org>
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Implement a simple static mapping algorithm of the i915 priority levels
(int, -1k to 1k exposed to user) to the 4 GuC levels. Mapping is as
follows:
i915 level < 0 -> GuC low level (3)
i915 level == 0 -> GuC normal level (2)
i915 level < INT_MAX -> GuC high level (1)
i915 level == INT_MAX -> GuC highest level (0)
We believe this mapping should cover the UMD use cases (3 distinct user
levels + 1 kernel level).
In addition to static mapping, a simple counter system is attached to
each context tracking the number of requests inflight on the context at
each level. This is needed as the GuC levels are per context while in
the i915 levels are per request.
v2:
(Daniele)
- Add BUILD_BUG_ON to enforce ordering of priority levels
- Add missing lockdep to guc_prio_fini
- Check for return before setting context registered flag
- Map DISPLAY priority or higher to highest guc prio
- Update comment for guc_prio
Signed-off-by: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
Cc: Daniele Ceraolo Spurio <daniele.ceraolospurio@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniele Ceraolo Spurio <daniele.ceraolospurio@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: John Harrison <John.C.Harrison@Intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20210727002348.97202-33-matthew.brost@intel.com
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If backlog handler is running during a tear down operation we may enqueue
data on the ingress msg queue while tear down is trying to free it.
sk_psock_backlog()
sk_psock_handle_skb()
skb_psock_skb_ingress()
sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue()
sk_psock_queue_msg(psock,msg)
spin_lock(ingress_lock)
sk_psock_zap_ingress()
_sk_psock_purge_ingerss_msg()
_sk_psock_purge_ingress_msg()
-- free ingress_msg list --
spin_unlock(ingress_lock)
spin_lock(ingress_lock)
list_add_tail(msg,ingress_msg) <- entry on list with no one
left to free it.
spin_unlock(ingress_lock)
To fix we only enqueue from backlog if the ENABLED bit is set. The tear
down logic clears the bit with ingress_lock set so we wont enqueue the
msg in the last step.
Fixes: 799aa7f98d53 ("skmsg: Avoid lock_sock() in sk_psock_backlog()")
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210727160500.1713554-4-john.fastabend@gmail.com
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Add the dt-binding for the RPM Clock Controller on the SM4250/6115 SoCs.
Signed-off-by: Iskren Chernev <iskren.chernev@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210627185927.695411-3-iskren.chernev@gmail.com
Acked-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org>
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Pull rdma fixes from Jason Gunthorpe:
"Nothing very exciting here, mainly just a bunch of irdma fixes. irdma
is a new driver this cycle so it to be expected.
- Many more irdma fixups from bots/etc
- bnxt_re regression in their counters from a FW upgrade
- User triggerable memory leak in rxe"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rdma/rdma:
RDMA/irdma: Change returned type of irdma_setup_virt_qp to void
RDMA/irdma: Change the returned type of irdma_set_hw_rsrc to void
RDMA/irdma: change the returned type of irdma_sc_repost_aeq_entries to void
RDMA/irdma: Check vsi pointer before using it
RDMA/rxe: Fix memory leak in error path code
RDMA/irdma: Change the returned type to void
RDMA/irdma: Make spdxcheck.py happy
RDMA/irdma: Fix unused variable total_size warning
RDMA/bnxt_re: Fix stats counters
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The LPT stands for Lynxpoint PCH. However the driver is used on a few
Intel Atom SoCs. Rename it to reflect this in a way how another clock
driver, i.e. clk-pmc-atom, is called.
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210722193450.35321-1-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup
Pull cgroup fix from Tejun Heo:
"Fix leak of filesystem context root which is triggered by LTP.
Not too likely to be a problem in non-testing environments"
* 'for-5.14-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup:
cgroup1: fix leaked context root causing sporadic NULL deref in LTP
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The inline version is used on three NOMMU architectures and is
particularly inefficient when it scans the string one byte at a time
twice. It also lacks a check for user_addr_max(), but this is
probably ok on NOMMU targets.
Consolidate the asm-generic implementation with the library version
that is used everywhere else. This version is generalized enough to
work efficiently on both MMU and NOMMU targets, and using the
same code everywhere reduces the potential for subtle bugs.
Mark the prototypes as __must_check in the process.
Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
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All other user triggered operations are gone from ndo_ioctl, so move
the SIOCBOND family into a custom operation as well.
The .ndo_ioctl() helper is no longer called by the dev_ioctl.c code now,
but there are still a few definitions in obsolete wireless drivers as well
as the appletalk and ieee802154 layers to call SIOCSIFADDR/SIOCGIFADDR
helpers from inside the kernel.
Cc: Jay Vosburgh <j.vosburgh@gmail.com>
Cc: Veaceslav Falico <vfalico@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Working towards obsoleting the .ndo_do_ioctl operation entirely,
stop passing the SIOCBRADDIF/SIOCBRDELIF device ioctl commands
into this callback.
My first attempt was to add another ndo_siocbr() callback, but
as there is only a single driver that takes these commands and
there is already a hook mechanism to call directly into this
driver, extend this hook instead, and use it for both the
deviceless and the device specific ioctl commands.
Cc: Roopa Prabhu <roopa@nvidia.com>
Cc: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@nvidia.com>
Cc: bridge@lists.linux-foundation.org
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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In order to further reduce the scope of ndo_do_ioctl(), move
out the SIOCWANDEV handling into a new network device operation
function.
Adjust the prototype to only pass the if_settings sub-structure
in place of the ifreq, and remove the redundant 'cmd' argument
in the process.
Cc: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
Cc: "Jan \"Yenya\" Kasprzak" <kas@fi.muni.cz>
Cc: Kevin Curtis <kevin.curtis@farsite.co.uk>
Cc: Zhao Qiang <qiang.zhao@nxp.com>
Cc: Martin Schiller <ms@dev.tdt.de>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-x25@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Most users of ndo_do_ioctl are ethernet drivers that implement
the MII commands SIOCGMIIPHY/SIOCGMIIREG/SIOCSMIIREG, or hardware
timestamping with SIOCSHWTSTAMP/SIOCGHWTSTAMP.
Separate these from the few drivers that use ndo_do_ioctl to
implement SIOCBOND, SIOCBR and SIOCWANDEV commands.
This is a purely cosmetic change intended to help readers find
their way through the implementation.
Cc: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Cc: Jay Vosburgh <j.vosburgh@gmail.com>
Cc: Veaceslav Falico <vfalico@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
Cc: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Cc: Vivien Didelot <vivien.didelot@gmail.com>
Cc: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Cc: Vladimir Oltean <olteanv@gmail.com>
Cc: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The compat handlers for SIOCDEVPRIVATE are incorrect for any driver that
passes data as part of struct ifreq rather than as an ifr_data pointer, or
that passes data back this way, since the compat_ifr_data_ioctl() helper
overwrites the ifr_data pointer and does not copy anything back out.
Since all drivers using devprivate commands are now converted to the
new .ndo_siocdevprivate callback, fix this by adding the missing piece
and passing the pointer separately the whole way.
This further unifies the native and compat logic for socket ioctls,
as the new code now passes the correct pointer as well as the correct
data for both native and compat ioctls.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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