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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2023-03-05 11:27:48 -0800
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2023-03-05 11:27:48 -0800
commit7f9ec7d8169b5281eff2b907d8ffb1bf56045f73 (patch)
treea48e3363789751bf9df08caf409248e04a9ce0c3 /Documentation
parent4e9c542c7a51bcc8f6ce283459900ba47a6690f5 (diff)
parentdd093fb08e8f8a958fec4eef36f9f09eac047f60 (diff)
Merge tag 'x86-urgent-2023-03-05' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 updates from Thomas Gleixner: "A small set of updates for x86: - Return -EIO instead of success when the certificate buffer for SEV guests is not large enough - Allow STIPB to be enabled with legacy IBSR. Legacy IBRS is cleared on return to userspace for performance reasons, but the leaves user space vulnerable to cross-thread attacks which STIBP prevents. Update the documentation accordingly" * tag 'x86-urgent-2023-03-05' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: virt/sev-guest: Return -EIO if certificate buffer is not large enough Documentation/hw-vuln: Document the interaction between IBRS and STIBP x86/speculation: Allow enabling STIBP with legacy IBRS
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation')
-rw-r--r--Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst21
1 files changed, 16 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
index 3fe6511c5405..4d186f599d90 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
@@ -479,8 +479,16 @@ Spectre variant 2
On Intel Skylake-era systems the mitigation covers most, but not all,
cases. See :ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>` for more details.
- On CPUs with hardware mitigation for Spectre variant 2 (e.g. Enhanced
- IBRS on x86), retpoline is automatically disabled at run time.
+ On CPUs with hardware mitigation for Spectre variant 2 (e.g. IBRS
+ or enhanced IBRS on x86), retpoline is automatically disabled at run time.
+
+ Systems which support enhanced IBRS (eIBRS) enable IBRS protection once at
+ boot, by setting the IBRS bit, and they're automatically protected against
+ Spectre v2 variant attacks, including cross-thread branch target injections
+ on SMT systems (STIBP). In other words, eIBRS enables STIBP too.
+
+ Legacy IBRS systems clear the IBRS bit on exit to userspace and
+ therefore explicitly enable STIBP for that
The retpoline mitigation is turned on by default on vulnerable
CPUs. It can be forced on or off by the administrator
@@ -504,9 +512,12 @@ Spectre variant 2
For Spectre variant 2 mitigation, individual user programs
can be compiled with return trampolines for indirect branches.
This protects them from consuming poisoned entries in the branch
- target buffer left by malicious software. Alternatively, the
- programs can disable their indirect branch speculation via prctl()
- (See :ref:`Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst <set_spec_ctrl>`).
+ target buffer left by malicious software.
+
+ On legacy IBRS systems, at return to userspace, implicit STIBP is disabled
+ because the kernel clears the IBRS bit. In this case, the userspace programs
+ can disable indirect branch speculation via prctl() (See
+ :ref:`Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst <set_spec_ctrl>`).
On x86, this will turn on STIBP to guard against attacks from the
sibling thread when the user program is running, and use IBPB to
flush the branch target buffer when switching to/from the program.