Merge branch 'master' into test

* master: (688 commits)
  dt-bindings: mailbox: qcom: Document the APCS clock binding
  mailbox: qcom: Create APCS child device for clock controller
  mailbox: qcom: Convert APCS IPC driver to use regmap
  KVM/SVM: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL
  KVM/VMX: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL
  KVM/VMX: Emulate MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES
  KVM/x86: Add IBPB support
  KVM/x86: Update the reverse_cpuid list to include CPUID_7_EDX
  pinctrl: remove include file from <linux/device.h>
  firmware: dmi: handle missing DMI data gracefully
  firmware: dmi_scan: Fix handling of empty DMI strings
  firmware: dmi_scan: Drop dmi_initialized
  firmware: dmi: Optimize dmi_matches
  Revert "defer call to mem_cgroup_sk_alloc()"
  soreuseport: fix mem leak in reuseport_add_sock()
  net: qlge: use memmove instead of skb_copy_to_linear_data
  net: qed: use correct strncpy() size
  net: cxgb4: avoid memcpy beyond end of source buffer
  cls_u32: add missing RCU annotation.
  r8152: set rx mode early when linking on
  ...

1 files changed, 218 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..0409c80c32c0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h
@@ -0,0 +1,218 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */
+/*
+ * PowerPC Memory Protection Keys management
+ *
+ * Copyright 2017, Ram Pai, IBM Corporation.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _ASM_POWERPC_KEYS_H
+#define _ASM_POWERPC_KEYS_H
+
+#include <linux/jump_label.h>
+#include <asm/firmware.h>
+
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(pkey_disabled);
+extern int pkeys_total; /* total pkeys as per device tree */
+extern u32 initial_allocation_mask; /* bits set for reserved keys */
+
+/*
+ * Define these here temporarily so we're not dependent on patching linux/mm.h.
+ * Once it's updated we can drop these.
+ */
+#ifndef VM_PKEY_BIT0
+# define VM_PKEY_SHIFT	VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_0
+# define VM_PKEY_BIT0	VM_HIGH_ARCH_0
+# define VM_PKEY_BIT1	VM_HIGH_ARCH_1
+# define VM_PKEY_BIT2	VM_HIGH_ARCH_2
+# define VM_PKEY_BIT3	VM_HIGH_ARCH_3
+# define VM_PKEY_BIT4	VM_HIGH_ARCH_4
+#endif
+
+#define ARCH_VM_PKEY_FLAGS (VM_PKEY_BIT0 | VM_PKEY_BIT1 | VM_PKEY_BIT2 | \
+			    VM_PKEY_BIT3 | VM_PKEY_BIT4)
+
+/* Override any generic PKEY permission defines */
+#define PKEY_DISABLE_EXECUTE   0x4
+#define PKEY_ACCESS_MASK       (PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS | \
+				PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE  | \
+				PKEY_DISABLE_EXECUTE)
+
+static inline u64 pkey_to_vmflag_bits(u16 pkey)
+{
+	return (((u64)pkey << VM_PKEY_SHIFT) & ARCH_VM_PKEY_FLAGS);
+}
+
+static inline u64 vmflag_to_pte_pkey_bits(u64 vm_flags)
+{
+	if (static_branch_likely(&pkey_disabled))
+		return 0x0UL;
+
+	return (((vm_flags & VM_PKEY_BIT0) ? H_PTE_PKEY_BIT4 : 0x0UL) |
+		((vm_flags & VM_PKEY_BIT1) ? H_PTE_PKEY_BIT3 : 0x0UL) |
+		((vm_flags & VM_PKEY_BIT2) ? H_PTE_PKEY_BIT2 : 0x0UL) |
+		((vm_flags & VM_PKEY_BIT3) ? H_PTE_PKEY_BIT1 : 0x0UL) |
+		((vm_flags & VM_PKEY_BIT4) ? H_PTE_PKEY_BIT0 : 0x0UL));
+}
+
+static inline int vma_pkey(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	if (static_branch_likely(&pkey_disabled))
+		return 0;
+	return (vma->vm_flags & ARCH_VM_PKEY_FLAGS) >> VM_PKEY_SHIFT;
+}
+
+#define arch_max_pkey() pkeys_total
+
+static inline u64 pte_to_hpte_pkey_bits(u64 pteflags)
+{
+	return (((pteflags & H_PTE_PKEY_BIT0) ? HPTE_R_KEY_BIT0 : 0x0UL) |
+		((pteflags & H_PTE_PKEY_BIT1) ? HPTE_R_KEY_BIT1 : 0x0UL) |
+		((pteflags & H_PTE_PKEY_BIT2) ? HPTE_R_KEY_BIT2 : 0x0UL) |
+		((pteflags & H_PTE_PKEY_BIT3) ? HPTE_R_KEY_BIT3 : 0x0UL) |
+		((pteflags & H_PTE_PKEY_BIT4) ? HPTE_R_KEY_BIT4 : 0x0UL));
+}
+
+static inline u16 pte_to_pkey_bits(u64 pteflags)
+{
+	return (((pteflags & H_PTE_PKEY_BIT0) ? 0x10 : 0x0UL) |
+		((pteflags & H_PTE_PKEY_BIT1) ? 0x8 : 0x0UL) |
+		((pteflags & H_PTE_PKEY_BIT2) ? 0x4 : 0x0UL) |
+		((pteflags & H_PTE_PKEY_BIT3) ? 0x2 : 0x0UL) |
+		((pteflags & H_PTE_PKEY_BIT4) ? 0x1 : 0x0UL));
+}
+
+#define pkey_alloc_mask(pkey) (0x1 << pkey)
+
+#define mm_pkey_allocation_map(mm) (mm->context.pkey_allocation_map)
+
+#define __mm_pkey_allocated(mm, pkey) {	\
+	mm_pkey_allocation_map(mm) |= pkey_alloc_mask(pkey); \
+}
+
+#define __mm_pkey_free(mm, pkey) {	\
+	mm_pkey_allocation_map(mm) &= ~pkey_alloc_mask(pkey);	\
+}
+
+#define __mm_pkey_is_allocated(mm, pkey)	\
+	(mm_pkey_allocation_map(mm) & pkey_alloc_mask(pkey))
+
+#define __mm_pkey_is_reserved(pkey) (initial_allocation_mask & \
+				       pkey_alloc_mask(pkey))
+
+static inline bool mm_pkey_is_allocated(struct mm_struct *mm, int pkey)
+{
+	/* A reserved key is never considered as 'explicitly allocated' */
+	return ((pkey < arch_max_pkey()) &&
+		!__mm_pkey_is_reserved(pkey) &&
+		__mm_pkey_is_allocated(mm, pkey));
+}
+
+extern void __arch_activate_pkey(int pkey);
+extern void __arch_deactivate_pkey(int pkey);
+/*
+ * Returns a positive, 5-bit key on success, or -1 on failure.
+ * Relies on the mmap_sem to protect against concurrency in mm_pkey_alloc() and
+ * mm_pkey_free().
+ */
+static inline int mm_pkey_alloc(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Note: this is the one and only place we make sure that the pkey is
+	 * valid as far as the hardware is concerned. The rest of the kernel
+	 * trusts that only good, valid pkeys come out of here.
+	 */
+	u32 all_pkeys_mask = (u32)(~(0x0));
+	int ret;
+
+	if (static_branch_likely(&pkey_disabled))
+		return -1;
+
+	/*
+	 * Are we out of pkeys? We must handle this specially because ffz()
+	 * behavior is undefined if there are no zeros.
+	 */
+	if (mm_pkey_allocation_map(mm) == all_pkeys_mask)
+		return -1;
+
+	ret = ffz((u32)mm_pkey_allocation_map(mm));
+	__mm_pkey_allocated(mm, ret);
+
+	/*
+	 * Enable the key in the hardware
+	 */
+	if (ret > 0)
+		__arch_activate_pkey(ret);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static inline int mm_pkey_free(struct mm_struct *mm, int pkey)
+{
+	if (static_branch_likely(&pkey_disabled))
+		return -1;
+
+	if (!mm_pkey_is_allocated(mm, pkey))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * Disable the key in the hardware
+	 */
+	__arch_deactivate_pkey(pkey);
+	__mm_pkey_free(mm, pkey);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Try to dedicate one of the protection keys to be used as an
+ * execute-only protection key.
+ */
+extern int __execute_only_pkey(struct mm_struct *mm);
+static inline int execute_only_pkey(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+	if (static_branch_likely(&pkey_disabled))
+		return -1;
+
+	return __execute_only_pkey(mm);
+}
+
+extern int __arch_override_mprotect_pkey(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+					 int prot, int pkey);
+static inline int arch_override_mprotect_pkey(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+					      int prot, int pkey)
+{
+	if (static_branch_likely(&pkey_disabled))
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Is this an mprotect_pkey() call? If so, never override the value that
+	 * came from the user.
+	 */
+	if (pkey != -1)
+		return pkey;
+
+	return __arch_override_mprotect_pkey(vma, prot, pkey);
+}
+
+extern int __arch_set_user_pkey_access(struct task_struct *tsk, int pkey,
+				       unsigned long init_val);
+static inline int arch_set_user_pkey_access(struct task_struct *tsk, int pkey,
+					    unsigned long init_val)
+{
+	if (static_branch_likely(&pkey_disabled))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	return __arch_set_user_pkey_access(tsk, pkey, init_val);
+}
+
+static inline bool arch_pkeys_enabled(void)
+{
+	return !static_branch_likely(&pkey_disabled);
+}
+
+extern void pkey_mm_init(struct mm_struct *mm);
+extern bool arch_supports_pkeys(int cap);
+extern unsigned int arch_usable_pkeys(void);
+extern void thread_pkey_regs_save(struct thread_struct *thread);
+extern void thread_pkey_regs_restore(struct thread_struct *new_thread,
+				     struct thread_struct *old_thread);
+extern void thread_pkey_regs_init(struct thread_struct *thread);
+#endif /*_ASM_POWERPC_KEYS_H */