KVM: PPC: Book3S: Allow XICS emulation to work in nested hosts using XIVE

Currently, the KVM code assumes that if the host kernel is using the
XIVE interrupt controller (the new interrupt controller that first
appeared in POWER9 systems), then the in-kernel XICS emulation will
use the XIVE hardware to deliver interrupts to the guest.  However,
this only works when the host is running in hypervisor mode and has
full access to all of the XIVE functionality.  It doesn't work in any
nested virtualization scenario, either with PR KVM or nested-HV KVM,
because the XICS-on-XIVE code calls directly into the native-XIVE
routines, which are not initialized and cannot function correctly
because they use OPAL calls, and OPAL is not available in a guest.

This means that using the in-kernel XICS emulation in a nested
hypervisor that is using XIVE as its interrupt controller will cause a
(nested) host kernel crash.  To fix this, we change most of the places
where the current code calls xive_enabled() to select between the
XICS-on-XIVE emulation and the plain XICS emulation to call a new
function, xics_on_xive(), which returns false in a guest.

However, there is a further twist.  The plain XICS emulation has some
functions which are used in real mode and access the underlying XICS
controller (the interrupt controller of the host) directly.  In the
case of a nested hypervisor, this means doing XICS hypercalls
directly.  When the nested host is using XIVE as its interrupt
controller, these hypercalls will fail.  Therefore this also adds
checks in the places where the XICS emulation wants to access the
underlying interrupt controller directly, and if that is XIVE, makes
the code use the virtual mode fallback paths, which call generic
kernel infrastructure rather than doing direct XICS access.

Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
Reviewed-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>

1 files changed, 7 insertions, 7 deletions

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_builtin.c b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_builtin.c
index a71e2fc00a4e..b0cf22477e87 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_builtin.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_builtin.c
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ void kvmhv_rm_send_ipi(int cpu)
 	}
 
 	/* We should never reach this */
-	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(xive_enabled()))
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(xics_on_xive()))
 	    return;
 
 	/* Else poke the target with an IPI */
@@ -577,7 +577,7 @@ unsigned long kvmppc_rm_h_xirr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	if (!kvmppc_xics_enabled(vcpu))
 		return H_TOO_HARD;
-	if (xive_enabled()) {
+	if (xics_on_xive()) {
 		if (is_rm())
 			return xive_rm_h_xirr(vcpu);
 		if (unlikely(!__xive_vm_h_xirr))
@@ -592,7 +592,7 @@ unsigned long kvmppc_rm_h_xirr_x(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	if (!kvmppc_xics_enabled(vcpu))
 		return H_TOO_HARD;
 	vcpu->arch.regs.gpr[5] = get_tb();
-	if (xive_enabled()) {
+	if (xics_on_xive()) {
 		if (is_rm())
 			return xive_rm_h_xirr(vcpu);
 		if (unlikely(!__xive_vm_h_xirr))
@@ -606,7 +606,7 @@ unsigned long kvmppc_rm_h_ipoll(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long server)
 {
 	if (!kvmppc_xics_enabled(vcpu))
 		return H_TOO_HARD;
-	if (xive_enabled()) {
+	if (xics_on_xive()) {
 		if (is_rm())
 			return xive_rm_h_ipoll(vcpu, server);
 		if (unlikely(!__xive_vm_h_ipoll))
@@ -621,7 +621,7 @@ int kvmppc_rm_h_ipi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long server,
 {
 	if (!kvmppc_xics_enabled(vcpu))
 		return H_TOO_HARD;
-	if (xive_enabled()) {
+	if (xics_on_xive()) {
 		if (is_rm())
 			return xive_rm_h_ipi(vcpu, server, mfrr);
 		if (unlikely(!__xive_vm_h_ipi))
@@ -635,7 +635,7 @@ int kvmppc_rm_h_cppr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cppr)
 {
 	if (!kvmppc_xics_enabled(vcpu))
 		return H_TOO_HARD;
-	if (xive_enabled()) {
+	if (xics_on_xive()) {
 		if (is_rm())
 			return xive_rm_h_cppr(vcpu, cppr);
 		if (unlikely(!__xive_vm_h_cppr))
@@ -649,7 +649,7 @@ int kvmppc_rm_h_eoi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long xirr)
 {
 	if (!kvmppc_xics_enabled(vcpu))
 		return H_TOO_HARD;
-	if (xive_enabled()) {
+	if (xics_on_xive()) {
 		if (is_rm())
 			return xive_rm_h_eoi(vcpu, xirr);
 		if (unlikely(!__xive_vm_h_eoi))