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authorMauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>2019-04-19 21:39:29 -0300
committerMauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>2019-07-15 11:03:01 -0300
commit4d3beaa06d3536aa8968d1828a66bd5ccb5036ac (patch)
tree3bc769db2b6214f2e7fa298e915a313225949a21 /Documentation/siphash.txt
parente7751617dd0599ceadf4221cb08e04307b00aa1f (diff)
docs: security: move some books to it and update
The following files belong to security: Documentation/security/LSM.rst -> Documentation/security/lsm-development.rst Documentation/lsm.txt -> Documentation/security/lsm.rst Documentation/SAK.txt -> Documentation/security/sak.rst Documentation/siphash.txt -> Documentation/security/siphash.rst Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
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-===========================
-SipHash - a short input PRF
-===========================
-
-:Author: Written by Jason A. Donenfeld <jason@zx2c4.com>
-
-SipHash is a cryptographically secure PRF -- a keyed hash function -- that
-performs very well for short inputs, hence the name. It was designed by
-cryptographers Daniel J. Bernstein and Jean-Philippe Aumasson. It is intended
-as a replacement for some uses of: `jhash`, `md5_transform`, `sha_transform`,
-and so forth.
-
-SipHash takes a secret key filled with randomly generated numbers and either
-an input buffer or several input integers. It spits out an integer that is
-indistinguishable from random. You may then use that integer as part of secure
-sequence numbers, secure cookies, or mask it off for use in a hash table.
-
-Generating a key
-================
-
-Keys should always be generated from a cryptographically secure source of
-random numbers, either using get_random_bytes or get_random_once::
-
- siphash_key_t key;
- get_random_bytes(&key, sizeof(key));
-
-If you're not deriving your key from here, you're doing it wrong.
-
-Using the functions
-===================
-
-There are two variants of the function, one that takes a list of integers, and
-one that takes a buffer::
-
- u64 siphash(const void *data, size_t len, const siphash_key_t *key);
-
-And::
-
- u64 siphash_1u64(u64, const siphash_key_t *key);
- u64 siphash_2u64(u64, u64, const siphash_key_t *key);
- u64 siphash_3u64(u64, u64, u64, const siphash_key_t *key);
- u64 siphash_4u64(u64, u64, u64, u64, const siphash_key_t *key);
- u64 siphash_1u32(u32, const siphash_key_t *key);
- u64 siphash_2u32(u32, u32, const siphash_key_t *key);
- u64 siphash_3u32(u32, u32, u32, const siphash_key_t *key);
- u64 siphash_4u32(u32, u32, u32, u32, const siphash_key_t *key);
-
-If you pass the generic siphash function something of a constant length, it
-will constant fold at compile-time and automatically choose one of the
-optimized functions.
-
-Hashtable key function usage::
-
- struct some_hashtable {
- DECLARE_HASHTABLE(hashtable, 8);
- siphash_key_t key;
- };
-
- void init_hashtable(struct some_hashtable *table)
- {
- get_random_bytes(&table->key, sizeof(table->key));
- }
-
- static inline hlist_head *some_hashtable_bucket(struct some_hashtable *table, struct interesting_input *input)
- {
- return &table->hashtable[siphash(input, sizeof(*input), &table->key) & (HASH_SIZE(table->hashtable) - 1)];
- }
-
-You may then iterate like usual over the returned hash bucket.
-
-Security
-========
-
-SipHash has a very high security margin, with its 128-bit key. So long as the
-key is kept secret, it is impossible for an attacker to guess the outputs of
-the function, even if being able to observe many outputs, since 2^128 outputs
-is significant.
-
-Linux implements the "2-4" variant of SipHash.
-
-Struct-passing Pitfalls
-=======================
-
-Often times the XuY functions will not be large enough, and instead you'll
-want to pass a pre-filled struct to siphash. When doing this, it's important
-to always ensure the struct has no padding holes. The easiest way to do this
-is to simply arrange the members of the struct in descending order of size,
-and to use offsetendof() instead of sizeof() for getting the size. For
-performance reasons, if possible, it's probably a good thing to align the
-struct to the right boundary. Here's an example::
-
- const struct {
- struct in6_addr saddr;
- u32 counter;
- u16 dport;
- } __aligned(SIPHASH_ALIGNMENT) combined = {
- .saddr = *(struct in6_addr *)saddr,
- .counter = counter,
- .dport = dport
- };
- u64 h = siphash(&combined, offsetofend(typeof(combined), dport), &secret);
-
-Resources
-=========
-
-Read the SipHash paper if you're interested in learning more:
-https://131002.net/siphash/siphash.pdf
-
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-===============================================
-HalfSipHash - SipHash's insecure younger cousin
-===============================================
-
-:Author: Written by Jason A. Donenfeld <jason@zx2c4.com>
-
-On the off-chance that SipHash is not fast enough for your needs, you might be
-able to justify using HalfSipHash, a terrifying but potentially useful
-possibility. HalfSipHash cuts SipHash's rounds down from "2-4" to "1-3" and,
-even scarier, uses an easily brute-forcable 64-bit key (with a 32-bit output)
-instead of SipHash's 128-bit key. However, this may appeal to some
-high-performance `jhash` users.
-
-Danger!
-
-Do not ever use HalfSipHash except for as a hashtable key function, and only
-then when you can be absolutely certain that the outputs will never be
-transmitted out of the kernel. This is only remotely useful over `jhash` as a
-means of mitigating hashtable flooding denial of service attacks.
-
-Generating a key
-================
-
-Keys should always be generated from a cryptographically secure source of
-random numbers, either using get_random_bytes or get_random_once:
-
-hsiphash_key_t key;
-get_random_bytes(&key, sizeof(key));
-
-If you're not deriving your key from here, you're doing it wrong.
-
-Using the functions
-===================
-
-There are two variants of the function, one that takes a list of integers, and
-one that takes a buffer::
-
- u32 hsiphash(const void *data, size_t len, const hsiphash_key_t *key);
-
-And::
-
- u32 hsiphash_1u32(u32, const hsiphash_key_t *key);
- u32 hsiphash_2u32(u32, u32, const hsiphash_key_t *key);
- u32 hsiphash_3u32(u32, u32, u32, const hsiphash_key_t *key);
- u32 hsiphash_4u32(u32, u32, u32, u32, const hsiphash_key_t *key);
-
-If you pass the generic hsiphash function something of a constant length, it
-will constant fold at compile-time and automatically choose one of the
-optimized functions.
-
-Hashtable key function usage
-============================
-
-::
-
- struct some_hashtable {
- DECLARE_HASHTABLE(hashtable, 8);
- hsiphash_key_t key;
- };
-
- void init_hashtable(struct some_hashtable *table)
- {
- get_random_bytes(&table->key, sizeof(table->key));
- }
-
- static inline hlist_head *some_hashtable_bucket(struct some_hashtable *table, struct interesting_input *input)
- {
- return &table->hashtable[hsiphash(input, sizeof(*input), &table->key) & (HASH_SIZE(table->hashtable) - 1)];
- }
-
-You may then iterate like usual over the returned hash bucket.
-
-Performance
-===========
-
-HalfSipHash is roughly 3 times slower than JenkinsHash. For many replacements,
-this will not be a problem, as the hashtable lookup isn't the bottleneck. And
-in general, this is probably a good sacrifice to make for the security and DoS
-resistance of HalfSipHash.