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authorJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>2022-06-14 23:16:13 +0200
committerBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>2022-06-27 10:34:00 +0200
commitfc02735b14fff8c6678b521d324ade27b1a3d4cf (patch)
tree9be32b1a805858cab02c043a740b2bab8f45a15c /arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
parentbb06650634d3552c0f8557e9d16aa1a408040e28 (diff)
KVM: VMX: Prevent guest RSB poisoning attacks with eIBRS
On eIBRS systems, the returns in the vmexit return path from __vmx_vcpu_run() to vmx_vcpu_run() are exposed to RSB poisoning attacks. Fix that by moving the post-vmexit spec_ctrl handling to immediately after the vmexit. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h1
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
index 1b1982448aa4..da654af12ccb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
@@ -405,6 +405,7 @@ void vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
struct vmx_uret_msr *vmx_find_uret_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr);
void pt_update_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void vmx_update_host_rsp(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long host_rsp);
+void vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned int flags);
unsigned int __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx);
bool __vmx_vcpu_run(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long *regs,
unsigned int flags);