summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>2017-06-09 14:07:02 -0700
committerJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>2017-06-10 17:11:40 -0700
commitc70c86c421427fd8487867de66c4104b15abd772 (patch)
tree0d742b0b9d2f2972b1f93aea3caf1a6c87b3b91b
parent317d9a054e1c6d5f18b02b99ce09911942f8e603 (diff)
apparmor: move capability checks to using labels
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/capability.c57
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/capability.h6
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/ipc.c2
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/lsm.c20
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/resource.c2
5 files changed, 58 insertions, 29 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/capability.c b/security/apparmor/capability.c
index 3bc19843d8df..67e347192a55 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/capability.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/capability.c
@@ -48,15 +48,16 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct audit_cache, audit_cache);
static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
{
struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
+
audit_log_format(ab, " capname=");
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, capability_names[sa->u.cap]);
}
/**
* audit_caps - audit a capability
+ * @sa: audit data
* @profile: profile being tested for confinement (NOT NULL)
* @cap: capability tested
- @audit: whether an audit record should be generated
* @error: error code returned by test
*
* Do auditing of capability and handle, audit/complain/kill modes switching
@@ -64,16 +65,13 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
*
* Returns: 0 or sa->error on success, error code on failure
*/
-static int audit_caps(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int audit,
- int error)
+static int audit_caps(struct common_audit_data *sa, struct aa_profile *profile,
+ int cap, int error)
{
struct audit_cache *ent;
int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
- DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP, OP_CAPABLE);
- sa.u.cap = cap;
- aad(&sa)->error = error;
- if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT)
- aad(&sa)->info = "optional: no audit";
+
+ aad(sa)->error = error;
if (likely(!error)) {
/* test if auditing is being forced */
@@ -105,24 +103,44 @@ static int audit_caps(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int audit,
}
put_cpu_var(audit_cache);
- return aa_audit(type, profile, &sa, audit_cb);
+ return aa_audit(type, profile, sa, audit_cb);
}
/**
* profile_capable - test if profile allows use of capability @cap
* @profile: profile being enforced (NOT NULL, NOT unconfined)
* @cap: capability to test if allowed
+ * @audit: whether an audit record should be generated
+ * @sa: audit data (MAY BE NULL indicating no auditing)
*
* Returns: 0 if allowed else -EPERM
*/
-static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap)
+static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int audit,
+ struct common_audit_data *sa)
{
- return cap_raised(profile->caps.allow, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM;
+ int error;
+
+ if (cap_raised(profile->caps.allow, cap) &&
+ !cap_raised(profile->caps.denied, cap))
+ error = 0;
+ else
+ error = -EPERM;
+
+ if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) {
+ if (!COMPLAIN_MODE(profile))
+ return error;
+ /* audit the cap request in complain mode but note that it
+ * should be optional.
+ */
+ aad(sa)->info = "optional: no audit";
+ }
+
+ return audit_caps(sa, profile, cap, error);
}
/**
* aa_capable - test permission to use capability
- * @profile: profile being tested against (NOT NULL)
+ * @label: label being tested for capability (NOT NULL)
* @cap: capability to be tested
* @audit: whether an audit record should be generated
*
@@ -130,14 +148,15 @@ static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap)
*
* Returns: 0 on success, or else an error code.
*/
-int aa_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int audit)
+int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, int audit)
{
- int error = profile_capable(profile, cap);
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ int error = 0;
+ DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP, OP_CAPABLE);
- if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) {
- if (!COMPLAIN_MODE(profile))
- return error;
- }
+ sa.u.cap = cap;
+ error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+ profile_capable(profile, cap, audit, &sa));
- return audit_caps(profile, cap, audit, error);
+ return error;
}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/capability.h b/security/apparmor/include/capability.h
index 1218e95ebe49..e0304e2aeb7f 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/capability.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/capability.h
@@ -19,11 +19,12 @@
#include "apparmorfs.h"
-struct aa_profile;
+struct aa_label;
/* aa_caps - confinement data for capabilities
* @allowed: capabilities mask
* @audit: caps that are to be audited
+ * @denied: caps that are explicitly denied
* @quiet: caps that should not be audited
* @kill: caps that when requested will result in the task being killed
* @extended: caps that are subject finer grained mediation
@@ -31,6 +32,7 @@ struct aa_profile;
struct aa_caps {
kernel_cap_t allow;
kernel_cap_t audit;
+ kernel_cap_t denied;
kernel_cap_t quiet;
kernel_cap_t kill;
kernel_cap_t extended;
@@ -38,7 +40,7 @@ struct aa_caps {
extern struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_caps[];
-int aa_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int audit);
+int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, int audit);
static inline void aa_free_cap_rules(struct aa_caps *caps)
{
diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
index fa68cd42bd15..7678d94c4002 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/ipc.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_profile *tracer, struct aa_profile *tracee,
if (profile_unconfined(tracer) || tracer == tracee)
return 0;
/* log this capability request */
- return aa_capable(tracer, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, 1);
+ return aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, 1);
}
/**
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index f7f82ce00d73..bcfdcdb3eae2 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -117,20 +117,28 @@ static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
struct aa_label *label;
- struct aa_profile *profile;
const struct cred *cred;
rcu_read_lock();
cred = __task_cred(target);
label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
- profile = labels_profile(label);
+
/*
* cap_capget is stacked ahead of this and will
* initialize effective and permitted.
*/
- if (!profile_unconfined(profile) && !COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) {
- *effective = cap_intersect(*effective, profile->caps.allow);
- *permitted = cap_intersect(*permitted, profile->caps.allow);
+ if (!unconfined(label)) {
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ struct label_it i;
+
+ label_for_each_confined(i, label, profile) {
+ if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile))
+ continue;
+ *effective = cap_intersect(*effective,
+ profile->caps.allow);
+ *permitted = cap_intersect(*permitted,
+ profile->caps.allow);
+ }
}
rcu_read_unlock();
aa_put_label(label);
@@ -146,7 +154,7 @@ static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
if (!unconfined(label))
- error = aa_capable(labels_profile(label), cap, audit);
+ error = aa_capable(label, cap, audit);
aa_put_label(label);
return error;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/resource.c b/security/apparmor/resource.c
index ab8e104c1970..2474ee0b3467 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/resource.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/resource.c
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ int aa_task_setrlimit(struct aa_profile *profile, struct task_struct *task,
* task has CAP_SYS_RESOURCE.
*/
if ((profile != labels_profile(task_label) &&
- aa_capable(profile, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE, 1)) ||
+ aa_capable(&profile->label, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE, 1)) ||
(profile->rlimits.mask & (1 << resource) &&
new_rlim->rlim_max > profile->rlimits.limits[resource].rlim_max))
error = -EACCES;