diff options
| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2019-05-14 07:57:29 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2019-05-14 07:57:29 -0700 |
| commit | fa4bff165070dc40a3de35b78e4f8da8e8d85ec5 (patch) | |
| tree | 1430bdefedcf00030b4152baf12f530a04bd25f3 /Documentation/ABI | |
| parent | 63863ee8e2f6f6ae47be3dff4af2f2806f5ca2dd (diff) | |
| parent | 95310e348a321b45fb746c176961d4da72344282 (diff) | |
Merge branch 'x86-mds-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 MDS mitigations from Thomas Gleixner:
"Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) is a hardware vulnerability
which allows unprivileged speculative access to data which is
available in various CPU internal buffers. This new set of misfeatures
has the following CVEs assigned:
CVE-2018-12126 MSBDS Microarchitectural Store Buffer Data Sampling
CVE-2018-12130 MFBDS Microarchitectural Fill Buffer Data Sampling
CVE-2018-12127 MLPDS Microarchitectural Load Port Data Sampling
CVE-2019-11091 MDSUM Microarchitectural Data Sampling Uncacheable Memory
MDS attacks target microarchitectural buffers which speculatively
forward data under certain conditions. Disclosure gadgets can expose
this data via cache side channels.
Contrary to other speculation based vulnerabilities the MDS
vulnerability does not allow the attacker to control the memory target
address. As a consequence the attacks are purely sampling based, but
as demonstrated with the TLBleed attack samples can be postprocessed
successfully.
The mitigation is to flush the microarchitectural buffers on return to
user space and before entering a VM. It's bolted on the VERW
instruction and requires a microcode update. As some of the attacks
exploit data structures shared between hyperthreads, full protection
requires to disable hyperthreading. The kernel does not do that by
default to avoid breaking unattended updates.
The mitigation set comes with documentation for administrators and a
deeper technical view"
* 'x86-mds-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (23 commits)
x86/speculation/mds: Fix documentation typo
Documentation: Correct the possible MDS sysfs values
x86/mds: Add MDSUM variant to the MDS documentation
x86/speculation/mds: Add 'mitigations=' support for MDS
x86/speculation/mds: Print SMT vulnerable on MSBDS with mitigations off
x86/speculation/mds: Fix comment
x86/speculation/mds: Add SMT warning message
x86/speculation: Move arch_smt_update() call to after mitigation decisions
x86/speculation/mds: Add mds=full,nosmt cmdline option
Documentation: Add MDS vulnerability documentation
Documentation: Move L1TF to separate directory
x86/speculation/mds: Add mitigation mode VMWERV
x86/speculation/mds: Add sysfs reporting for MDS
x86/speculation/mds: Add mitigation control for MDS
x86/speculation/mds: Conditionally clear CPU buffers on idle entry
x86/kvm/vmx: Add MDS protection when L1D Flush is not active
x86/speculation/mds: Clear CPU buffers on exit to user
x86/speculation/mds: Add mds_clear_cpu_buffers()
x86/kvm: Expose X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR to guests
x86/speculation/mds: Add BUG_MSBDS_ONLY
...
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/ABI')
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu | 4 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu index 4fb76c0e8d30..1528239f69b2 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu @@ -484,6 +484,7 @@ What: /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2 /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf + /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds Date: January 2018 Contact: Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Description: Information about CPU vulnerabilities @@ -496,8 +497,7 @@ Description: Information about CPU vulnerabilities "Vulnerable" CPU is affected and no mitigation in effect "Mitigation: $M" CPU is affected and mitigation $M is in effect - Details about the l1tf file can be found in - Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst + See also: Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst What: /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/active |