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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2017-09-04 12:21:28 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2017-09-04 12:21:28 -0700
commitb1b6f83ac938d176742c85757960dec2cf10e468 (patch)
treef99e605318232a9327500896b9187b5ec9cad0c1 /Documentation
parent5f82e71a001d14824a7728ad9e49f6aea420f161 (diff)
parent9e52fc2b50de3a1c08b44f94c610fbe998c0031a (diff)
Merge branch 'x86-mm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 mm changes from Ingo Molnar: "PCID support, 5-level paging support, Secure Memory Encryption support The main changes in this cycle are support for three new, complex hardware features of x86 CPUs: - Add 5-level paging support, which is a new hardware feature on upcoming Intel CPUs allowing up to 128 PB of virtual address space and 4 PB of physical RAM space - a 512-fold increase over the old limits. (Supercomputers of the future forecasting hurricanes on an ever warming planet can certainly make good use of more RAM.) Many of the necessary changes went upstream in previous cycles, v4.14 is the first kernel that can enable 5-level paging. This feature is activated via CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL=y - disabled by default. (By Kirill A. Shutemov) - Add 'encrypted memory' support, which is a new hardware feature on upcoming AMD CPUs ('Secure Memory Encryption', SME) allowing system RAM to be encrypted and decrypted (mostly) transparently by the CPU, with a little help from the kernel to transition to/from encrypted RAM. Such RAM should be more secure against various attacks like RAM access via the memory bus and should make the radio signature of memory bus traffic harder to intercept (and decrypt) as well. This feature is activated via CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT=y - disabled by default. (By Tom Lendacky) - Enable PCID optimized TLB flushing on newer Intel CPUs: PCID is a hardware feature that attaches an address space tag to TLB entries and thus allows to skip TLB flushing in many cases, even if we switch mm's. (By Andy Lutomirski) All three of these features were in the works for a long time, and it's coincidence of the three independent development paths that they are all enabled in v4.14 at once" * 'x86-mm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (65 commits) x86/mm: Enable RCU based page table freeing (CONFIG_HAVE_RCU_TABLE_FREE=y) x86/mm: Use pr_cont() in dump_pagetable() x86/mm: Fix SME encryption stack ptr handling kvm/x86: Avoid clearing the C-bit in rsvd_bits() x86/CPU: Align CR3 defines x86/mm, mm/hwpoison: Clear PRESENT bit for kernel 1:1 mappings of poison pages acpi, x86/mm: Remove encryption mask from ACPI page protection type x86/mm, kexec: Fix memory corruption with SME on successive kexecs x86/mm/pkeys: Fix typo in Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt x86/mm/dump_pagetables: Speed up page tables dump for CONFIG_KASAN=y x86/mm: Implement PCID based optimization: try to preserve old TLB entries using PCID x86: Enable 5-level paging support via CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL=y x86/mm: Allow userspace have mappings above 47-bit x86/mm: Prepare to expose larger address space to userspace x86/mpx: Do not allow MPX if we have mappings above 47-bit x86/mm: Rename tasksize_32bit/64bit to task_size_32bit/64bit() x86/xen: Redefine XEN_ELFNOTE_INIT_P2M using PUD_SIZE * PTRS_PER_PUD x86/mm/dump_pagetables: Fix printout of p4d level x86/mm/dump_pagetables: Generalize address normalization x86/boot: Fix memremap() related build failure ...
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation')
-rw-r--r--Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt13
-rw-r--r--Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.txt68
-rw-r--r--Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt6
-rw-r--r--Documentation/x86/x86_64/5level-paging.txt64
4 files changed, 148 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 3a99cc96b6b1..dad6fa01af95 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2233,6 +2233,17 @@
memory contents and reserves bad memory
regions that are detected.
+ mem_encrypt= [X86-64] AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) control
+ Valid arguments: on, off
+ Default (depends on kernel configuration option):
+ on (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT=y)
+ off (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT=n)
+ mem_encrypt=on: Activate SME
+ mem_encrypt=off: Do not activate SME
+
+ Refer to Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.txt
+ for details on when memory encryption can be activated.
+
mem_sleep_default= [SUSPEND] Default system suspend mode:
s2idle - Suspend-To-Idle
shallow - Power-On Suspend or equivalent (if supported)
@@ -2697,6 +2708,8 @@
nopat [X86] Disable PAT (page attribute table extension of
pagetables) support.
+ nopcid [X86-64] Disable the PCID cpu feature.
+
norandmaps Don't use address space randomization. Equivalent to
echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space
diff --git a/Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.txt b/Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.txt
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f512ab718541
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+Secure Memory Encryption (SME) is a feature found on AMD processors.
+
+SME provides the ability to mark individual pages of memory as encrypted using
+the standard x86 page tables. A page that is marked encrypted will be
+automatically decrypted when read from DRAM and encrypted when written to
+DRAM. SME can therefore be used to protect the contents of DRAM from physical
+attacks on the system.
+
+A page is encrypted when a page table entry has the encryption bit set (see
+below on how to determine its position). The encryption bit can also be
+specified in the cr3 register, allowing the PGD table to be encrypted. Each
+successive level of page tables can also be encrypted by setting the encryption
+bit in the page table entry that points to the next table. This allows the full
+page table hierarchy to be encrypted. Note, this means that just because the
+encryption bit is set in cr3, doesn't imply the full hierarchy is encyrpted.
+Each page table entry in the hierarchy needs to have the encryption bit set to
+achieve that. So, theoretically, you could have the encryption bit set in cr3
+so that the PGD is encrypted, but not set the encryption bit in the PGD entry
+for a PUD which results in the PUD pointed to by that entry to not be
+encrypted.
+
+Support for SME can be determined through the CPUID instruction. The CPUID
+function 0x8000001f reports information related to SME:
+
+ 0x8000001f[eax]:
+ Bit[0] indicates support for SME
+ 0x8000001f[ebx]:
+ Bits[5:0] pagetable bit number used to activate memory
+ encryption
+ Bits[11:6] reduction in physical address space, in bits, when
+ memory encryption is enabled (this only affects
+ system physical addresses, not guest physical
+ addresses)
+
+If support for SME is present, MSR 0xc00100010 (MSR_K8_SYSCFG) can be used to
+determine if SME is enabled and/or to enable memory encryption:
+
+ 0xc0010010:
+ Bit[23] 0 = memory encryption features are disabled
+ 1 = memory encryption features are enabled
+
+Linux relies on BIOS to set this bit if BIOS has determined that the reduction
+in the physical address space as a result of enabling memory encryption (see
+CPUID information above) will not conflict with the address space resource
+requirements for the system. If this bit is not set upon Linux startup then
+Linux itself will not set it and memory encryption will not be possible.
+
+The state of SME in the Linux kernel can be documented as follows:
+ - Supported:
+ The CPU supports SME (determined through CPUID instruction).
+
+ - Enabled:
+ Supported and bit 23 of MSR_K8_SYSCFG is set.
+
+ - Active:
+ Supported, Enabled and the Linux kernel is actively applying
+ the encryption bit to page table entries (the SME mask in the
+ kernel is non-zero).
+
+SME can also be enabled and activated in the BIOS. If SME is enabled and
+activated in the BIOS, then all memory accesses will be encrypted and it will
+not be necessary to activate the Linux memory encryption support. If the BIOS
+merely enables SME (sets bit 23 of the MSR_K8_SYSCFG), then Linux can activate
+memory encryption by default (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT=y) or
+by supplying mem_encrypt=on on the kernel command line. However, if BIOS does
+not enable SME, then Linux will not be able to activate memory encryption, even
+if configured to do so by default or the mem_encrypt=on command line parameter
+is specified.
diff --git a/Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt b/Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt
index b64304540821..fa46dcb347bc 100644
--- a/Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt
+++ b/Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ with a key. In this example WRPKRU is wrapped by a C function
called pkey_set().
int real_prot = PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE;
- pkey = pkey_alloc(0, PKEY_DENY_WRITE);
+ pkey = pkey_alloc(0, PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE);
ptr = mmap(NULL, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_NONE, MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
ret = pkey_mprotect(ptr, PAGE_SIZE, real_prot, pkey);
... application runs here
@@ -42,9 +42,9 @@ called pkey_set().
Now, if the application needs to update the data at 'ptr', it can
gain access, do the update, then remove its write access:
- pkey_set(pkey, 0); // clear PKEY_DENY_WRITE
+ pkey_set(pkey, 0); // clear PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE
*ptr = foo; // assign something
- pkey_set(pkey, PKEY_DENY_WRITE); // set PKEY_DENY_WRITE again
+ pkey_set(pkey, PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE); // set PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE again
Now when it frees the memory, it will also free the pkey since it
is no longer in use:
diff --git a/Documentation/x86/x86_64/5level-paging.txt b/Documentation/x86/x86_64/5level-paging.txt
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..087251a0d99c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/x86/x86_64/5level-paging.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+== Overview ==
+
+Original x86-64 was limited by 4-level paing to 256 TiB of virtual address
+space and 64 TiB of physical address space. We are already bumping into
+this limit: some vendors offers servers with 64 TiB of memory today.
+
+To overcome the limitation upcoming hardware will introduce support for
+5-level paging. It is a straight-forward extension of the current page
+table structure adding one more layer of translation.
+
+It bumps the limits to 128 PiB of virtual address space and 4 PiB of
+physical address space. This "ought to be enough for anybody" ©.
+
+QEMU 2.9 and later support 5-level paging.
+
+Virtual memory layout for 5-level paging is described in
+Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt
+
+== Enabling 5-level paging ==
+
+CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL=y enables the feature.
+
+So far, a kernel compiled with the option enabled will be able to boot
+only on machines that supports the feature -- see for 'la57' flag in
+/proc/cpuinfo.
+
+The plan is to implement boot-time switching between 4- and 5-level paging
+in the future.
+
+== User-space and large virtual address space ==
+
+On x86, 5-level paging enables 56-bit userspace virtual address space.
+Not all user space is ready to handle wide addresses. It's known that
+at least some JIT compilers use higher bits in pointers to encode their
+information. It collides with valid pointers with 5-level paging and
+leads to crashes.
+
+To mitigate this, we are not going to allocate virtual address space
+above 47-bit by default.
+
+But userspace can ask for allocation from full address space by
+specifying hint address (with or without MAP_FIXED) above 47-bits.
+
+If hint address set above 47-bit, but MAP_FIXED is not specified, we try
+to look for unmapped area by specified address. If it's already
+occupied, we look for unmapped area in *full* address space, rather than
+from 47-bit window.
+
+A high hint address would only affect the allocation in question, but not
+any future mmap()s.
+
+Specifying high hint address on older kernel or on machine without 5-level
+paging support is safe. The hint will be ignored and kernel will fall back
+to allocation from 47-bit address space.
+
+This approach helps to easily make application's memory allocator aware
+about large address space without manually tracking allocated virtual
+address space.
+
+One important case we need to handle here is interaction with MPX.
+MPX (without MAWA extension) cannot handle addresses above 47-bit, so we
+need to make sure that MPX cannot be enabled we already have VMA above
+the boundary and forbid creating such VMAs once MPX is enabled.
+