| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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snapshot_write() is inappropriately limiting the amount of data that can
be written in cases where a partial page has already been written. For
example, one would expect to be able to write 1 byte, then 4095 bytes to
the snapshot device, and have both of those complete fully (since now
we're aligned to a page again). But what ends up happening is we write 1
byte, then 4094/4095 bytes complete successfully.
The reason is that simple_write_to_buffer()'s second argument is the
total size of the buffer, not the size of the buffer minus the offset.
Since simple_write_to_buffer() accounts for the offset in its
implementation, snapshot_write() can just pass the full page size
directly down.
Signed-off-by: Evan Green <evgreen@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
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Commit 39fbef4b0f77 ("PM: hibernate: Get block device exclusively in
swsusp_check()") changed the opening mode of the block device to
(FMODE_READ | FMODE_EXCL).
In the corresponding calls to swsusp_close(), the mode is still just
FMODE_READ which triggers the warning in blkdev_flush_mapping() on
resume from hibernate.
So, use the mode (FMODE_READ | FMODE_EXCL) also when closing the
device.
Fixes: 39fbef4b0f77 ("PM: hibernate: Get block device exclusively in swsusp_check()")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Zeitlhofer <thomas.zeitlhofer+lkml@ze-it.at>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
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To hot unplug a CPU, the idle task on that CPU calls a few layers of C
code before finally leaving the kernel. When KASAN is in use, poisoned
shadow is left around for each of the active stack frames, and when
shadow call stacks are in use. When shadow call stacks (SCS) are in use
the task's saved SCS SP is left pointing at an arbitrary point within
the task's shadow call stack.
When a CPU is offlined than onlined back into the kernel, this stale
state can adversely affect execution. Stale KASAN shadow can alias new
stackframes and result in bogus KASAN warnings. A stale SCS SP is
effectively a memory leak, and prevents a portion of the shadow call
stack being used. Across a number of hotplug cycles the idle task's
entire shadow call stack can become unusable.
We previously fixed the KASAN issue in commit:
e1b77c92981a5222 ("sched/kasan: remove stale KASAN poison after hotplug")
... by removing any stale KASAN stack poison immediately prior to
onlining a CPU.
Subsequently in commit:
f1a0a376ca0c4ef1 ("sched/core: Initialize the idle task with preemption disabled")
... the refactoring left the KASAN and SCS cleanup in one-time idle
thread initialization code rather than something invoked prior to each
CPU being onlined, breaking both as above.
We fixed SCS (but not KASAN) in commit:
63acd42c0d4942f7 ("sched/scs: Reset the shadow stack when idle_task_exit")
... but as this runs in the context of the idle task being offlined it's
potentially fragile.
To fix these consistently and more robustly, reset the SCS SP and KASAN
shadow of a CPU's idle task immediately before we online that CPU in
bringup_cpu(). This ensures the idle task always has a consistent state
when it is running, and removes the need to so so when exiting an idle
task.
Whenever any thread is created, dup_task_struct() will give the task a
stack which is free of KASAN shadow, and initialize the task's SCS SP,
so there's no need to specially initialize either for idle thread within
init_idle(), as this was only necessary to handle hotplug cycles.
I've tested this on arm64 with:
* gcc 11.1.0, defconfig +KASAN_INLINE, KASAN_STACK
* clang 12.0.0, defconfig +KASAN_INLINE, KASAN_STACK, SHADOW_CALL_STACK
... offlining and onlining CPUS with:
| while true; do
| for C in /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu*/online; do
| echo 0 > $C;
| echo 1 > $C;
| done
| done
Fixes: f1a0a376ca0c4ef1 ("sched/core: Initialize the idle task with preemption disabled")
Reported-by: Qian Cai <quic_qiancai@quicinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Valentin Schneider <valentin.schneider@arm.com>
Tested-by: Qian Cai <quic_qiancai@quicinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20211115113310.35693-1-mark.rutland@arm.com/
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Add missing 'tu' variable initialization in the probes loop,
otherwise the head 'tu' is used instead of added probes.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211123142801.182530-1-jolsa@kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 99c9a923e97a ("tracing/uprobe: Fix double perf_event linking on multiprobe uprobe")
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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cpuacct.stat shows user time based on raw random precision tick
based counters. Use cputime_addjust() to scale these values against the
total runtime accounted by the scheduler, like we already do
for user/system times in /proc/<pid>/stat.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <arbn@yandex-team.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211115164607.23784-4-arbn@yandex-team.com
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cpuacct has 2 different ways of accounting and showing user
and system times.
The first one uses cpuacct_account_field() to account times
and cpuacct.stat file to expose them. And this one seems to work ok.
The second one is uses cpuacct_charge() function for accounting and
set of cpuacct.usage* files to show times. Despite some attempts to
fix it in the past it still doesn't work. Sometimes while running KVM
guest the cpuacct_charge() accounts most of the guest time as
system time. This doesn't match with user&system times shown in
cpuacct.stat or proc/<pid>/stat.
Demonstration:
# git clone https://github.com/aryabinin/kvmsample
# make
# mkdir /sys/fs/cgroup/cpuacct/test
# echo $$ > /sys/fs/cgroup/cpuacct/test/tasks
# ./kvmsample &
# for i in {1..5}; do cat /sys/fs/cgroup/cpuacct/test/cpuacct.usage_sys; sleep 1; done
1976535645
2979839428
3979832704
4983603153
5983604157
Use cpustats accounted in cpuacct_account_field() as the source
of user/sys times for cpuacct.usage* files. Make cpuacct_charge()
to account only summary execution time.
Fixes: d740037fac70 ("sched/cpuacct: Split usage accounting into user_usage and sys_usage")
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <arbn@yandex-team.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211115164607.23784-3-arbn@yandex-team.com
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Replace fatal BUG_ON() with more safe WARN_ON_ONCE() in cpuacct_cpuusage_read().
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <arbn@yandex-team.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211115164607.23784-2-arbn@yandex-team.com
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cpuacct.stat in no-root cgroups shows user time without guest time
included int it. This doesn't match with user time shown in root
cpuacct.stat and /proc/<pid>/stat. This also affects cgroup2's cpu.stat
in the same way.
Make account_guest_time() to add user time to cgroup's cpustat to
fix this.
Fixes: ef12fefabf94 ("cpuacct: add per-cgroup utime/stime statistics")
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <arbn@yandex-team.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211115164607.23784-1-arbn@yandex-team.com
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syzbot reported that the warning in perf_sigtrap() fires, saying that
the event's task does not match current:
| WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 9090 at kernel/events/core.c:6446 perf_pending_event+0x40d/0x4b0 kernel/events/core.c:6513
| Modules linked in:
| CPU: 0 PID: 9090 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.15.0-syzkaller #0
| Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
| RIP: 0010:perf_sigtrap kernel/events/core.c:6446 [inline]
| RIP: 0010:perf_pending_event_disable kernel/events/core.c:6470 [inline]
| RIP: 0010:perf_pending_event+0x40d/0x4b0 kernel/events/core.c:6513
| ...
| Call Trace:
| <IRQ>
| irq_work_single+0x106/0x220 kernel/irq_work.c:211
| irq_work_run_list+0x6a/0x90 kernel/irq_work.c:242
| irq_work_run+0x4f/0xd0 kernel/irq_work.c:251
| __sysvec_irq_work+0x95/0x3d0 arch/x86/kernel/irq_work.c:22
| sysvec_irq_work+0x8e/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/irq_work.c:17
| </IRQ>
| <TASK>
| asm_sysvec_irq_work+0x12/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:664
| RIP: 0010:__raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:152 [inline]
| RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x38/0x70 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:194
| ...
| coredump_task_exit kernel/exit.c:371 [inline]
| do_exit+0x1865/0x25c0 kernel/exit.c:771
| do_group_exit+0xe7/0x290 kernel/exit.c:929
| get_signal+0x3b0/0x1ce0 kernel/signal.c:2820
| arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x2a9/0x1c40 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:868
| handle_signal_work kernel/entry/common.c:148 [inline]
| exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:172 [inline]
| exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x17d/0x290 kernel/entry/common.c:207
| __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:289 [inline]
| syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x19/0x60 kernel/entry/common.c:300
| do_syscall_64+0x42/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86
| entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
On x86 this shouldn't happen, which has arch_irq_work_raise().
The test program sets up a perf event with sigtrap set to fire on the
'sched_wakeup' tracepoint, which fired in ttwu_do_wakeup().
This happened because the 'sched_wakeup' tracepoint also takes a task
argument passed on to perf_tp_event(), which is used to deliver the
event to that other task.
Since we cannot deliver synchronous signals to other tasks, skip an event if
perf_tp_event() is targeted at another task and perf_event_attr::sigtrap is
set, which will avoid ever entering perf_sigtrap() for such events.
Fixes: 97ba62b27867 ("perf: Add support for SIGTRAP on perf events")
Reported-by: syzbot+663359e32ce6f1a305ad@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/YYpoCOBmC/kJWfmI@elver.google.com
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We found that a process with 10 thousnads threads has been encountered
a regression problem from Linux-v4.14 to Linux-v5.4. It is a kind of
workload which will concurrently allocate lots of memory in different
threads sometimes. In this case, we will see the down_read_trylock()
with a high hotspot. Therefore, we suppose that rwsem has a regression
at least since Linux-v5.4. In order to easily debug this problem, we
write a simply benchmark to create the similar situation lile the
following.
```c++
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <cstdio>
#include <cassert>
#include <thread>
#include <vector>
#include <chrono>
volatile int mutex;
void trigger(int cpu, char* ptr, std::size_t sz)
{
cpu_set_t set;
CPU_ZERO(&set);
CPU_SET(cpu, &set);
assert(pthread_setaffinity_np(pthread_self(), sizeof(set), &set) == 0);
while (mutex);
for (std::size_t i = 0; i < sz; i += 4096) {
*ptr = '\0';
ptr += 4096;
}
}
int main(int argc, char* argv[])
{
std::size_t sz = 100;
if (argc > 1)
sz = atoi(argv[1]);
auto nproc = std::thread::hardware_concurrency();
std::vector<std::thread> thr;
sz <<= 30;
auto* ptr = mmap(nullptr, sz, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_ANON |
MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
assert(ptr != MAP_FAILED);
char* cptr = static_cast<char*>(ptr);
auto run = sz / nproc;
run = (run >> 12) << 12;
mutex = 1;
for (auto i = 0U; i < nproc; ++i) {
thr.emplace_back(std::thread([i, cptr, run]() { trigger(i, cptr, run); }));
cptr += run;
}
rusage usage_start;
getrusage(RUSAGE_SELF, &usage_start);
auto start = std::chrono::system_clock::now();
mutex = 0;
for (auto& t : thr)
t.join();
rusage usage_end;
getrusage(RUSAGE_SELF, &usage_end);
auto end = std::chrono::system_clock::now();
timeval utime;
timeval stime;
timersub(&usage_end.ru_utime, &usage_start.ru_utime, &utime);
timersub(&usage_end.ru_stime, &usage_start.ru_stime, &stime);
printf("usr: %ld.%06ld\n", utime.tv_sec, utime.tv_usec);
printf("sys: %ld.%06ld\n", stime.tv_sec, stime.tv_usec);
printf("real: %lu\n",
std::chrono::duration_cast<std::chrono::milliseconds>(end -
start).count());
return 0;
}
```
The functionality of above program is simply which creates `nproc`
threads and each of them are trying to touch memory (trigger page
fault) on different CPU. Then we will see the similar profile by
`perf top`.
25.55% [kernel] [k] down_read_trylock
14.78% [kernel] [k] handle_mm_fault
13.45% [kernel] [k] up_read
8.61% [kernel] [k] clear_page_erms
3.89% [kernel] [k] __do_page_fault
The highest hot instruction, which accounts for about 92%, in
down_read_trylock() is cmpxchg like the following.
91.89 │ lock cmpxchg %rdx,(%rdi)
Sice the problem is found by migrating from Linux-v4.14 to Linux-v5.4,
so we easily found that the commit ddb20d1d3aed ("locking/rwsem: Optimize
down_read_trylock()") caused the regression. The reason is that the
commit assumes the rwsem is not contended at all. But it is not always
true for mmap lock which could be contended with thousands threads.
So most threads almost need to run at least 2 times of "cmpxchg" to
acquire the lock. The overhead of atomic operation is higher than
non-atomic instructions, which caused the regression.
By using the above benchmark, the real executing time on a x86-64 system
before and after the patch were:
Before Patch After Patch
# of Threads real real reduced by
------------ ------ ------ ----------
1 65,373 65,206 ~0.0%
4 15,467 15,378 ~0.5%
40 6,214 5,528 ~11.0%
For the uncontended case, the new down_read_trylock() is the same as
before. For the contended cases, the new down_read_trylock() is faster
than before. The more contended, the more fast.
Signed-off-by: Muchun Song <songmuchun@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211118094455.9068-1-songmuchun@bytedance.com
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There are some inconsistency in the way that the handoff bit is being
handled in readers and writers that lead to a race condition.
Firstly, when a queue head writer set the handoff bit, it will clear
it when the writer is being killed or interrupted on its way out
without acquiring the lock. That is not the case for a queue head
reader. The handoff bit will simply be inherited by the next waiter.
Secondly, in the out_nolock path of rwsem_down_read_slowpath(), both
the waiter and handoff bits are cleared if the wait queue becomes
empty. For rwsem_down_write_slowpath(), however, the handoff bit is
not checked and cleared if the wait queue is empty. This can
potentially make the handoff bit set with empty wait queue.
Worse, the situation in rwsem_down_write_slowpath() relies on wstate,
a variable set outside of the critical section containing the ->count
manipulation, this leads to race condition where RWSEM_FLAG_HANDOFF
can be double subtracted, corrupting ->count.
To make the handoff bit handling more consistent and robust, extract
out handoff bit clearing code into the new rwsem_del_waiter() helper
function. Also, completely eradicate wstate; always evaluate
everything inside the same critical section.
The common function will only use atomic_long_andnot() to clear bits
when the wait queue is empty to avoid possible race condition. If the
first waiter with handoff bit set is killed or interrupted to exit the
slowpath without acquiring the lock, the next waiter will inherit the
handoff bit.
While at it, simplify the trylock for loop in
rwsem_down_write_slowpath() to make it easier to read.
Fixes: 4f23dbc1e657 ("locking/rwsem: Implement lock handoff to prevent lock starvation")
Reported-by: Zhenhua Ma <mazhenhua@xiaomi.com>
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211116012912.723980-1-longman@redhat.com
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The security_task_getsecid_subj() LSM hook invites misuse by allowing
callers to specify a task even though the hook is only safe when the
current task is referenced. Fix this by removing the task_struct
argument to the hook, requiring LSM implementations to use the
current task. While we are changing the hook declaration we also
rename the function to security_current_getsecid_subj() in an effort
to reinforce that the hook captures the subjective credentials of the
current task and not an arbitrary task on the system.
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
- Fix double free in destroy_hist_field
- Harden memset() of trace_iterator structure
- Do not warn in trace printk check when test buffer fills up
* tag 'trace-v5.16-6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Don't use out-of-sync va_list in event printing
tracing: Use memset_startat() to zero struct trace_iterator
tracing/histogram: Fix UAF in destroy_hist_field()
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull exit-vs-signal handling fixes from Eric Biederman:
"This is a small set of changes where debuggers were no longer able to
intercept synchronous SIGTRAP and SIGSEGV, introduced by the exit
cleanups.
This is essentially the change you suggested with all of i's dotted
and the t's crossed so that ptrace can intercept all of the cases it
has been able to intercept the past, and all of the cases that made it
to exit without giving ptrace a chance still don't give ptrace a
chance"
* 'SA_IMMUTABLE-fixes-for-v5.16-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
signal: Replace force_fatal_sig with force_exit_sig when in doubt
signal: Don't always set SA_IMMUTABLE for forced signals
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Recently to prevent issues with SECCOMP_RET_KILL and similar signals
being changed before they are delivered SA_IMMUTABLE was added.
Unfortunately this broke debuggers[1][2] which reasonably expect
to be able to trap synchronous SIGTRAP and SIGSEGV even when
the target process is not configured to handle those signals.
Add force_exit_sig and use it instead of force_fatal_sig where
historically the code has directly called do_exit. This has the
implementation benefits of going through the signal exit path
(including generating core dumps) without the danger of allowing
userspace to ignore or change these signals.
This avoids userspace regressions as older kernels exited with do_exit
which debuggers also can not intercept.
In the future is should be possible to improve the quality of
implementation of the kernel by changing some of these force_exit_sig
calls to force_fatal_sig. That can be done where it matters on
a case-by-case basis with careful analysis.
Reported-by: Kyle Huey <me@kylehuey.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAP045AoMY4xf8aC_4QU_-j7obuEPYgTcnQQP3Yxk=2X90jtpjw@mail.gmail.com
[2] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211117150258.GB5403@xsang-OptiPlex-9020
Fixes: 00b06da29cf9 ("signal: Add SA_IMMUTABLE to ensure forced siganls do not get changed")
Fixes: a3616a3c0272 ("signal/m68k: Use force_sigsegv(SIGSEGV) in fpsp040_die")
Fixes: 83a1f27ad773 ("signal/powerpc: On swapcontext failure force SIGSEGV")
Fixes: 9bc508cf0791 ("signal/s390: Use force_sigsegv in default_trap_handler")
Fixes: 086ec444f866 ("signal/sparc32: In setup_rt_frame and setup_fram use force_fatal_sig")
Fixes: c317d306d550 ("signal/sparc32: Exit with a fatal signal when try_to_clear_window_buffer fails")
Fixes: 695dd0d634df ("signal/x86: In emulate_vsyscall force a signal instead of calling do_exit")
Fixes: 1fbd60df8a85 ("signal/vm86_32: Properly send SIGSEGV when the vm86 state cannot be saved.")
Fixes: 941edc5bf174 ("exit/syscall_user_dispatch: Send ordinary signals on failure")
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/871r3dqfv8.fsf_-_@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Kyle Huey <khuey@kylehuey.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Recently to prevent issues with SECCOMP_RET_KILL and similar signals
being changed before they are delivered SA_IMMUTABLE was added.
Unfortunately this broke debuggers[1][2] which reasonably expect to be
able to trap synchronous SIGTRAP and SIGSEGV even when the target
process is not configured to handle those signals.
Update force_sig_to_task to support both the case when we can allow
the debugger to intercept and possibly ignore the signal and the case
when it is not safe to let userspace know about the signal until the
process has exited.
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Reported-by: Kyle Huey <me@kylehuey.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAP045AoMY4xf8aC_4QU_-j7obuEPYgTcnQQP3Yxk=2X90jtpjw@mail.gmail.com
[2] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211117150258.GB5403@xsang-OptiPlex-9020
Fixes: 00b06da29cf9 ("signal: Add SA_IMMUTABLE to ensure forced siganls do not get changed")
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/877dd5qfw5.fsf_-_@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Kyle Huey <khuey@kylehuey.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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If trace_seq becomes full, trace_seq_vprintf() no longer consumes
arguments from va_list, making va_list out of sync with format
processing by trace_check_vprintf().
This causes va_arg() in trace_check_vprintf() to return wrong
positional argument, which results into a WARN_ON_ONCE() hit.
ftrace_stress_test from LTP triggers this situation.
Fix it by explicitly avoiding further use if va_list at the point
when it's consistency can no longer be guaranteed.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211118145516.13219-1-nikita.yushchenko@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Nikita Yushchenko <nikita.yushchenko@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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In preparation for FORTIFY_SOURCE performing compile-time and run-time
field bounds checking for memset(), avoid intentionally writing across
neighboring fields.
Use memset_startat() to avoid confusing memset() about writing beyond
the target struct member.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211118202217.1285588-1-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net
Pull networking fixes from Jakub Kicinski:
"Including fixes from bpf, mac80211.
Current release - regressions:
- devlink: don't throw an error if flash notification sent before
devlink visible
- page_pool: Revert "page_pool: disable dma mapping support...",
turns out there are active arches who need it
Current release - new code bugs:
- amt: cancel delayed_work synchronously in amt_fini()
Previous releases - regressions:
- xsk: fix crash on double free in buffer pool
- bpf: fix inner map state pruning regression causing program
rejections
- mac80211: drop check for DONT_REORDER in __ieee80211_select_queue,
preventing mis-selecting the best effort queue
- mac80211: do not access the IV when it was stripped
- mac80211: fix radiotap header generation, off-by-one
- nl80211: fix getting radio statistics in survey dump
- e100: fix device suspend/resume
Previous releases - always broken:
- tcp: fix uninitialized access in skb frags array for Rx 0cp
- bpf: fix toctou on read-only map's constant scalar tracking
- bpf: forbid bpf_ktime_get_coarse_ns and bpf_timer_* in tracing
progs
- tipc: only accept encrypted MSG_CRYPTO msgs
- smc: transfer remaining wait queue entries during fallback, fix
missing wake ups
- udp: validate checksum in udp_read_sock() (when sockmap is used)
- sched: act_mirred: drop dst for the direction from egress to
ingress
- virtio_net_hdr_to_skb: count transport header in UFO, prevent
allowing bad skbs into the stack
- nfc: reorder the logic in nfc_{un,}register_device, fix unregister
- ipsec: check return value of ipv6_skip_exthdr
- usb: r8152: add MAC passthrough support for more Lenovo Docks"
* tag 'net-5.16-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net: (96 commits)
ptp: ocp: Fix a couple NULL vs IS_ERR() checks
net: ethernet: dec: tulip: de4x5: fix possible array overflows in type3_infoblock()
net: tulip: de4x5: fix the problem that the array 'lp->phy[8]' may be out of bound
ipv6: check return value of ipv6_skip_exthdr
e100: fix device suspend/resume
devlink: Don't throw an error if flash notification sent before devlink visible
page_pool: Revert "page_pool: disable dma mapping support..."
ethernet: hisilicon: hns: hns_dsaf_misc: fix a possible array overflow in hns_dsaf_ge_srst_by_port()
octeontx2-af: debugfs: don't corrupt user memory
NFC: add NCI_UNREG flag to eliminate the race
NFC: reorder the logic in nfc_{un,}register_device
NFC: reorganize the functions in nci_request
tipc: check for null after calling kmemdup
i40e: Fix display error code in dmesg
i40e: Fix creation of first queue by omitting it if is not power of two
i40e: Fix warning message and call stack during rmmod i40e driver
i40e: Fix ping is lost after configuring ADq on VF
i40e: Fix changing previously set num_queue_pairs for PFs
i40e: Fix NULL ptr dereference on VSI filter sync
i40e: Fix correct max_pkt_size on VF RX queue
...
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Calling destroy_hist_field() on an expression will recursively free
any operands associated with the expression. If during expression
parsing the operands of the expression are already set when an error
is encountered, there is no need to explicity free the operands. Doing
so will result in destroy_hist_field() being called twice for the
operands and lead to a use-after-free (UAF) error.
If the operands are associated with the expression, only call
destroy_hist_field() on the expression since the operands will be
recursively freed.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAHk-=wgcrEbFgkw9720H3tW-AhHOoEKhYwZinYJw4FpzSaJ6_Q@mail.gmail.com/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211118011542.1420131-1-kaleshsingh@google.com
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com>
Fixes: 8b5d46fd7a38 ("tracing/histogram: Optimize division by constants")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/printk/linux
Pull printk fixes from Petr Mladek:
- Try to flush backtraces from other CPUs also on the local one. This
was a regression caused by printk_safe buffers removal.
- Remove header dependency warning.
* tag 'printk-for-5.16-fixup' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/printk/linux:
printk: Remove printk.h inclusion in percpu.h
printk: restore flushing of NMI buffers on remote CPUs after NMI backtraces
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Kyle Huey <me@kylehuey.com> writes:
> rr, a userspace record and replay debugger[0], uses the recorded register
> state at PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT to find the point in time at which to cease
> executing the program during replay.
>
> If a SIGKILL races with processing another signal in get_signal, it is
> possible for the kernel to decline to notify the tracer of the original
> signal. But if the original signal had a handler, the kernel proceeds
> with setting up a signal handler frame as if the tracer had chosen to
> deliver the signal unmodified to the tracee. When the kernel goes to
> execute the signal handler that it has now modified the stack and registers
> for, it will discover the pending SIGKILL, and terminate the tracee
> without executing the handler. When PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT is delivered to
> the tracer, however, the effects of handler setup will be visible to
> the tracer.
>
> Because rr (the tracer) was never notified of the signal, it is not aware
> that a signal handler frame was set up and expects the state of the program
> at PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT to be a state that will be reconstructed naturally
> by allowing the program to execute from the last event. When that fails
> to happen during replay, rr will assert and die.
>
> The following patches add an explicit check for a newly pending SIGKILL
> after the ptracer has been notified and the siglock has been reacquired.
> If this happens, we stop processing the current signal and proceed
> immediately to handling the SIGKILL. This makes the state reported at
> PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT the unmodified state of the program, and also avoids the
> work to set up a signal handler frame that will never be used.
>
> [0] https://rr-project.org/
The problem is that while the traced process makes it into ptrace_stop,
the tracee is killed before the tracer manages to wait for the
tracee and discover which signal was about to be delivered.
More generally the problem is that while siglock was dropped a signal
with process wide effect is short cirucit delivered to the entire
process killing it, but the process continues to try and deliver another
signal.
In general it impossible to avoid all cases where work is performed
after the process has been killed. In particular if the process is
killed after get_signal returns the code will simply not know it has
been killed until after delivering the signal frame to userspace.
On the other hand when the code has already discovered the process
has been killed and taken user space visible action that shows
the kernel knows the process has been killed, it is just silly
to then write the signal frame to the user space stack.
Instead of being silly detect the process has been killed
in ptrace_signal and requeue the signal so the code can pretend
it was simply never dequeued for delivery.
To test the process has been killed I use fatal_signal_pending rather
than signal_group_exit to match the test in signal_pending_state which
is used in schedule which is where ptrace_stop detects the process has
been killed.
Requeuing the signal so the code can pretend it was simply never
dequeued improves the user space visible behavior that has been
present since ebf5ebe31d2c ("[PATCH] signal-fixes-2.5.59-A4").
Kyle Huey verified that this change in behavior and makes rr happy.
Reported-by: Kyle Huey <khuey@kylehuey.com>
Reported-by: Marko Mäkelä <marko.makela@mariadb.com>
History Tree: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.gi
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87tugcd5p2.fsf_-_@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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In the event that a tracer changes which signal needs to be delivered
and that signal is currently blocked then the signal needs to be
requeued for later delivery.
With the advent of CLONE_THREAD the kernel has 2 signal queues per
task. The per process queue and the per task queue. Update the code
so that if the signal is removed from the per process queue it is
requeued on the per process queue. This is necessary to make it
appear the signal was never dequeued.
The rr debugger reasonably believes that the state of the process from
the last ptrace_stop it observed until PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT can be recreated
by simply letting a process run. If a SIGKILL interrupts a ptrace_stop
this is not true today.
So return signals to their original queue in ptrace_signal so that
signals that are not delivered appear like they were never dequeued.
Fixes: 794aa320b79d ("[PATCH] sigfix-2.5.40-D6")
History Tree: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.gi
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87zgq4d5r4.fsf_-_@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Recently while investigating a problem with rr and signals I noticed
that siglock is dropped in ptrace_signal and get_signal does not jump
to relock.
Looking farther to see if the problem is anywhere else I see that
do_signal_stop also returns if signal_group_exit is true. I believe
that test can now never be true, but it is a bit hard to trace
through and be certain.
Testing signal_group_exit is not expensive, so move the test for
signal_group_exit into the for loop inside of get_signal to ensure
the test is never skipped improperly.
This has been a potential problem since I added the test for
signal_group_exit was added.
Fixes: 35634ffa1751 ("signal: Always notice exiting tasks")
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/875yssekcd.fsf_-_@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Use static_call to optimize perf's guest callbacks on arm64 and x86,
which are now the only architectures that define the callbacks. Use
DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_RET0 as the default/NULL for all guest callbacks, as
the callback semantics are that a return value '0' means "not in guest".
static_call obviously avoids the overhead of CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y, but is
also advantageous versus other solutions, e.g. per-cpu callbacks, in that
a per-cpu memory load is not needed to detect the !guest case.
Based on code from Peter and Like.
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211111020738.2512932-10-seanjc@google.com
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Introduce GUEST_PERF_EVENTS and require architectures to select it to
allow registering and using guest callbacks in perf. This will hopefully
make it more difficult for new architectures to add useless "support" for
guest callbacks, e.g. via copy+paste.
Stubbing out the helpers has the happy bonus of avoiding a load of
perf_guest_cbs when GUEST_PERF_EVENTS=n on arm64/x86.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211111020738.2512932-9-seanjc@google.com
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Drop the 'int' return value from the perf (un)register callbacks helpers
and stop pretending perf can support multiple callbacks. The 'int'
returns are not future proofing anything as none of the callers take
action on an error. It's also not obvious that there will ever be
co-tenant hypervisors, and if there are, that allowing multiple callbacks
to be registered is desirable or even correct.
Opportunistically rename callbacks=>cbs in the affected declarations to
match their definitions.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211111020738.2512932-5-seanjc@google.com
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Protect perf_guest_cbs with RCU to fix multiple possible errors. Luckily,
all paths that read perf_guest_cbs already require RCU protection, e.g. to
protect the callback chains, so only the direct perf_guest_cbs touchpoints
need to be modified.
Bug #1 is a simple lack of WRITE_ONCE/READ_ONCE behavior to ensure
perf_guest_cbs isn't reloaded between a !NULL check and a dereference.
Fixed via the READ_ONCE() in rcu_dereference().
Bug #2 is that on weakly-ordered architectures, updates to the callbacks
themselves are not guaranteed to be visible before the pointer is made
visible to readers. Fixed by the smp_store_release() in
rcu_assign_pointer() when the new pointer is non-NULL.
Bug #3 is that, because the callbacks are global, it's possible for
readers to run in parallel with an unregisters, and thus a module
implementing the callbacks can be unloaded while readers are in flight,
resulting in a use-after-free. Fixed by a synchronize_rcu() call when
unregistering callbacks.
Bug #1 escaped notice because it's extremely unlikely a compiler will
reload perf_guest_cbs in this sequence. perf_guest_cbs does get reloaded
for future derefs, e.g. for ->is_user_mode(), but the ->is_in_guest()
guard all but guarantees the consumer will win the race, e.g. to nullify
perf_guest_cbs, KVM has to completely exit the guest and teardown down
all VMs before KVM start its module unload / unregister sequence. This
also makes it all but impossible to encounter bug #3.
Bug #2 has not been a problem because all architectures that register
callbacks are strongly ordered and/or have a static set of callbacks.
But with help, unloading kvm_intel can trigger bug #1 e.g. wrapping
perf_guest_cbs with READ_ONCE in perf_misc_flags() while spamming
kvm_intel module load/unload leads to:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
CPU: 6 PID: 1825 Comm: stress Not tainted 5.14.0-rc2+ #459
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:perf_misc_flags+0x1c/0x70
Call Trace:
perf_prepare_sample+0x53/0x6b0
perf_event_output_forward+0x67/0x160
__perf_event_overflow+0x52/0xf0
handle_pmi_common+0x207/0x300
intel_pmu_handle_irq+0xcf/0x410
perf_event_nmi_handler+0x28/0x50
nmi_handle+0xc7/0x260
default_do_nmi+0x6b/0x170
exc_nmi+0x103/0x130
asm_exc_nmi+0x76/0xbf
Fixes: 39447b386c84 ("perf: Enhance perf to allow for guest statistic collection from host")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211111020738.2512932-2-seanjc@google.com
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We've noticed cases where tasks in a cgroup are stalled on memory but
there is little memory FULL pressure since tasks stay on the runqueue
in reclaim.
A simple example involves a single threaded program that keeps leaking
and touching large amounts of memory. It runs in a cgroup with swap
enabled, memory.high set at 10M and cpu.max ratio set at 5%. Though
there is significant CPU pressure and memory SOME, there is barely any
memory FULL since the task enters reclaim and stays on the runqueue.
However, this memory-bound task is effectively stalled on memory and
we expect memory FULL to match memory SOME in this scenario.
The code is confused about memstall && running, thinking there is a
stalled task and a productive task when there's only one task: a
reclaimer that's counted as both. To fix this, we redefine the
condition for PSI_MEM_FULL to check that all running tasks are in an
active memstall instead of checking that there are no running tasks.
case PSI_MEM_FULL:
- return unlikely(tasks[NR_MEMSTALL] && !tasks[NR_RUNNING]);
+ return unlikely(tasks[NR_MEMSTALL] &&
+ tasks[NR_RUNNING] == tasks[NR_MEMSTALL_RUNNING]);
This will capture reclaimers. It will also capture tasks that called
psi_memstall_enter() and are about to sleep, but this should be
negligible noise.
Signed-off-by: Brian Chen <brianchen118@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211110213312.310243-1-brianchen118@gmail.com
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Adds accounting for "forced idle" time, which is time where a cookie'd
task forces its SMT sibling to idle, despite the presence of runnable
tasks.
Forced idle time is one means to measure the cost of enabling core
scheduling (ie. the capacity lost due to the need to force idle).
Forced idle time is attributed to the thread responsible for causing
the forced idle.
A few details:
- Forced idle time is displayed via /proc/PID/sched. It also requires
that schedstats is enabled.
- Forced idle is only accounted when a sibling hyperthread is held
idle despite the presence of runnable tasks. No time is charged if
a sibling is idle but has no runnable tasks.
- Tasks with 0 cookie are never charged forced idle.
- For SMT > 2, we scale the amount of forced idle charged based on the
number of forced idle siblings. Additionally, we split the time up and
evenly charge it to all running tasks, as each is equally responsible
for the forced idle.
Signed-off-by: Josh Don <joshdon@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211018203428.2025792-1-joshdon@google.com
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Add the missing SPDX license header to
include/linux/psi.h
include/linux/psi_types.h
kernel/sched/psi.c
Signed-off-by: Liu Xinpeng <liuxp11@chinatelecom.cn>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1635133586-84611-2-git-send-email-liuxp11@chinatelecom.cn
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Comment in function psi_task_switch,there are two same lines.
...
* runtime state, the cgroup that contains both tasks
* runtime state, the cgroup that contains both tasks
...
Signed-off-by: Liu Xinpeng <liuxp11@chinatelecom.cn>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1635133586-84611-1-git-send-email-liuxp11@chinatelecom.cn
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mutex_acquire_nest() expects a pointer, pass the pointer.
Fixes: 12235da8c80a1 ("kernel/locking: Add context to ww_mutex_trylock()")
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211104122706.frk52zxbjorso2kv@linutronix.de
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Daniel Borkmann says:
====================
pull-request: bpf 2021-11-16
We've added 12 non-merge commits during the last 5 day(s) which contain
a total of 23 files changed, 573 insertions(+), 73 deletions(-).
The main changes are:
1) Fix pruning regression where verifier went overly conservative rejecting
previsouly accepted programs, from Alexei Starovoitov and Lorenz Bauer.
2) Fix verifier TOCTOU bug when using read-only map's values as constant
scalars during verification, from Daniel Borkmann.
3) Fix a crash due to a double free in XSK's buffer pool, from Magnus Karlsson.
4) Fix libbpf regression when cross-building runqslower, from Jean-Philippe Brucker.
5) Forbid use of bpf_ktime_get_coarse_ns() and bpf_timer_*() helpers in tracing
programs due to deadlock possibilities, from Dmitrii Banshchikov.
6) Fix checksum validation in sockmap's udp_read_sock() callback, from Cong Wang.
7) Various BPF sample fixes such as XDP stats in xdp_sample_user, from Alexander Lobakin.
8) Fix libbpf gen_loader error handling wrt fd cleanup, from Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi.
* https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf:
udp: Validate checksum in udp_read_sock()
bpf: Fix toctou on read-only map's constant scalar tracking
samples/bpf: Fix build error due to -isystem removal
selftests/bpf: Add tests for restricted helpers
bpf: Forbid bpf_ktime_get_coarse_ns and bpf_timer_* in tracing progs
libbpf: Perform map fd cleanup for gen_loader in case of error
samples/bpf: Fix incorrect use of strlen in xdp_redirect_cpu
tools/runqslower: Fix cross-build
samples/bpf: Fix summary per-sec stats in xdp_sample_user
selftests/bpf: Check map in map pruning
bpf: Fix inner map state pruning regression.
xsk: Fix crash on double free in buffer pool
====================
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211116141134.6490-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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In the current code, the actual max tail call count is 33 which is greater
than MAX_TAIL_CALL_CNT (defined as 32). The actual limit is not consistent
with the meaning of MAX_TAIL_CALL_CNT and thus confusing at first glance.
We can see the historical evolution from commit 04fd61ab36ec ("bpf: allow
bpf programs to tail-call other bpf programs") and commit f9dabe016b63
("bpf: Undo off-by-one in interpreter tail call count limit"). In order
to avoid changing existing behavior, the actual limit is 33 now, this is
reasonable.
After commit 874be05f525e ("bpf, tests: Add tail call test suite"), we can
see there exists failed testcase.
On all archs when CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON is not set:
# echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_enable
# modprobe test_bpf
# dmesg | grep -w FAIL
Tail call error path, max count reached jited:0 ret 34 != 33 FAIL
On some archs:
# echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_enable
# modprobe test_bpf
# dmesg | grep -w FAIL
Tail call error path, max count reached jited:1 ret 34 != 33 FAIL
Although the above failed testcase has been fixed in commit 18935a72eb25
("bpf/tests: Fix error in tail call limit tests"), it would still be good
to change the value of MAX_TAIL_CALL_CNT from 32 to 33 to make the code
more readable.
The 32-bit x86 JIT was using a limit of 32, just fix the wrong comments and
limit to 33 tail calls as the constant MAX_TAIL_CALL_CNT updated. For the
mips64 JIT, use "ori" instead of "addiu" as suggested by Johan Almbladh.
For the riscv JIT, use RV_REG_TCC directly to save one register move as
suggested by Björn Töpel. For the other implementations, no function changes,
it does not change the current limit 33, the new value of MAX_TAIL_CALL_CNT
can reflect the actual max tail call count, the related tail call testcases
in test_bpf module and selftests can work well for the interpreter and the
JIT.
Here are the test results on x86_64:
# uname -m
x86_64
# echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_enable
# modprobe test_bpf test_suite=test_tail_calls
# dmesg | tail -1
test_bpf: test_tail_calls: Summary: 8 PASSED, 0 FAILED, [0/8 JIT'ed]
# rmmod test_bpf
# echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_enable
# modprobe test_bpf test_suite=test_tail_calls
# dmesg | tail -1
test_bpf: test_tail_calls: Summary: 8 PASSED, 0 FAILED, [8/8 JIT'ed]
# rmmod test_bpf
# ./test_progs -t tailcalls
#142 tailcalls:OK
Summary: 1/11 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED
Signed-off-by: Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Tested-by: Johan Almbladh <johan.almbladh@anyfinetworks.com>
Tested-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Johan Almbladh <johan.almbladh@anyfinetworks.com>
Acked-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/1636075800-3264-1-git-send-email-yangtiezhu@loongson.cn
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Commit a23740ec43ba ("bpf: Track contents of read-only maps as scalars") is
checking whether maps are read-only both from BPF program side and user space
side, and then, given their content is constant, reading out their data via
map->ops->map_direct_value_addr() which is then subsequently used as known
scalar value for the register, that is, it is marked as __mark_reg_known()
with the read value at verification time. Before a23740ec43ba, the register
content was marked as an unknown scalar so the verifier could not make any
assumptions about the map content.
The current implementation however is prone to a TOCTOU race, meaning, the
value read as known scalar for the register is not guaranteed to be exactly
the same at a later point when the program is executed, and as such, the
prior made assumptions of the verifier with regards to the program will be
invalid which can cause issues such as OOB access, etc.
While the BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG map flag is always fixed and required to be
specified at map creation time, the map->frozen property is initially set to
false for the map given the map value needs to be populated, e.g. for global
data sections. Once complete, the loader "freezes" the map from user space
such that no subsequent updates/deletes are possible anymore. For the rest
of the lifetime of the map, this freeze one-time trigger cannot be undone
anymore after a successful BPF_MAP_FREEZE cmd return. Meaning, any new BPF_*
cmd calls which would update/delete map entries will be rejected with -EPERM
since map_get_sys_perms() removes the FMODE_CAN_WRITE permission. This also
means that pending update/delete map entries must still complete before this
guarantee is given. This corner case is not an issue for loaders since they
create and prepare such program private map in successive steps.
However, a malicious user is able to trigger this TOCTOU race in two different
ways: i) via userfaultfd, and ii) via batched updates. For i) userfaultfd is
used to expand the competition interval, so that map_update_elem() can modify
the contents of the map after map_freeze() and bpf_prog_load() were executed.
This works, because userfaultfd halts the parallel thread which triggered a
map_update_elem() at the time where we copy key/value from the user buffer and
this already passed the FMODE_CAN_WRITE capability test given at that time the
map was not "frozen". Then, the main thread performs the map_freeze() and
bpf_prog_load(), and once that had completed successfully, the other thread
is woken up to complete the pending map_update_elem() which then changes the
map content. For ii) the idea of the batched update is similar, meaning, when
there are a large number of updates to be processed, it can increase the
competition interval between the two. It is therefore possible in practice to
modify the contents of the map after executing map_freeze() and bpf_prog_load().
One way to fix both i) and ii) at the same time is to expand the use of the
map's map->writecnt. The latter was introduced in fc9702273e2e ("bpf: Add mmap()
support for BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY") and further refined in 1f6cb19be2e2 ("bpf:
Prevent re-mmap()'ing BPF map as writable for initially r/o mapping") with
the rationale to make a writable mmap()'ing of a map mutually exclusive with
read-only freezing. The counter indicates writable mmap() mappings and then
prevents/fails the freeze operation. Its semantics can be expanded beyond
just mmap() by generally indicating ongoing write phases. This would essentially
span any parallel regular and batched flavor of update/delete operation and
then also have map_freeze() fail with -EBUSY. For the check_mem_access() in
the verifier we expand upon the bpf_map_is_rdonly() check ensuring that all
last pending writes have completed via bpf_map_write_active() test. Once the
map->frozen is set and bpf_map_write_active() indicates a map->writecnt of 0
only then we are really guaranteed to use the map's data as known constants.
For map->frozen being set and pending writes in process of still being completed
we fall back to marking that register as unknown scalar so we don't end up
making assumptions about it. With this, both TOCTOU reproducers from i) and
ii) are fixed.
Note that the map->writecnt has been converted into a atomic64 in the fix in
order to avoid a double freeze_mutex mutex_{un,}lock() pair when updating
map->writecnt in the various map update/delete BPF_* cmd flavors. Spanning
the freeze_mutex over entire map update/delete operations in syscall side
would not be possible due to then causing everything to be serialized.
Similarly, something like synchronize_rcu() after setting map->frozen to wait
for update/deletes to complete is not possible either since it would also
have to span the user copy which can sleep. On the libbpf side, this won't
break d66562fba1ce ("libbpf: Add BPF object skeleton support") as the
anonymous mmap()-ed "map initialization image" is remapped as a BPF map-backed
mmap()-ed memory where for .rodata it's non-writable.
Fixes: a23740ec43ba ("bpf: Track contents of read-only maps as scalars")
Reported-by: w1tcher.bupt@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Use of bpf_ktime_get_coarse_ns() and bpf_timer_* helpers in tracing
progs may result in locking issues.
bpf_ktime_get_coarse_ns() uses ktime_get_coarse_ns() time accessor that
isn't safe for any context:
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
5.15.0-syzkaller #0 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syz-executor.4/14877 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffffff8cb30008 (tk_core.seq.seqcount){----}-{0:0}, at: ktime_get_coarse_ts64+0x25/0x110 kernel/time/timekeeping.c:2255
but task is already holding lock:
ffffffff90dbf200 (&obj_hash[i].lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: debug_object_deactivate+0x61/0x400 lib/debugobjects.c:735
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (&obj_hash[i].lock){-.-.}-{2:2}:
lock_acquire+0x19f/0x4d0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5625
__raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline]
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xd1/0x120 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162
__debug_object_init+0xd9/0x1860 lib/debugobjects.c:569
debug_hrtimer_init kernel/time/hrtimer.c:414 [inline]
debug_init kernel/time/hrtimer.c:468 [inline]
hrtimer_init+0x20/0x40 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1592
ntp_init_cmos_sync kernel/time/ntp.c:676 [inline]
ntp_init+0xa1/0xad kernel/time/ntp.c:1095
timekeeping_init+0x512/0x6bf kernel/time/timekeeping.c:1639
start_kernel+0x267/0x56e init/main.c:1030
secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xb1/0xbb
-> #0 (tk_core.seq.seqcount){----}-{0:0}:
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3051 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3174 [inline]
validate_chain+0x1dfb/0x8240 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3789
__lock_acquire+0x1382/0x2b00 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5015
lock_acquire+0x19f/0x4d0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5625
seqcount_lockdep_reader_access+0xfe/0x230 include/linux/seqlock.h:103
ktime_get_coarse_ts64+0x25/0x110 kernel/time/timekeeping.c:2255
ktime_get_coarse include/linux/timekeeping.h:120 [inline]
ktime_get_coarse_ns include/linux/timekeeping.h:126 [inline]
____bpf_ktime_get_coarse_ns kernel/bpf/helpers.c:173 [inline]
bpf_ktime_get_coarse_ns+0x7e/0x130 kernel/bpf/helpers.c:171
bpf_prog_a99735ebafdda2f1+0x10/0xb50
bpf_dispatcher_nop_func include/linux/bpf.h:721 [inline]
__bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:626 [inline]
bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:633 [inline]
BPF_PROG_RUN_ARRAY include/linux/bpf.h:1294 [inline]
trace_call_bpf+0x2cf/0x5d0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:127
perf_trace_run_bpf_submit+0x7b/0x1d0 kernel/events/core.c:9708
perf_trace_lock+0x37c/0x440 include/trace/events/lock.h:39
trace_lock_release+0x128/0x150 include/trace/events/lock.h:58
lock_release+0x82/0x810 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5636
__raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:149 [inline]
_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x75/0x130 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:194
debug_hrtimer_deactivate kernel/time/hrtimer.c:425 [inline]
debug_deactivate kernel/time/hrtimer.c:481 [inline]
__run_hrtimer kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1653 [inline]
__hrtimer_run_queues+0x2f9/0xa60 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1749
hrtimer_interrupt+0x3b3/0x1040 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1811
local_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1086 [inline]
__sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xf9/0x270 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1103
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x8c/0xb0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1097
asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x12/0x20
__raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:152 [inline]
_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0xd4/0x130 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:194
try_to_wake_up+0x702/0xd20 kernel/sched/core.c:4118
wake_up_process kernel/sched/core.c:4200 [inline]
wake_up_q+0x9a/0xf0 kernel/sched/core.c:953
futex_wake+0x50f/0x5b0 kernel/futex/waitwake.c:184
do_futex+0x367/0x560 kernel/futex/syscalls.c:127
__do_sys_futex kernel/futex/syscalls.c:199 [inline]
__se_sys_futex+0x401/0x4b0 kernel/futex/syscalls.c:180
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
There is a possible deadlock with bpf_timer_* set of helpers:
hrtimer_start()
lock_base();
trace_hrtimer...()
perf_event()
bpf_run()
bpf_timer_start()
hrtimer_start()
lock_base() <- DEADLOCK
Forbid use of bpf_ktime_get_coarse_ns() and bpf_timer_* helpers in
BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE, BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT, BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT
and BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT prog types.
Fixes: d05512618056 ("bpf: Add bpf_ktime_get_coarse_ns helper")
Fixes: b00628b1c7d5 ("bpf: Introduce bpf timers.")
Reported-by: syzbot+43fd005b5a1b4d10781e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Dmitrii Banshchikov <me@ubique.spb.ru>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20211113142227.566439-2-me@ubique.spb.ru
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There is a race between updaters and flushers (flush can possibly miss
the latest update(s)). This is expected as explained in
cgroup_rstat_updated() comment, add also machine readable annotation so
that KCSAN results aren't noisy.
Reported-by: Hao Sun <sunhao.th@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CACkBjsbPVdkub=e-E-p1WBOLxS515ith-53SFdmFHWV_QMo40w@mail.gmail.com
Suggested-by: Hao Sun <sunhao.th@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Koutný <mkoutny@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
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Daniel Borkmann says:
====================
pull-request: bpf-next 2021-11-15
We've added 72 non-merge commits during the last 13 day(s) which contain
a total of 171 files changed, 2728 insertions(+), 1143 deletions(-).
The main changes are:
1) Add btf_type_tag attributes to bring kernel annotations like __user/__rcu to
BTF such that BPF verifier will be able to detect misuse, from Yonghong Song.
2) Big batch of libbpf improvements including various fixes, future proofing APIs,
and adding a unified, OPTS-based bpf_prog_load() low-level API, from Andrii Nakryiko.
3) Add ingress_ifindex to BPF_SK_LOOKUP program type for selectively applying the
programmable socket lookup logic to packets from a given netdev, from Mark Pashmfouroush.
4) Remove the 128M upper JIT limit for BPF programs on arm64 and add selftest to
ensure exception handling still works, from Russell King and Alan Maguire.
5) Add a new bpf_find_vma() helper for tracing to map an address to the backing
file such as shared library, from Song Liu.
6) Batch of various misc fixes to bpftool, fixing a memory leak in BPF program dump,
updating documentation and bash-completion among others, from Quentin Monnet.
7) Deprecate libbpf bpf_program__get_prog_info_linear() API and migrate its users as
the API is heavily tailored around perf and is non-generic, from Dave Marchevsky.
8) Enable libbpf's strict mode by default in bpftool and add a --legacy option as an
opt-out for more relaxed BPF program requirements, from Stanislav Fomichev.
9) Fix bpftool to use libbpf_get_error() to check for errors, from Hengqi Chen.
* https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next: (72 commits)
bpftool: Use libbpf_get_error() to check error
bpftool: Fix mixed indentation in documentation
bpftool: Update the lists of names for maps and prog-attach types
bpftool: Fix indent in option lists in the documentation
bpftool: Remove inclusion of utilities.mak from Makefiles
bpftool: Fix memory leak in prog_dump()
selftests/bpf: Fix a tautological-constant-out-of-range-compare compiler warning
selftests/bpf: Fix an unused-but-set-variable compiler warning
bpf: Introduce btf_tracing_ids
bpf: Extend BTF_ID_LIST_GLOBAL with parameter for number of IDs
bpftool: Enable libbpf's strict mode by default
docs/bpf: Update documentation for BTF_KIND_TYPE_TAG support
selftests/bpf: Clarify llvm dependency with btf_tag selftest
selftests/bpf: Add a C test for btf_type_tag
selftests/bpf: Rename progs/tag.c to progs/btf_decl_tag.c
selftests/bpf: Test BTF_KIND_DECL_TAG for deduplication
selftests/bpf: Add BTF_KIND_TYPE_TAG unit tests
selftests/bpf: Test libbpf API function btf__add_type_tag()
bpftool: Support BTF_KIND_TYPE_TAG
libbpf: Support BTF_KIND_TYPE_TAG
...
====================
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211115162008.25916-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fix from Steven Rostedt:
"Update to tracing histogram variable string copy
A fix to only copy the size of the field to the histogram string did
not take into account that the size can be larger than the storage"
* tag 'trace-v5.16-5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Add length protection to histogram string copies
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The string copies to the histogram storage has a max size of 256 bytes
(defined by MAX_FILTER_STR_VAL). Only the string size of the event field
needs to be copied to the event storage, but no more than what is in the
event storage. Although nothing should be bigger than 256 bytes, there's
no protection against overwriting of the storage if one day there is.
Copy no more than the destination size, and enforce it.
Also had to turn MAX_FILTER_STR_VAL into an unsigned int, to keep the
min() comparison of the string sizes of comparable types.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAHk-=wjREUihCGrtRBwfX47y_KrLCGjiq3t6QtoNJpmVrAEb1w@mail.gmail.com/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211114132834.183429a4@rorschach.local.home
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Tom Zanussi <zanussi@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Fixes: 63f84ae6b82b ("tracing/histogram: Do not copy the fixed-size char array field over the field size")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull timer fix from Thomas Gleixner:
"A single fix for POSIX CPU timers to address a problem where POSIX CPU
timer delivery stops working for a new child task because
copy_process() copies state information which is only valid for the
parent task"
* tag 'timers-urgent-2021-11-14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
posix-cpu-timers: Clear task::posix_cputimers_work in copy_process()
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull irq fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
"A set of fixes for the interrupt subsystem
Core code:
- A regression fix for the Open Firmware interrupt mapping code where
a interrupt controller property in a node caused a map property in
the same node to be ignored.
Interrupt chip drivers:
- Workaround a limitation in SiFive PLIC interrupt chip which
silently ignores an EOI when the interrupt line is masked.
- Provide the missing mask/unmask implementation for the CSKY MP
interrupt controller.
PCI/MSI:
- Prevent a use after free when PCI/MSI interrupts are released by
destroying the sysfs entries before freeing the memory which is
accessed in the sysfs show() function.
- Implement a mask quirk for the Nvidia ION AHCI chip which does not
advertise masking capability despite implementing it. Even worse
the chip comes out of reset with all MSI entries masked, which due
to the missing masking capability never get unmasked.
- Move the check which prevents accessing the MSI[X] masking for XEN
back into the low level accessors. The recent consolidation missed
that these accessors can be invoked from places which do not have
that check which broke XEN. Move them back to he original place
instead of sprinkling tons of these checks all over the code"
* tag 'irq-urgent-2021-11-14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
of/irq: Don't ignore interrupt-controller when interrupt-map failed
irqchip/sifive-plic: Fixup EOI failed when masked
irqchip/csky-mpintc: Fixup mask/unmask implementation
PCI/MSI: Destroy sysfs before freeing entries
PCI: Add MSI masking quirk for Nvidia ION AHCI
PCI/MSI: Deal with devices lying about their MSI mask capability
PCI/MSI: Move non-mask check back into low level accessors
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull scheduler fixes from Borislav Petkov:
- Avoid touching ~100 config files in order to be able to select the
preemption model
- clear cluster CPU masks too, on the CPU unplug path
- prevent use-after-free in cfs
- Prevent a race condition when updating CPU cache domains
- Factor out common shared part of smp_prepare_cpus() into a common
helper which can be called by both baremetal and Xen, in order to fix
a booting of Xen PV guests
* tag 'sched_urgent_for_v5.16_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
preempt: Restore preemption model selection configs
arch_topology: Fix missing clear cluster_cpumask in remove_cpu_topology()
sched/fair: Prevent dead task groups from regaining cfs_rq's
sched/core: Mitigate race cpus_share_cache()/update_top_cache_domain()
x86/smp: Factor out parts of native_smp_prepare_cpus()
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull perf fixes from Borislav Petkov:
- Prevent unintentional page sharing by checking whether a page
reference to a PMU samples page has been acquired properly before
that
- Make sure the LBR_SELECT MSR is saved/restored too
- Reset the LBR_SELECT MSR when resetting the LBR PMU to clear any
residual data left
* tag 'perf_urgent_for_v5.16_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
perf/core: Avoid put_page() when GUP fails
perf/x86/vlbr: Add c->flags to vlbr event constraints
perf/x86/lbr: Reset LBR_SELECT during vlbr reset
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"Three tracing fixes:
- Make local osnoise_instances static
- Copy just actual size of histogram strings
- Properly check missing operands in histogram expressions"
* tag 'trace-v5.16-4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing/histogram: Fix check for missing operands in an expression
tracing/histogram: Do not copy the fixed-size char array field over the field size
tracing/osnoise: Make osnoise_instances static
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If a binary operation is detected while parsing an expression string,
the operand strings are deduced by splitting the experssion string at
the position of the detected binary operator. Both operand strings are
sub-strings (can be empty string) of the expression string but will
never be NULL.
Currently a NULL check is used for missing operands, fix this by
checking for empty strings instead.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211112191324.1302505-1-kaleshsingh@google.com
Signed-off-by: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com>
Fixes: 9710b2f341a0 ("tracing: Fix operator precedence for hist triggers expression")
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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field size
Do not copy the fixed-size char array field of the events over
the field size. The histogram treats char array as a string and
there are 2 types of char array in the event, fixed-size and
dynamic string. The dynamic string (__data_loc) field must be
null terminated, but the fixed-size char array field may not
be null terminated (not a string, but just a data).
In that case, histogram can copy the data after the field.
This uses the original field size for fixed-size char array
field to restrict the histogram not to access over the original
field size.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/163673292822.195747.3696966210526410250.stgit@devnote2
Fixes: 02205a6752f2 (tracing: Add support for 'field variables')
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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