Merge branch 'kvm-guestmemfd' into HEAD

Introduce several new KVM uAPIs to ultimately create a guest-first memory
subsystem within KVM, a.k.a. guest_memfd.  Guest-first memory allows KVM
to provide features, enhancements, and optimizations that are kludgly
or outright impossible to implement in a generic memory subsystem.

The core KVM ioctl() for guest_memfd is KVM_CREATE_GUEST_MEMFD, which
similar to the generic memfd_create(), creates an anonymous file and
returns a file descriptor that refers to it.  Again like "regular"
memfd files, guest_memfd files live in RAM, have volatile storage,
and are automatically released when the last reference is dropped.
The key differences between memfd files (and every other memory subystem)
is that guest_memfd files are bound to their owning virtual machine,
cannot be mapped, read, or written by userspace, and cannot be resized.
guest_memfd files do however support PUNCH_HOLE, which can be used to
convert a guest memory area between the shared and guest-private states.

A second KVM ioctl(), KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES, allows userspace to
specify attributes for a given page of guest memory.  In the long term,
it will likely be extended to allow userspace to specify per-gfn RWX
protections, including allowing memory to be writable in the guest
without it also being writable in host userspace.

The immediate and driving use case for guest_memfd are Confidential
(CoCo) VMs, specifically AMD's SEV-SNP, Intel's TDX, and KVM's own pKVM.
For such use cases, being able to map memory into KVM guests without
requiring said memory to be mapped into the host is a hard requirement.
While SEV+ and TDX prevent untrusted software from reading guest private
data by encrypting guest memory, pKVM provides confidentiality and
integrity *without* relying on memory encryption.  In addition, with
SEV-SNP and especially TDX, accessing guest private memory can be fatal
to the host, i.e. KVM must be prevent host userspace from accessing
guest memory irrespective of hardware behavior.

Long term, guest_memfd may be useful for use cases beyond CoCo VMs,
for example hardening userspace against unintentional accesses to guest
memory.  As mentioned earlier, KVM's ABI uses userspace VMA protections to
define the allow guest protection (with an exception granted to mapping
guest memory executable), and similarly KVM currently requires the guest
mapping size to be a strict subset of the host userspace mapping size.
Decoupling the mappings sizes would allow userspace to precisely map
only what is needed and with the required permissions, without impacting
guest performance.

A guest-first memory subsystem also provides clearer line of sight to
things like a dedicated memory pool (for slice-of-hardware VMs) and
elimination of "struct page" (for offload setups where userspace _never_
needs to DMA from or into guest memory).

guest_memfd is the result of 3+ years of development and exploration;
taking on memory management responsibilities in KVM was not the first,
second, or even third choice for supporting CoCo VMs.  But after many
failed attempts to avoid KVM-specific backing memory, and looking at
where things ended up, it is quite clear that of all approaches tried,
guest_memfd is the simplest, most robust, and most extensible, and the
right thing to do for KVM and the kernel at-large.

The "development cycle" for this version is going to be very short;
ideally, next week I will merge it as is in kvm/next, taking this through
the KVM tree for 6.8 immediately after the end of the merge window.
The series is still based on 6.6 (plus KVM changes for 6.7) so it
will require a small fixup for changes to get_file_rcu() introduced in
6.7 by commit 0ede61d8589c ("file: convert to SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU").
The fixup will be done as part of the merge commit, and most of the text
above will become the commit message for the merge.

Pending post-merge work includes:
- hugepage support
- looking into using the restrictedmem framework for guest memory
- introducing a testing mechanism to poison memory, possibly using
  the same memory attributes introduced here
- SNP and TDX support

There are two non-KVM patches buried in the middle of this series:

  fs: Rename anon_inode_getfile_secure() and anon_inode_getfd_secure()
  mm: Add AS_UNMOVABLE to mark mapping as completely unmovable

The first is small and mostly suggested-by Christian Brauner; the second
a bit less so but it was written by an mm person (Vlastimil Babka).

1 files changed, 257 insertions, 14 deletions

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index c57e181bba21..59b026b6ad2a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -795,16 +795,26 @@ static struct kvm_lpage_info *lpage_info_slot(gfn_t gfn,
 	return &slot->arch.lpage_info[level - 2][idx];
 }
 
+/*
+ * The most significant bit in disallow_lpage tracks whether or not memory
+ * attributes are mixed, i.e. not identical for all gfns at the current level.
+ * The lower order bits are used to refcount other cases where a hugepage is
+ * disallowed, e.g. if KVM has shadow a page table at the gfn.
+ */
+#define KVM_LPAGE_MIXED_FLAG	BIT(31)
+
 static void update_gfn_disallow_lpage_count(const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
 					    gfn_t gfn, int count)
 {
 	struct kvm_lpage_info *linfo;
-	int i;
+	int old, i;
 
 	for (i = PG_LEVEL_2M; i <= KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL; ++i) {
 		linfo = lpage_info_slot(gfn, slot, i);
+
+		old = linfo->disallow_lpage;
 		linfo->disallow_lpage += count;
-		WARN_ON_ONCE(linfo->disallow_lpage < 0);
+		WARN_ON_ONCE((old ^ linfo->disallow_lpage) & KVM_LPAGE_MIXED_FLAG);
 	}
 }
 
@@ -3056,7 +3066,7 @@ static void direct_pte_prefetch(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *sptep)
  *
  * There are several ways to safely use this helper:
  *
- * - Check mmu_invalidate_retry_hva() after grabbing the mapping level, before
+ * - Check mmu_invalidate_retry_gfn() after grabbing the mapping level, before
  *   consuming it.  In this case, mmu_lock doesn't need to be held during the
  *   lookup, but it does need to be held while checking the MMU notifier.
  *
@@ -3137,9 +3147,9 @@ out:
 	return level;
 }
 
-int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm,
-			      const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn,
-			      int max_level)
+static int __kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm,
+				       const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
+				       gfn_t gfn, int max_level, bool is_private)
 {
 	struct kvm_lpage_info *linfo;
 	int host_level;
@@ -3151,6 +3161,9 @@ int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm,
 			break;
 	}
 
+	if (is_private)
+		return max_level;
+
 	if (max_level == PG_LEVEL_4K)
 		return PG_LEVEL_4K;
 
@@ -3158,6 +3171,16 @@ int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm,
 	return min(host_level, max_level);
 }
 
+int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm,
+			      const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn,
+			      int max_level)
+{
+	bool is_private = kvm_slot_can_be_private(slot) &&
+			  kvm_mem_is_private(kvm, gfn);
+
+	return __kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(kvm, slot, gfn, max_level, is_private);
+}
+
 void kvm_mmu_hugepage_adjust(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
 {
 	struct kvm_memory_slot *slot = fault->slot;
@@ -3178,8 +3201,9 @@ void kvm_mmu_hugepage_adjust(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault
 	 * Enforce the iTLB multihit workaround after capturing the requested
 	 * level, which will be used to do precise, accurate accounting.
 	 */
-	fault->req_level = kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(vcpu->kvm, slot,
-						     fault->gfn, fault->max_level);
+	fault->req_level = __kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(vcpu->kvm, slot,
+						       fault->gfn, fault->max_level,
+						       fault->is_private);
 	if (fault->req_level == PG_LEVEL_4K || fault->huge_page_disallowed)
 		return;
 
@@ -3739,7 +3763,7 @@ static int mmu_first_shadow_root_alloc(struct kvm *kvm)
 	    kvm_page_track_write_tracking_enabled(kvm))
 		goto out_success;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < KVM_ADDRESS_SPACE_NUM; i++) {
+	for (i = 0; i < kvm_arch_nr_memslot_as_ids(kvm); i++) {
 		slots = __kvm_memslots(kvm, i);
 		kvm_for_each_memslot(slot, bkt, slots) {
 			/*
@@ -4259,6 +4283,55 @@ void kvm_arch_async_page_ready(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_async_pf *work)
 	kvm_mmu_do_page_fault(vcpu, work->cr2_or_gpa, 0, true, NULL);
 }
 
+static inline u8 kvm_max_level_for_order(int order)
+{
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL > PG_LEVEL_1G);
+
+	KVM_MMU_WARN_ON(order != KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(PG_LEVEL_1G) &&
+			order != KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(PG_LEVEL_2M) &&
+			order != KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(PG_LEVEL_4K));
+
+	if (order >= KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(PG_LEVEL_1G))
+		return PG_LEVEL_1G;
+
+	if (order >= KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(PG_LEVEL_2M))
+		return PG_LEVEL_2M;
+
+	return PG_LEVEL_4K;
+}
+
+static void kvm_mmu_prepare_memory_fault_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					      struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
+{
+	kvm_prepare_memory_fault_exit(vcpu, fault->gfn << PAGE_SHIFT,
+				      PAGE_SIZE, fault->write, fault->exec,
+				      fault->is_private);
+}
+
+static int kvm_faultin_pfn_private(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				   struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
+{
+	int max_order, r;
+
+	if (!kvm_slot_can_be_private(fault->slot)) {
+		kvm_mmu_prepare_memory_fault_exit(vcpu, fault);
+		return -EFAULT;
+	}
+
+	r = kvm_gmem_get_pfn(vcpu->kvm, fault->slot, fault->gfn, &fault->pfn,
+			     &max_order);
+	if (r) {
+		kvm_mmu_prepare_memory_fault_exit(vcpu, fault);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	fault->max_level = min(kvm_max_level_for_order(max_order),
+			       fault->max_level);
+	fault->map_writable = !(fault->slot->flags & KVM_MEM_READONLY);
+
+	return RET_PF_CONTINUE;
+}
+
 static int __kvm_faultin_pfn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
 {
 	struct kvm_memory_slot *slot = fault->slot;
@@ -4291,6 +4364,14 @@ static int __kvm_faultin_pfn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault
 			return RET_PF_EMULATE;
 	}
 
+	if (fault->is_private != kvm_mem_is_private(vcpu->kvm, fault->gfn)) {
+		kvm_mmu_prepare_memory_fault_exit(vcpu, fault);
+		return -EFAULT;
+	}
+
+	if (fault->is_private)
+		return kvm_faultin_pfn_private(vcpu, fault);
+
 	async = false;
 	fault->pfn = __gfn_to_pfn_memslot(slot, fault->gfn, false, false, &async,
 					  fault->write, &fault->map_writable,
@@ -4366,7 +4447,7 @@ static bool is_page_fault_stale(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 		return true;
 
 	return fault->slot &&
-	       mmu_invalidate_retry_hva(vcpu->kvm, fault->mmu_seq, fault->hva);
+	       mmu_invalidate_retry_gfn(vcpu->kvm, fault->mmu_seq, fault->gfn);
 }
 
 static int direct_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
@@ -6228,7 +6309,7 @@ static bool kvm_rmap_zap_gfn_range(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn_start, gfn_t gfn_e
 	if (!kvm_memslots_have_rmaps(kvm))
 		return flush;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < KVM_ADDRESS_SPACE_NUM; i++) {
+	for (i = 0; i < kvm_arch_nr_memslot_as_ids(kvm); i++) {
 		slots = __kvm_memslots(kvm, i);
 
 		kvm_for_each_memslot_in_gfn_range(&iter, slots, gfn_start, gfn_end) {
@@ -6260,7 +6341,9 @@ void kvm_zap_gfn_range(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn_start, gfn_t gfn_end)
 
 	write_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
 
-	kvm_mmu_invalidate_begin(kvm, 0, -1ul);
+	kvm_mmu_invalidate_begin(kvm);
+
+	kvm_mmu_invalidate_range_add(kvm, gfn_start, gfn_end);
 
 	flush = kvm_rmap_zap_gfn_range(kvm, gfn_start, gfn_end);
 
@@ -6270,7 +6353,7 @@ void kvm_zap_gfn_range(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn_start, gfn_t gfn_end)
 	if (flush)
 		kvm_flush_remote_tlbs_range(kvm, gfn_start, gfn_end - gfn_start);
 
-	kvm_mmu_invalidate_end(kvm, 0, -1ul);
+	kvm_mmu_invalidate_end(kvm);
 
 	write_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
 }
@@ -6723,7 +6806,7 @@ void kvm_mmu_invalidate_mmio_sptes(struct kvm *kvm, u64 gen)
 	 * modifier prior to checking for a wrap of the MMIO generation so
 	 * that a wrap in any address space is detected.
 	 */
-	gen &= ~((u64)KVM_ADDRESS_SPACE_NUM - 1);
+	gen &= ~((u64)kvm_arch_nr_memslot_as_ids(kvm) - 1);
 
 	/*
 	 * The very rare case: if the MMIO generation number has wrapped,
@@ -7176,3 +7259,163 @@ void kvm_mmu_pre_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
 	if (kvm->arch.nx_huge_page_recovery_thread)
 		kthread_stop(kvm->arch.nx_huge_page_recovery_thread);
 }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES
+bool kvm_arch_pre_set_memory_attributes(struct kvm *kvm,
+					struct kvm_gfn_range *range)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Zap SPTEs even if the slot can't be mapped PRIVATE.  KVM x86 only
+	 * supports KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PRIVATE, and so it *seems* like KVM
+	 * can simply ignore such slots.  But if userspace is making memory
+	 * PRIVATE, then KVM must prevent the guest from accessing the memory
+	 * as shared.  And if userspace is making memory SHARED and this point
+	 * is reached, then at least one page within the range was previously
+	 * PRIVATE, i.e. the slot's possible hugepage ranges are changing.
+	 * Zapping SPTEs in this case ensures KVM will reassess whether or not
+	 * a hugepage can be used for affected ranges.
+	 */
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!kvm_arch_has_private_mem(kvm)))
+		return false;
+
+	return kvm_unmap_gfn_range(kvm, range);
+}
+
+static bool hugepage_test_mixed(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn,
+				int level)
+{
+	return lpage_info_slot(gfn, slot, level)->disallow_lpage & KVM_LPAGE_MIXED_FLAG;
+}
+
+static void hugepage_clear_mixed(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn,
+				 int level)
+{
+	lpage_info_slot(gfn, slot, level)->disallow_lpage &= ~KVM_LPAGE_MIXED_FLAG;
+}
+
+static void hugepage_set_mixed(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn,
+			       int level)
+{
+	lpage_info_slot(gfn, slot, level)->disallow_lpage |= KVM_LPAGE_MIXED_FLAG;
+}
+
+static bool hugepage_has_attrs(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
+			       gfn_t gfn, int level, unsigned long attrs)
+{
+	const unsigned long start = gfn;
+	const unsigned long end = start + KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level);
+
+	if (level == PG_LEVEL_2M)
+		return kvm_range_has_memory_attributes(kvm, start, end, attrs);
+
+	for (gfn = start; gfn < end; gfn += KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level - 1)) {
+		if (hugepage_test_mixed(slot, gfn, level - 1) ||
+		    attrs != kvm_get_memory_attributes(kvm, gfn))
+			return false;
+	}
+	return true;
+}
+
+bool kvm_arch_post_set_memory_attributes(struct kvm *kvm,
+					 struct kvm_gfn_range *range)
+{
+	unsigned long attrs = range->arg.attributes;
+	struct kvm_memory_slot *slot = range->slot;
+	int level;
+
+	lockdep_assert_held_write(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+	lockdep_assert_held(&kvm->slots_lock);
+
+	/*
+	 * Calculate which ranges can be mapped with hugepages even if the slot
+	 * can't map memory PRIVATE.  KVM mustn't create a SHARED hugepage over
+	 * a range that has PRIVATE GFNs, and conversely converting a range to
+	 * SHARED may now allow hugepages.
+	 */
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!kvm_arch_has_private_mem(kvm)))
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * The sequence matters here: upper levels consume the result of lower
+	 * level's scanning.
+	 */
+	for (level = PG_LEVEL_2M; level <= KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL; level++) {
+		gfn_t nr_pages = KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level);
+		gfn_t gfn = gfn_round_for_level(range->start, level);
+
+		/* Process the head page if it straddles the range. */
+		if (gfn != range->start || gfn + nr_pages > range->end) {
+			/*
+			 * Skip mixed tracking if the aligned gfn isn't covered
+			 * by the memslot, KVM can't use a hugepage due to the
+			 * misaligned address regardless of memory attributes.
+			 */
+			if (gfn >= slot->base_gfn) {
+				if (hugepage_has_attrs(kvm, slot, gfn, level, attrs))
+					hugepage_clear_mixed(slot, gfn, level);
+				else
+					hugepage_set_mixed(slot, gfn, level);
+			}
+			gfn += nr_pages;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Pages entirely covered by the range are guaranteed to have
+		 * only the attributes which were just set.
+		 */
+		for ( ; gfn + nr_pages <= range->end; gfn += nr_pages)
+			hugepage_clear_mixed(slot, gfn, level);
+
+		/*
+		 * Process the last tail page if it straddles the range and is
+		 * contained by the memslot.  Like the head page, KVM can't
+		 * create a hugepage if the slot size is misaligned.
+		 */
+		if (gfn < range->end &&
+		    (gfn + nr_pages) <= (slot->base_gfn + slot->npages)) {
+			if (hugepage_has_attrs(kvm, slot, gfn, level, attrs))
+				hugepage_clear_mixed(slot, gfn, level);
+			else
+				hugepage_set_mixed(slot, gfn, level);
+		}
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
+void kvm_mmu_init_memslot_memory_attributes(struct kvm *kvm,
+					    struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
+{
+	int level;
+
+	if (!kvm_arch_has_private_mem(kvm))
+		return;
+
+	for (level = PG_LEVEL_2M; level <= KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL; level++) {
+		/*
+		 * Don't bother tracking mixed attributes for pages that can't
+		 * be huge due to alignment, i.e. process only pages that are
+		 * entirely contained by the memslot.
+		 */
+		gfn_t end = gfn_round_for_level(slot->base_gfn + slot->npages, level);
+		gfn_t start = gfn_round_for_level(slot->base_gfn, level);
+		gfn_t nr_pages = KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level);
+		gfn_t gfn;
+
+		if (start < slot->base_gfn)
+			start += nr_pages;
+
+		/*
+		 * Unlike setting attributes, every potential hugepage needs to
+		 * be manually checked as the attributes may already be mixed.
+		 */
+		for (gfn = start; gfn < end; gfn += nr_pages) {
+			unsigned long attrs = kvm_get_memory_attributes(kvm, gfn);
+
+			if (hugepage_has_attrs(kvm, slot, gfn, level, attrs))
+				hugepage_clear_mixed(slot, gfn, level);
+			else
+				hugepage_set_mixed(slot, gfn, level);
+		}
+	}
+}
+#endif