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pointer
Current tracing_init_dentry() return a d_entry pointer, while is not
necessary. This function returns NULL on success or error on failure,
which means there is no valid d_entry pointer return.
Let's return 0 on success and negative value for error.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200712011036.70948-5-richard.weiyang@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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Currently we have following call flow:
tracer_init_tracefs()
tracing_init_dentry()
event_trace_init()
tracing_init_dentry()
This shows tracing_init_dentry() is called twice in this flow and this
is not necessary.
Let's remove the second one when it is for sure be properly initialized.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200712011036.70948-4-richard.weiyang@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/s390/linux
Pull s390 fixes from Vasily Gorbik:
- Fix order in trace_hardirqs_off_caller() to make locking state
consistent even if the IRQ tracer calls into lockdep again. Touches
common code. Acked-by Peter Zijlstra.
- Correctly handle secure storage violation exception to avoid kernel
panic triggered by user space misbehaviour.
- Switch the idle->seqcount over to using raw_write_*() to avoid
"suspicious RCU usage".
- Fix memory leaks on hard unplug in pci code.
- Use kvmalloc instead of kmalloc for larger allocations in zcrypt.
- Add few missing __init annotations to static functions to avoid
section mismatch complains when functions are not inlined.
* tag 's390-5.9-6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/s390/linux:
s390: add 3f program exception handler
lockdep: fix order in trace_hardirqs_off_caller()
s390/pci: fix leak of DMA tables on hard unplug
s390/init: add missing __init annotations
s390/zcrypt: fix kmalloc 256k failure
s390/idle: fix suspicious RCU usage
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The local_storage->list will be traversed by rcu reader in parallel.
Thus, hlist_add_head_rcu() is needed in bpf_selem_link_storage_nolock().
This patch fixes it.
This part of the code has recently been refactored in bpf-next
and this patch makes changes to the new file "bpf_local_storage.c".
Instead of using the original offending commit in the Fixes tag,
the commit that created the file "bpf_local_storage.c" is used.
A separate fix has been provided to the bpf tree.
Fixes: 450af8d0f6be ("bpf: Split bpf_local_storage to bpf_sk_storage")
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200916204453.2003915-1-kafai@fb.com
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Since kprobe_event= cmdline option allows user to put kprobes on the
functions in initmem, kprobe has to make such probes gone after boot.
Currently the probes on the init functions in modules will be handled
by module callback, but the kernel init text isn't handled.
Without this, kprobes may access non-exist text area to disable or
remove it.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/159972810544.428528.1839307531600646955.stgit@devnote2
Fixes: 970988e19eb0 ("tracing/kprobe: Add kprobe_event= boot parameter")
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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clang static analyzer reports this problem
trace_events_hist.c:3824:3: warning: Attempt to free
released memory
kfree(hist_data->attrs->var_defs.name[i]);
In parse_var_defs() if there is a problem allocating
var_defs.expr, the earlier var_defs.name is freed.
This free is duplicated by free_var_defs() which frees
the rest of the list.
Because free_var_defs() has to run anyway, remove the
second free fom parse_var_defs().
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200907135845.15804-1-trix@redhat.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 30350d65ac56 ("tracing: Add variable support to hist triggers")
Reviewed-by: Tom Zanussi <tom.zanussi@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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Commit 32927393dc1c ("sysctl: pass kernel pointers to ->proc_handler")
changed ctl_table.proc_handler to take a kernel pointer. Adjust the
signature of ftrace_enable_sysctl to match ctl_table.proc_handler which
fixes the following sparse warning:
kernel/trace/ftrace.c:7544:43: warning: incorrect type in argument 3 (different address spaces)
kernel/trace/ftrace.c:7544:43: expected void *
kernel/trace/ftrace.c:7544:43: got void [noderef] __user *buffer
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200907093207.13540-1-tklauser@distanz.ch
Fixes: 32927393dc1c ("sysctl: pass kernel pointers to ->proc_handler")
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Tobias Klauser <tklauser@distanz.ch>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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For 64bit CONFIG_BASE_SMALL=0 systems PID_MAX_LIMIT is set by default to
4194304. During boot the kernel sets a new value based on number of CPUs
but no lower than 32768. It is 1024 per CPU so with 128 CPUs the default
becomes 131072 which needs six digits.
This value can be increased during run time but must not exceed the
initial upper limit.
Systemd sometime after v241 sets it to the upper limit during boot. The
result is that when the pid exceeds five digits, the trace output is a
little hard to read because it is no longer properly padded (same like
on big iron with 98+ CPUs).
Increase the pid padding to seven digits.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200904082331.dcdkrr3bkn3e4qlg@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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Add synchronize_rcu() after list_del_rcu() in
ftrace_remove_trampoline_from_kallsyms() to protect readers of
ftrace_ops_trampoline_list (in ftrace_get_trampoline_kallsym)
which is used when kallsyms is read.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200901091617.31837-1-adrian.hunter@intel.com
Fixes: fc0ea795f53c8d ("ftrace: Add symbols for ftrace trampolines")
Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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Commit fc0ea795f53c ("ftrace: Add symbols for ftrace trampolines")
missed to remove ops from new ftrace_ops_trampoline_list in
ftrace_startup() if ftrace_hash_ipmodify_enable() fails there. It may
lead to BUG if such ops come from a module which may be removed.
Moreover, the trampoline itself is not freed in this case.
Fix it by calling ftrace_trampoline_free() during the rollback.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200831122631.28057-1-mbenes@suse.cz
Fixes: fc0ea795f53c ("ftrace: Add symbols for ftrace trampolines")
Fixes: f8b8be8a310a ("ftrace, kprobes: Support IPMODIFY flag to find IP modify conflict")
Signed-off-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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Commit 0cb2f1372baa ("kprobes: Fix NULL pointer dereference at
kprobe_ftrace_handler") fixed one bug but not completely fixed yet.
If we run a kprobe_module.tc of ftracetest, kernel showed a warning
as below.
# ./ftracetest test.d/kprobe/kprobe_module.tc
=== Ftrace unit tests ===
[1] Kprobe dynamic event - probing module
...
[ 22.400215] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 22.400962] Failed to disarm kprobe-ftrace at trace_printk_irq_work+0x0/0x7e [trace_printk] (-2)
[ 22.402139] WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 200 at kernel/kprobes.c:1091 __disarm_kprobe_ftrace.isra.0+0x7e/0xa0
[ 22.403358] Modules linked in: trace_printk(-)
[ 22.404028] CPU: 7 PID: 200 Comm: rmmod Not tainted 5.9.0-rc2+ #66
[ 22.404870] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 22.406139] RIP: 0010:__disarm_kprobe_ftrace.isra.0+0x7e/0xa0
[ 22.406947] Code: 30 8b 03 eb c9 80 3d e5 09 1f 01 00 75 dc 49 8b 34 24 89 c2 48 c7 c7 a0 c2 05 82 89 45 e4 c6 05 cc 09 1f 01 01 e8 a9 c7 f0 ff <0f> 0b 8b 45 e4 eb b9 89 c6 48 c7 c7 70 c2 05 82 89 45 e4 e8 91 c7
[ 22.409544] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000237df0 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 22.410385] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff83066024 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 22.411434] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff810de8d3 RDI: ffffffff810de8d3
[ 22.412687] RBP: ffffc90000237e10 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001
[ 22.413762] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88807c478640
[ 22.414852] R13: ffffffff8235ebc0 R14: ffffffffa00060c0 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 22.415941] FS: 00000000019d48c0(0000) GS:ffff88807d7c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 22.417264] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 22.418176] CR2: 00000000005bb7e3 CR3: 0000000078f7a000 CR4: 00000000000006a0
[ 22.419309] Call Trace:
[ 22.419990] kill_kprobe+0x94/0x160
[ 22.420652] kprobes_module_callback+0x64/0x230
[ 22.421470] notifier_call_chain+0x4f/0x70
[ 22.422184] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x49/0x70
[ 22.422979] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x1ac/0x240
[ 22.423733] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x50
[ 22.424366] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 22.425176] RIP: 0033:0x4bb81d
[ 22.425741] Code: 00 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 e0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 22.428726] RSP: 002b:00007ffc70fef008 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0
[ 22.430169] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000019d48a0 RCX: 00000000004bb81d
[ 22.431375] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000880 RDI: 00007ffc70fef028
[ 22.432543] RBP: 0000000000000880 R08: 00000000ffffffff R09: 00007ffc70fef320
[ 22.433692] R10: 0000000000656300 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffc70fef028
[ 22.434635] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 22.435682] irq event stamp: 1169
[ 22.436240] hardirqs last enabled at (1179): [<ffffffff810df542>] console_unlock+0x422/0x580
[ 22.437466] hardirqs last disabled at (1188): [<ffffffff810df19b>] console_unlock+0x7b/0x580
[ 22.438608] softirqs last enabled at (866): [<ffffffff81c0038e>] __do_softirq+0x38e/0x490
[ 22.439637] softirqs last disabled at (859): [<ffffffff81a00f42>] asm_call_on_stack+0x12/0x20
[ 22.440690] ---[ end trace 1e7ce7e1e4567276 ]---
[ 22.472832] trace_kprobe: This probe might be able to register after target module is loaded. Continue.
This is because the kill_kprobe() calls disarm_kprobe_ftrace() even
if the given probe is not enabled. In that case, ftrace_set_filter_ip()
fails because the given probe point is not registered to ftrace.
Fix to check the given (going) probe is enabled before invoking
disarm_kprobe_ftrace().
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/159888672694.1411785.5987998076694782591.stgit@devnote2
Fixes: 0cb2f1372baa ("kprobes: Fix NULL pointer dereference at kprobe_ftrace_handler")
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: "Naveen N . Rao" <naveen.n.rao@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Muchun Song <songmuchun@bytedance.com>
Cc: Chengming Zhou <zhouchengming@bytedance.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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Currently the callback passed to arch_stack_walk() has an argument called
reliable passed to it to indicate if the stack entry is reliable, a comment
says that this is used by some printk() consumers. However in the current
kernel none of the arch_stack_walk() implementations ever set this flag to
true and the only callback implementation we have is in the generic
stacktrace code which ignores the flag. It therefore appears that this
flag is redundant so we can simplify and clarify things by removing it.
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200914153409.25097-2-broonie@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
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LD_[ABS|IND] instructions may return from the function early. bpf_tail_call
pseudo instruction is either fallthrough or return. Allow them in the
subprograms only when subprograms are BTF annotated and have scalar return
types. Allow ld_abs and tail_call in the main program even if it calls into
subprograms. In the past that was not ok to do for ld_abs, since it was JITed
with special exit sequence. Since bpf_gen_ld_abs() was introduced the ld_abs
looks like normal exit insn from JIT point of view, so it's safe to allow them
in the main program.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Relax verifier's restriction that was meant to forbid tailcall usage
when subprog count was higher than 1.
Also, do not max out the stack depth of program that utilizes tailcalls.
Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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This commit serves two things:
1) it optimizes BPF prologue/epilogue generation
2) it makes possible to have tailcalls within BPF subprogram
Both points are related to each other since without 1), 2) could not be
achieved.
In [1], Alexei says:
"The prologue will look like:
nop5
xor eax,eax // two new bytes if bpf_tail_call() is used in this
// function
push rbp
mov rbp, rsp
sub rsp, rounded_stack_depth
push rax // zero init tail_call counter
variable number of push rbx,r13,r14,r15
Then bpf_tail_call will pop variable number rbx,..
and final 'pop rax'
Then 'add rsp, size_of_current_stack_frame'
jmp to next function and skip over 'nop5; xor eax,eax; push rpb; mov
rbp, rsp'
This way new function will set its own stack size and will init tail
call
counter with whatever value the parent had.
If next function doesn't use bpf_tail_call it won't have 'xor eax,eax'.
Instead it would need to have 'nop2' in there."
Implement that suggestion.
Since the layout of stack is changed, tail call counter handling can not
rely anymore on popping it to rbx just like it have been handled for
constant prologue case and later overwrite of rbx with actual value of
rbx pushed to stack. Therefore, let's use one of the register (%rcx) that
is considered to be volatile/caller-saved and pop the value of tail call
counter in there in the epilogue.
Drop the BUILD_BUG_ON in emit_prologue and in
emit_bpf_tail_call_indirect where instruction layout is not constant
anymore.
Introduce new poke target, 'tailcall_bypass' to poke descriptor that is
dedicated for skipping the register pops and stack unwind that are
generated right before the actual jump to target program.
For case when the target program is not present, BPF program will skip
the pop instructions and nop5 dedicated for jmpq $target. An example of
such state when only R6 of callee saved registers is used by program:
ffffffffc0513aa1: e9 0e 00 00 00 jmpq 0xffffffffc0513ab4
ffffffffc0513aa6: 5b pop %rbx
ffffffffc0513aa7: 58 pop %rax
ffffffffc0513aa8: 48 81 c4 00 00 00 00 add $0x0,%rsp
ffffffffc0513aaf: 0f 1f 44 00 00 nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
ffffffffc0513ab4: 48 89 df mov %rbx,%rdi
When target program is inserted, the jump that was there to skip
pops/nop5 will become the nop5, so CPU will go over pops and do the
actual tailcall.
One might ask why there simply can not be pushes after the nop5?
In the following example snippet:
ffffffffc037030c: 48 89 fb mov %rdi,%rbx
(...)
ffffffffc0370332: 5b pop %rbx
ffffffffc0370333: 58 pop %rax
ffffffffc0370334: 48 81 c4 00 00 00 00 add $0x0,%rsp
ffffffffc037033b: 0f 1f 44 00 00 nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
ffffffffc0370340: 48 81 ec 00 00 00 00 sub $0x0,%rsp
ffffffffc0370347: 50 push %rax
ffffffffc0370348: 53 push %rbx
ffffffffc0370349: 48 89 df mov %rbx,%rdi
ffffffffc037034c: e8 f7 21 00 00 callq 0xffffffffc0372548
There is the bpf2bpf call (at ffffffffc037034c) right after the tailcall
and jump target is not present. ctx is in %rbx register and BPF
subprogram that we will call into on ffffffffc037034c is relying on it,
e.g. it will pick ctx from there. Such code layout is therefore broken
as we would overwrite the content of %rbx with the value that was pushed
on the prologue. That is the reason for the 'bypass' approach.
Special care needs to be taken during the install/update/remove of
tailcall target. In case when target program is not present, the CPU
must not execute the pop instructions that precede the tailcall.
To address that, the following states can be defined:
A nop, unwind, nop
B nop, unwind, tail
C skip, unwind, nop
D skip, unwind, tail
A is forbidden (lead to incorrectness). The state transitions between
tailcall install/update/remove will work as follows:
First install tail call f: C->D->B(f)
* poke the tailcall, after that get rid of the skip
Update tail call f to f': B(f)->B(f')
* poke the tailcall (poke->tailcall_target) and do NOT touch the
poke->tailcall_bypass
Remove tail call: B(f')->C(f')
* poke->tailcall_bypass is poked back to jump, then we wait the RCU
grace period so that other programs will finish its execution and
after that we are safe to remove the poke->tailcall_target
Install new tail call (f''): C(f')->D(f'')->B(f'').
* same as first step
This way CPU can never be exposed to "unwind, tail" state.
Last but not least, when tailcalls get mixed with bpf2bpf calls, it
would be possible to encounter the endless loop due to clearing the
tailcall counter if for example we would use the tailcall3-like from BPF
selftests program that would be subprogram-based, meaning the tailcall
would be present within the BPF subprogram.
This test, broken down to particular steps, would do:
entry -> set tailcall counter to 0, bump it by 1, tailcall to func0
func0 -> call subprog_tail
(we are NOT skipping the first 11 bytes of prologue and this subprogram
has a tailcall, therefore we clear the counter...)
subprog -> do the same thing as entry
and then loop forever.
To address this, the idea is to go through the call chain of bpf2bpf progs
and look for a tailcall presence throughout whole chain. If we saw a single
tail call then each node in this call chain needs to be marked as a subprog
that can reach the tailcall. We would later feed the JIT with this info
and:
- set eax to 0 only when tailcall is reachable and this is the entry prog
- if tailcall is reachable but there's no tailcall in insns of currently
JITed prog then push rax anyway, so that it will be possible to
propagate further down the call chain
- finally if tailcall is reachable, then we need to precede the 'call'
insn with mov rax, [rbp - (stack_depth + 8)]
Tail call related cases from test_verifier kselftest are also working
fine. Sample BPF programs that utilize tail calls (sockex3, tracex5)
work properly as well.
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200517043227.2gpq22ifoq37ogst@ast-mbp.dhcp.thefacebook.com/
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Protect against potential stack overflow that might happen when bpf2bpf
calls get combined with tailcalls. Limit the caller's stack depth for
such case down to 256 so that the worst case scenario would result in 8k
stack size (32 which is tailcall limit * 256 = 8k).
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Reflect the actual purpose of poke->ip and rename it to
poke->tailcall_target so that it will not the be confused with another
poke target that will be introduced in next commit.
While at it, do the same thing with poke->ip_stable - rename it to
poke->tailcall_target_stable.
Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Previously, there was no need for poke descriptors being present in
subprogram's bpf_prog_aux struct since tailcalls were simply not allowed
in them. Each subprog is JITed independently so in order to enable
JITing subprograms that use tailcalls, do the following:
- in fixup_bpf_calls() store the index of tailcall insn onto the generated
poke descriptor,
- in case when insn patching occurs, adjust the tailcall insn idx from
bpf_patch_insn_data,
- then in jit_subprogs() check whether the given poke descriptor belongs
to the current subprog by checking if that previously stored absolute
index of tail call insn is in the scope of the insns of given subprog,
- update the insn->imm with new poke descriptor slot so that while JITing
the proper poke descriptor will be grabbed
This way each of the main program's poke descriptors are distributed
across the subprograms poke descriptor array, so main program's
descriptors can be untracked out of the prog array map.
Add also subprog's aux struct to the BPF map poke_progs list by calling
on it map_poke_track().
In case of any error, call the map_poke_untrack() on subprog's aux
structs that have already been registered to prog array map.
Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Commit 2a9127fcf229 ("mm: rewrite wait_on_page_bit_common() logic") made
the page locking entirely fair, in that if a waiter came in while the
lock was held, the lock would be transferred to the lockers strictly in
order.
That was intended to finally get rid of the long-reported watchdog
failures that involved the page lock under extreme load, where a process
could end up waiting essentially forever, as other page lockers stole
the lock from under it.
It also improved some benchmarks, but it ended up causing huge
performance regressions on others, simply because fair lock behavior
doesn't end up giving out the lock as aggressively, causing better
worst-case latency, but potentially much worse average latencies and
throughput.
Instead of reverting that change entirely, this introduces a controlled
amount of unfairness, with a sysctl knob to tune it if somebody needs
to. But the default value should hopefully be good for any normal load,
allowing a few rounds of lock stealing, but enforcing the strict
ordering before the lock has been stolen too many times.
There is also a hint from Matthieu Baerts that the fair page coloring
may end up exposing an ABBA deadlock that is hidden by the usual
optimistic lock stealing, and while the unfairness doesn't fix the
fundamental issue (and I'm still looking at that), it avoids it in
practice.
The amount of unfairness can be modified by writing a new value to the
'sysctl_page_lock_unfairness' variable (default value of 5, exposed
through /proc/sys/vm/page_lock_unfairness), but that is hopefully
something we'd use mainly for debugging rather than being necessary for
any deep system tuning.
This whole issue has exposed just how critical the page lock can be, and
how contended it gets under certain locks. And the main contention
doesn't really seem to be anything related to IO (which was the origin
of this lock), but for things like just verifying that the page file
mapping is stable while faulting in the page into a page table.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/ed8442fd-6f54-dd84-cd4a-941e8b7ee603@MichaelLarabel.com/
Link: https://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=article&item=linux-50-59&num=1
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/c560a38d-8313-51fb-b1ec-e904bd8836bc@tessares.net/
Reported-and-tested-by: Michael Larabel <Michael@michaellarabel.com>
Tested-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Fold the misaligned u64 workarounds into the main quotactl flow instead
of implementing a separate compat syscall handler.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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|
The new field 'dma_range_map' in struct device is used to facilitate the
use of single or multiple offsets between mapping regions of cpu addrs and
dma addrs. It subsumes the role of "dev->dma_pfn_offset" which was only
capable of holding a single uniform offset and had no region bounds
checking.
The function of_dma_get_range() has been modified so that it takes a single
argument -- the device node -- and returns a map, NULL, or an error code.
The map is an array that holds the information regarding the DMA regions.
Each range entry contains the address offset, the cpu_start address, the
dma_start address, and the size of the region.
of_dma_configure() is the typical manner to set range offsets but there are
a number of ad hoc assignments to "dev->dma_pfn_offset" in the kernel
driver code. These cases now invoke the function
dma_direct_set_offset(dev, cpu_addr, dma_addr, size).
Signed-off-by: Jim Quinlan <james.quinlan@broadcom.com>
[hch: various interface cleanups]
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
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When booting the kernel v5.9-rc4 on a VM, the kernel would panic when
printing a warning message in swiotlb_map(). The dev->dma_mask must not
be a NULL pointer when calling the dma mapping layer. A NULL pointer
check can potentially avoid the panic.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Tai <thomas.tai@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
|
|
The rcu_tasks_trace_postgp() function uses for_each_process_thread()
to scan the task list without the benefit of RCU read-side protection,
which can result in use-after-free errors on task_struct structures.
This error was missed because the TRACE01 rcutorture scenario enables
lockdep, but also builds with CONFIG_PREEMPT_NONE=y. In this situation,
preemption is disabled everywhere, so lockdep thinks everywhere can
be a legitimate RCU reader. This commit therefore adds the needed
rcu_read_lock() and rcu_read_unlock().
Note that this bug can occur only after an RCU Tasks Trace CPU stall
warning, which by default only happens after a grace period has extended
for ten minutes (yes, not a typo, minutes).
Fixes: 4593e772b502 ("rcu-tasks: Add stall warnings for RCU Tasks Trace")
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: <bpf@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.7.x
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
|
|
When rcu_tasks_trace_postgp() function detects an RCU Tasks Trace
CPU stall, it adds all tasks blocking the current grace period to
a list, invoking get_task_struct() on each to prevent them from
being freed while on the list. It then traverses that list,
printing stall-warning messages for each one that is still blocking
the current grace period and removing it from the list. The list
removal invokes the matching put_task_struct().
This of course means that in the admittedly unlikely event that some
task executes its outermost rcu_read_unlock_trace() in the meantime, it
won't be removed from the list and put_task_struct() won't be executing,
resulting in a task_struct leak. This commit therefore makes the list
removal and put_task_struct() unconditional, stopping the leak.
Note further that this bug can occur only after an RCU Tasks Trace CPU
stall warning, which by default only happens after a grace period has
extended for ten minutes (yes, not a typo, minutes).
Fixes: 4593e772b502 ("rcu-tasks: Add stall warnings for RCU Tasks Trace")
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: <bpf@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.7.x
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
|
|
The more intense grace-period processing resulting from the 50x RCU
Tasks Trace grace-period speedups exposed the following race condition:
o Task A running on CPU 0 executes rcu_read_lock_trace(),
entering a read-side critical section.
o When Task A eventually invokes rcu_read_unlock_trace()
to exit its read-side critical section, this function
notes that the ->trc_reader_special.s flag is zero and
and therefore invoke wil set ->trc_reader_nesting to zero
using WRITE_ONCE(). But before that happens...
o The RCU Tasks Trace grace-period kthread running on some other
CPU interrogates Task A, but this fails because this task is
currently running. This kthread therefore sends an IPI to CPU 0.
o CPU 0 receives the IPI, and thus invokes trc_read_check_handler().
Because Task A has not yet cleared its ->trc_reader_nesting
counter, this function sees that Task A is still within its
read-side critical section. This function therefore sets the
->trc_reader_nesting.b.need_qs flag, AKA the .need_qs flag.
Except that Task A has already checked the .need_qs flag, which
is part of the ->trc_reader_special.s flag. The .need_qs flag
therefore remains set until Task A's next rcu_read_unlock_trace().
o Task A now invokes synchronize_rcu_tasks_trace(), which cannot
start a new grace period until the current grace period completes.
And thus cannot return until after that time.
But Task A's .need_qs flag is still set, which prevents the current
grace period from completing. And because Task A is blocked, it
will never execute rcu_read_unlock_trace() until its call to
synchronize_rcu_tasks_trace() returns.
We are therefore deadlocked.
This race is improbable, but 80 hours of rcutorture made it happen twice.
The race was possible before the grace-period speedup, but roughly 50x
less probable. Several thousand hours of rcutorture would have been
necessary to have a reasonable chance of making this happen before this
50x speedup.
This commit therefore eliminates this deadlock by setting
->trc_reader_nesting to a large negative number before checking the
.need_qs and zeroing (or decrementing with respect to its initial
value) ->trc_reader_nesting. For its part, the IPI handler's
trc_read_check_handler() function adds a check for negative values,
deferring evaluation of the task in this case. Taken together, these
changes avoid this deadlock scenario.
Fixes: 276c410448db ("rcu-tasks: Split ->trc_reader_need_end")
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: <bpf@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.7.x
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
|
|
The various RCU tasks flavors currently wait 100 milliseconds between each
grace period in order to prevent CPU-bound loops and to favor efficiency
over latency. However, RCU Tasks Trace needs to have a grace-period
latency of roughly 25 milliseconds, which is completely infeasible given
the 100-millisecond per-grace-period sleep. This commit therefore reduces
this sleep duration to 5 milliseconds (or one jiffy, whichever is longer)
in kernels built with CONFIG_TASKS_TRACE_RCU_READ_MB=y.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAADnVQK_AiX+S_L_A4CQWT11XyveppBbQSQgH_qWGyzu_E8Yeg@mail.gmail.com/
Reported-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: <bpf@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
|
|
Many workloads are quite sensitive to IPIs, and such workloads should
build kernels with CONFIG_TASKS_TRACE_RCU_READ_MB=y to prevent RCU
Tasks Trace from using them under normal conditions. However, other
workloads are quite happy to permit more IPIs if doing so makes BPF
program updates go faster. This commit therefore sets the default
value for the rcupdate.rcu_task_ipi_delay kernel parameter to zero for
kernels that have been built with CONFIG_TASKS_TRACE_RCU_READ_MB=n,
while retaining the old default of (HZ / 10) for kernels that have
indicated an aversion to IPIs via CONFIG_TASKS_TRACE_RCU_READ_MB=y.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAADnVQK_AiX+S_L_A4CQWT11XyveppBbQSQgH_qWGyzu_E8Yeg@mail.gmail.com/
Reported-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: <bpf@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
|
|
Commit 8344496e8b49 ("rcu-tasks: Conditionally compile
show_rcu_tasks_gp_kthreads()") introduced conditional
compilation of several functions, but forgot one occurrence of
show_rcu_tasks_classic_gp_kthread() that causes the compiler to warn of
an unused static function. This commit uses "static inline" to avoid
these complaints and possibly also to avoid emitting an actual definition
of this function.
Fixes: 8344496e8b49 ("rcu-tasks: Conditionally compile show_rcu_tasks_gp_kthreads()")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.8.x
Reported-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
|
|
The RCU Tasks Trace grace periods are too slow, as in 40x slower than
those of RCU Tasks. This is due to my having assumed a one-second grace
period was OK, and thus not having optimized any further. This commit
provides the first step in this optimization process, namely by allowing
the task_list scan backoff interval to be specified on a per-flavor basis,
and then speeding up the scans for RCU Tasks Trace. However, kernels
built with CONFIG_TASKS_TRACE_RCU_READ_MB=y continue to use the old slower
backoff, consistent with that Kconfig option's goal of reducing IPIs.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAADnVQK_AiX+S_L_A4CQWT11XyveppBbQSQgH_qWGyzu_E8Yeg@mail.gmail.com/
Reported-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: <bpf@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
|
|
The n_heavy_reader_attempts, n_heavy_reader_updates, and
n_heavy_reader_ofl_updates variables are not used outside of their
translation unit, so this commit marks them static.
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
|
|
To support MSI irq domains which do not fit at all into the regular MSI
irqdomain scheme, like the XEN MSI interrupt management for PV/HVM/DOM0,
it's necessary to allow to override the alloc/free implementation.
This is a preperatory step to switch X86 away from arch_*_msi_irqs() and
store the irq domain pointer right in struct device.
No functional change for existing MSI irq domain users.
Aside of the evil XEN wrapper this is also useful for special MSI domains
which need to do extra alloc/free work before/after calling the generic
core function. Work like allocating/freeing MSI descriptors, MSI storage
space etc.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200826112333.526797548@linutronix.de
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PCI devices behind a VMD bus are not subject to interrupt remapping, but
the irq domain for VMD MSI cannot be distinguished from a regular PCI/MSI
irq domain.
Add a new domain bus token and allow it in the bus token check in
msi_check_reservation_mode() to keep the functionality the same once VMD
uses this token.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jon Derrick <jonathan.derrick@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200826112332.954409970@linutronix.de
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pci_msi_get_hwirq() and pci_msi_set_desc are not longer special. Enable the
generic MSI domain ops in the core and PCI MSI code unconditionally and get
rid of the x86 specific implementations in the X86 MSI code and in the
hyperv PCI driver.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200826112332.564274859@linutronix.de
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The documentation of irq_chip_compose_msi_msg() claims that with
hierarchical irq domains the first chip in the hierarchy which has an
irq_compose_msi_msg() callback is chosen. But the code just keeps
iterating after it finds a chip with a compose callback.
The x86 HPET MSI implementation relies on that behaviour, but that does not
make it more correct.
The message should always be composed at the domain which manages the
underlying resource (e.g. APIC or remap table) because that domain knows
about the required layout of the message.
On X86 the following hierarchies exist:
1) vector -------- PCI/MSI
2) vector -- IR -- PCI/MSI
The vector domain has a different message format than the IR (remapping)
domain. So obviously the PCI/MSI domain can't compose the message without
having knowledge about the parent domain, which is exactly the opposite of
what hierarchical domains want to achieve.
X86 actually has two different PCI/MSI chips where #1 has a compose
callback and #2 does not. #2 delegates the composition to the remap domain
where it belongs, but #1 does it at the PCI/MSI level.
For the upcoming device MSI support it's necessary to change this and just
let the first domain which can compose the message take care of it. That
way the top level chip does not have to worry about it and the device MSI
code does not need special knowledge about topologies. It just sets the
compose callback to NULL and lets the hierarchy pick the first chip which
has one.
Due to that the attempt to move the compose callback from the direct
delivery PCI/MSI domain to the vector domain made the system fail to boot
with interrupt remapping enabled because in the remapping case
irq_chip_compose_msi_msg() keeps iterating and choses the compose callback
of the vector domain which obviously creates the wrong format for the remap
table.
Break out of the loop when the first irq chip with a compose callback is
found and fixup the HPET code temporarily. That workaround will be removed
once the direct delivery compose callback is moved to the place where it
belongs in the vector domain.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200826112331.047917603@linutronix.de
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The __this_cpu*() accessors are (in general) IRQ-unsafe which, given
that percpu-rwsem is a blocking primitive, should be just fine.
However, file_end_write() is used from IRQ context and will cause
load-store issues on architectures where the per-cpu accessors are not
natively irq-safe.
Fix it by using the IRQ-safe this_cpu_*() for operations on
read_count. This will generate more expensive code on a number of
platforms, which might cause a performance regression for some of the
other percpu-rwsem users.
If any such is reported, we can consider alternative solutions.
Fixes: 70fe2f48152e ("aio: fix freeze protection of aio writes")
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200915140750.137881-1-houtao1@huawei.com
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__raise_softirq_irqoff() must be called with interrupts disabled to protect
the per CPU softirq pending state update against an interrupt and soft
interrupt handling on return from interrupt.
Add a lockdep assertion to validate the calling convention.
[ tglx: Massaged changelog ]
Signed-off-by: Jiafei Pan <Jiafei.Pan@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200814045522.45719-1-Jiafei.Pan@nxp.com
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Alexei Starovoitov says:
====================
pull-request: bpf 2020-09-15
The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net* tree.
We've added 12 non-merge commits during the last 19 day(s) which contain
a total of 10 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-).
The main changes are:
1) docs/bpf fixes, from Andrii.
2) ld_abs fix, from Daniel.
3) socket casting helpers fix, from Martin.
4) hash iterator fixes, from Yonghong.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
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This syscall binds a map to a program. Returns success if the map is
already bound to the program.
Signed-off-by: YiFei Zhu <zhuyifei@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Cc: YiFei Zhu <zhuyifei1999@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200915234543.3220146-3-sdf@google.com
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To support modifying the used_maps array, we use a mutex to protect
the use of the counter and the array. The mutex is initialized right
after the prog aux is allocated, and destroyed right before prog
aux is freed. This way we guarantee it's initialized for both cBPF
and eBPF.
Signed-off-by: YiFei Zhu <zhuyifei@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Cc: YiFei Zhu <zhuyifei1999@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200915234543.3220146-2-sdf@google.com
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Running selftest
./btf_btf -p
the kernel had the following warning:
[ 51.528185] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1756 at kernel/bpf/hashtab.c:717 htab_map_get_next_key+0x2eb/0x300
[ 51.529217] Modules linked in:
[ 51.529583] CPU: 3 PID: 1756 Comm: test_btf Not tainted 5.9.0-rc1+ #878
[ 51.530346] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.9.3-1.el7.centos 04/01/2014
[ 51.531410] RIP: 0010:htab_map_get_next_key+0x2eb/0x300
...
[ 51.542826] Call Trace:
[ 51.543119] map_seq_next+0x53/0x80
[ 51.543528] seq_read+0x263/0x400
[ 51.543932] vfs_read+0xad/0x1c0
[ 51.544311] ksys_read+0x5f/0xe0
[ 51.544689] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
[ 51.545116] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
The related source code in kernel/bpf/hashtab.c:
709 static int htab_map_get_next_key(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *next_key)
710 {
711 struct bpf_htab *htab = container_of(map, struct bpf_htab, map);
712 struct hlist_nulls_head *head;
713 struct htab_elem *l, *next_l;
714 u32 hash, key_size;
715 int i = 0;
716
717 WARN_ON_ONCE(!rcu_read_lock_held());
In kernel/bpf/inode.c, bpffs map pretty print calls map->ops->map_get_next_key()
without holding a rcu_read_lock(), hence causing the above warning.
To fix the issue, just surrounding map->ops->map_get_next_key() with rcu read lock.
Fixes: a26ca7c982cb ("bpf: btf: Add pretty print support to the basic arraymap")
Reported-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200916004401.146277-1-yhs@fb.com
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Use the record extending feature of the ringbuffer to implement
continuous messages. This preserves the existing continuous message
behavior.
Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200914123354.832-7-john.ogness@linutronix.de
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Add support for extending the newest data block. For this, introduce
a new finalization state (desc_finalized) denoting a committed
descriptor that cannot be extended.
Until a record is finalized, a writer can reopen that record to
append new data. Reopening a record means transitioning from the
desc_committed state back to the desc_reserved state.
A writer can explicitly finalize a record if there is no intention
of extending it. Also, records are automatically finalized when a
new record is reserved. This relieves writers of needing to
explicitly finalize while also making such records available to
readers sooner. (Readers can only traverse finalized records.)
Four new memory barrier pairs are introduced. Two of them are
insignificant additions (data_realloc:A/desc_read:D and
data_realloc:A/data_push_tail:B) because they are alternate path
memory barriers that exactly match the purpose, pairing, and
context of the two existing memory barrier pairs they provide an
alternate path for. The other two new memory barrier pairs are
significant additions:
desc_reopen_last:A / _prb_commit:B - When reopening a descriptor,
ensure the state transitions back to desc_reserved before
fully trusting the descriptor data.
_prb_commit:B / desc_reserve:D - When committing a descriptor,
ensure the state transitions to desc_committed before checking
the head ID to see if the descriptor needs to be finalized.
Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200914123354.832-6-john.ogness@linutronix.de
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Rather than deriving the state by evaluating bits within the flags
area of the state variable, assign the states explicit values and
set those values in the flags area. Introduce macros to make it
simple to read and write state values for the state variable.
Although the functionality is preserved, the binary representation
for the states is changed.
Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200914123354.832-5-john.ogness@linutronix.de
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prb_reserve() will set some meta data values and leave others
uninitialized (or rather, containing the values of the previous
wrap). Simplify the API by always clearing out all the fields.
Only the sequence number is filled in. The caller is now
responsible for filling in the rest of the meta data fields.
In particular, for correctly filling in text and dict lengths.
Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200914123354.832-4-john.ogness@linutronix.de
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Rather than continually needing to explicitly check @begin and @next
to identify a dataless block, introduce and use a BLK_DATALESS()
macro.
Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200914123354.832-3-john.ogness@linutronix.de
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Move the internal get_data() function as-is above prb_reserve() so
that a later change can make use of the static function.
Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200914123354.832-2-john.ogness@linutronix.de
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@state_var is copied as part of the descriptor copying via
memcpy(). This is not allowed because @state_var is an atomic type,
which in some implementations may contain a spinlock.
Avoid using memcpy() with @state_var by explicitly copying the other
fields of the descriptor. @state_var is set using atomic set
operator before returning.
Fixes: b6cf8b3f3312 ("printk: add lockless ringbuffer")
Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200914094803.27365-2-john.ogness@linutronix.de
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It is expected that desc_read() will always set at least the
@state_var field. However, if the descriptor is in an inconsistent
state, no fields are set.
Also, the second load of @state_var is not stored in @desc_out and
so might not match the state value that is returned.
Always set the last loaded @state_var into @desc_out, regardless of
the descriptor consistency.
Fixes: b6cf8b3f3312 ("printk: add lockless ringbuffer")
Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200914094803.27365-1-john.ogness@linutronix.de
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On v5.8 when doing seccomp syscall rewrites (e.g. getpid into getppid
as seen in the seccomp selftests), trace (and audit) correctly see the
rewritten syscall on entry and exit:
seccomp_bpf-1307 [000] .... 22974.874393: sys_enter: NR 110 (...
seccomp_bpf-1307 [000] .N.. 22974.874401: sys_exit: NR 110 = 1304
With mainline we see a mismatched enter and exit (the original syscall
is incorrectly visible on entry):
seccomp_bpf-1030 [000] .... 21.806766: sys_enter: NR 39 (...
seccomp_bpf-1030 [000] .... 21.806767: sys_exit: NR 110 = 1027
When ptrace or seccomp change the syscall, this needs to be visible to
trace and audit at that time as well. Update the syscall earlier so they
see the correct value.
Fixes: d88d59b64ca3 ("core/entry: Respect syscall number rewrites")
Reported-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200912005826.586171-1-keescook@chromium.org
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