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| author | Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> | 2020-10-02 12:15:24 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> | 2020-10-02 12:15:24 +0100 |
| commit | 0a21ac0d3094349de50f42b3712931de208ba74a (patch) | |
| tree | 7dfdb4a74477c29b7e026cb0c2657b63d1dacf09 /arch/arm64/Kconfig | |
| parent | 57b8b1b4351dafe94de09a2aab5eba885b6705f0 (diff) | |
| parent | 780c083a8f840ca9162c7a4090ff5e10d15152a2 (diff) | |
Merge branch 'for-next/ghostbusters' into for-next/core
Fix and subsequently rewrite Spectre mitigations, including the addition
of support for PR_SPEC_DISABLE_NOEXEC.
(Will Deacon and Marc Zyngier)
* for-next/ghostbusters: (22 commits)
arm64: Add support for PR_SPEC_DISABLE_NOEXEC prctl() option
arm64: Pull in task_stack_page() to Spectre-v4 mitigation code
KVM: arm64: Allow patching EL2 vectors even with KASLR is not enabled
arm64: Get rid of arm64_ssbd_state
KVM: arm64: Convert ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 to arm64_get_spectre_v4_state()
KVM: arm64: Get rid of kvm_arm_have_ssbd()
KVM: arm64: Simplify handling of ARCH_WORKAROUND_2
arm64: Rewrite Spectre-v4 mitigation code
arm64: Move SSBD prctl() handler alongside other spectre mitigation code
arm64: Rename ARM64_SSBD to ARM64_SPECTRE_V4
arm64: Treat SSBS as a non-strict system feature
arm64: Group start_thread() functions together
KVM: arm64: Set CSV2 for guests on hardware unaffected by Spectre-v2
arm64: Rewrite Spectre-v2 mitigation code
arm64: Introduce separate file for spectre mitigations and reporting
arm64: Rename ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR to ARM64_SPECTRE_V2
KVM: arm64: Simplify install_bp_hardening_cb()
KVM: arm64: Replace CONFIG_KVM_INDIRECT_VECTORS with CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE
arm64: Remove Spectre-related CONFIG_* options
arm64: Run ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 enabling code on all CPUs
...
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/arm64/Kconfig')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/arm64/Kconfig | 26 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 26 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig index b8fcd9a0ee8e..e7f804887dc6 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig @@ -1172,32 +1172,6 @@ config UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 If unsure, say Y. -config HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR - bool "Harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks" if EXPERT - default y - help - Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors rely on - being able to manipulate the branch predictor for a victim context by - executing aliasing branches in the attacker context. Such attacks - can be partially mitigated against by clearing internal branch - predictor state and limiting the prediction logic in some situations. - - This config option will take CPU-specific actions to harden the - branch predictor against aliasing attacks and may rely on specific - instruction sequences or control bits being set by the system - firmware. - - If unsure, say Y. - -config ARM64_SSBD - bool "Speculative Store Bypass Disable" if EXPERT - default y - help - This enables mitigation of the bypassing of previous stores - by speculative loads. - - If unsure, say Y. - config RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED bool "Apply r/o permissions of VM areas also to their linear aliases" default y |