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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2020-10-25 10:45:26 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2020-10-25 10:45:26 -0700
commit81ecf91eab1045c009b5d73408c44033ba86bb4d (patch)
treed06fd8687b590bc5814dea1e28dbf39944c91a90 /Documentation/admin-guide
parent91f28da8c9a054286d6917ce191349455c479478 (diff)
parent03ca0ec138927b16fab0dad7b869f42eb2849c94 (diff)
Merge tag 'safesetid-5.10' of git://github.com/micah-morton/linux
Pull SafeSetID updates from Micah Morton: "The changes are mostly contained to within the SafeSetID LSM, with the exception of a few 1-line changes to change some ns_capable() calls to ns_capable_setid() -- causing a flag (CAP_OPT_INSETID) to be set that is examined by SafeSetID code and nothing else in the kernel. The changes to SafeSetID internally allow for setting up GID transition security policies, as already existed for UIDs" * tag 'safesetid-5.10' of git://github.com/micah-morton/linux: LSM: SafeSetID: Fix warnings reported by test bot LSM: SafeSetID: Add GID security policy handling LSM: Signal to SafeSetID when setting group IDs
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/admin-guide')
-rw-r--r--Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/SafeSetID.rst29
1 files changed, 20 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/SafeSetID.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/SafeSetID.rst
index 7bff07ce4fdd..17996c9070e2 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/SafeSetID.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/SafeSetID.rst
@@ -3,9 +3,9 @@ SafeSetID
=========
SafeSetID is an LSM module that gates the setid family of syscalls to restrict
UID/GID transitions from a given UID/GID to only those approved by a
-system-wide whitelist. These restrictions also prohibit the given UIDs/GIDs
+system-wide allowlist. These restrictions also prohibit the given UIDs/GIDs
from obtaining auxiliary privileges associated with CAP_SET{U/G}ID, such as
-allowing a user to set up user namespace UID mappings.
+allowing a user to set up user namespace UID/GID mappings.
Background
@@ -98,10 +98,21 @@ Directions for use
==================
This LSM hooks the setid syscalls to make sure transitions are allowed if an
applicable restriction policy is in place. Policies are configured through
-securityfs by writing to the safesetid/add_whitelist_policy and
-safesetid/flush_whitelist_policies files at the location where securityfs is
-mounted. The format for adding a policy is '<UID>:<UID>', using literal
-numbers, such as '123:456'. To flush the policies, any write to the file is
-sufficient. Again, configuring a policy for a UID will prevent that UID from
-obtaining auxiliary setid privileges, such as allowing a user to set up user
-namespace UID mappings.
+securityfs by writing to the safesetid/uid_allowlist_policy and
+safesetid/gid_allowlist_policy files at the location where securityfs is
+mounted. The format for adding a policy is '<UID>:<UID>' or '<GID>:<GID>',
+using literal numbers, and ending with a newline character such as '123:456\n'.
+Writing an empty string "" will flush the policy. Again, configuring a policy
+for a UID/GID will prevent that UID/GID from obtaining auxiliary setid
+privileges, such as allowing a user to set up user namespace UID/GID mappings.
+
+Note on GID policies and setgroups()
+==================
+In v5.9 we are adding support for limiting CAP_SETGID privileges as was done
+previously for CAP_SETUID. However, for compatibility with common sandboxing
+related code conventions in userspace, we currently allow arbitrary
+setgroups() calls for processes with CAP_SETGID restrictions. Until we add
+support in a future release for restricting setgroups() calls, these GID
+policies add no meaningful security. setgroups() restrictions will be enforced
+once we have the policy checking code in place, which will rely on GID policy
+configuration code added in v5.9.