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Always check context access if the register we're operating on is
PTR_TO_CTX, rather than relying on ARG_PTR_TO_CTX. This allows
simplifying the arg_type checking section of the function.
Signed-off-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200921121227.255763-8-lmb@cloudflare.com
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Instead of dealing with reg->ref_obj_id individually for every arg type that
needs it, rely on the fact that ref_obj_id is zero if the register is not
reference tracked.
Signed-off-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200921121227.255763-7-lmb@cloudflare.com
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Perform BTF type checks if the register we're working on contains a BTF
pointer, rather than if the argument is for a BTF pointer. This is easier
to understand, and allows removing the code from the arg_type checking
section of the function.
Signed-off-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200921121227.255763-6-lmb@cloudflare.com
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Function prototypes using ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID currently use two ways to signal
which BTF IDs are acceptable. First, bpf_func_proto.btf_id is an array of
IDs, one for each argument. This array is only accessed up to the highest
numbered argument that uses ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID and may therefore be less than
five arguments long. It usually points at a BTF_ID_LIST. Second, check_btf_id
is a function pointer that is called by the verifier if present. It gets the
actual BTF ID of the register, and the argument number we're currently checking.
It turns out that the only user check_arg_btf_id ignores the argument, and is
simply used to check whether the BTF ID has a struct sock_common at it's start.
Replace both of these mechanisms with an explicit BTF ID for each argument
in a function proto. Thanks to btf_struct_ids_match this is very flexible:
check_arg_btf_id can be replaced by requiring struct sock_common.
Signed-off-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200921121227.255763-5-lmb@cloudflare.com
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Move the check for a NULL or zero register to check_helper_mem_access. This
makes check_stack_boundary easier to understand.
Signed-off-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200921121227.255763-3-lmb@cloudflare.com
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bsearch doesn't modify the contents of the array, so we can take a const pointer.
Signed-off-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200921121227.255763-2-lmb@cloudflare.com
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If BTF data is missing or removed from the ELF section it is still exported
via sysfs as a zero-length file:
root@OpenWrt:/# ls -l /sys/kernel/btf/vmlinux
-r--r--r-- 1 root root 0 Jul 18 02:59 /sys/kernel/btf/vmlinux
Moreover, reads from this file succeed and leak kernel data:
root@OpenWrt:/# hexdump -C /sys/kernel/btf/vmlinux|head -10
000000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................|
*
000cc0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 80 83 b0 80 |................|
000cd0 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................|
000ce0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 57 ac 6e 9d |............W.n.|
000cf0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................|
*
002650 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 |................|
002660 80 82 9a c4 80 85 97 80 81 a9 51 68 00 00 00 02 |..........Qh....|
002670 80 25 44 dc 80 85 97 80 81 a9 50 24 81 ab c4 60 |.%D.......P$...`|
This situation was first observed with kernel 5.4.x, cross-compiled for a
MIPS target system. Fix by adding a sanity-check for export of zero-length
data sections.
Fixes: 341dfcf8d78e ("btf: expose BTF info through sysfs")
Signed-off-by: Tony Ambardar <Tony.Ambardar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/b38db205a66238f70823039a8c531535864eaac5.1600417359.git.Tony.Ambardar@gmail.com
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The in_atomic() macro cannot always detect atomic context, in particular,
it cannot know about held spinlocks in non-preemptible kernels. Although,
there is no user call bpf_link_put() with holding spinlock now, be on the
safe side, so we can avoid this in the future.
Signed-off-by: Muchun Song <songmuchun@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200917074453.20621-1-songmuchun@bytedance.com
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The local_storage->list will be traversed by rcu reader in parallel.
Thus, hlist_add_head_rcu() is needed in bpf_selem_link_storage_nolock().
This patch fixes it.
This part of the code has recently been refactored in bpf-next
and this patch makes changes to the new file "bpf_local_storage.c".
Instead of using the original offending commit in the Fixes tag,
the commit that created the file "bpf_local_storage.c" is used.
A separate fix has been provided to the bpf tree.
Fixes: 450af8d0f6be ("bpf: Split bpf_local_storage to bpf_sk_storage")
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200916204453.2003915-1-kafai@fb.com
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LD_[ABS|IND] instructions may return from the function early. bpf_tail_call
pseudo instruction is either fallthrough or return. Allow them in the
subprograms only when subprograms are BTF annotated and have scalar return
types. Allow ld_abs and tail_call in the main program even if it calls into
subprograms. In the past that was not ok to do for ld_abs, since it was JITed
with special exit sequence. Since bpf_gen_ld_abs() was introduced the ld_abs
looks like normal exit insn from JIT point of view, so it's safe to allow them
in the main program.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Relax verifier's restriction that was meant to forbid tailcall usage
when subprog count was higher than 1.
Also, do not max out the stack depth of program that utilizes tailcalls.
Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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This commit serves two things:
1) it optimizes BPF prologue/epilogue generation
2) it makes possible to have tailcalls within BPF subprogram
Both points are related to each other since without 1), 2) could not be
achieved.
In [1], Alexei says:
"The prologue will look like:
nop5
xor eax,eax // two new bytes if bpf_tail_call() is used in this
// function
push rbp
mov rbp, rsp
sub rsp, rounded_stack_depth
push rax // zero init tail_call counter
variable number of push rbx,r13,r14,r15
Then bpf_tail_call will pop variable number rbx,..
and final 'pop rax'
Then 'add rsp, size_of_current_stack_frame'
jmp to next function and skip over 'nop5; xor eax,eax; push rpb; mov
rbp, rsp'
This way new function will set its own stack size and will init tail
call
counter with whatever value the parent had.
If next function doesn't use bpf_tail_call it won't have 'xor eax,eax'.
Instead it would need to have 'nop2' in there."
Implement that suggestion.
Since the layout of stack is changed, tail call counter handling can not
rely anymore on popping it to rbx just like it have been handled for
constant prologue case and later overwrite of rbx with actual value of
rbx pushed to stack. Therefore, let's use one of the register (%rcx) that
is considered to be volatile/caller-saved and pop the value of tail call
counter in there in the epilogue.
Drop the BUILD_BUG_ON in emit_prologue and in
emit_bpf_tail_call_indirect where instruction layout is not constant
anymore.
Introduce new poke target, 'tailcall_bypass' to poke descriptor that is
dedicated for skipping the register pops and stack unwind that are
generated right before the actual jump to target program.
For case when the target program is not present, BPF program will skip
the pop instructions and nop5 dedicated for jmpq $target. An example of
such state when only R6 of callee saved registers is used by program:
ffffffffc0513aa1: e9 0e 00 00 00 jmpq 0xffffffffc0513ab4
ffffffffc0513aa6: 5b pop %rbx
ffffffffc0513aa7: 58 pop %rax
ffffffffc0513aa8: 48 81 c4 00 00 00 00 add $0x0,%rsp
ffffffffc0513aaf: 0f 1f 44 00 00 nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
ffffffffc0513ab4: 48 89 df mov %rbx,%rdi
When target program is inserted, the jump that was there to skip
pops/nop5 will become the nop5, so CPU will go over pops and do the
actual tailcall.
One might ask why there simply can not be pushes after the nop5?
In the following example snippet:
ffffffffc037030c: 48 89 fb mov %rdi,%rbx
(...)
ffffffffc0370332: 5b pop %rbx
ffffffffc0370333: 58 pop %rax
ffffffffc0370334: 48 81 c4 00 00 00 00 add $0x0,%rsp
ffffffffc037033b: 0f 1f 44 00 00 nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
ffffffffc0370340: 48 81 ec 00 00 00 00 sub $0x0,%rsp
ffffffffc0370347: 50 push %rax
ffffffffc0370348: 53 push %rbx
ffffffffc0370349: 48 89 df mov %rbx,%rdi
ffffffffc037034c: e8 f7 21 00 00 callq 0xffffffffc0372548
There is the bpf2bpf call (at ffffffffc037034c) right after the tailcall
and jump target is not present. ctx is in %rbx register and BPF
subprogram that we will call into on ffffffffc037034c is relying on it,
e.g. it will pick ctx from there. Such code layout is therefore broken
as we would overwrite the content of %rbx with the value that was pushed
on the prologue. That is the reason for the 'bypass' approach.
Special care needs to be taken during the install/update/remove of
tailcall target. In case when target program is not present, the CPU
must not execute the pop instructions that precede the tailcall.
To address that, the following states can be defined:
A nop, unwind, nop
B nop, unwind, tail
C skip, unwind, nop
D skip, unwind, tail
A is forbidden (lead to incorrectness). The state transitions between
tailcall install/update/remove will work as follows:
First install tail call f: C->D->B(f)
* poke the tailcall, after that get rid of the skip
Update tail call f to f': B(f)->B(f')
* poke the tailcall (poke->tailcall_target) and do NOT touch the
poke->tailcall_bypass
Remove tail call: B(f')->C(f')
* poke->tailcall_bypass is poked back to jump, then we wait the RCU
grace period so that other programs will finish its execution and
after that we are safe to remove the poke->tailcall_target
Install new tail call (f''): C(f')->D(f'')->B(f'').
* same as first step
This way CPU can never be exposed to "unwind, tail" state.
Last but not least, when tailcalls get mixed with bpf2bpf calls, it
would be possible to encounter the endless loop due to clearing the
tailcall counter if for example we would use the tailcall3-like from BPF
selftests program that would be subprogram-based, meaning the tailcall
would be present within the BPF subprogram.
This test, broken down to particular steps, would do:
entry -> set tailcall counter to 0, bump it by 1, tailcall to func0
func0 -> call subprog_tail
(we are NOT skipping the first 11 bytes of prologue and this subprogram
has a tailcall, therefore we clear the counter...)
subprog -> do the same thing as entry
and then loop forever.
To address this, the idea is to go through the call chain of bpf2bpf progs
and look for a tailcall presence throughout whole chain. If we saw a single
tail call then each node in this call chain needs to be marked as a subprog
that can reach the tailcall. We would later feed the JIT with this info
and:
- set eax to 0 only when tailcall is reachable and this is the entry prog
- if tailcall is reachable but there's no tailcall in insns of currently
JITed prog then push rax anyway, so that it will be possible to
propagate further down the call chain
- finally if tailcall is reachable, then we need to precede the 'call'
insn with mov rax, [rbp - (stack_depth + 8)]
Tail call related cases from test_verifier kselftest are also working
fine. Sample BPF programs that utilize tail calls (sockex3, tracex5)
work properly as well.
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200517043227.2gpq22ifoq37ogst@ast-mbp.dhcp.thefacebook.com/
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Protect against potential stack overflow that might happen when bpf2bpf
calls get combined with tailcalls. Limit the caller's stack depth for
such case down to 256 so that the worst case scenario would result in 8k
stack size (32 which is tailcall limit * 256 = 8k).
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Reflect the actual purpose of poke->ip and rename it to
poke->tailcall_target so that it will not the be confused with another
poke target that will be introduced in next commit.
While at it, do the same thing with poke->ip_stable - rename it to
poke->tailcall_target_stable.
Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Previously, there was no need for poke descriptors being present in
subprogram's bpf_prog_aux struct since tailcalls were simply not allowed
in them. Each subprog is JITed independently so in order to enable
JITing subprograms that use tailcalls, do the following:
- in fixup_bpf_calls() store the index of tailcall insn onto the generated
poke descriptor,
- in case when insn patching occurs, adjust the tailcall insn idx from
bpf_patch_insn_data,
- then in jit_subprogs() check whether the given poke descriptor belongs
to the current subprog by checking if that previously stored absolute
index of tail call insn is in the scope of the insns of given subprog,
- update the insn->imm with new poke descriptor slot so that while JITing
the proper poke descriptor will be grabbed
This way each of the main program's poke descriptors are distributed
across the subprograms poke descriptor array, so main program's
descriptors can be untracked out of the prog array map.
Add also subprog's aux struct to the BPF map poke_progs list by calling
on it map_poke_track().
In case of any error, call the map_poke_untrack() on subprog's aux
structs that have already been registered to prog array map.
Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Alexei Starovoitov says:
====================
pull-request: bpf 2020-09-15
The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net* tree.
We've added 12 non-merge commits during the last 19 day(s) which contain
a total of 10 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-).
The main changes are:
1) docs/bpf fixes, from Andrii.
2) ld_abs fix, from Daniel.
3) socket casting helpers fix, from Martin.
4) hash iterator fixes, from Yonghong.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This syscall binds a map to a program. Returns success if the map is
already bound to the program.
Signed-off-by: YiFei Zhu <zhuyifei@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Cc: YiFei Zhu <zhuyifei1999@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200915234543.3220146-3-sdf@google.com
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To support modifying the used_maps array, we use a mutex to protect
the use of the counter and the array. The mutex is initialized right
after the prog aux is allocated, and destroyed right before prog
aux is freed. This way we guarantee it's initialized for both cBPF
and eBPF.
Signed-off-by: YiFei Zhu <zhuyifei@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Cc: YiFei Zhu <zhuyifei1999@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200915234543.3220146-2-sdf@google.com
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Running selftest
./btf_btf -p
the kernel had the following warning:
[ 51.528185] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1756 at kernel/bpf/hashtab.c:717 htab_map_get_next_key+0x2eb/0x300
[ 51.529217] Modules linked in:
[ 51.529583] CPU: 3 PID: 1756 Comm: test_btf Not tainted 5.9.0-rc1+ #878
[ 51.530346] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.9.3-1.el7.centos 04/01/2014
[ 51.531410] RIP: 0010:htab_map_get_next_key+0x2eb/0x300
...
[ 51.542826] Call Trace:
[ 51.543119] map_seq_next+0x53/0x80
[ 51.543528] seq_read+0x263/0x400
[ 51.543932] vfs_read+0xad/0x1c0
[ 51.544311] ksys_read+0x5f/0xe0
[ 51.544689] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
[ 51.545116] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
The related source code in kernel/bpf/hashtab.c:
709 static int htab_map_get_next_key(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *next_key)
710 {
711 struct bpf_htab *htab = container_of(map, struct bpf_htab, map);
712 struct hlist_nulls_head *head;
713 struct htab_elem *l, *next_l;
714 u32 hash, key_size;
715 int i = 0;
716
717 WARN_ON_ONCE(!rcu_read_lock_held());
In kernel/bpf/inode.c, bpffs map pretty print calls map->ops->map_get_next_key()
without holding a rcu_read_lock(), hence causing the above warning.
To fix the issue, just surrounding map->ops->map_get_next_key() with rcu read lock.
Fixes: a26ca7c982cb ("bpf: btf: Add pretty print support to the basic arraymap")
Reported-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200916004401.146277-1-yhs@fb.com
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Header frame.h is getting more code annotations to help objtool analyze
object files.
Rename the file to objtool.h.
[ jpoimboe: add objtool.h to MAINTAINERS ]
Signed-off-by: Julien Thierry <jthierry@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
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Using the read_iter/write_iter interfaces allows for in-kernel users
to set sysctls without using set_fs(). Also, the buffer is a string,
so give it the real type of 'char *', not void *.
[AV: Christoph's fixup folded in]
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Commit 41c48f3a98231 ("bpf: Support access
to bpf map fields") added support to access map fields
with CORE support. For example,
struct bpf_map {
__u32 max_entries;
} __attribute__((preserve_access_index));
struct bpf_array {
struct bpf_map map;
__u32 elem_size;
} __attribute__((preserve_access_index));
struct {
__uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY);
__uint(max_entries, 4);
__type(key, __u32);
__type(value, __u32);
} m_array SEC(".maps");
SEC("cgroup_skb/egress")
int cg_skb(void *ctx)
{
struct bpf_array *array = (struct bpf_array *)&m_array;
/* .. array->map.max_entries .. */
}
In kernel, bpf_htab has similar structure,
struct bpf_htab {
struct bpf_map map;
...
}
In the above cg_skb(), to access array->map.max_entries, with CORE, the clang will
generate two builtin's.
base = &m_array;
/* access array.map */
map_addr = __builtin_preserve_struct_access_info(base, 0, 0);
/* access array.map.max_entries */
max_entries_addr = __builtin_preserve_struct_access_info(map_addr, 0, 0);
max_entries = *max_entries_addr;
In the current llvm, if two builtin's are in the same function or
in the same function after inlining, the compiler is smart enough to chain
them together and generates like below:
base = &m_array;
max_entries = *(base + reloc_offset); /* reloc_offset = 0 in this case */
and we are fine.
But if we force no inlining for one of functions in test_map_ptr() selftest, e.g.,
check_default(), the above two __builtin_preserve_* will be in two different
functions. In this case, we will have code like:
func check_hash():
reloc_offset_map = 0;
base = &m_array;
map_base = base + reloc_offset_map;
check_default(map_base, ...)
func check_default(map_base, ...):
max_entries = *(map_base + reloc_offset_max_entries);
In kernel, map_ptr (CONST_PTR_TO_MAP) does not allow any arithmetic.
The above "map_base = base + reloc_offset_map" will trigger a verifier failure.
; VERIFY(check_default(&hash->map, map));
0: (18) r7 = 0xffffb4fe8018a004
2: (b4) w1 = 110
3: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +0) = r1
R1_w=invP110 R7_w=map_value(id=0,off=4,ks=4,vs=8,imm=0) R10=fp0
; VERIFY_TYPE(BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH, check_hash);
4: (18) r1 = 0xffffb4fe8018a000
6: (b4) w2 = 1
7: (63) *(u32 *)(r1 +0) = r2
R1_w=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=8,imm=0) R2_w=invP1 R7_w=map_value(id=0,off=4,ks=4,vs=8,imm=0) R10=fp0
8: (b7) r2 = 0
9: (18) r8 = 0xffff90bcb500c000
11: (18) r1 = 0xffff90bcb500c000
13: (0f) r1 += r2
R1 pointer arithmetic on map_ptr prohibited
To fix the issue, let us permit map_ptr + 0 arithmetic which will
result in exactly the same map_ptr.
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200908175702.2463625-1-yhs@fb.com
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We got slightly different patches removing a double word
in a comment in net/ipv4/raw.c - picked the version from net.
Simple conflict in drivers/net/ethernet/ibm/ibmvnic.c. Use cached
values instead of VNIC login response buffer (following what
commit 507ebe6444a4 ("ibmvnic: Fix use-after-free of VNIC login
response buffer") did).
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Pull networking fixes from David Miller:
1) Use netif_rx_ni() when necessary in batman-adv stack, from Jussi
Kivilinna.
2) Fix loss of RTT samples in rxrpc, from David Howells.
3) Memory leak in hns_nic_dev_probe(), from Dignhao Liu.
4) ravb module cannot be unloaded, fix from Yuusuke Ashizuka.
5) We disable BH for too lokng in sctp_get_port_local(), add a
cond_resched() here as well, from Xin Long.
6) Fix memory leak in st95hf_in_send_cmd, from Dinghao Liu.
7) Out of bound access in bpf_raw_tp_link_fill_link_info(), from
Yonghong Song.
8) Missing of_node_put() in mt7530 DSA driver, from Sumera
Priyadarsini.
9) Fix crash in bnxt_fw_reset_task(), from Michael Chan.
10) Fix geneve tunnel checksumming bug in hns3, from Yi Li.
11) Memory leak in rxkad_verify_response, from Dinghao Liu.
12) In tipc, don't use smp_processor_id() in preemptible context. From
Tuong Lien.
13) Fix signedness issue in mlx4 memory allocation, from Shung-Hsi Yu.
14) Missing clk_disable_prepare() in gemini driver, from Dan Carpenter.
15) Fix ABI mismatch between driver and firmware in nfp, from Louis
Peens.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net: (110 commits)
net/smc: fix sock refcounting in case of termination
net/smc: reset sndbuf_desc if freed
net/smc: set rx_off for SMCR explicitly
net/smc: fix toleration of fake add_link messages
tg3: Fix soft lockup when tg3_reset_task() fails.
doc: net: dsa: Fix typo in config code sample
net: dp83867: Fix WoL SecureOn password
nfp: flower: fix ABI mismatch between driver and firmware
tipc: fix shutdown() of connectionless socket
ipv6: Fix sysctl max for fib_multipath_hash_policy
drivers/net/wan/hdlc: Change the default of hard_header_len to 0
net: gemini: Fix another missing clk_disable_unprepare() in probe
net: bcmgenet: fix mask check in bcmgenet_validate_flow()
amd-xgbe: Add support for new port mode
net: usb: dm9601: Add USB ID of Keenetic Plus DSL
vhost: fix typo in error message
net: ethernet: mlx4: Fix memory allocation in mlx4_buddy_init()
pktgen: fix error message with wrong function name
net: ethernet: ti: am65-cpsw: fix rmii 100Mbit link mode
cxgb4: fix thermal zone device registration
...
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Currently, for hashmap, the bpf iterator will grab a bucket lock, a
spinlock, before traversing the elements in the bucket. This can ensure
all bpf visted elements are valid. But this mechanism may cause
deadlock if update/deletion happens to the same bucket of the
visited map in the program. For example, if we added bpf_map_update_elem()
call to the same visited element in selftests bpf_iter_bpf_hash_map.c,
we will have the following deadlock:
============================================
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
5.9.0-rc1+ #841 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
test_progs/1750 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff9a5bb73c5e70 (&htab->buckets[i].raw_lock){....}-{2:2}, at: htab_map_update_elem+0x1cf/0x410
but task is already holding lock:
ffff9a5bb73c5e20 (&htab->buckets[i].raw_lock){....}-{2:2}, at: bpf_hash_map_seq_find_next+0x94/0x120
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0
----
lock(&htab->buckets[i].raw_lock);
lock(&htab->buckets[i].raw_lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
...
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x78/0xa0
__lock_acquire.cold.74+0x209/0x2e3
lock_acquire+0xba/0x380
? htab_map_update_elem+0x1cf/0x410
? __lock_acquire+0x639/0x20c0
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x3b/0x80
? htab_map_update_elem+0x1cf/0x410
htab_map_update_elem+0x1cf/0x410
? lock_acquire+0xba/0x380
bpf_prog_ad6dab10433b135d_dump_bpf_hash_map+0x88/0xa9c
? find_held_lock+0x34/0xa0
bpf_iter_run_prog+0x81/0x16e
__bpf_hash_map_seq_show+0x145/0x180
bpf_seq_read+0xff/0x3d0
vfs_read+0xad/0x1c0
ksys_read+0x5f/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
...
The bucket_lock first grabbed in seq_ops->next() called by bpf_seq_read(),
and then grabbed again in htab_map_update_elem() in the bpf program, causing
deadlocks.
Actually, we do not need bucket_lock here, we can just use rcu_read_lock()
similar to netlink iterator where the rcu_read_{lock,unlock} likes below:
seq_ops->start():
rcu_read_lock();
seq_ops->next():
rcu_read_unlock();
/* next element */
rcu_read_lock();
seq_ops->stop();
rcu_read_unlock();
Compared to old bucket_lock mechanism, if concurrent updata/delete happens,
we may visit stale elements, miss some elements, or repeat some elements.
I think this is a reasonable compromise. For users wanting to avoid
stale, missing/repeated accesses, bpf_map batch access syscall interface
can be used.
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200902235340.2001375-1-yhs@fb.com
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Currently, task_file iterator iterates all files from all tasks.
This may potentially visit a lot of duplicated files if there are
many tasks sharing the same files, e.g., typical pthreads
where these pthreads and the main thread are sharing the same files.
This patch changed task_file iterator to skip a particular task
if that task shares the same files as its group_leader (the task
having the same tgid and also task->tgid == task->pid).
This will preserve the same result, visiting all files from all
tasks, and will reduce runtime cost significantl, e.g., if there are
a lot of pthreads and the process has a lot of open files.
Suggested-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200902023112.1672792-1-yhs@fb.com
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Daniel Borkmann says:
====================
pull-request: bpf-next 2020-09-01
The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net-next* tree.
There are two small conflicts when pulling, resolve as follows:
1) Merge conflict in tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c between 88a82120282b ("libbpf: Factor
out common ELF operations and improve logging") in bpf-next and 1e891e513e16
("libbpf: Fix map index used in error message") in net-next. Resolve by taking
the hunk in bpf-next:
[...]
scn = elf_sec_by_idx(obj, obj->efile.btf_maps_shndx);
data = elf_sec_data(obj, scn);
if (!scn || !data) {
pr_warn("elf: failed to get %s map definitions for %s\n",
MAPS_ELF_SEC, obj->path);
return -EINVAL;
}
[...]
2) Merge conflict in drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/xsk/rx.c between
9647c57b11e5 ("xsk: i40e: ice: ixgbe: mlx5: Test for dma_need_sync earlier for
better performance") in bpf-next and e20f0dbf204f ("net/mlx5e: RX, Add a prefetch
command for small L1_CACHE_BYTES") in net-next. Resolve the two locations by retaining
net_prefetch() and taking xsk_buff_dma_sync_for_cpu() from bpf-next. Should look like:
[...]
xdp_set_data_meta_invalid(xdp);
xsk_buff_dma_sync_for_cpu(xdp, rq->xsk_pool);
net_prefetch(xdp->data);
[...]
We've added 133 non-merge commits during the last 14 day(s) which contain
a total of 246 files changed, 13832 insertions(+), 3105 deletions(-).
The main changes are:
1) Initial support for sleepable BPF programs along with bpf_copy_from_user() helper
for tracing to reliably access user memory, from Alexei Starovoitov.
2) Add BPF infra for writing and parsing TCP header options, from Martin KaFai Lau.
3) bpf_d_path() helper for returning full path for given 'struct path', from Jiri Olsa.
4) AF_XDP support for shared umems between devices and queues, from Magnus Karlsson.
5) Initial prep work for full BPF-to-BPF call support in libbpf, from Andrii Nakryiko.
6) Generalize bpf_sk_storage map & add local storage for inodes, from KP Singh.
7) Implement sockmap/hash updates from BPF context, from Lorenz Bauer.
8) BPF xor verification for scalar types & add BPF link iterator, from Yonghong Song.
9) Use target's prog type for BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT prog verification, from Udip Pant.
10) Rework BPF tracing samples to use libbpf loader, from Daniel T. Lee.
11) Fix xdpsock sample to really cycle through all buffers, from Weqaar Janjua.
12) Improve type safety for tun/veth XDP frame handling, from Maciej Żenczykowski.
13) Various smaller cleanups and improvements all over the place.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The functions bq_enqueue(), bq_flush_to_queue(), and bq_xmit_all() in
{cpu,dev}map.c always return zero. Changing the return type from int
to void makes the code easier to follow.
Suggested-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn.topel@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200901083928.6199-1-bjorn.topel@gmail.com
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Technically the bpf programs can sleep while attached to bpf_lsm_file_mprotect,
but such programs need to access user memory. So they're in might_fault()
category. Which means they cannot be called from file_mprotect lsm hook that
takes write lock on mm->mmap_lock.
Adjust the test accordingly.
Also add might_fault() to __bpf_prog_enter_sleepable() to catch such deadlocks early.
Fixes: 1e6c62a88215 ("bpf: Introduce sleepable BPF programs")
Fixes: e68a144547fc ("selftests/bpf: Add sleepable tests")
Reported-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200831201651.82447-1-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
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resolve_btfids doesn't like empty set. Add unused ID when BPF_LSM is off.
Fixes: 1e6c62a88215 ("bpf: Introduce sleepable BPF programs")
Reported-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn.topel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Tested-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Acked-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200831163132.66521-1-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
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Sleepable BPF programs can now use copy_from_user() to access user memory.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Acked-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200827220114.69225-4-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
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Introduce sleepable BPF programs that can request such property for themselves
via BPF_F_SLEEPABLE flag at program load time. In such case they will be able
to use helpers like bpf_copy_from_user() that might sleep. At present only
fentry/fexit/fmod_ret and lsm programs can request to be sleepable and only
when they are attached to kernel functions that are known to allow sleeping.
The non-sleepable programs are relying on implicit rcu_read_lock() and
migrate_disable() to protect life time of programs, maps that they use and
per-cpu kernel structures used to pass info between bpf programs and the
kernel. The sleepable programs cannot be enclosed into rcu_read_lock().
migrate_disable() maps to preempt_disable() in non-RT kernels, so the progs
should not be enclosed in migrate_disable() as well. Therefore
rcu_read_lock_trace is used to protect the life time of sleepable progs.
There are many networking and tracing program types. In many cases the
'struct bpf_prog *' pointer itself is rcu protected within some other kernel
data structure and the kernel code is using rcu_dereference() to load that
program pointer and call BPF_PROG_RUN() on it. All these cases are not touched.
Instead sleepable bpf programs are allowed with bpf trampoline only. The
program pointers are hard-coded into generated assembly of bpf trampoline and
synchronize_rcu_tasks_trace() is used to protect the life time of the program.
The same trampoline can hold both sleepable and non-sleepable progs.
When rcu_read_lock_trace is held it means that some sleepable bpf program is
running from bpf trampoline. Those programs can use bpf arrays and preallocated
hash/lru maps. These map types are waiting on programs to complete via
synchronize_rcu_tasks_trace();
Updates to trampoline now has to do synchronize_rcu_tasks_trace() and
synchronize_rcu_tasks() to wait for sleepable progs to finish and for
trampoline assembly to finish.
This is the first step of introducing sleepable progs. Eventually dynamically
allocated hash maps can be allowed and networking program types can become
sleepable too.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Acked-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200827220114.69225-3-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
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Most of the maps do not use max_entries during verification time.
Thus, those map_meta_equal() do not need to enforce max_entries
when it is inserted as an inner map during runtime. The max_entries
check is removed from the default implementation bpf_map_meta_equal().
The prog_array_map and xsk_map are exception. Its map_gen_lookup
uses max_entries to generate inline lookup code. Thus, they will
implement its own map_meta_equal() to enforce max_entries.
Since there are only two cases now, the max_entries check
is not refactored and stays in its own .c file.
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200828011813.1970516-1-kafai@fb.com
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Some properties of the inner map is used in the verification time.
When an inner map is inserted to an outer map at runtime,
bpf_map_meta_equal() is currently used to ensure those properties
of the inserting inner map stays the same as the verification
time.
In particular, the current bpf_map_meta_equal() checks max_entries which
turns out to be too restrictive for most of the maps which do not use
max_entries during the verification time. It limits the use case that
wants to replace a smaller inner map with a larger inner map. There are
some maps do use max_entries during verification though. For example,
the map_gen_lookup in array_map_ops uses the max_entries to generate
the inline lookup code.
To accommodate differences between maps, the map_meta_equal is added
to bpf_map_ops. Each map-type can decide what to check when its
map is used as an inner map during runtime.
Also, some map types cannot be used as an inner map and they are
currently black listed in bpf_map_meta_alloc() in map_in_map.c.
It is not unusual that the new map types may not aware that such
blacklist exists. This patch enforces an explicit opt-in
and only allows a map to be used as an inner map if it has
implemented the map_meta_equal ops. It is based on the
discussion in [1].
All maps that support inner map has its map_meta_equal points
to bpf_map_meta_equal in this patch. A later patch will
relax the max_entries check for most maps. bpf_types.h
counts 28 map types. This patch adds 23 ".map_meta_equal"
by using coccinelle. -5 for
BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY
BPF_MAP_TYPE_(PERCPU)_CGROUP_STORAGE
BPF_MAP_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS
BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS
BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS
The "if (inner_map->inner_map_meta)" check in bpf_map_meta_alloc()
is moved such that the same error is returned.
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200522022342.899756-1-kafai@fb.com/
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200828011806.1970400-1-kafai@fb.com
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bpf selftest test_progs/test_sk_assign failed with llvm 11 and llvm 12.
Compared to llvm 10, llvm 11 and 12 generates xor instruction which
is not handled properly in verifier. The following illustrates the
problem:
16: (b4) w5 = 0
17: ... R5_w=inv0 ...
...
132: (a4) w5 ^= 1
133: ... R5_w=inv(id=0,umax_value=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) ...
...
37: (bc) w8 = w5
38: ... R5=inv(id=0,umax_value=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff))
R8_w=inv(id=0,umax_value=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) ...
...
41: (bc) w3 = w8
42: ... R3_w=inv(id=0,umax_value=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff)) ...
45: (56) if w3 != 0x0 goto pc+1
... R3_w=inv0 ...
46: (b7) r1 = 34
47: R1_w=inv34 R7=pkt(id=0,off=26,r=38,imm=0)
47: (0f) r7 += r1
48: R1_w=invP34 R3_w=inv0 R7_w=pkt(id=0,off=60,r=38,imm=0)
48: (b4) w9 = 0
49: R1_w=invP34 R3_w=inv0 R7_w=pkt(id=0,off=60,r=38,imm=0)
49: (69) r1 = *(u16 *)(r7 +0)
invalid access to packet, off=60 size=2, R7(id=0,off=60,r=38)
R7 offset is outside of the packet
At above insn 132, w5 = 0, but after w5 ^= 1, we give a really conservative
value of w5. At insn 45, in reality the condition should be always false.
But due to conservative value for w3, the verifier evaluates it could be
true and this later leads to verifier failure complaining potential
packet out-of-bound access.
This patch implemented proper XOR support in verifier.
In the above example, we have:
132: R5=invP0
132: (a4) w5 ^= 1
133: R5_w=invP1
...
37: (bc) w8 = w5
...
41: (bc) w3 = w8
42: R3_w=invP1
...
45: (56) if w3 != 0x0 goto pc+1
47: R3_w=invP1
...
processed 353 insns ...
and the verifier can verify the program successfully.
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200825064608.2017937-1-yhs@fb.com
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This patch adds changes in verifier to make decisions such as granting
of read / write access or enforcement of return code status based on
the program type of the target program while using dynamic program
extension (of type BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT).
The BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT type can be used to extend types such as XDP, SKB
and others. Since the BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT program type on itself is just a
placeholder for those, we need this extended check for those extended
programs to actually work with proper access, while using this option.
Specifically, it introduces following changes:
- may_access_direct_pkt_data:
allow access to packet data based on the target prog
- check_return_code:
enforce return code based on the target prog
(currently, this check is skipped for EXT program)
- check_ld_abs:
check for 'may_access_skb' based on the target prog
- check_map_prog_compatibility:
enforce the map compatibility check based on the target prog
- may_update_sockmap:
allow sockmap update based on the target prog
Some other occurrences of prog->type is left as it without replacing
with the 'resolved' type:
- do_check_common() and check_attach_btf_id():
already have specific logic to handle the EXT prog type
- jit_subprogs() and bpf_check():
Not changed for jit compilation or while inferring env->ops
Next few patches in this series include selftests for some of these cases.
Signed-off-by: Udip Pant <udippant@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200825232003.2877030-2-udippant@fb.com
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Adding support to define sorted set of BTF ID values.
Following defines sorted set of BTF ID values:
BTF_SET_START(btf_allowlist_d_path)
BTF_ID(func, vfs_truncate)
BTF_ID(func, vfs_fallocate)
BTF_ID(func, dentry_open)
BTF_ID(func, vfs_getattr)
BTF_ID(func, filp_close)
BTF_SET_END(btf_allowlist_d_path)
It defines following 'struct btf_id_set' variable to access
values and count:
struct btf_id_set btf_allowlist_d_path;
Adding 'allowed' callback to struct bpf_func_proto, to allow
verifier the check on allowed callers.
Adding btf_id_set_contains function, which will be used by
allowed callbacks to verify the caller's BTF ID value is
within allowed set.
Also removing extra '\' in __BTF_ID_LIST macro.
Added BTF_SET_START_GLOBAL macro for global sets.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200825192124.710397-10-jolsa@kernel.org
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Adding btf_struct_ids_match function to check if given address provided
by BTF object + offset is also address of another nested BTF object.
This allows to pass an argument to helper, which is defined via parent
BTF object + offset, like for bpf_d_path (added in following changes):
SEC("fentry/filp_close")
int BPF_PROG(prog_close, struct file *file, void *id)
{
...
ret = bpf_d_path(&file->f_path, ...
The first bpf_d_path argument is hold by verifier as BTF file object
plus offset of f_path member.
The btf_struct_ids_match function will walk the struct file object and
check if there's nested struct path object on the given offset.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200825192124.710397-9-jolsa@kernel.org
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Adding btf_struct_walk function that walks through the
struct type + given offset and returns following values:
enum bpf_struct_walk_result {
/* < 0 error */
WALK_SCALAR = 0,
WALK_PTR,
WALK_STRUCT,
};
WALK_SCALAR - when SCALAR_VALUE is found
WALK_PTR - when pointer value is found, its ID is stored
in 'next_btf_id' output param
WALK_STRUCT - when nested struct object is found, its ID is stored
in 'next_btf_id' output param
It will be used in following patches to get all nested
struct objects for given type and offset.
The btf_struct_access now calls btf_struct_walk function,
as long as it gets nested structs as return value.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200825192124.710397-8-jolsa@kernel.org
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Andrii suggested we can simply jump to again label
instead of making recursion call.
Suggested-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200825192124.710397-7-jolsa@kernel.org
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Adding type_id pointer as argument to __btf_resolve_size
to return also BTF ID of the resolved type. It will be
used in following changes.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200825192124.710397-6-jolsa@kernel.org
|
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If the resolved type is array, make btf_resolve_size return also
ID of the elem type. It will be needed in following changes.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200825192124.710397-5-jolsa@kernel.org
|
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Moving btf_resolve_size into __btf_resolve_size and
keeping btf_resolve_size public with just first 3
arguments, because the rest of the arguments are not
used by outside callers.
Following changes are adding more arguments, which
are not useful to outside callers. They will be added
to the __btf_resolve_size function.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200825192124.710397-4-jolsa@kernel.org
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The CC_CAN_LINK checks that the host compiler can link, but bpf_preload
relies on libbpf which in turn needs libelf to be present during linking.
allmodconfig runs in odd setups with cross compilers and missing host
libraries like libelf. Instead of extending kconfig with every possible
library that bpf_preload might need disallow building BPF_PRELOAD in
such build-only configurations.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Adds support for both bpf_{sk, inode}_storage_{get, delete} to be used
in LSM programs. These helpers are not used for tracing programs
(currently) as their usage is tied to the life-cycle of the object and
should only be used where the owning object won't be freed (when the
owning object is passed as an argument to the LSM hook). Thus, they
are safer to use in LSM hooks than tracing. Usage of local storage in
tracing programs will probably follow a per function based whitelist
approach.
Since the UAPI helper signature for bpf_sk_storage expect a bpf_sock,
it, leads to a compilation warning for LSM programs, it's also updated
to accept a void * pointer instead.
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200825182919.1118197-7-kpsingh@chromium.org
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Similar to bpf_local_storage for sockets, add local storage for inodes.
The life-cycle of storage is managed with the life-cycle of the inode.
i.e. the storage is destroyed along with the owning inode.
The BPF LSM allocates an __rcu pointer to the bpf_local_storage in the
security blob which are now stackable and can co-exist with other LSMs.
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200825182919.1118197-6-kpsingh@chromium.org
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A purely mechanical change:
bpf_sk_storage.c = bpf_sk_storage.c + bpf_local_storage.c
bpf_sk_storage.h = bpf_sk_storage.h + bpf_local_storage.h
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200825182919.1118197-5-kpsingh@chromium.org
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Commit f2e10bff16a0 ("bpf: Add support for BPF_OBJ_GET_INFO_BY_FD for bpf_link")
added link query for raw_tp. One of fields in link_info is to
fill a user buffer with tp_name. The Scurrent checking only
declares "ulen && !ubuf" as invalid. So "!ulen && ubuf" will be
valid. Later on, we do "copy_to_user(ubuf, tp_name, ulen - 1)" which
may overwrite user memory incorrectly.
This patch fixed the problem by disallowing "!ulen && ubuf" case as well.
Fixes: f2e10bff16a0 ("bpf: Add support for BPF_OBJ_GET_INFO_BY_FD for bpf_link")
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200821191054.714731-1-yhs@fb.com
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Replace the existing /* fall through */ comments and its variants with
the new pseudo-keyword macro fallthrough[1]. Also, remove unnecessary
fall-through markings when it is the case.
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v5.7/process/deprecated.html?highlight=fallthrough#implicit-switch-case-fall-through
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
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Allow calling bpf_map_update_elem on sockmap and sockhash from a BPF
context. The synchronization required for this is a bit fiddly: we
need to prevent the socket from changing its state while we add it
to the sockmap, since we rely on getting a callback via
sk_prot->unhash. However, we can't just lock_sock like in
sock_map_sk_acquire because that might sleep. So instead we disable
softirq processing and use bh_lock_sock to prevent further
modification.
Yet, this is still not enough. BPF can be called in contexts where
the current CPU might have locked a socket. If the BPF can get
a hold of such a socket, inserting it into a sockmap would lead to
a deadlock. One straight forward example are sock_ops programs that
have ctx->sk, but the same problem exists for kprobes, etc.
We deal with this by allowing sockmap updates only from known safe
contexts. Improper usage is rejected by the verifier.
I've audited the enabled contexts to make sure they can't run in
a locked context. It's possible that CGROUP_SKB and others are
safe as well, but the auditing here is much more difficult. In
any case, we can extend the safe contexts when the need arises.
Signed-off-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200821102948.21918-6-lmb@cloudflare.com
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