diff options
author | J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> | 2020-05-21 10:58:15 -0400 |
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committer | J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> | 2020-05-21 10:58:15 -0400 |
commit | 6670ee2ef219ac9e1c836a277dda0c949ad8b1ff (patch) | |
tree | 0eee3d97941caab0bc85f93a7653b0cfd4abf51b /arch/x86/entry/calling.h | |
parent | 746c6237ece641da79df09abcf87bc29f6f9665b (diff) | |
parent | f2453978a4f2ddb1938fa80e9bf0c9d6252bd5f8 (diff) |
Merge branch 'nfsd-5.8' of git://linux-nfs.org/~cel/cel-2.6 into for-5.8-incoming
Highlights of this series:
* Remove serialization of sending RPC/RDMA Replies
* Convert the TCP socket send path to use xdr_buf::bvecs (pre-requisite for
RPC-on-TLS)
* Fix svcrdma backchannel sendto return code
* Convert a number of dprintk call sites to use tracepoints
* Fix the "suggest braces around empty body in an 'else' statement" warning
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/entry/calling.h')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/entry/calling.h | 40 |
1 files changed, 21 insertions, 19 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h index 0789e13ece90..1c7f13bb6728 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h +++ b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h @@ -98,13 +98,6 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with #define SIZEOF_PTREGS 21*8 .macro PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS rdx=%rdx rax=%rax save_ret=0 - /* - * Push registers and sanitize registers of values that a - * speculation attack might otherwise want to exploit. The - * lower registers are likely clobbered well before they - * could be put to use in a speculative execution gadget. - * Interleave XOR with PUSH for better uop scheduling: - */ .if \save_ret pushq %rsi /* pt_regs->si */ movq 8(%rsp), %rsi /* temporarily store the return address in %rsi */ @@ -114,34 +107,43 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with pushq %rsi /* pt_regs->si */ .endif pushq \rdx /* pt_regs->dx */ - xorl %edx, %edx /* nospec dx */ pushq %rcx /* pt_regs->cx */ - xorl %ecx, %ecx /* nospec cx */ pushq \rax /* pt_regs->ax */ pushq %r8 /* pt_regs->r8 */ - xorl %r8d, %r8d /* nospec r8 */ pushq %r9 /* pt_regs->r9 */ - xorl %r9d, %r9d /* nospec r9 */ pushq %r10 /* pt_regs->r10 */ - xorl %r10d, %r10d /* nospec r10 */ pushq %r11 /* pt_regs->r11 */ - xorl %r11d, %r11d /* nospec r11*/ pushq %rbx /* pt_regs->rbx */ - xorl %ebx, %ebx /* nospec rbx*/ pushq %rbp /* pt_regs->rbp */ - xorl %ebp, %ebp /* nospec rbp*/ pushq %r12 /* pt_regs->r12 */ - xorl %r12d, %r12d /* nospec r12*/ pushq %r13 /* pt_regs->r13 */ - xorl %r13d, %r13d /* nospec r13*/ pushq %r14 /* pt_regs->r14 */ - xorl %r14d, %r14d /* nospec r14*/ pushq %r15 /* pt_regs->r15 */ - xorl %r15d, %r15d /* nospec r15*/ UNWIND_HINT_REGS + .if \save_ret pushq %rsi /* return address on top of stack */ .endif + + /* + * Sanitize registers of values that a speculation attack might + * otherwise want to exploit. The lower registers are likely clobbered + * well before they could be put to use in a speculative execution + * gadget. + */ + xorl %edx, %edx /* nospec dx */ + xorl %ecx, %ecx /* nospec cx */ + xorl %r8d, %r8d /* nospec r8 */ + xorl %r9d, %r9d /* nospec r9 */ + xorl %r10d, %r10d /* nospec r10 */ + xorl %r11d, %r11d /* nospec r11 */ + xorl %ebx, %ebx /* nospec rbx */ + xorl %ebp, %ebp /* nospec rbp */ + xorl %r12d, %r12d /* nospec r12 */ + xorl %r13d, %r13d /* nospec r13 */ + xorl %r14d, %r14d /* nospec r14 */ + xorl %r15d, %r15d /* nospec r15 */ + .endm .macro POP_REGS pop_rdi=1 skip_r11rcx=0 |