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Since commit fc137c0ddab2 ("sched/numa: enhance vma scanning logic")
NUMA Balancing allows updating PTEs to trap NUMA hinting faults if the
task had previously accessed VMA. However unconditional scan of VMAs are
allowed during initial phase of VMA creation until process's
mm numa_scan_seq reaches 2 even though current task had not accessed VMA.
Rationale:
- Without initial scan subsequent PTE update may never happen.
- Give fair opportunity to all the VMAs to be scanned and subsequently
understand the access pattern of all the VMAs.
But it has a corner case where, if a VMA is created after some time,
process's mm numa_scan_seq could be already greater than 2.
For e.g., values of mm numa_scan_seq when VMAs are created by running
mmtest autonuma benchmark briefly looks like:
start_seq=0 : 459
start_seq=2 : 138
start_seq=3 : 144
start_seq=4 : 8
start_seq=8 : 1
start_seq=9 : 1
This results in no unconditional PTE updates for those VMAs created after
some time.
Fix:
- Note down the initial value of mm numa_scan_seq in per VMA start_seq.
- Allow unconditional scan till start_seq + 2.
Result:
SUT: AMD EPYC Milan with 2 NUMA nodes 256 cpus.
base kernel: upstream 6.6-rc6 with Mels patches [1] applied.
kernbench
========== base patched %gain
Amean elsp-128 165.09 ( 0.00%) 164.78 * 0.19%*
Duration User 41404.28 41375.08
Duration System 9862.22 9768.48
Duration Elapsed 519.87 518.72
Ops NUMA PTE updates 1041416.00 831536.00
Ops NUMA hint faults 263296.00 220966.00
Ops NUMA pages migrated 258021.00 212769.00
Ops AutoNUMA cost 1328.67 1114.69
autonumabench
NUMA01_THREADLOCAL
==================
Amean elsp-NUMA01_THREADLOCAL 81.79 (0.00%) 67.74 * 17.18%*
Duration User 54832.73 47379.67
Duration System 75.00 185.75
Duration Elapsed 576.72 476.09
Ops NUMA PTE updates 394429.00 11121044.00
Ops NUMA hint faults 1001.00 8906404.00
Ops NUMA pages migrated 288.00 2998694.00
Ops AutoNUMA cost 7.77 44666.84
Signed-off-by: Raghavendra K T <raghavendra.kt@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2ea7cbce80ac7c62e90cbfb9653a7972f902439f.1697816692.git.raghavendra.kt@amd.com
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull hardening fixes from Kees Cook:
- stackleak: add declarations for global functions (Arnd Bergmann)
- gcc-plugins: randstruct: Only warn about true flexible arrays (Kees
Cook)
- gcc-plugins: latent_entropy: Fix description typo (Konstantin Runov)
* tag 'hardening-v6.7-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
gcc-plugins: latent_entropy: Fix typo (args -> argc) in plugin description
gcc-plugins: randstruct: Only warn about true flexible arrays
stackleak: add declarations for global functions
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Audit of the refcounting turned up that perf_pmu_migrate_context()
fails to migrate the ctx refcount.
Fixes: bd2756811766 ("perf: Rewrite core context handling")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230612093539.085862001@infradead.org
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
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Add LDO output selection for dacref.
Signed-off-by: Jack Yu <jack.yu@realtek.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/62cad4e51c044108bad872ab349e36f8@realtek.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
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Widely used variable names can be used by macro users, potentially
leading to name collisions.
Suffix locals used inside the macros with an underscore, to reduce the
collision potential.
Suggested-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Michał Winiarski <michal.winiarski@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20231024110710.3039807-1-michal.winiarski@intel.com
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The problem is in nft_byteorder_eval() where we are iterating through a
loop and writing to dst[0], dst[1], dst[2] and so on... On each
iteration we are writing 8 bytes. But dst[] is an array of u32 so each
element only has space for 4 bytes. That means that every iteration
overwrites part of the previous element.
I spotted this bug while reviewing commit caf3ef7468f7 ("netfilter:
nf_tables: prevent OOB access in nft_byteorder_eval") which is a related
issue. I think that the reason we have not detected this bug in testing
is that most of time we only write one element.
Fixes: ce1e7989d989 ("netfilter: nft_byteorder: provide 64bit le/be conversion")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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Introduce several new KVM uAPIs to ultimately create a guest-first memory
subsystem within KVM, a.k.a. guest_memfd. Guest-first memory allows KVM
to provide features, enhancements, and optimizations that are kludgly
or outright impossible to implement in a generic memory subsystem.
The core KVM ioctl() for guest_memfd is KVM_CREATE_GUEST_MEMFD, which
similar to the generic memfd_create(), creates an anonymous file and
returns a file descriptor that refers to it. Again like "regular"
memfd files, guest_memfd files live in RAM, have volatile storage,
and are automatically released when the last reference is dropped.
The key differences between memfd files (and every other memory subystem)
is that guest_memfd files are bound to their owning virtual machine,
cannot be mapped, read, or written by userspace, and cannot be resized.
guest_memfd files do however support PUNCH_HOLE, which can be used to
convert a guest memory area between the shared and guest-private states.
A second KVM ioctl(), KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES, allows userspace to
specify attributes for a given page of guest memory. In the long term,
it will likely be extended to allow userspace to specify per-gfn RWX
protections, including allowing memory to be writable in the guest
without it also being writable in host userspace.
The immediate and driving use case for guest_memfd are Confidential
(CoCo) VMs, specifically AMD's SEV-SNP, Intel's TDX, and KVM's own pKVM.
For such use cases, being able to map memory into KVM guests without
requiring said memory to be mapped into the host is a hard requirement.
While SEV+ and TDX prevent untrusted software from reading guest private
data by encrypting guest memory, pKVM provides confidentiality and
integrity *without* relying on memory encryption. In addition, with
SEV-SNP and especially TDX, accessing guest private memory can be fatal
to the host, i.e. KVM must be prevent host userspace from accessing
guest memory irrespective of hardware behavior.
Long term, guest_memfd may be useful for use cases beyond CoCo VMs,
for example hardening userspace against unintentional accesses to guest
memory. As mentioned earlier, KVM's ABI uses userspace VMA protections to
define the allow guest protection (with an exception granted to mapping
guest memory executable), and similarly KVM currently requires the guest
mapping size to be a strict subset of the host userspace mapping size.
Decoupling the mappings sizes would allow userspace to precisely map
only what is needed and with the required permissions, without impacting
guest performance.
A guest-first memory subsystem also provides clearer line of sight to
things like a dedicated memory pool (for slice-of-hardware VMs) and
elimination of "struct page" (for offload setups where userspace _never_
needs to DMA from or into guest memory).
guest_memfd is the result of 3+ years of development and exploration;
taking on memory management responsibilities in KVM was not the first,
second, or even third choice for supporting CoCo VMs. But after many
failed attempts to avoid KVM-specific backing memory, and looking at
where things ended up, it is quite clear that of all approaches tried,
guest_memfd is the simplest, most robust, and most extensible, and the
right thing to do for KVM and the kernel at-large.
The "development cycle" for this version is going to be very short;
ideally, next week I will merge it as is in kvm/next, taking this through
the KVM tree for 6.8 immediately after the end of the merge window.
The series is still based on 6.6 (plus KVM changes for 6.7) so it
will require a small fixup for changes to get_file_rcu() introduced in
6.7 by commit 0ede61d8589c ("file: convert to SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU").
The fixup will be done as part of the merge commit, and most of the text
above will become the commit message for the merge.
Pending post-merge work includes:
- hugepage support
- looking into using the restrictedmem framework for guest memory
- introducing a testing mechanism to poison memory, possibly using
the same memory attributes introduced here
- SNP and TDX support
There are two non-KVM patches buried in the middle of this series:
fs: Rename anon_inode_getfile_secure() and anon_inode_getfd_secure()
mm: Add AS_UNMOVABLE to mark mapping as completely unmovable
The first is small and mostly suggested-by Christian Brauner; the second
a bit less so but it was written by an mm person (Vlastimil Babka).
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Add a new x86 VM type, KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM, to serve as a development
and testing vehicle for Confidential (CoCo) VMs, and potentially to even
become a "real" product in the distant future, e.g. a la pKVM.
The private memory support in KVM x86 is aimed at AMD's SEV-SNP and
Intel's TDX, but those technologies are extremely complex (understatement),
difficult to debug, don't support running as nested guests, and require
hardware that's isn't universally accessible. I.e. relying SEV-SNP or TDX
for maintaining guest private memory isn't a realistic option.
At the very least, KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM will enable a variety of
selftests for guest_memfd and private memory support without requiring
unique hardware.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20231027182217.3615211-24-seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Tested-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Let x86 track the number of address spaces on a per-VM basis so that KVM
can disallow SMM memslots for confidential VMs. Confidentials VMs are
fundamentally incompatible with emulating SMM, which as the name suggests
requires being able to read and write guest memory and register state.
Disallowing SMM will simplify support for guest private memory, as KVM
will not need to worry about tracking memory attributes for multiple
address spaces (SMM is the only "non-default" address space across all
architectures).
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Tested-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Message-Id: <20231027182217.3615211-23-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Drop __KVM_VCPU_MULTIPLE_ADDRESS_SPACE and instead check the value of
KVM_ADDRESS_SPACE_NUM.
No functional change intended.
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Tested-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Message-Id: <20231027182217.3615211-22-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Add support for resolving page faults on guest private memory for VMs
that differentiate between "shared" and "private" memory. For such VMs,
KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD memslots can include both fd-based private memory and
hva-based shared memory, and KVM needs to map in the "correct" variant,
i.e. KVM needs to map the gfn shared/private as appropriate based on the
current state of the gfn's KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PRIVATE flag.
For AMD's SEV-SNP and Intel's TDX, the guest effectively gets to request
shared vs. private via a bit in the guest page tables, i.e. what the guest
wants may conflict with the current memory attributes. To support such
"implicit" conversion requests, exit to user with KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT
to forward the request to userspace. Add a new flag for memory faults,
KVM_MEMORY_EXIT_FLAG_PRIVATE, to communicate whether the guest wants to
map memory as shared vs. private.
Like KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PRIVATE, use bit 3 for flagging private memory
so that KVM can use bits 0-2 for capturing RWX behavior if/when userspace
needs such information, e.g. a likely user of KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT is to
exit on missing mappings when handling guest page fault VM-Exits. In
that case, userspace will want to know RWX information in order to
correctly/precisely resolve the fault.
Note, private memory *must* be backed by guest_memfd, i.e. shared mappings
always come from the host userspace page tables, and private mappings
always come from a guest_memfd instance.
Co-developed-by: Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Tested-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Message-Id: <20231027182217.3615211-21-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Introduce an ioctl(), KVM_CREATE_GUEST_MEMFD, to allow creating file-based
memory that is tied to a specific KVM virtual machine and whose primary
purpose is to serve guest memory.
A guest-first memory subsystem allows for optimizations and enhancements
that are kludgy or outright infeasible to implement/support in a generic
memory subsystem. With guest_memfd, guest protections and mapping sizes
are fully decoupled from host userspace mappings. E.g. KVM currently
doesn't support mapping memory as writable in the guest without it also
being writable in host userspace, as KVM's ABI uses VMA protections to
define the allow guest protection. Userspace can fudge this by
establishing two mappings, a writable mapping for the guest and readable
one for itself, but that’s suboptimal on multiple fronts.
Similarly, KVM currently requires the guest mapping size to be a strict
subset of the host userspace mapping size, e.g. KVM doesn’t support
creating a 1GiB guest mapping unless userspace also has a 1GiB guest
mapping. Decoupling the mappings sizes would allow userspace to precisely
map only what is needed without impacting guest performance, e.g. to
harden against unintentional accesses to guest memory.
Decoupling guest and userspace mappings may also allow for a cleaner
alternative to high-granularity mappings for HugeTLB, which has reached a
bit of an impasse and is unlikely to ever be merged.
A guest-first memory subsystem also provides clearer line of sight to
things like a dedicated memory pool (for slice-of-hardware VMs) and
elimination of "struct page" (for offload setups where userspace _never_
needs to mmap() guest memory).
More immediately, being able to map memory into KVM guests without mapping
said memory into the host is critical for Confidential VMs (CoCo VMs), the
initial use case for guest_memfd. While AMD's SEV and Intel's TDX prevent
untrusted software from reading guest private data by encrypting guest
memory with a key that isn't usable by the untrusted host, projects such
as Protected KVM (pKVM) provide confidentiality and integrity *without*
relying on memory encryption. And with SEV-SNP and TDX, accessing guest
private memory can be fatal to the host, i.e. KVM must be prevent host
userspace from accessing guest memory irrespective of hardware behavior.
Attempt #1 to support CoCo VMs was to add a VMA flag to mark memory as
being mappable only by KVM (or a similarly enlightened kernel subsystem).
That approach was abandoned largely due to it needing to play games with
PROT_NONE to prevent userspace from accessing guest memory.
Attempt #2 to was to usurp PG_hwpoison to prevent the host from mapping
guest private memory into userspace, but that approach failed to meet
several requirements for software-based CoCo VMs, e.g. pKVM, as the kernel
wouldn't easily be able to enforce a 1:1 page:guest association, let alone
a 1:1 pfn:gfn mapping. And using PG_hwpoison does not work for memory
that isn't backed by 'struct page', e.g. if devices gain support for
exposing encrypted memory regions to guests.
Attempt #3 was to extend the memfd() syscall and wrap shmem to provide
dedicated file-based guest memory. That approach made it as far as v10
before feedback from Hugh Dickins and Christian Brauner (and others) led
to it demise.
Hugh's objection was that piggybacking shmem made no sense for KVM's use
case as KVM didn't actually *want* the features provided by shmem. I.e.
KVM was using memfd() and shmem to avoid having to manage memory directly,
not because memfd() and shmem were the optimal solution, e.g. things like
read/write/mmap in shmem were dead weight.
Christian pointed out flaws with implementing a partial overlay (wrapping
only _some_ of shmem), e.g. poking at inode_operations or super_operations
would show shmem stuff, but address_space_operations and file_operations
would show KVM's overlay. Paraphrashing heavily, Christian suggested KVM
stop being lazy and create a proper API.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20201020061859.18385-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20210416154106.23721-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20210824005248.200037-1-seanjc@google.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20211111141352.26311-1-chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221202061347.1070246-1-chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ff5c5b97-acdf-9745-ebe5-c6609dd6322e@google.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230418-anfallen-irdisch-6993a61be10b@brauner
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZEM5Zq8oo+xnApW9@google.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20230306191944.GA15773@monkey
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/ZII1p8ZHlHaQ3dDl@casper.infradead.org
Cc: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Cc: Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@google.com>
Cc: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: Maciej Szmigiero <mail@maciej.szmigiero.name>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: Wang <wei.w.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Liam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Cc: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20231027182217.3615211-17-seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Tested-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The call to the inode_init_security_anon() LSM hook is not the sole
reason to use anon_inode_getfile_secure() or anon_inode_getfd_secure().
For example, the functions also allow one to create a file with non-zero
size, without needing a full-blown filesystem. In this case, you don't
need a "secure" version, just unique inodes; the current name of the
functions is confusing and does not explain well the difference with
the more "standard" anon_inode_getfile() and anon_inode_getfd().
Of course, there is another side of the coin; neither io_uring nor
userfaultfd strictly speaking need distinct inodes, and it is not
that clear anymore that anon_inode_create_get{file,fd}() allow the LSM
to intercept and block the inode's creation. If one was so inclined,
anon_inode_getfile_secure() and anon_inode_getfd_secure() could be kept,
using the shared inode or a new one depending on CONFIG_SECURITY.
However, this is probably overkill, and potentially a cause of bugs in
different configurations. Therefore, just add a comment to io_uring
and userfaultfd explaining the choice of the function.
While at it, remove the export for what is now anon_inode_create_getfd().
There is no in-tree module that uses it, and the old name is gone anyway.
If anybody actually needs the symbol, they can ask or they can just use
anon_inode_create_getfile(), which will be exported very soon for use
in KVM.
Suggested-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Add helper to get the DSC bits_per_pixel precision for the DP sink.
Signed-off-by: Ankit Nautiyal <ankit.k.nautiyal@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Suraj Kandpal <suraj.kandpal@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Sui Jingfeng <suijingfeng@loongson.cn>
Acked-by: Maxime Ripard <mripard@kernel.org>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20231110101020.4067342-2-ankit.k.nautiyal@intel.com
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Say that drm_flip_work_commit() is safe to call in atomic context. Turn
the name into a hyperlink.
Suggested-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20231101103618.23806-3-tzimmermann@suse.de
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Contain struct drm_flip_task and its helper functions
drm_flip_work_allocate_task() and drm_flip_work_queue_task() within
drm_flip_work.c There are no callers outside of the flip-work code.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20231101103618.23806-2-tzimmermann@suse.de
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Pass an instance of struct drm_format_conv_state to DRM's format
conversion helpers. Update all callers.
Most drivers can use the format-conversion state from their shadow-
plane state. The shadow plane's destroy function releases the
allocated buffer. Drivers will later be able to allocate a buffer
of appropriate size in their plane's atomic_check code.
The gud driver uses a separate thread for committing updates. For
now, the update worker contains its own format-conversion state.
Images in the format-helper tests are small. The tests preallocate
a static page for the temporary buffer. Unloading the module releases
the memory.
v6:
* update patch for ssd132x support
v5:
* avoid using unusupported shadow-plane state in repaper (Noralf)
* fix documentation (Noralf, kernel test robot)
v3:
* store buffer in shadow-plane state (Javier, Maxime)
* replace ARRAY_SIZE() with sizeof() (Jani)
Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com> # ssd130x
Cc: Noralf Trønnes <noralf@tronnes.org>
Cc: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: David Lechner <david@lechnology.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20231009141018.11291-4-tzimmermann@suse.de
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Store an instance of struct drm_format_conv_state in the shadow-plane
state struct drm_shadow_plane_state. Many drivers with shadow planes
use DRM's format helpers to copy or convert the framebuffer data to
backing storage in the scanout buffer. The shadow plane provides the
necessary state and manages the conversion's intermediate buffer memory.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Noralf Trønnes <noralf@tronnes.org>
Tested-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20231009141018.11291-3-tzimmermann@suse.de
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Hold temporary memory for format conversion in an instance of struct
drm_format_conv_state. Update internal helpers of DRM's format-conversion
code accordingly. Drivers will later be able to maintain this cache by
themselves.
Besides caching, struct drm_format_conv_state will be useful to hold
additional information for format conversion, such as palette data or
foreground/background colors. This will enable conversion from indexed
color formats to component-based formats.
v5:
* improve documentation (Javier, Noralf)
v3:
* rename struct drm_xfrm_buf to struct drm_format_conv_state
(Javier)
* remove managed cleanup
* add drm_format_conv_state_copy() for shadow-plane support
Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Noralf Trønnes <noralf@tronnes.org>
Tested-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20231009141018.11291-2-tzimmermann@suse.de
|
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get_evtchn_to_irq() has only one external user while irq_from_evtchn()
provides the same functionality and is exported for a wider user base.
Modify the only external user of get_evtchn_to_irq() to use
irq_from_evtchn() instead and make get_evtchn_to_irq() static.
evtchn_from_irq() and irq_from_virq() have a single external user and
can easily be combined to a new helper irq_evtchn_from_virq() allowing
to drop irq_from_virq() and to make evtchn_from_irq() static.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleksandr Tyshchenko <oleksandr_tyshchenko@epam.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
|
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Implement functionality to receive and forward a new TVLV capable
multicast packet type.
The new batman-adv multicast packet type allows to contain several
originator destination addresses within a TVLV. Routers on the way will
potentially split the batman-adv multicast packet and adjust its tracker
TVLV contents.
Routing decisions are still based on the selected BATMAN IV or BATMAN V
routing algorithm. So this new batman-adv multicast packet type retains
the same loop-free properties.
Also a new OGM multicast TVLV flag is introduced to signal to other
nodes that we are capable of handling a batman-adv multicast packet and
multicast tracker TVLV. And that all of our hard interfaces have an MTU
of at least 1280 bytes (IPv6 minimum MTU), as a simple solution for now
to avoid MTU issues while forwarding.
Signed-off-by: Linus Lüssing <linus.luessing@c0d3.blue>
Signed-off-by: Simon Wunderlich <sw@simonwunderlich.de>
|
|
From Jani:
The drm_print.[ch] facilities use very few pr_*() calls directly. The
users of pr_*() calls do not necessarily include <drm/drm_print.h> at
all, and really don't have to.
Even the ones that do include it, usually have <linux/...> includes
first, and <drm/...> includes next. Notably, <linux/kernel.h> includes
<linux/printk.h>.
And, of course, <linux/printk.h> defines pr_fmt() itself if not already
defined.
No, it's encouraged not to use pr_*() at all, and prefer drm device
based logging, or device based logging.
This reverts commit 36245bd02e88e68ac5955c2958c968879d7b75a9.
Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <ltuikov89@gmail.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/878r75wzm9.fsf@intel.com
Acked-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20231111024130.11464-2-ltuikov89@gmail.com
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Currently the DRM GPUVM offers common infrastructure to track GPU VA
allocations and mappings, generically connect GPU VA mappings to their
backing buffers and perform more complex mapping operations on the GPU VA
space.
However, there are more design patterns commonly used by drivers, which
can potentially be generalized in order to make the DRM GPUVM represent
a basis for GPU-VM implementations. In this context, this patch aims
at generalizing the following elements.
1) Provide a common dma-resv for GEM objects not being used outside of
this GPU-VM.
2) Provide tracking of external GEM objects (GEM objects which are
shared with other GPU-VMs).
3) Provide functions to efficiently lock all GEM objects dma-resv the
GPU-VM contains mappings of.
4) Provide tracking of evicted GEM objects the GPU-VM contains mappings
of, such that validation of evicted GEM objects is accelerated.
5) Provide some convinience functions for common patterns.
Big thanks to Boris Brezillon for his help to figure out locking for
drivers updating the GPU VA space within the fence signalling path.
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com>
Suggested-by: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20231108001259.15123-12-dakr@redhat.com
|
|
Add an abstraction layer between the drm_gpuva mappings of a particular
drm_gem_object and this GEM object itself. The abstraction represents a
combination of a drm_gem_object and drm_gpuvm. The drm_gem_object holds
a list of drm_gpuvm_bo structures (the structure representing this
abstraction), while each drm_gpuvm_bo contains list of mappings of this
GEM object.
This has multiple advantages:
1) We can use the drm_gpuvm_bo structure to attach it to various lists
of the drm_gpuvm. This is useful for tracking external and evicted
objects per VM, which is introduced in subsequent patches.
2) Finding mappings of a certain drm_gem_object mapped in a certain
drm_gpuvm becomes much cheaper.
3) Drivers can derive and extend the structure to easily represent
driver specific states of a BO for a certain GPUVM.
The idea of this abstraction was taken from amdgpu, hence the credit for
this idea goes to the developers of amdgpu.
Cc: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20231108001259.15123-11-dakr@redhat.com
|
|
Implement reference counting for struct drm_gpuvm.
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20231108001259.15123-10-dakr@redhat.com
|
|
Introduce flags for struct drm_gpuvm, this required by subsequent
commits.
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20231108001259.15123-8-dakr@redhat.com
|
|
Provide a common dma-resv for GEM objects not being used outside of this
GPU-VM. This is used in a subsequent patch to generalize dma-resv,
external and evicted object handling and GEM validation.
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20231108001259.15123-6-dakr@redhat.com
|
|
Drivers may use this function to validate userspace requests in advance,
hence export it.
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20231108001259.15123-4-dakr@redhat.com
|
|
Use drm_WARN() and drm_WARN_ON() variants to indicate drivers the
context the failing VM resides in.
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20231108001259.15123-2-dakr@redhat.com
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux
Pull btrfs fixes from David Sterba:
- fix potential overflow in returned value from SEARCH_TREE_V2
ioctl on 32bit architecture
- zoned mode fixes:
- drop unnecessary write pointer check for RAID0/RAID1/RAID10
profiles, now it works because of raid-stripe-tree
- wait for finishing the zone when direct IO needs a new
allocation
- simple quota fixes:
- pass correct owning root pointer when cleaning up an
aborted transaction
- fix leaking some structures when processing delayed refs
- change key type number of BTRFS_EXTENT_OWNER_REF_KEY,
reorder it before inline refs that are supposed to be
sorted, keeping the original number would complicate a lot
of things; this change needs an updated version of
btrfs-progs to work and filesystems need to be recreated
- fix error pointer dereference after failure to allocate fs
devices
- fix race between accounting qgroup extents and removing a
qgroup
* tag 'for-6.7-rc1-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux:
btrfs: make OWNER_REF_KEY type value smallest among inline refs
btrfs: fix qgroup record leaks when using simple quotas
btrfs: fix race between accounting qgroup extents and removing a qgroup
btrfs: fix error pointer dereference after failure to allocate fs devices
btrfs: make found_logical_ret parameter mandatory for function queue_scrub_stripe()
btrfs: get correct owning_root when dropping snapshot
btrfs: zoned: wait for data BG to be finished on direct IO allocation
btrfs: zoned: drop no longer valid write pointer check
btrfs: directly return 0 on no error code in btrfs_insert_raid_extent()
btrfs: use u64 for buffer sizes in the tree search ioctls
|
|
There are no users of xen_irq_from_pirq() and xen_set_irq_pending().
Remove those functions.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleksandr Tyshchenko <oleksandr_tyshchenko@epam.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
|
|
smatch reports:
drivers/firmware/arm_ffa/bus.c:108:17: warning:
symbol 'ffa_bus_type' was not declared. Should it be static?
ffa_bus_type is exported to be useful in the FF-A driver. So this
warning is not correct. However, declaring the ffa_bus_type structure
in the header like many other bus_types do already removes this warning.
So let us just do the same and get rid of the warning.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231024105715.2369638-1-sudeep.holla@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
|
|
The quotes symbol in
"EEE "link partner ability 1
should be at the end of the register name
"EEE link partner ability 1"
Signed-off-by: Marek Behún <kabel@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Add an "unmovable" flag for mappings that cannot be migrated under any
circumstance. KVM will use the flag for its upcoming GUEST_MEMFD support,
which will not support compaction/migration, at least not in the
foreseeable future.
Test AS_UNMOVABLE under folio lock as already done for the async
compaction/dirty folio case, as the mapping can be removed by truncation
while compaction is running. To avoid having to lock every folio with a
mapping, assume/require that unmovable mappings are also unevictable, and
have mapping_set_unmovable() also set AS_UNEVICTABLE.
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Co-developed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20231027182217.3615211-15-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
In confidential computing usages, whether a page is private or shared is
necessary information for KVM to perform operations like page fault
handling, page zapping etc. There are other potential use cases for
per-page memory attributes, e.g. to make memory read-only (or no-exec,
or exec-only, etc.) without having to modify memslots.
Introduce the KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES ioctl, advertised by
KVM_CAP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES, to allow userspace to set the per-page memory
attributes to a guest memory range.
Use an xarray to store the per-page attributes internally, with a naive,
not fully optimized implementation, i.e. prioritize correctness over
performance for the initial implementation.
Use bit 3 for the PRIVATE attribute so that KVM can use bits 0-2 for RWX
attributes/protections in the future, e.g. to give userspace fine-grained
control over read, write, and execute protections for guest memory.
Provide arch hooks for handling attribute changes before and after common
code sets the new attributes, e.g. x86 will use the "pre" hook to zap all
relevant mappings, and the "post" hook to track whether or not hugepages
can be used to map the range.
To simplify the implementation wrap the entire sequence with
kvm_mmu_invalidate_{begin,end}() even though the operation isn't strictly
guaranteed to be an invalidation. For the initial use case, x86 *will*
always invalidate memory, and preventing arch code from creating new
mappings while the attributes are in flux makes it much easier to reason
about the correctness of consuming attributes.
It's possible that future usages may not require an invalidation, e.g.
if KVM ends up supporting RWX protections and userspace grants _more_
protections, but again opt for simplicity and punt optimizations to
if/when they are needed.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/Y2WB48kD0J4VGynX@google.com
Cc: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Cc: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Signed-off-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20231027182217.3615211-14-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Add a new KVM exit type to allow userspace to handle memory faults that
KVM cannot resolve, but that userspace *may* be able to handle (without
terminating the guest).
KVM will initially use KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT to report implicit
conversions between private and shared memory. With guest private memory,
there will be two kind of memory conversions:
- explicit conversion: happens when the guest explicitly calls into KVM
to map a range (as private or shared)
- implicit conversion: happens when the guest attempts to access a gfn
that is configured in the "wrong" state (private vs. shared)
On x86 (first architecture to support guest private memory), explicit
conversions will be reported via KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL+KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE,
but reporting KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL for implicit conversions is undesriable
as there is (obviously) no hypercall, and there is no guarantee that the
guest actually intends to convert between private and shared, i.e. what
KVM thinks is an implicit conversion "request" could actually be the
result of a guest code bug.
KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT will be used to report memory faults that appear to
be implicit conversions.
Note! To allow for future possibilities where KVM reports
KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT and fills run->memory_fault on _any_ unresolved
fault, KVM returns "-EFAULT" (-1 with errno == EFAULT from userspace's
perspective), not '0'! Due to historical baggage within KVM, exiting to
userspace with '0' from deep callstacks, e.g. in emulation paths, is
infeasible as doing so would require a near-complete overhaul of KVM,
whereas KVM already propagates -errno return codes to userspace even when
the -errno originated in a low level helper.
Report the gpa+size instead of a single gfn even though the initial usage
is expected to always report single pages. It's entirely possible, likely
even, that KVM will someday support sub-page granularity faults, e.g.
Intel's sub-page protection feature allows for additional protections at
128-byte granularity.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230908222905.1321305-5-amoorthy@google.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZQ3AmLO2SYv3DszH@google.com
Cc: Anish Moorthy <amoorthy@google.com>
Cc: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20231027182217.3615211-10-seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Tested-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Introduce a "version 2" of KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION so that additional
information can be supplied without setting userspace up to fail. The
padding in the new kvm_userspace_memory_region2 structure will be used to
pass a file descriptor in addition to the userspace_addr, i.e. allow
userspace to point at a file descriptor and map memory into a guest that
is NOT mapped into host userspace.
Alternatively, KVM could simply add "struct kvm_userspace_memory_region2"
without a new ioctl(), but as Paolo pointed out, adding a new ioctl()
makes detection of bad flags a bit more robust, e.g. if the new fd field
is guarded only by a flag and not a new ioctl(), then a userspace bug
(setting a "bad" flag) would generate out-of-bounds access instead of an
-EINVAL error.
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Tested-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Message-Id: <20231027182217.3615211-9-seanjc@google.com>
Acked-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Convert KVM_ARCH_WANT_MMU_NOTIFIER into a Kconfig and select it where
appropriate to effectively maintain existing behavior. Using a proper
Kconfig will simplify building more functionality on top of KVM's
mmu_notifier infrastructure.
Add a forward declaration of kvm_gfn_range to kvm_types.h so that
including arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_ppc.h's with CONFIG_KVM=n doesn't
generate warnings due to kvm_gfn_range being undeclared. PPC defines
hooks for PR vs. HV without guarding them via #ifdeffery, e.g.
bool (*unmap_gfn_range)(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_gfn_range *range);
bool (*age_gfn)(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_gfn_range *range);
bool (*test_age_gfn)(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_gfn_range *range);
bool (*set_spte_gfn)(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_gfn_range *range);
Alternatively, PPC could forward declare kvm_gfn_range, but there's no
good reason not to define it in common KVM.
Acked-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Tested-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Message-Id: <20231027182217.3615211-8-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Currently in mmu_notifier invalidate path, hva range is recorded and then
checked against by mmu_invalidate_retry_hva() in the page fault handling
path. However, for the soon-to-be-introduced private memory, a page fault
may not have a hva associated, checking gfn(gpa) makes more sense.
For existing hva based shared memory, gfn is expected to also work. The
only downside is when aliasing multiple gfns to a single hva, the
current algorithm of checking multiple ranges could result in a much
larger range being rejected. Such aliasing should be uncommon, so the
impact is expected small.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Tested-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
[sean: convert vmx_set_apic_access_page_addr() to gfn-based API]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@linux.intel.com>
Message-Id: <20231027182217.3615211-4-seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Rounding up the queue depth to power of two is not a hardware requirement.
In order to optimize the per connection memory usage, removing drivers
implementation which round up to the queue depths to the power of 2.
Implements a mask to maintain backward compatibility with older
library.
Signed-off-by: Chandramohan Akula <chandramohan.akula@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Selvin Xavier <selvin.xavier@broadcom.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1698069803-1787-3-git-send-email-selvin.xavier@broadcom.com
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
|
|
While we have a lsm_fill_user_ctx() helper function designed to make
life easier for LSMs which return lsm_ctx structs to userspace, we
didn't include all of the buffer length safety checks and buffer
padding adjustments in the helper. This led to code duplication
across the different LSMs and the possibility for mistakes across the
different LSM subsystems. In order to reduce code duplication and
decrease the chances of silly mistakes, we're consolidating all of
this code into the lsm_fill_user_ctx() helper.
The buffer padding is also modified from a fixed 8-byte alignment to
an alignment that matches the word length of the machine
(BITS_PER_LONG / 8).
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
When IMA becomes a proper LSM we will reintroduce an appropriate
LSM ID, but drop it from the userspace API for now in an effort
to put an end to debates around the naming of the LSM ID macro.
Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Add lsm_name_to_attr(), which translates a text string to a
LSM_ATTR value if one is available.
Add lsm_fill_user_ctx(), which fills a struct lsm_ctx, including
the trailing attribute value.
Both are used in module specific components of LSM system calls.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Wireup lsm_get_self_attr, lsm_set_self_attr and lsm_list_modules
system calls.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
[PM: forward ported beyond v6.6 due merge window changes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Create a system call to report the list of Linux Security Modules
that are active on the system. The list is provided as an array
of LSM ID numbers.
The calling application can use this list determine what LSM
specific actions it might take. That might include choosing an
output format, determining required privilege or bypassing
security module specific behavior.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Create a system call lsm_get_self_attr() to provide the security
module maintained attributes of the current process.
Create a system call lsm_set_self_attr() to set a security
module maintained attribute of the current process.
Historically these attributes have been exposed to user space via
entries in procfs under /proc/self/attr.
The attribute value is provided in a lsm_ctx structure. The structure
identifies the size of the attribute, and the attribute value. The format
of the attribute value is defined by the security module. A flags field
is included for LSM specific information. It is currently unused and must
be 0. The total size of the data, including the lsm_ctx structure and any
padding, is maintained as well.
struct lsm_ctx {
__u64 id;
__u64 flags;
__u64 len;
__u64 ctx_len;
__u8 ctx[];
};
Two new LSM hooks are used to interface with the LSMs.
security_getselfattr() collects the lsm_ctx values from the
LSMs that support the hook, accounting for space requirements.
security_setselfattr() identifies which LSM the attribute is
intended for and passes it along.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Use the LSM ID number instead of the LSM name to identify which
security module's attibute data should be shown in /proc/self/attr.
The security_[gs]etprocattr() functions have been changed to expect
the LSM ID. The change from a string comparison to an integer comparison
in these functions will provide a minor performance improvement.
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Mickael Salaun <mic@digikod.net>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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As LSMs are registered add their lsm_id pointers to a table.
This will be used later for attribute reporting.
Determine the number of possible security modules based on
their respective CONFIG options. This allows the number to be
known at build time. This allows data structures and tables
to use the constant.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Mickael Salaun <mic@digikod.net>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Create a struct lsm_id to contain identifying information about Linux
Security Modules (LSMs). At inception this contains the name of the
module and an identifier associated with the security module. Change
the security_add_hooks() interface to use this structure. Change the
individual modules to maintain their own struct lsm_id and pass it to
security_add_hooks().
The values are for LSM identifiers are defined in a new UAPI
header file linux/lsm.h. Each existing LSM has been updated to
include it's LSMID in the lsm_id.
The LSM ID values are sequential, with the oldest module
LSM_ID_CAPABILITY being the lowest value and the existing modules
numbered in the order they were included in the main line kernel.
This is an arbitrary convention for assigning the values, but
none better presents itself. The value 0 is defined as being invalid.
The values 1-99 are reserved for any special case uses which may
arise in the future. This may include attributes of the LSM
infrastructure itself, possibly related to namespacing or network
attribute management. A special range is identified for such attributes
to help reduce confusion for developers unfamiliar with LSMs.
LSM attribute values are defined for the attributes presented by
modules that are available today. As with the LSM IDs, The value 0
is defined as being invalid. The values 1-99 are reserved for any
special case uses which may arise in the future.
Cc: linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Mickael Salaun <mic@digikod.net>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Nacked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
[PM: forward ported beyond v6.6 due merge window changes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Add 'uv_survival_time' field to regulation_constraints for specifying
survival time post critical under-voltage event. Update the regulator
notifier call chain and Device Tree property parsing to use this new
field, allowing a configurable timeout before emergency shutdown.
Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231026144824.4065145-6-o.rempel@pengutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
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